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[center]Logic and Reasonable Argument[/center]

There is a lot of debate over one issue or the other on these boards. And that's a good thing. One learns from argument. Unfortunately, much of the argument in these forums is of lower quality. Much of it is illogical of nature. The purpose of this thread is to explain some the basics of logical reasoning as I understand them in the hope to improve the overall quality of debate on these boards. I have no special training in philosophy per se save for a minor I took at a university in undergraduate studies when I got out of the Army, so feel free to pitch in with criticism and so forth. This is meant to be a group discussion, not a lecture.

What Is Logic?

One simple definition of logic is given by Webster's Third: the science of correct reasoning. There are many other definitions, but at bottom logic is an intellectual tool which allows a person to analyze an argument, or a string of reasoned points, and work out whether the conclusion is likely to be correct or not. One doesn't need to know a lot about logic to argue, but even a little bit of knowledge in this area will allow you to more readily spot invalid arguments as and when these arise.

What Logic Is Not

In the first place, logic is not some absolute law which governs the known universe. There are countless instances from the past where notable, reasoning men have concluded that because some things were considered to be logically impossible (according to science of the day) then they must be impossible in a practical sense as well. An example of this kind of mistaken assumption would be man's assessment that as only birds had wings, then only birds could fly. Once it was believed that the earth was flat, therefore it was illogical to assume one might "sail around it," though it was perfectly logical to assume that if one sailed too close to the earth's "edge" then one would certainly "fall off." At one time is was held that Euclidean geometry was, in fact, a universal law; now man knows that the rules of Euclidean geometry are not universal. And so it has gone over time. As man's knowledge has increased, so have our logical wayposts changed and shifted to allow us to better rationalize our proper function in relation to, and our actual position within, the universe.

Also, logic should not be construed as some set of ironclad rules which govern human behavior. Humans often entertain logically-conflicting goals and aspirations. For example: Peter needs to speak to whomever is in charge: the person in charge is Paul: therefore Peter needs to speak to Steve. That would be a logical statement, yet it might not be applicable to Peter in the real world. Peter might have a terrible aversion to speaking with Paul which would render such any such conversation a likely disaster. And so, while logic is a powerful tool, it is not the only tool. And while this thread will try to explain how to use logic beneficially, people must decide for themselves whether or not logic is the right tool for their particular job. There are other ways to communicate, discuss and debate.

[center]Fallacies and Fallacious Reasoning[/center]

"Fallacy" and "fallacious" must be two of the most misused words in the English language. Describing something as a fallacy, or stating that a statement is fallacious, is usually interpreted to mean that the statement in question is wrong. But this is not necessarily so.

A fallacy is, generally speaking, an error in reasoning. This differs from a factual error, which is simply being wrong about facts. It's possible, though not likely, for a statement to be fallacious yet still be accurate. In short, an argument could reach the right conclusion through means of a flawed reasoning process.

In short, a fallacy is an "argument" in which the premises given for the conclusion do not provide the needed degree of support for that conclusion. Much of advertising is fallacious of nature. Trying to spot the fallacious reasoning in ads is a fun way to learn to recognize the various types of fallacies.

"Obviously"

As for the use of the word "obviously" in arguments (overemployment of this word is found everywhere), what might be claimed as "obvious" by one person frequently is nothing of the kind to another. Examples of this misuse that occur frequently would include, "Obviously, restricting gun ownership will reduce shooting deaths," "Obviously, we all agree that too many innocent people get executed," and so forth. In cases of these kinds "obviously" is used as a kind of debate club to bully the other party into agreeing with the proposition by means of implication that if they cannot somehow comprehend this "obvious" thing then it must be for the reason they are simply too stupid to understand an otherwise simple relationship or concept. So, as the intent goes, they will agree with the alleged "obvious" thing rather than to look the fool. The catch is that the "obvious" relationships claimed may not be correct in fact or in any logical sense, and may be much less direct than they seem. Indeed, these relationships might be incorrect and without logical ties. On the other hand, an "obvious" relationship may be such a thing to a person who is intimately familiar with a given subject area, but might not be as "obvious" to somebody outside that area.

An example of two "obvious" statements that seem to be contradictory.

"Obviously, it's easy to hit a target coming in on a known trajectory from a known location to a known target at a known time and known speed."

"Obviously, it's extremely hard to hit a bullet with a bullet."

Both statements are "obviously" correct, yet a listener should challenge both and ask for the "obvious" to be explained. Why is it so easy in one case and so difficult in the other? And why are these statements contradictory? Well, ask yourself, "What's missing?"

The answer might be that in the first case someone refers to a guided weapons system, whereas in the second case the reference is to an unguided weapons system.

Anyway, let's look at some common fallacies.

[center]The Ad Hominem Fallacies[/center]

We'll start off with ad hominem fallacies since these are not just numerous and often employed, but can be offensive of nature and so immediately and extremely detrimental to civil discourse.

The ad hominem fallacies are not only commonly employed but also commonly misunderstood. Many people falsely assume that any personal attack or extreme criticism is ad hominem in nature, but this is not true. Some attacks aren't ad hominem fallacies, and some ad hominem fallacies do not necessarily result in obvious insults. In general, there are five separate cases of the ad hominem plea: the Abusive ad hominem, the tu quoque, the Circumstantial ad hominem, the Genetic Fallacy, and Smear Tactics.

Ad hominem is a general category of fallacy in which a claim or argument is rejected on the basis of some irrelevant fact, or implied fact, about the author of an argument or a claim. This kind of fallacy often involves two basic building blocks of bad argument: the first building block presents itself in the form of an attack against the character of the person making his argument or some claim, or perhaps the attack will be against the individual's circumstances, or it could even be launched against his actions; the second building block is presented as "evidence" against the argument or claim in question.

Ad hominem arguments or pleas of any kind are fallacious for the reason that a person's character, or a person's circumstances, or even his actions, do not necessarily bear on the truth or falsity of his argument or claim.

Abusive ad hominem

In formal case the abusive ad hominem plea might play out thusly: person A makes argument X: then person B attacks person A: with person A now discredited to whatever extent, his argument is hoped to be judged false.

Let's make up a conversational example of a typical Abusive ad hominem plea at work.

Suppose Tom says, "I believe the death penalty is morally wrong for this reason, that reason and the other reason." Larry responds, "You only say that because you're a priest!" Tom might then respond, "But what about the reasons I gave in support of my position?" Larry: "Those don't count. As I've already pointed out, you're nothing but a crazy Catholic, plus everyone knows priests abuse children, so nobody could believe anything they said!"

Current simplistic attacks on President Bush from various mainstream media outlets serve as excellent examples of ad hominem pleas to the masses. It's an old technique of "discredit the man" in order to discredit the man's ideas and work. A simple form of this is all too often encountered along the lines of, "President Bush is not articulate in his speech, on top of that he wears cowboy boots, and therefore nothing he says could have credence. And that is why our troops should not be in Iraq."

Again, suppose an author wrote a book which served to dispel the notion that Houdini was able to converse with spirits. A typical attack would be, "Of course you'd say that, but you're a dirty atheist so who could believe you? " And so on.

Tu Quoque

A special form of ad hominem plea, tu quoque (from the Latin, "you, also" or "you're another") is a fallacious argument which concludes that a person's claim is false because 1) it is inconsistent with something else a person has said or 2) what a person says is inconsistent with his actions.

Now the fact that a person makes inconsistent claims does not make any particular claim he makes false (although of any pair of inconsistent claims, only one can possibly be true, though both could be false). The fact that a person's claims are not consistent with his actions might indicate that the person is a hypocrite, say, but this does not prove his claims to necessarily be false.

For example, when accused of rigging the polls in Florida during the 2000 national election, some Democrats responded, "Well, the Republicans have rigged elections as well." This would be a perfect example of the ad hominem tu quoque argument.

In this case of ad hominem plea, instead of attacking the original person who makes an argument on grounds unrelated to the argument itself, the attacker aims to discredit the argument for some perceived fault of the person instead.

In the classic "fight fire with fire" rationalization a man might claim, "I'm justified in attacking you because you attacked me earlier!" Or, "How can you insist it's wrong to drink and drive when you yourself have been cited for DUI?" The justification here is that an action is somehow proper because someone else has already behaved likewise. But the fallacy is that just for the reason that person A is hypocritical in some sense does not constitute evidence that person A's argument or claim is without merit.

It's a small step from "if you did something then so can I" to supposing "you would do something if you had the chance." In this manner we find arguments constructed such as: "Those people are utterly ruthless in their business practices, so we should screw them first if we get the chance." This is bad reasoning as it doesn't matter (logically speaking) what someone else might do if capable. That realization in and of itself constitutes no good argument that the action in question is right, correct or even moral.

More subtly, this plea might be presented in the form: "You argue that it is wrong to take a man's life, yet you work in as a guard in a prison in a state with capital punishment, and you have personally pulled the switch, therefore why should I accept a belief which you obviously don't believe in very strongly yourself?"

The reasoning here is that if person A acts in some manner which seems to contradict his claim, or seems to suggest that person A does not actually strongly believe in the underlying tenets of his position, then that claim or position must be false. But just because someone acts inconsistently in his own life does not constitute evidence that a claim he makes is false, or that a position he maintains has no intrinsic merit.

That doesn't mean we cannot point out glaring inconsistencies when these are presented in arguments. These inconsistencies might indicate that a person does not believe what he espouses, in which case it would be legitimate to ask why then should anyone else believe in this thing? It might also be the case that a person simply misunderstands his own argument, in which case it could turn out that no effective defense for the argument can be found.

Circumstantial ad hominem

In this case an effort is made to dismiss an argument through means of an attack on a person or an entire class of people who believe something to be true. In formal presentation this argument runs: it is not surprising to discover that person/people A believes/believe X is a good thing: the reason for this belief is found in the circumstances of person/people A.

