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First of all, lets expand USAFFE: This term is sometimes said to be "US Armed Forces in the Far East." But it really stood for "US Army Forces in the Far East." It was a creation of the War Department, and it turned (first defacto, then formally) the Philippine Department into a support branch. [Previously, the Philippine Department was the superior to the Philippine Division in the chain of command.] With the creation of USAFFE, Gen. MacArthur, a retired former US Army Chief of Staff who also was Field Marshall of the Philippine Army, took over command of US ARMY troops in the Philippines. Note this had nothing whatever to do with US NAVY forces in the Philippines. Adm Hart commanded the Asiatic Fleet, an independent entity not even subordinate to Pacific Fleet. [He usually got orders from the Navy Dept, but sometimes directly from the President]. Adm Hart and Gen MacArthur lived in the same building (the Manila Hotel), but could never dine, as each insisted he be seated at the head of the table! They appear to have hated each other to the point they did not speak directly. WITP OBs wrongly have Asiatic Fleet reporting to USAFFE - it is an independent force - and it is not a restricted command (it actually withdraws from Philippine waters in tact to be defeated by attrition in the Dutch East Indies).

The Philippine Army is a curiosity. It was overtaken by events and never reached its planned size of over 200,000 men in 2 regular and 10 reserve divisions. It also was mixed with regular US Army troops and two peculiar colonial military organizations: the Philippine Scouts and the Philippine Constabulary (which was paramilitary in character). Most of the officers and experienced NCOs of the Philippine Army came from the US Army or one of these organizations. They, in turn, had been created by, and were still led by, the US Army, and they had many US officers. This should not be interpreted to mean that there was much cultural understanding between American and Filipinos, even in these units. The command language was English, and it was rare for a US officer to learn even Tagalog (the nominal "national" language of the Philippines - although to this day no legal document has ever been written in it), much less Visaya (the language of 70% of the population) or any of the other 34 dialects spoken by the troops. An American who socialized with Filipino's (other than Gen MacArthur, who was social with the highest levels in Filipino society) was ostracized. Filipinos were called "monkeys" - as in the Navy drinking song "The Monkeys Have No Tails in Zamboanga."
It was not until WWII era events that a significant number of Americans came to respect Filipinos, because of the risks they took on behalf of US civilians at Sao Thomas University (in Manila) and Teacher's Camp (in Baguio City), as well as service in the underground, in guerilla forces, and as effective scouts for returning US forces (sort of precursors to LURPS).

The Philippine Army was organized as one (in fact, two in theory) "Regular Division" plus ten "Reserve Divisions." The quotes because the "Reserve Divisions" got most of the officers when finally they were mobilized, at the expense of the "Regular Division" which had to reform. Eventually the Philippine Army was inducted into the US Army (without, however, granting them US Army pay scales) - joining the Philippine Scouts and Philippine Constabulary which were ALWAYS in the US Army. In addition to these, there were some regular US Army formations, including 31st Infantry Regiment, four field artillery regiments, two tank battalions, two coast artillery anti-aircraft regiments (one of them missing from the WITP OB), and three regiments of coast artillery manning five forts. The Philippine Army also managed to stand up a coast artillery regiment (a second was planned), an artillery brigade, an anti-tank brigade (SP), a small air force and a tiny coastal patrol element (2 PT boats, of 12 planned).

The Philippine Army used a combination of WWI era equipment and modern weapons. Except for 155mm guns (without sights or fire control equipment), all the artillery was either 75mm Field Guns or "2.95 inch" (75mm) Pack guns. All the mortars were 3 inch, with overage ammunition which prooved to be 70% duds. The allocation of .50 cal Browning machine guns was 2 per regiment. The allocation of .30 cal machine guns was 8 per machine gun company (the "heavy weapons" unit of a battalion - which otherwise had no mortars or ATGs). There was no heavy weapons platoon in a company - just a single BAR! Eventually a one battalion Marine "regiment" and an ad hoc naval infantry battalion (called a "marine regiment") were added to US Army forces as well.

The coast defenses were obsolete, being built either before or after World War I. Their guns could be outranged by modern battleships, and except for Fort Drum and a single unique emplacement, all guns were vulnerable to air attack. Nevertheless, these guns were capable of closing Manila Bay for many months. Information released in the 1980s indicates that Fort Drum alone (with 2 twin 14 inch special army turrets and 2 six inch singles) would have kept Manila Bay after the surrender of General Waynewright had only it been provided with food!

Of all units in the Philippines, only the Philippine Scouts and the Coast Artillery aquitted themselves well in combat. The Scouts were able to stop even the best Japanese formations when backed with tanks, but had to fall back when flanking units gave way. They were the first to take the M-1 Garand into action, leading a US general to declare it "the finest battle implement ever invented." No less than 26 feet of concrete was planed off Fort Drum by bombs and shells, but all systems remained 100% operational. The Army Air Forces, the largest single concentration in the world at the time the war began, were destroyed on the ground. USAFFE forces attempts to stop the enemy at the beaches were defeated,
although the Philippine First Regular Division did manage a temporary reversal at one point. The campaign was marked by