Conversationally this argument might well run in today's mainstream press: "President Bush and his family have long been known to possess ties to oil interests, therefore his call for more off-shore exploration and drilling to offset America's oil dependence on Saudi Arabia must be selfishly motivated and thus bad for this country."

In this example the pros and cons of the issue of "off-shore exploration and drilling" are not directly addressed, only the suggestion that the man who has suggested this action probably has selfish motives.

Again: "The Green Bay Packers couldn't possibly be as bad as their 3-12 record indicates. They are taking games this season in order to get the #1 draft choice and have the rights to Reggie Bush." The suggestion is that because of Green Bay's supposed motive to move up in the NFL draft the team is not trying to win, whereas in fact no sound argument has been made to support this argument, only that the "circumstances" surrounding the team's poor performances seem suspicious.

Finally: "Why should we believe anything President Bush says? He lied to us about weapons of mass destruction, so how could we believe him or anyone else in the war or state departments when claims are made that the war in Iraq is going better than planned?"

This is a sort of combination of abusive and circumstantial ad hominem, with a strong dose of innuendo thrown in for good measure

The argument first calls the president a liar (who would believe a liar, after all?) when in fact no evidence has been presented that he is in fact a liar (perhaps he was merely mistaken or confused or lied to himself--a significant difference), then by association everyone in the war and state departments are lumped together with the president as being somehow untrustworthy, too, with the overall implication being that anything any of them says with regard to the war in Iraq going well must be false, ergo the war in Iraq is not going well but is, in fact, a failure.

Nothing could be more illogical than to make that kind of argument, yet we find it all the time, and not just in casual debates on forums runs by recreational software companies like Matrix, but in professionally-written articles in magazines, major daily newspapers and in mainstream news broadcasts.

The Genetic Fallacy

This fallacious variation of ad hominem doesn't attack the person but rather wants to erode the base, root or origin of an argument. The "logic" in this instance assumes that because an idea comes from a bad place then that idea must itself be bad.

To wit: "The World Health Organization has in the past been closely associated with Fidel Castro and Cuba. Castro is a known tyrant, and Cuba is not a nation of free people. Therefore no one who has respect for human rights should have anything to do with WHO or respect its work it."

Here it is concluded illogically that the WHO is a dubious organization based on its association with the leader of a brutalized nation. The link here is "genetic" because it's based on the false assumption that just because the source of some of WHO's assistance derives from an unhealthy place, then the organization itself and the work it does must be correspondingly unhealthy.

Smear Tactics

This is the "preemptive strike" of ad hominem pleas. Smear tactics aim to discredit a person before he has a chance to make an argument through the presentation of unfavorable information (true or false, it makes no difference) about him. The argument usually runs like this: person A is a bad apple: therefore anything he say today, tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow ought to be dismissed out of hand.

This form of argument, also known as "poisoning the well," the etymology of which dates back to medieval Europe where Christians widely held that Jews had brought plague to the land by poisoning the wells with it (ironically, this same "logical" principle can be traced back to Rome, where Christians themselves were blamed for all sorts of bad things, and duly persecuted because of this), can be both abusive and circumstantial in nature.

For instance:

"He's a fool!"

is an abusive form, whereas,

"He says that's good because he hawks it for his living."

would be a kind of circumstantial plea at work.

As with all other forms of ad hominem pleas, a person who debates under such circumstances is likely to find himself under personal assault, or at the least debating something other than the original idea tendered for examination.

In fact, smear tactics are not actually arguments at all, but rather unhandsome window dressing which sets the stage for the audience to fall into some other fallacious trap. To avoid this and similar pitfalls, always keep in mind that arguments must either stand or fall on their own merits.

There are many other kinds of fallacies. Almost without number. Let's examine some of these.

The Fallacy of Composition

This fallacy comes in two forms which are similar. This reasoning argues wrongly from a premise where a term is employed distributively to a conclusion in which it is used collectively. It is falsely assumed that what is true of a whole must also be true of all the whole's parts.

The first fallacy-of-composition type arises when a person reasons from the characteristics of individual members of a class or group to a conclusion regarding the characteristics of the entire class or group (taken as a whole). Formally, this argument runs: individual X things have the characteristics of A, B, C: therefore, the entire class of X has the characteristics of A, B, C.

This line of reasoning is clearly bad. The mere fact that an individual might have certain characteristics does not guarantee that everyone has those characteristics. However, drawing an inference about the characteristics of a class based on the characteristics of its individual members is not always fallacious. In a given case sufficient justification might be provided to warrant the conclusion, but this justification must be demonstrated, not assumed.

The second type of fallacy of composition is committed when it is concluded that what is true of the parts of a whole must be true of the whole itself without the justification for this conclusion demonstrated. Formally: parts of the whole X have characteristics A, B, C: therefore the whole X must have characteristics A, B, C.

It cannot be reasonably inferred that simply because parts of a complex whole have (or for that matter lack) certain properties, that the whole they are constituents of has (or lacks) those properties. In a mathematical sense this argument might run: the numbers 1 and 3 are both odd: 1 and 3 are parts of 4: therefore the number 4 is an odd number.

This reasoning, too, is not always fallacious. If there is justification for the inference from parts to the whole, then the reasoning is sound. Example: if all parts of a structure were composed of glass, no fallacy is committed to conclude the entire structure is composed of glass.

Examples of bad reasoning along this line would include, "As a horse eats more food than a human being, therefore horses as a group eat more food than do all the humans on the planet," and "As atoms are without color, and cats are made of atoms, cats are colorless, too."

Finally, "As every player on the team is a superstar, the team is a great team." This would be fallacious since it has not been demonstrated that these superstars are able to play together effectively. Hence, the team might be lousy even though all the players are talented. It would be like telling someone, "Look, you like pizza and beer, and ice cream and soda, therefore you're going to love this shake I made of pizza, beer, ice cream and soda."

Turn this "logic" around and we have the Fallacy of Division, where it is errantly reasoned that one might find truth in the collective sense and then apply that to the parts of the argument when used distributively. That is, that what is true for a whole must be true for the constituents of that whole. Example: "The number 4 is an even number. As 1 and 3 are both parts of 4, therefore 1 and 3 are even numbers."

Anyway, there is no end to man's ability to "reason" fallaciously. For example, we have both the fallacy of Denying the Antecedent and Affirming the Consequent. Examples of denying the antecedent can be found in the following constructs:

"If I go outside and run too hard I will have a heart attack and die. As I never go outside and run at all I'll never die of a heart attack."

or

"Sex, booze and women all shorten lives. Therefore I shall give up sex, booze and women, take up the cinema instead, and live forever."

In both cases, our thinker might well have then gotten into his car, headed for the cinema, and suffered a fatal heart attack in the front row. The problem with this kind of "reasoning" is that it fails to see that different actions might cause similar events.

As it is with denying the antecedent, affirming the consequent is a line of reasoning perfectly suited for those who proceed through life like Mr. Magoo, and is especially for those favorably disposed toward conditional arguments. A formal example would run: action A results in X result: result X is before me, therefore action A must have occurred.

In real life we might find, "The wife must have killed her husband for the insurance, as she had just taken out a large life insurance policy on him." Given the many alternative possibilities, that would represent a kind of "Lestradian" deduction.

In these kinds of if-then constructs, it is all right to affirm to antecedent (if) in order to prove the consequence (then), but the opposite does not hold true. So, if one were to say: "If a man falls out of the sky from 10,000 feet he will die; that man fell 10,000 feet out of the sky and so he died" would be an acceptable, common sort of argument, or modus ponens. It would not be acceptable to suggest, "If a man falls out of the sky from 10,000 feet he will die; this man is dead therefore he fell 10,000 feet out of the sky." Clearly, in the second case the man we find dead might have died of many causes other than falling out of the sky from a great height.

The Appeal to Authority

This is also known as "Fallacious Appeal to Authority," "Misuse of Authority," "Irrelevant Authority," "Questionable Authority," "Inappropriate Authority" and ad verecundiam. These forms are fallacious when the person in question is not, in fact, an expert in the given area under scrutiny, but merely an "expert" in some other guise. In such cases the argument is flawed because the fact that an unqualified person makes a claim does not provide any justification for the claim. The claim could be true, but the fact that an unqualified person made the claim does not provide any rational reason to accept the claim as true.

When a person falls prey to this fallacy, they accept a claim to be true absent adequate evidence. The person accepts the claim because he erroneously believes the person making the claim is a legitimate expert, hence by extension the claim is reasonable to accept. Since people have a tendency to believe authorities (and there are good reasons to accept some claims made by some authorities in some cases) this fallacy is very common. Since this argument is fallacious only when the authority figure referenced is not a legitimate authority in a particular context, it is necessary to provide acceptable standards of assessment. The following standards can be accepted:

•The authority figure has sufficient expertise in the subject matter in question

•The claim made by the authority is within his area(s) of expertise

•There is adequate degree of agreement among other experts in the field with regard to the subject in question

•The authority in question is not significantly biased

•The area of expertise is a legitimate area or discipline of accredited study

•The authority in question must be identified

(This last standard is often abused and almost constitutes a fallacious subargument known as The Appeal to an Unnamed Authority. Typically, the person making this kind of argument will say things like "I have a book that says...", or "they say...", or "the experts say...", or "scientists believe that...", or "I read in the paper..." or "I saw on TV..." or some similar statement. In such cases the speaker hopes the listener(s) will simply accept the unidentified source as a legitimate authority and believe the claim made. If an audience accepts this claim simply because it accepts the unidentified source as an expert--without good reason to do so--it has fallen prey to this fallacy.)

Not all appeals to authority are fallacious; people often have to rely on experts because no one person can be an expert on everything, and people do not have the time or ability to investigate every single claim themselves. To distinguish a valid argument from a fallacious appeal to authority, the argument must meet the six standards noted above. However, even a valid appeal to authority is not an exceptionally strong argument. After all, in such cases a claim is accepted as true simply because a person asserts it is true. The authority in question may be an expert, but it could be his expertise does not bear specifically on the truth of that particular claim (the expertise of an authority does not actually determine whether the claim is true or false--that hinges case by case). Hence, arguments that deal directly with evidence relating to the claim itself will be stronger, with perhaps the (valid) appeal to authority used as an addendum and brace for that.

The Appeal to Belief

An appeal to belief is fallacious because the fact that many people believe a claim does not, in general, serve as evidence that the claim is true. There are, however, some cases when the fact that many people accept a claim as true is an indication that it is true. For example, while you are visiting Maine, you are told by several people that they believe people older than 16 need to buy a fishing license in order to fish. Barring reasons to doubt these people, their statements give you cause to believe that anyone over 16 will need to buy a fishing license.

There are also cases in which what people believe actually determines the truth of a claim. For example, the truth of claims about manners and proper behavior might simply depend on what people believe to be good manners and proper behavior. Another example is the case of community standards, which are often taken to be the standards that most people accept. In some cases, what violates certain community standards is taken to be obscene. In such cases, for the claim "x is obscene" to be true then most people in that community would need to believe that x is obscene. In such cases it is still prudent to question the justification of the individual beliefs.

The Appeal to Common Practice

This is a fallacy because the mere fact that most people do something does not make it correct, moral, justified, or reasonable.

However, an appeal to fair play, which might seem to be an appeal to common practice, need not be a fallacy. For example, a woman working in an office might say, "The men who do the same job as I do get paid more than I get paid, therefore it would be fair for me to get paid the same as them." This would not be a fallacy as long as there was no relevant difference between her and the men (in terms of ability, experience, hours worked, etc.).

This kind of argument rests heavily on the principle of relevant difference. According to this principle, two people, Smith and Jones, can only be treated differently if and only if there is a relevant difference between them. For example, it would be fine for me to give a higher salary to Smith than Jones if Smith did better work than Jones. However, it would be wrong of me to give Smith more money than Jones simply because Smith has red hair and Jones has brown hair.

There might be some cases in which the fact that most people accept X as moral entails that X is moral. For example, one view of morality is that morality is relative to the practices of a culture, time, person, etc. If what is moral is determined by what is commonly practiced, then this argument would not be a fallacy.

This might, however, lead to odd results. For example, imagine that there are 100 people who live in a community, 60 of which do not cheat and steal, while 40 do. At this time, cheating and stealing would be wrong. The next day, a natural disaster kills 30 of the 60 people who did not cheat or steal. Now it is morally correct to cheat and steal. Thus, it would be possible to change the moral order of any communal context to one's view simply by eliminating those who disagree.

The Appeal to Consequences of a Belief

This line of "reasoning" is fallacious because the consequences of a belief have no bearing on whether the belief is true or false. For example, if someone were to say, "If pink elephants didn't exist then I would be miserable, so they must exist as I am happy with my lot," this would not be a valid line of reasoning. It is important to note here that the consequence in question stems directly from this man's belief that he could not possibly be happy unless these pleasing elephants existed, a kind of preposterous test.

We must learn to distinguish between a rational reason to believe (RRB, which is supported by evidence) and a prudential reason to believe (PRB, a reason spurned by motivation). An RRB connotes evidence that objectively and logically supports the position, whereas a PRB comes saddled with a dubious belief due to some external factor (fear, a threat, a benefit or harm that may stem from belief, hope, a wish) that is relevant to what a person values but is not relevant to the truth or falsity of the position.

The nature of this fallacy seems especially clear in the case of Wishful Thinking, which is also referred to as "positive thinking," "optimism," "visualization," and just plain "faith." In this argument the premise defines a desire for something to be true. The problem with this line of "reasoning," as attractive as it must seem to many people, is that merely wishing something to be true does not make it true. Just because one wishes that the mortgage were paid does not actually make that mortgage paid. And if you don't believe me, just ask the mortgage holder!

This is, perhaps, the most difficult of all fallacies to overcome, as we all have an inbuilt tendency to see the world the way we want to see it, through rose-colored glasses as it were, rather than the way it actually appears. We all at times wish only to hear what we wish to hear, see only what we wish to see, read meaning where no meaning exists, and pretty much just pleasantly daydream a new existence. But as therapeutic as that may or may not be psychologically speaking, it is not a good method to practice in debate, where it will inevitably lead to one unsound conclusion after the next.

One might term a conclusion reached through this crippled means as a kind of perceived reality, where cognitive bias leads one into an altered mental state where yes might be no, in might be out, black might be white, and so on and so forth. This is quite "normal" in a manner of speaking and as far as that goes. We are all susceptible to this Walter Mitty phenomenon to one extent or another, and as long as one doesn't travel too far down that road in his regular life he should be okay. But we are asked to buck it up in debate, and ruthlessly beat down this tendency to dream when it rears its ugly head. Should we hope to thoughtfully investigate life and derive valid conclusions from the world around us, there is no other possibility.

The Appeal to Emotion

This fallacy is committed when someone manipulates emotions in order to get the audience to accept a claim as being true. This sort of "reasoning" is extremely common in politics, and it serves as the basis for a large portion of modern advertising. It is fallacious because using tactics to incite emotions in people does not serve as evidence for a claim.

For example, if a person were able to instill in another person an incredible hatred of the claim that 1+1 = 2, then further inspire in that other person a love for the claim that 1+1 = 3, it would hardly follow that the claim that 1+1 = 3, even though the second person fervently believed this to be so.

It should be noted that in many cases it is not obvious that the person committing the fallacy is attempting to support a claim, thus this method assumes an insidious nature and is an extremely effective persuasive device. For example, "Ban guns, they're dangerous to children" might be an extremely effective argument at face value, though upon closer examination it might fail.

A strong argument can be made that emotions carry much more force (or more to the point are easier to manipulate) than a more intellectual approach with many people. Logical argumentation is often difficult and time consuming, and it often lacks the power and sense of urgency to spur people to action. It is the real-world power of emotional appeals that explains their popularity and wide usage. However effective this technique may be, though, it is still fallacious.

It should be noted that the use of tactics to inspire emotions is an important skill to possess. Without an appeal to peoples' emotions it is often difficult, as suggested above, to get them to take action or to perform at their best in critical situations; however, it mustr be stated again that this is not an acceptable form of formal argumentation. In a pinch, use it if you must. In a debate, leave it at home.

In any event, as long as one is able to distinguish between what excites one's emotions and what constitutes a valid claim, one is unlikely to fall prey to this fallacy. But be on your guard always. This method is in use everywhere.

The Appeal to Fear

This line of "reasoning" is fallacious because creating fear in people does not constitute evidence for a claim. It is important to distinguish between a rational reason to believe (RRB, or "evidence") and a prudential reason to believe (PRB, or "motivation"). A RRB is evidence that objectively and logically supports the claim. A PRB is a reason to accept the belief because of some external factor (such as fear, a threat, or a benefit or harm that may stem from the belief) that is relevant to what a person values but is not relevant to the truth or falsity of the claim.

For example, it might be prudent to not fail the son of your department chairman because you fear he will make life tough for you. However, this does not provide evidence for the claim that the son deserves to pass the class. A classic appeal to fear fallacy would be: "You must believe that God exists. After all, if you do not accept the existence of God, then you will face the horrors of hell."

The Appeal to Flattery

The basic idea behind this fallacy is that flattery is presented in the place of evidence for accepting a claim. This is fairly easy to spot: "My, Bill, that is a really nice tie. By the way, it is quite clear that one plus one equals three."

The Appeal to Novelty

Appeal to novelty is a fallacy that occurs when it is assumed that something is better or correct simply because it is new. This sort of "reasoning" is fallacious because the novelty or newness of something does not automatically make it correct or better than something older. This is made quite obvious by the following example: Joe has proposed that 1+1 should now be equal to 3. When asked why people should accept this, he says that he just came up with the idea. Since it is newer than the idea that 1+1=2, it must be better.

This sort of "reasoning" is appealing for many reasons. First, "western culture" includes a very powerful commitment to the notion that new things must be better than old things. Second, the notion of progress (which seems to have come, in part, from the notion of evolution) implies that newer things will be superior to older things. Third, media advertising often sends the message that newer must be better. Because of these three factors (and others) people often accept that a new thing (idea, product, concept, etc.) must be better because it is new. Hence, Novelty is a common fallacy, found especially in advertising.

The Appeal to Pity

An appeal to pity is a fallacy in which a person substitutes a claim intended to create pity for evidence in an argument. This line of "reasoning" is fallacious because pity does not serve as evidence for a claim.

For example: "You must accept that 1+1=3. After all, I lie here dying before you." While you may pity me because I am dying, it would hardly make my claim true.

(This fallacy differs from the "Appeal to the Consequences of a Belief." In this fallacy, a person uses the effects of a belief as a substitute for evidence. There are various forms of this "reasoning." For instance, "A must be so, because if we did not accept A then negative consequences would be the result," or " X must be so because by accepting that truth brings positive consequences." And finally, we find this in the form of "wishful thinking," where "I wish that X were true, therefore X is true.")

In the Appeal to Pity, it is the feelings of pity or sympathy that are substituted for evidence. It must be noted that there are cases in which claims that actually serve as evidence also evoke a feeling of pity. For example, getting run over by a truck would be a legitimate excuse for missing a deadline and might evoke pity for the person run over. Still, in such case the feeling of pity is not evidence.

The Appeal to Popularity

The idea here is that a claim should be accepted as being true simply because most or many people are so favorably inclined. The fact that most or many people have favorable opinions of the claim is substituted in place of actual evidence for the claim. A person falls prey to this fallacy if he accepts a claim as being true simply because many or most other people approve of the claim. It is fallacious to accept the approval of the majority as evidence for any claim.

For example, suppose a skilled speaker managed to get many people to absolutely love the claim that 1+1=3. It would still not be rational to accept this claim simply because many people approved. Wide approval of one's peers in such a case is no substitute for an absolute (mathematical) proof.

At one time people approved of claims such as "the world is flat," "humans cannot survive at speeds greater than 25 miles per hour," "the sun revolves around the earth," but all these claims turned out to be false.

This sort of "reasoning" is quite common and can be a persuasive device. Since many (if not most) people tend to conform with the views of the majority, convincing a person that the majority approves of a claim is often an effective way to get him to accept that claim as truth. Advertisers often use this tactic when they attempt to sell products by claiming that many other people use and love the given products. In such cases the advertisers hope that people will accept the (purported) approval of "many others" as a good "reason" to buy the product themselves.

The Appeal to Ridicule

This is a fallacy in which ridicule or mockery is substituted for evidence in an argument. This sort of "reasoning" is fallacious because mocking a claim does not demonstrate its falsehood.

A simple example would be: "One plus one equals two?! That's the most ridiculous thing I have ever heard!"

It should be noted that demonstrating a claim to be ridiculous through the use of legitimate methods (such as a non-fallacious argument) can make it reasonable to reject the claim. One form of this line of reasoning is known as reductio ad absurdum (reducing to absurdity). In this sort of argument, the idea is to show that a contradiction (a statement that must be false) or an absurd result follows from a claim. One establishes a contention by deriving an absurdity from its denial, thus arguing that a thesis must be accepted because its rejection would be untenable. It is a sound and ancient style of reasoning that has been employed throughout the history of philosophy and mathematics.

For example: "Bill claims that a member of a minority group cannot be a racist. However, this is absurd. Think about this: white males are a minority in the world. Given Bill's claim, it would follow that no white males could be racists. Hence, the Klan, Nazis, and white supremacists are not racist organizations." Since the claim that the Klan, Nazis, and white supremacists are not racist organizations is clearly absurd, it can be concluded that the claim that a member of a minority cannot be a racist is false.

The Spiteful Fallacy

A fallacy in which spite is substituted for evidence when an argument is made against a claim. This sort of "reasoning" is fallacious because a feeling of spite does not count as evidence for or against a claim.

Example: "Bill claims that the earth revolves around the sun. But remember that dirty trick Bill pulled on you last week? Now, doesn't my claim that the sun revolves around the earth make more sense to you?"

Of course, there are cases in which a claim that also evokes feelings of spite or malice can serve as legitimate evidence. However, the feelings of malice or spite are not evidence. So, the statement "Since a city treasurer should be honest, a known thief would be a bad choice for that position" rings true enough, and no doubt will raise bad feelings against known thieves residing in city government, but those bad feelings in and of themselves do not constitute evidence that they would make for bad treasurers.

The Appeal to Tradition

This fallacy occurs when it is assumed that something is better or more correct simply because it is older, more traditional, "has always been done that way." This sort of "reasoning" is fallacious because the age of something does not automatically make it correct or better than something newer.

For example: "The theory that witches and demons cause disease is far older than the theory that microorganisms cause diseases. Therefore, the theory about witches and demons must be true."

This sort of argument can be appealing for any number of reasons. People often prefer to stick with what is older or traditional--this is a fairly common psychological characteristic of people which may stem from the fact that people feel more comfortable about what has been around longer, or simply tend to resist change in general. Also, sticking with things that are older or traditional is easier than to test new things. Hence, people often prefer older and traditional things out of laziness.

Age might well have pertinence in some contexts. If a person concluded that aged wine might well taste better than brand-new wine, he would not be committing an appeal to tradition. This is because in this case we know that the age of a particular wine often proves to be relevant to its quality. Thus, the fallacy is committed only when the age is not in and of itself relevant to the claim.

One final case that should be considered is the Test of Time. People might assume that because something has lasted as a tradition over the years (has been around a long time) that this could only be so because it has "passed the test of time." If a person assumes that something must be correct or true simply because it has persisted a long time, then he has fallen prey to an "Appeal to Tradition." After all, history shows people can indeed persist in accepting false claims for centuries. However, if a person argued that the claim or thing in question had successfully stood up to valid tests for a long period of time, then he would not be committing a fallacy. In such cases the claim would be backed by evidence derived from said tests.

As an example: the theory that matter is made of subatomic particles has survived numerous tests and challenges over the years, and so there is a weight of evidence in favor of this theory. The claim seems reasonable to accept because of the weight of this evidence, not because the claim itself dates back any number of years.

The Bandwagon Fallacy (aka peer pressure)

The "Bandwagon" is a fallacy in which a threat of rejection by one's peers (peer pressure) is substituted for evidence in an argument. This line of "reasoning" is fallacious because peer pressure and threat of rejection do not constitute evidence for rejecting a claim. It should be noted that loyalty to a group and the need to belong can give people very strong reasons to conform to the views and positions of those groups. From a practical standpoint we often compromise our beliefs in order to belong to groups; however, feelings of loyalty and the need to belong do not constitute evidence for a claim.

Begging the Question

Also known as "circular reasoning" or petitio principii, in this fallacy the premise includes the claim that the conclusion is true or (directly or indirectly) assumes the conclusion is true. This sort of "reasoning" is fallacious because simply assuming that the conclusion is true (directly or indirectly) in the premise does not constitute evidence for that conclusion. Simply assuming a claim is true does not serve as evidence for that claim. This is especially clear in particularly blatant cases: "X is true. The evidence for this claim is that X is true." Some cases of question begging are fairly blatant, while others can be subtle.

For instance, a blatant case would be:

     "God must exist."

     "How do you know that?"

     "Because the Bible says this is so."

     "Why should I believe what the Bible says?"

     "Because the Bible was written by men of God."

A more subtle form: "Sure, this was Indian Territory once, and the white settlers didn't always treat the Indians well, or always live up to treaties. But there is no question we have every right to be here and to enjoy this land. After all, we brought civilization to the Indians, a clearly superior way of life. You'd think they'd be grateful."

Biased Sample

This fallacy is committed when a person draws a conclusion about a population based on a sample that is biased or prejudiced in some manner. The person committing the fallacy is misusing a type of reasoning known variously as "Inductive Generalization" and "Statistical Generalization." The fallacy is committed when the sample is likely to be biased in some manner.

A sample is biased or loaded when the method used to select the sample results in a sample that does not adequately represent the population from which it is drawn. Biased samples are generally not very reliable. The idea is that biased samples are less likely to contain opinion proportional to and thus representative of the whole population. For example, if a person wants to find out what most Americans think about gun control, a poll taken only at an NRA meeting would represent a biased sample. So would a similar poll taken at a meeting of Handguns Control Inc.

Since the Biased-Sample fallacy is committed when the sample is biased or loaded, it is important to have samples that are not biased, or rather more balanced. The best way to achieve this state is to take samples in ways that avoid known bias. There are, in general, three types of samples that are aimed at avoiding bias. These methods (when used properly) will result in a sample that matches the whole population fairly closely. The three types of samples are as follows

Random Sample: This is a sample that is taken in such a way that nothing but chance determines which members of the population are selected for the sample. Ideally, any individual member of the population has the same chance as being selected as any other. This type of sample tends to avoid being biased because a biased sample is one that is taken in such a way that some members of the population have a significantly greater chance of being selected for the sample than other members. Unfortunately, creating an ideal random sample is difficult.

Stratified Sample: This is a sample that is taken by using the following steps: 1) the relevant strata (population subgroups) are identified, 2) the number of members in each stratum is determined and 3) a random sample is taken from each stratum in exact proportion to its size. This method is most useful when dealing with stratified populations. For example, a person's income often influences how he votes, so when conducting a presidential poll it would be a good idea to take a stratified sample using economic classes as the basis for determining the strata. This method avoids loaded samples by (ideally) ensuring that each stratum of the population is adequately represented.

Time-lapse Sample: This type of sample is taken by taking a stratified or random sample and then taking at least one more sample with a significant lapse of time between them. After the two samples are taken, they can be compared for changes. This method of sampling is important when making predictions. A prediction based on only one sample is likely to be a Hasty Generalization (because the sample is likely to be too small to cover past, present and future populations) or a Biased Sample (because the sample will only include instances from one time period).

People often commit biased sampling because of their own bias and prejudice. For example, a person might intentionally or unintentionally seek out people or events that support a given bias of his. So, a person who is pushing a particular scientific theory might tend to gather samples that are biased in favor of that theory. People also commonly commit this fallacy because of laziness or sloppiness. It is easer to simply take a sample from what happens to be available rather than taking the time and effort to generate an adequate sample and draw a justified conclusion. It is important to keep in mind that bias is relative to the purpose of a given sample. What may be a biased sample in one context may not be in another.

Burden of Proof

This fallacy occurs when the burden of proof is placed on the wrong side. Another version occurs when a lack of evidence for side A is taken to be evidence for side B in cases in which the burden of proof actually rests on side B. A common name for this is an Appeal to Ignorance.

In many situations, one side has the burden of proof resting on it. This side is obligated to provide evidence for its position. The claim of the other side, the one that does not bear the burden of proof, is assumed to be true unless proven otherwise. The difficulty in such cases is determining which side, if any, the burden of proof rests on. In many cases, settling this issue can be a matter of significant debate. In some cases the burden of proof is set by the situation.

For example, in American law (except, as far as I know, in Louisiana) a person is assumed to be innocent until proven guilty, hence the burden of proof in law is on the prosecution.

Another example: in formal debate, the burden of proof is placed on the affirmative team. So, one side asserts that Proposition A is a good thing. Therefore, the side that holds Proposition A to be good thing is obliged to demonstrate in fact that it is a good thing. One does not demand that the other side prove Proposition A is not a good thing, though as a matter of practice that side often tries, sometimes successfully, to demonstrate just that--but this effort is voluntary, not obligatory.

In general, the burden of proof rests on those who claim something exists (such as Bigfoot, psychic powers, universals) or the need for something exists (health care, traffic laws, public education). This is for the reason that to prove a positive is easier (if in fact something is positive, it must be logically assumed that there exists evidence of this positive attribute) than to prove a negative (where the case often arises than not all possible scenarios might ever be exhausted, therefore the case could never actually be proved).


[center]Summary[/center]
As I noted above, the list of fallacious cases is well-nigh endless. But hopefully this short article will give someone with interest food for thought, thirst for discussion, greater appreciation for the potential that good argument offers the inquisitive mind, and a wholesome aversion to fallacies.

Don't you have a job?

Anyway, here's a good short story on fallacies that some of you have read at some time"

LINK

ORIGINAL: Crimguy

Don't you have a job?

Unfortunately I do. I also have a wife and a daughter and a son, none of whom claim to truly understand me. But then no one ever said that wargames are for everyone.

Tris..................You failed to mention one of my favorite terms, the "Lynch mob mentality", provoked by the most dangerous person in the world, I.E.:the loudest mouth at the lynch mob.[8D]
I agree with your treatise, and suspect we are all guilty of it, by habit, ritual, indoctrination, or even human frustrations.[;)]

Ouch.

'Tis hard to say if greater want of skill
Appear in writing or in judging ill,
But of the two less dangerous is the offense
To tire our patience than mislead our sense
Some few in that but numbers err in this,
Ten censure wrong for one who writes amiss,
A fool might once himself alone expose,
Now one in verse makes many more in prose.

'Tis with our judgments as our watches, none
Go just alike, yet each believes his own
In poets as true genius is but rare
True taste as seldom is the critic share
Both must alike from Heaven derive their light,
These born to judge as well as those to write
Let such teach others who themselves excel,
And censure freely, who have written well
Authors are partial to their wit, 'tis true
But are not critics to their judgment too?

Yet if we look more closely we shall find
Most have the seeds of judgment in their mind
Nature affords at least a glimmering light
The lines though touched but faintly are drawn right,
But as the slightest sketch if justly traced
Is by ill coloring but the more disgraced
So by false learning is good sense defaced
Some are bewildered in the maze of schools
And some made coxcombs nature meant but fools
In search of wit these lose their common sense
And then turn critics in their own defense
Each burns alike who can or cannot write
Or with a rival's or an eunuch's spite
All fools have still an itching to deride
And fain would be upon the laughing side
If Maevius scribble in Apollo's spite
There are who judge still worse than he can write.

Some have at first for wits then poets passed
Turned critics next and proved plain fools at last
Some neither can for wits nor critics pass
As heavy mules are neither horse nor ass.
Those half-learned witlings, numerous in our isle,
As half-formed insects on the banks of Nile
Unfinished things one knows not what to call
Their generation is so equivocal
To tell them would a hundred tongues require,
Or one vain wits that might a hundred tire.

But you who seek to give and merit fame,
And justly bear a critic's noble name,
Be sure yourself and your own reach to know
How far your genius taste and learning go.
Launch not beyond your depth, but be discreet
And mark that point where sense and dullness meet.

Nature to all things fixed the limits fit
And wisely curbed proud man's pretending wit.
As on the land while here the ocean gains.
In other parts it leaves wide sandy plains
Thus in the soul while memory prevails,
The solid power of understanding fails
Where beams of warm imagination play,
The memory's soft figures melt away
One science only will one genius fit,
So vast is art, so narrow human wit
Not only bounded to peculiar arts,
But oft in those confined to single parts
Like kings, we lose the conquests gained before,
By vain ambition still to make them more
Each might his several province well command,
Would all but stoop to what they understand.

First follow nature and your judgment frame
By her just standard, which is still the same.
Unerring nature still divinely bright,
One clear, unchanged and universal light,
Life force and beauty, must to all impart,
At once the source and end and test of art
Art from that fund each just supply provides,
Works without show and without pomp presides
In some fair body thus the informing soul
With spirits feeds, with vigor fills the whole,
Each motion guides and every nerve sustains,
Itself unseen, but in the effects remains.
Some, to whom Heaven in wit has been profuse,
Want as much more, to turn it to its use;
For wit and judgment often are at strife,
Though meant each other's aid, like man and wife.
'Tis more to guide, than spur the muse's steed,
Restrain his fury, than provoke his speed,
The winged courser, like a generous horse,
Shows most true mettle when you check his course.

Those rules, of old discovered, not devised,
Are nature still, but nature methodized;
Nature, like liberty, is but restrained
By the same laws which first herself ordained.

Hear how learned Greece her useful rules indites,
When to repress and when indulge our flights.
High on Parnassus' top her sons she showed,
And pointed out those arduous paths they trod;
Held from afar, aloft, the immortal prize,
And urged the rest by equal steps to rise.
Just precepts thus from great examples given,
She drew from them what they derived from Heaven.
The generous critic fanned the poet's fire,
And taught the world with reason to admire.
Then criticism the muse's handmaid proved,
To dress her charms, and make her more beloved:
But following wits from that intention strayed
Who could not win the mistress, wooed the maid
Against the poets their own arms they turned
Sure to hate most the men from whom they learned
So modern pothecaries taught the art
By doctors bills to play the doctor's part.
Bold in the practice of mistaken rules
Prescribe, apply, and call their masters fools.
Some on the leaves of ancient authors prey,
Nor time nor moths e'er spoil so much as they.
Some dryly plain, without invention's aid,
Write dull receipts how poems may be made
These leave the sense their learning to display,
And those explain the meaning quite away.

You then, whose judgment the right course would steer,
Know well each ancient's proper character,
His fable subject scope in every page,
Religion, country, genius of his age
Without all these at once before your eyes,
Cavil you may, but never criticise.
Be Homers works your study and delight,
Read them by day and meditate by night,
Thence form your judgment thence your maxims bring
And trace the muses upward to their spring.
Still with itself compared, his text peruse,
And let your comment be the Mantuan Muse.

When first young Maro in his boundless mind,
A work to outlast immortal Rome designed,
Perhaps he seemed above the critic's law
And but from nature's fountain scorned to draw
But when to examine every part he came
Nature and Homer were he found the same
Convinced, amazed, he checks the bold design
And rules as strict his labored work confine
As if the Stagirite o'erlooked each line
Learn hence for ancient rules a just esteem,
To copy nature is to copy them.

Some beauties yet no precepts can declare,
For there's a happiness as well as care.
Music resembles poetry--in each
Are nameless graces which no methods teach,
And which a master hand alone can reach
If, where the rules not far enough extend
(Since rules were made but to promote their end),
Some lucky license answer to the full
The intent proposed that license is a rule.
Thus Pegasus a nearer way to take
May boldly deviate from the common track
Great wits sometimes may gloriously offend,
And rise to faults true critics dare not mend,
From vulgar bounds with brave disorder part,
And snatch a grace beyond the reach of art,
Which without passing through the judgment gains
The heart and all its end at once attains.
In prospects, thus, some objects please our eyes,
Which out of nature's common order rise,
The shapeless rock or hanging precipice.
But though the ancients thus their rules invade
(As kings dispense with laws themselves have made),
Moderns beware! or if you must offend
Against the precept, ne'er transgress its end,
Let it be seldom, and compelled by need,
And have, at least, their precedent to plead.
The critic else proceeds without remorse,
Seizes your fame, and puts his laws in force.

I know there are, to whose presumptuous thoughts
Those freer beauties, even in them, seem faults
Some figures monstrous and misshaped appear,
Considered singly, or beheld too near,
Which, but proportioned to their light, or place,
Due distance reconciles to form and grace.
A prudent chief not always must display
His powers in equal ranks and fair array,
But with the occasion and the place comply.
Conceal his force, nay, seem sometimes to fly.
Those oft are stratagems which errors seem,
Nor is it Homer nods, but we that dream.

Still green with bays each ancient altar stands,
Above the reach of sacrilegious hands,
Secure from flames, from envy's fiercer rage,
Destructive war, and all-involving age.
See, from each clime the learned their incense bring;
Hear, in all tongues consenting Paeans ring!
In praise so just let every voice be joined,
And fill the general chorus of mankind.
Hail! bards triumphant! born in happier days;
Immortal heirs of universal praise!
Whose honors with increase of ages grow,
As streams roll down, enlarging as they flow;
Nations unborn your mighty names shall sound,
And worlds applaud that must not yet be found!
Oh may some spark of your celestial fire,
The last, the meanest of your sons inspire,
(That, on weak wings, from far pursues your flights,
Glows while he reads, but trembles as he writes),
To teach vain wits a science little known,
To admire superior sense, and doubt their own!

* * * * *

PART II.

Of all the causes which conspire to blind
Man's erring judgment and misguide the mind,
What the weak head with strongest bias rules,
Is pride, the never-failing vice of fools.
Whatever nature has in worth denied,
She gives in large recruits of needful pride;
For as in bodies, thus in souls, we find
What wants in blood and spirits, swelled with wind:
Pride where wit fails steps in to our defense,
And fills up all the mighty void of sense.
If once right reason drives that cloud away,
Truth breaks upon us with resistless day
Trust not yourself, but your defects to know,
Make use of every friend--and every foe.

A little learning is a dangerous thing
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring
There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,
And drinking largely sobers us again.
Tired at first sight with what the muse imparts,
In fearless youth we tempt the heights of arts
While from the bounded level of our mind
Short views we take nor see the lengths behind
But more advanced behold with strange surprise,
New distant scenes of endless science rise!
So pleased at first the towering Alps we try,
Mount o'er the vales and seem to tread the sky,
The eternal snows appear already passed
And the first clouds and mountains seem the last.
But those attained we tremble to survey
The growing labors of the lengthened way
The increasing prospect tires our wandering eyes,
Hills peep o'er hills and Alps on Alps arise!

A perfect judge will read each work of wit
With the same spirit that its author writ
Survey the whole nor seek slight faults to find
Where nature moves and rapture warms the mind,
Nor lose for that malignant dull delight
The generous pleasure to be charmed with wit
But in such lays as neither ebb nor flow,
Correctly cold and regularly low
That, shunning faults, one quiet tenor keep;
We cannot blame indeed--but we may sleep.
In wit, as nature, what affects our hearts
Is not the exactness of peculiar parts,
'Tis not a lip, or eye, we beauty call,
But the joint force and full result of all.
Thus, when we view some well proportioned dome
(The worlds just wonder, and even thine, O Rome!),
No single parts unequally surprise,
All comes united to the admiring eyes;
No monstrous height or breadth, or length, appear;
The whole at once is bold, and regular.

Whoever thinks a faultless piece to see.
Thinks what ne'er was, nor is, nor e'er shall be.
In every work regard the writer's end,
Since none can compass more than they intend;
And if the means be just, the conduct true,
Applause, in spite of trivial faults, is due.
As men of breeding, sometimes men of wit,
To avoid great errors, must the less commit:
Neglect the rules each verbal critic lays,
For not to know some trifles is a praise.
Most critics, fond of some subservient art,
Still make the whole depend upon a part:
They talk of principles, but notions prize,
And all to one loved folly sacrifice.

Once on a time La Mancha's knight, they say,
A certain bard encountering on the way,
Discoursed in terms as just, with looks as sage,
As e'er could Dennis, of the Grecian stage;
Concluding all were desperate sots and fools,
Who durst depart from Aristotle's rules
Our author, happy in a judge so nice,
Produced his play, and begged the knight's advice;
Made him observe the subject, and the plot,
The manners, passions, unities, what not?
All which, exact to rule, were brought about,
Were but a combat in the lists left out
"What! leave the combat out?" exclaims the knight.
"Yes, or we must renounce the Stagirite."
"Not so, by heaven!" (he answers in a rage)
"Knights, squires, and steeds must enter on the stage."
"So vast a throng the stage can ne'er contain."
"Then build a new, or act it in a plain."

Thus critics of less judgment than caprice,
Curious, not knowing, not exact, but nice,
Form short ideas, and offend in arts
(As most in manners) by a love to parts.

Some to conceit alone their taste confine,
And glittering thoughts struck out at every line;
Pleased with a work where nothing's just or fit;
One glaring chaos and wild heap of wit.
Poets, like painters, thus, unskilled to trace
The naked nature and the living grace,
With gold and jewels cover every part,
And hide with ornaments their want of art.
True wit is nature to advantage dressed;
What oft was thought, but ne'er so well expressed;
Something, whose truth convinced at sight we find
That gives us back the image of our mind.
As shades more sweetly recommend the light,
So modest plainness sets off sprightly wit
For works may have more wit than does them good,
As bodies perish through excess of blood.

Others for language all their care express,
And value books, as women men, for dress.
Their praise is still--"the style is excellent,"
The sense they humbly take upon content
Words are like leaves, and where they most abound
Much fruit of sense beneath is rarely found.
False eloquence, like the prismatic glass.
Its gaudy colors spreads on every place,
The face of nature we no more survey.
All glares alike without distinction gay:
But true expression, like the unchanging sun,
Clears and improves whate'er it shines upon;
It gilds all objects, but it alters none.
Expression is the dress of thought, and still
Appears more decent, as more suitable,
A vile conceit in pompous words expressed,
Is like a clown in regal purple dressed
For different styles with different subjects sort,
As several garbs with country town and court
Some by old words to fame have made pretense,
Ancients in phrase, mere moderns in their sense;
Such labored nothings, in so strange a style,
Amaze the unlearned, and make the learned smile.
Unlucky, as Fungoso in the play,
These sparks with awkward vanity display
What the fine gentleman wore yesterday;
And but so mimic ancient wits at best,
As apes our grandsires in their doublets dressed.
In words as fashions the same rule will hold,
Alike fantastic if too new or old.
Be not the first by whom the new are tried,
Nor yet the last to lay the old aside

But most by numbers judge a poet's song
And smooth or rough, with them is right or wrong.
In the bright muse though thousand charms conspire,
Her voice is all these tuneful fools admire,
Who haunt Parnassus but to please their ear,
Not mend their minds, as some to church repair,
Not for the doctrine but the music there
These equal syllables alone require,
Though oft the ear the open vowels tire;
While expletives their feeble aid do join;
And ten low words oft creep in one dull line,
While they ring round the same unvaried chimes,
With sure returns of still expected rhymes,
Where'er you find "the cooling western breeze,"
In the next line it "whispers through the trees"
If crystal streams "with pleasing murmurs creep"
The reader's threatened (not in vain) with "sleep"
Then, at the last and only couplet fraught
With some unmeaning thing they call a thought,
A needless Alexandrine ends the song
That, like a wounded snake drags its slow length along.

Leave such to tune their own dull rhymes, and know
What's roundly smooth or languishingly slow;
And praise the easy vigor of a line,
Where Denham's strength, and Waller's sweetness join.
True ease in writing comes from art, not chance,
As those move easiest who have learned to dance
'Tis not enough no harshness gives offense,
The sound must seem an echo to the sense.
Soft is the strain when Zephyr gently blows,
And the smooth stream in smoother numbers flows,
But when loud surges lash the sounding shore,
The hoarse, rough verse should like the torrent roar,
When Ajax strives some rock's vast weight to throw,
The line too labors, and the words move slow;
Not so, when swift Camilla scours the plain,
Flies o'er the unbending corn, and skims along the main.
Hear how Timotheus' varied lays surprise,
And bid alternate passions fall and rise!
While, at each change, the son of Libyan Jove
Now burns with glory, and then melts with love;
Now his fierce eyes with sparkling fury glow,
Now sighs steal out, and tears begin to flow:
Persians and Greeks like turns of nature found,
And the world's victor stood subdued by sound?
The power of music all our hearts allow,
And what Timotheus was, is Dryden now.

Avoid extremes, and shun the fault of such,
Who still are pleased too little or too much.
At every trifle scorn to take offense,
That always shows great pride, or little sense:
Those heads, as stomachs, are not sure the best,
Which nauseate all, and nothing can digest.
Yet let not each gay turn thy rapture move;
For fools admire, but men of sense approve:
As things seem large which we through mist descry,
Dullness is ever apt to magnify.

Some foreign writers, some our own despise,
The ancients only, or the moderns prize.
Thus wit, like faith, by each man is applied
To one small sect, and all are damned beside.
Meanly they seek the blessing to confine,
And force that sun but on a part to shine,
Which not alone the southern wit sublimes,
But ripens spirits in cold northern climes.
Which from the first has shone on ages past,
Enlights the present, and shall warm the last,
Though each may feel increases and decays,
And see now clearer and now darker days.
Regard not then if wit be old or new,
But blame the false, and value still the true.

Some ne'er advance a judgment of their own,
But catch the spreading notion of the town,
They reason and conclude by precedent,
And own stale nonsense which they ne'er invent.
Some judge of authors names not works, and then
Nor praise nor blame the writing, but the men.
Of all this servile herd the worst is he
That in proud dullness joins with quality
A constant critic at the great man's board,
To fetch and carry nonsense for my lord
What woful stuff this madrigal would be,
In some starved hackney sonnetteer, or me!
But let a lord once own the happy lines,
How the wit brightens! how the style refines!
Before his sacred name flies every fault,
And each exalted stanza teems with thought!

The vulgar thus through imitation err;
As oft the learned by being singular.
So much they scorn the crowd that if the throng
By chance go right they purposely go wrong:
So schismatics the plain believers quit,
And are but damned for having too much wit.
Some praise at morning what they blame at night,
But always think the last opinion right.
A muse by these is like a mistress used,
This hour she's idolized, the next abused;
While their weak heads, like towns unfortified,
'Twixt sense and nonsense daily change their side.
Ask them the cause, they're wiser still they say;
And still to-morrow's wiser than to-day.
We think our fathers fools, so wise we grow;
Our wiser sons, no doubt, will think us so.
Once school-divines this zealous isle o'erspread.
Who knew most sentences was deepest read,
Faith, Gospel, all, seemed made to be disputed,
And none had sense enough to be confuted:
Scotists and Thomists now in peace remain,
Amidst their kindred cobwebs in Duck Lane.
If faith itself has different dresses worn,
What wonder modes in wit should take their turn?
Oft, leaving what is natural and fit,
The current folly proves the ready wit;
And authors think their reputation safe,
Which lives as long as fools are pleased to laugh.

Some valuing those of their own side or mind,
Still make themselves the measure of mankind:
Fondly we think we honor merit then,
When we but praise ourselves in other men.
Parties in wit attend on those of state,
And public faction doubles private hate.
Pride, malice, folly against Dryden rose,
In various shapes of parsons, critics, beaux;
But sense survived, when merry jests were past;
For rising merit will buoy up at last.
Might he return, and bless once more our eyes,
New Blackmores and new Millbourns must arise:
Nay, should great Homer lift his awful head,
Zoilus again would start up from the dead
Envy will merit, as its shade, pursue,
But like a shadow, proves the substance true:
For envied wit, like Sol eclipsed, makes known
The opposing body's grossness, not its own.
When first that sun too powerful beams displays,
It draws up vapors which obscure its rays,
But even those clouds at last adorn its way
Reflect new glories and augment the day

Be thou the first true merit to befriend
His praise is lost who stays till all commend
Short is the date alas! of modern rhymes
And 'tis but just to let them live betimes
No longer now that golden age appears
When patriarch wits survived a thousand years
Now length of fame (our second life) is lost
And bare threescore is all even that can boast,
Our sons their fathers failing language see
And such as Chaucer is shall Dryden be
So when the faithful pencil has designed
Some bright idea of the master's mind
Where a new world leaps out at his command
And ready nature waits upon his hand
When the ripe colors soften and unite
And sweetly melt into just shade and light
When mellowing years their full perfection give
And each bold figure just begins to live
The treacherous colors the fair art betray
And all the bright creation fades away!

Unhappy wit, like most mistaken things
Atones not for that envy which it brings
In youth alone its empty praise we boast
But soon the short lived vanity is lost.
Like some fair flower the early spring supplies
That gayly blooms but even in blooming dies
What is this wit, which must our cares employ?
The owner's wife that other men enjoy
Then most our trouble still when most admired
And still the more we give the more required
Whose fame with pains we guard, but lose with ease,
Sure some to vex, but never all to please,
'Tis what the vicious fear, the virtuous shun,
By fools 'tis hated, and by knaves undone!

If wit so much from ignorance undergo,
Ah! let not learning too commence its foe!
Of old, those met rewards who could excel,
And such were praised who but endeavored well:
Though triumphs were to generals only due,
Crowns were reserved to grace the soldiers too.
Now they who reach Parnassus' lofty crown,
Employ their pains to spurn some others down;
And, while self-love each jealous writer rules,
Contending wits become the sport of fools:
But still the worst with most regret commend,
For each ill author is as bad a friend
To what base ends, and by what abject ways,
Are mortals urged, through sacred lust of praise!
Ah, ne'er so dire a thirst of glory boast,
Nor in the critic let the man be lost
Good-nature and good sense must ever join;
To err is human, to forgive, divine.

But if in noble minds some dregs remain,
Not yet purged off, of spleen and sour disdain;
Discharge that rage on more provoking crimes,
Nor fear a dearth in these flagitious times.
No pardon vile obscenity should find,
Though wit and art conspire to move your mind;
But dullness with obscenity must prove
As shameful sure as impotence in love.
In the fat age of pleasure, wealth, and ease,
Sprung the rank weed, and thrived with large increase:
When love was all an easy monarch's care,
Seldom at council, never in a war
Jilts ruled the state, and statesmen farces writ;
Nay, wits had pensions, and young lords had wit:
The fair sat panting at a courtier's play,
And not a mask went unimproved away:
The modest fan was lifted up no more,
And virgins smiled at what they blushed before.
The following license of a foreign reign,
Did all the dregs of bold Socinus drain,
Then unbelieving priests reformed the nation.
And taught more pleasant methods of salvation;
Where Heaven's free subjects might their rights dispute,
Lest God himself should seem too absolute:
Pulpits their sacred satire learned to spare,
And vice admired to find a flatterer there!
Encouraged thus, wit's Titans braved the skies,
And the press groaned with licensed blasphemies.
These monsters, critics! with your darts engage,
Here point your thunder, and exhaust your rage!
Yet shun their fault, who, scandalously nice,
Will needs mistake an author into vice;
All seems infected that the infected spy,
As all looks yellow to the jaundiced eye.

* * * * *


PART III.

Learn, then, what morals critics ought to show,
For 'tis but half a judge's task to know.
'Tis not enough, taste, judgment, learning, join;
In all you speak, let truth and candor shine:
That not alone what to your sense is due
All may allow, but seek your friendship too.

Be silent always, when you doubt your sense;
And speak, though sure, with seeming diffidence:
Some positive persisting fops we know,
Who, if once wrong will needs be always so;
But you, with pleasure, own your errors past,
And make each day a critique on the last.

'Tis not enough your counsel still be true;
Blunt truths more mischief than nice falsehoods do;
Men must be taught as if you taught them not,
And things unknown proposed as things forgot.
Without good breeding truth is disapproved;
That only makes superior sense beloved.

Be niggards of advice on no pretense;
For the worst avarice is that of sense
With mean complacence, ne'er betray your trust,
Nor be so civil as to prove unjust
Fear not the anger of the wise to raise,
Those best can bear reproof who merit praise.

'Twere well might critics still this freedom take,
But Appius reddens at each word you speak,
And stares, tremendous with a threatening eye,
Like some fierce tyrant in old tapestry
Fear most to tax an honorable fool
Whose right it is uncensured to be dull
Such, without wit are poets when they please,
As without learning they can take degrees
Leave dangerous truths to unsuccessful satires,
And flattery to fulsome dedicators
Whom, when they praise, the world believes no more,
Than when they promise to give scribbling o'er.

'Tis best sometimes your censure to restrain,
And charitably let the dull be vain
Your silence there is better than your spite,
For who can rail so long as they can write?
Still humming on, their drowsy course they keep,
And lashed so long like tops are lashed asleep.
False steps but help them to renew the race,
As after stumbling, jades will mend their pace.
What crowds of these, impenitently bold,
In sounds and jingling syllables grown old,
Still run on poets in a raging vein,
Even to the dregs and squeezing of the brain;
Strain out the last dull droppings of their sense,
And rhyme with all the rage of impotence!

Such shameless bards we have, and yet, 'tis true,
There are as mad abandoned critics, too
The bookful blockhead ignorantly read,
With loads of learned lumber in his head,
With his own tongue still edifies his ears,
And always listening to himself appears
All books he reads and all he reads assails
From Dryden's Fables down to Durfey's Tales
With him most authors steal their works or buy;
Garth did not write his own Dispensary
Name a new play, and he's the poets friend
Nay, showed his faults--but when would poets mend?
No place so sacred from such fops is barred,
Nor is Paul's Church more safe than Paul's Churchyard:
Nay, fly to altars; there they'll talk you dead,
For fools rush in where angels fear to tread
Distrustful sense with modest caution speaks,
It still looks home, and short excursions makes;
But rattling nonsense in full volleys breaks,
And, never shocked, and never turned aside.
Bursts out, resistless, with a thundering tide,

But where's the man who counsel can bestow,
Still pleased to teach, and yet not proud to know?
Unbiased, or by favor, or in spite,
Not dully prepossessed, nor blindly right;
Though learned, well-bred, and though well bred, sincere,
Modestly bold, and humanly severe,
Who to a friend his faults can freely show,
And gladly praise the merit of a foe?
Blessed with a taste exact, yet unconfined;
A knowledge both of books and human kind;
Generous converse, a soul exempt from pride;
And love to praise, with reason on his side?

Such once were critics such the happy few,
Athens and Rome in better ages knew.
The mighty Stagirite first left the shore,
Spread all his sails, and durst the deeps explore;
He steered securely, and discovered far,
Led by the light of the Maeonian star.
Poets, a race long unconfined and free,
Still fond and proud of savage liberty,
Received his laws, and stood convinced 'twas fit,
Who conquered nature, should preside o'er wit.

Horace still charms with graceful negligence,
And without method talks us into sense;
Will like a friend familiarly convey
The truest notions in the easiest way.
He who supreme in judgment as in wit,
Might boldly censure, as he boldly writ,
Yet judged with coolness though he sung with fire;
His precepts teach but what his works inspire
Our critics take a contrary extreme
They judge with fury, but they write with phlegm:
Nor suffers Horace more in wrong translations
By wits than critics in as wrong quotations.

See Dionysius Homer's thoughts refine,
And call new beauties forth from every line!

Fancy and art in gay Petronius please,
The scholar's learning with the courtier's ease.

In grave Quintilian's copious work we find
The justest rules and clearest method joined:
Thus useful arms in magazines we place,
All ranged in order, and disposed with grace,
But less to please the eye, than arm the hand,
Still fit for use, and ready at command.

Thee bold Longinus! all the Nine inspire,
And bless their critic with a poet's fire.
An ardent judge, who, zealous in his trust,
With warmth gives sentence, yet is always just:
Whose own example strengthens all his laws;
And is himself that great sublime he draws.

Thus long succeeding critics justly reigned,
License repressed, and useful laws ordained.
Learning and Rome alike in empire grew;
And arts still followed where her eagles flew,
From the same foes at last, both felt their doom,
And the same age saw learning fall, and Rome.
With tyranny then superstition joined
As that the body, this enslaved the mind;
Much was believed but little understood,
And to be dull was construed to be good;
A second deluge learning thus o'errun,
And the monks finished what the Goths begun.

At length Erasmus, that great injured name
(The glory of the priesthood and the shame!)
Stemmed the wild torrent of a barbarous age,
And drove those holy Vandals off the stage.

But see! each muse, in Leo's golden days,
Starts from her trance and trims her withered bays,
Rome's ancient genius o'er its ruins spread
Shakes off the dust, and rears his reverent head
Then sculpture and her sister arts revive,
Stones leaped to form, and rocks began to live;
With sweeter notes each rising temple rung,
A Raphael painted, and a Vida sung [704]
Immortal Vida! on whose honored brow
The poets bays and critic's ivy grow
Cremona now shall ever boast thy name
As next in place to Mantua, next in fame!

But soon by impious arms from Latium chased,
Their ancient bounds the banished muses passed.
Thence arts o'er all the northern world advance,
But critic-learning flourished most in France,
The rules a nation born to serve, obeys;
And Boileau still in right of Horace sways
But we, brave Britons, foreign laws despised,
And kept unconquered and uncivilized,
Fierce for the liberties of wit and bold,
We still defied the Romans as of old.
Yet some there were, among the sounder few
Of those who less presumed and better knew,
Who durst assert the juster ancient cause,
And here restored wit's fundamental laws.
Such was the muse, whose rule and practice tell
"Nature's chief masterpiece is writing well."
Such was Roscommon, not more learned than good,
With manners generous as his noble blood,
To him the wit of Greece and Rome was known,
And every author's merit, but his own
Such late was Walsh--the muse's judge and friend,
Who justly knew to blame or to commend,
To failings mild, but zealous for desert,
The clearest head, and the sincerest heart,
This humble praise, lamented shade! receive,
This praise at least a grateful muse may give.
The muse whose early voice you taught to sing
Prescribed her heights and pruned her tender wing,
(Her guide now lost) no more attempts to rise,
But in low numbers short excursions tries,
Content if hence the unlearned their wants may view,
The learned reflect on what before they knew
Careless of censure, nor too fond of fame,
Still pleased to praise, yet not afraid to blame,
Averse alike to flatter, or offend,
Not free from faults, nor yet too vain to mend.

ORIGINAL: m10bob

Tris..................You failed to mention one of my favorite terms, the "Lynch mob mentality", provoked by the most dangerous person in the world, I.E.:the loudest mouth at the lynch mob.[8D]
I agree with your treatise, and suspect we are all guilty of it, by habit, ritual, indoctrination, or even human frustrations.[;)]

I agree that many if not most people are gulity of fallacious pleas at one time or another. I certainly am, especially when I choose to "fight fire with fire." But it's a good idea not to intentionally use these forms of bad argument, as everyone suffers from that in the long run.

Pope on bad criticism being something worse even than bad poetry? Well, maybe he was right at that. [8D]

     I am sitting here thinking of sex and drinking cold coffee. -- Sarma

Is this thread supposed to be a joke? ... I don't get it.

ORIGINAL: doktorblood

Is this thread supposed to be a joke? ... I don't get it.

That would depend on the individual. What do you wish to make of it?

Jim and Bones would always get a pained look on their faces when Spock started up with his logic Yada-Yada. Kind of like they would like to poke a pointy stick in Spock's eye.

I guess ... that's what I make of it.

I think Mog & Tristanjohn were boored!!![;)] [:D]

I was too busy to send turns yesterday, so I claim partial credit for Mogami's post

ORIGINAL: Tom Hunter

I was too busy to send turns yesterday, so I claim partial credit for Mogami's post

Oddly, in the post count system - the post you just made and the one Mog or Tristanjohn made are entirely equivalent.

Well now I have something to print out and read in the bathroom.

Seriously we do need to lift the level of discussion a bit, at least in civility.[:)]

Hi, I am opposed to those who become critics simply to be critics. I am opposed to those who become critics without proper knowledge of the subject.
An example from the past.
I posted a haiku that TJ was quick to jump on supposing I to be the author

ORIGINAL: Tristanjohn

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Gathering all the rains
Of May,
The River Mogami rushes down
In one violent stream.

Well, haiku is supposed to have three lines of 5, 7 and 5 syllables, and refer to one of the seasons. I'll give you an A for effort.

It might better run:

Gather rains of May
as the river Mogami
rushes down in stream

Or something like that.


Hi, I think you should read up on Haiku more before grading the work of others. The above is an ENGLISH translation of Matsuo Munefusa. (the first great poet in the history of haikai) I'm pretty sure he knew what he was doing. Not always does a season need be a topic. Basho ( Matsuo's penname) often wrote things without a season.

Sleep on horseback,
The far moon in a continuing dream,
Steam of roasting tea

The manual for WITP only covers the mechanics of how the interface works. The WITP manual does not teach Operational Planning. THe players must learn how to plan and execute operations.
Players who approach the system from a tactical perspective will be disappointed. The game does not claim to be a tactical model but an Operational level model where some knowledge of the tactical outcomes is provided for the purpose of aiding future operational level planning.
The people I am most likely to listen to reqarding the limits or shortcomings of the system are those who display an abilty to use it as designed. No one who is not actually playing WITP should post anything other then bug reports. (and if they are not playing how would they have any comments on bugs) Bad players tend to blame the system for their failures.
While I enjoy reading much TJ posts and find him amusing he always omits posting the fact that he is a bad player. He also fails to admit that he was a critic of the system, the designers, and the producer before he ever actually saw the game. This has created a creditabilty gap for me when reading his posts.

But to the point. Threads such as this actually belong up in the General topic forum or at Madcows. This is the WITP forum (not the "game design" or "Art of posting" forum)

ORIGINAL: Mogami

The manual for WITP only covers the mechanics of how the interface works. The WITP manual does not teach Operational Planning. THe players must learn how to plan and execute operations.
Players who approach the system from a tactical perspective will be disappointed. The game does not claim to be a tactical model but an Operational level model where some knowledge of the tactical outcomes is provided for the purpose of aiding future operational level planning.
The people I am most likely to listen to reqarding the limits or shortcomings of the system are those who display an abilty to use it as designed. No one who is not actually playing WITP should post anything other then bug reports. (and if they are not playing how would they have any comments on bugs) Bad players tend to blame the system for their failures.
While I enjoy reading much TJ posts and find him amusing he always omits posting the fact that he is a bad player. He also fails to admit that he was a critic of the system, the designers, and the producer before he ever actually saw the game. This has created a creditabilty gap for me when reading his posts.

For instance, it is relatively easy to rob someone of operational forces while they execute forward operations, but try do carryout your own, and the tables will soon be turned.

The people I am most likely to listen to reqarding the limits or shortcomings of the system are those who display an abilty to use it as designed. No one who is not actually playing WITP should post anything other then bug reports. (and if they are not playing how would they have any comments on bugs) Bad players tend to blame the system for their failures.

While I enjoy reading much TJ posts and find him amusing he always omits posting the fact that he is a bad player. He also fails to admit that he was a critic of the system, the designers, and the producer before he ever actually saw the game. This has created a creditabilty gap for me when reading his posts.

That would be an example of two paragraphs comprised entirely of a chain of various kinds of ad hominem opinion making.

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, I am opposed to those who become critics simply to be critics. I am opposed to those who become critics without proper knowledge of the subject.
An example from the past.
I posted a haiku that TJ was quick to jump on supposing I to be the author

ORIGINAL: Tristanjohn

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Gathering all the rains
Of May,
The River Mogami rushes down
In one violent stream.

Well, haiku is supposed to have three lines of 5, 7 and 5 syllables, and refer to one of the seasons. I'll give you an A for effort.

It might better run:

Gather rains of May
as the river Mogami
rushes down in stream

Or something like that.


Hi, I think you should read up on Haiku more before grading the work of others. The above is an ENGLISH translation of Matsuo Munefusa. (the first great poet in the history of haikai) I'm pretty sure he knew what he was doing. Not always does a season need be a topic. Basho ( Matsuo's penname) often wrote things without a season.

Sleep on horseback,
The far moon in a continuing dream,
Steam of roasting tea

Didn't I respond to that at the time? Apparently not. This was from our AAR, no?

Had I responded I would have acknowledged my giddy disregard for the formalities of Haiku, which I find to be a delightful writing exercise no matter how expressed. I was introduced to this discipline in seventh grade by a lady called Mrs. Tetzlaff. We often sat in her classroom and composed our ditties (well, we didn't actually sing them) with the lights extinguished and the drapes pulled wide to reveal the tempests of storms over the bay.

Anyway, what has that to do with the topic of this thread?

The manual for WITP only covers the mechanics of how the interface works. The WITP manual does not teach Operational Planning. THe players must learn how to plan and execute operations.

Well, the manual incompletely and poorly covers the mechanics of play. It needs a thorough rewrite.

Players who approach the system from a tactical perspective will be disappointed. The game does not claim to be a tactical model but an Operational level model where some knowledge of the tactical outcomes is provided for the purpose of aiding future operational level planning.

The people I am most likely to listen to reqarding the limits or shortcomings of the system are those who display an abilty to use it as designed. No one who is not actually playing WITP should post anything other then bug reports. (and if they are not playing how would they have any comments on bugs) Bad players tend to blame the system for their failures.

This is old hat, Russ. Valid criticism of the system "gathering all the rains of May" began to pour in like "the river Mogami rushes down in one violent stream" from every corner of the compass immediately after release. And the last I checked that torrent had yet to be stopped.

While I enjoy reading much TJ posts and find him amusing he always omits posting the fact that he is a bad player.

This is a very good example of very bad writing. Three clauses which awkwardly state little of appreciable value. Without any punctuation at all save for a period.

Ignoring the (backhand?) compliments, which are hardly the point of that sentence, you 1) fail to demonstrate that I am actually a "bad player," 2) bother not to even define what your definition of a "bad player" might be, and 3) never get around to explaining why and how any of that is pertinent to anything in particular.

Just out of curiosity, on what do you base your claim? Your isolated opinion of my play through the scant turns of our game? My record of play in my other two posted AARs?

For the record, I was, in fact, so "good" as the Allies at playing according to the game's mechanics and rules that in one game my opponent gave up in frustration, so strong was my position after only some six months of play. Indeed, I then suggested a stand-down (to the person who took over the Japanese side from my first opponent) of all meaningful Allied operations anywhere in the central Pacific region (which at that time was more or less exposed to complete conquest) for the next six- to nine-month period, depending on how well the Japanese were able to reorganize and affect a decent defense.

For what it's worth, in all three of my games I have pushed the Allies increasingly hard in order to see just how far their position might be developed early in the war, all of this with an eye on the whacked logistics model which, as I have stated many times, I find to be the most serious problem in the overall system. As I happen to view the game to be seriously compromised by terrible design decisions, at no time has "winning" entered my mind. That's a theme you continue to harp on, as if it held relevance to whether or not Gary's simulation actually made good sense or not. I'd guess that argument of yours in brief form would run:

     1. Only "good" players understand the system well enough to criticize it

     2. You (is that the ubiquitous "you" or just me?) are a "bad player"

     3. Therefore, go away and be still

Isn't that about the size of it?

He also fails to admit that he was a critic of the system, the designers, and the producer before he ever actually saw the game. This has created a creditabilty gap for me when reading his posts.

That is not true.

I never criticized WitP before it was published. What I did was to analyze UV, found that system to be sorely wanting, and, based on feedback from the forum on what was and was not likely to be changed for WitP delivered myself to opinion of what needed to be changed if WitP should stand any chance of improving matters from my point of view.

But to the point. Threads such as this actually belong up in the General topic forum or at Madcows. This is the WITP forum (not the "game design" or "Art of posting" forum)

I think this thread is well placed in this forum. This post of yours is an excellent example of the kind of inaccurate statements and bad logic which habitually plague any and all effort to engage in intelligent discussion on game issues.

Here we go gathering nuts in May
Nuts in May
Nuts in May
Here we go gathering nuts in May
Erlie in the mornin'

...and it's still just December.

Please remember never to give Mogami an excuse to pull out any of those moldy old books of his that he's never read, but pretends to understand, and spend three or four days transcribing them into a post.

Too bad you people aren't getting paid by the word.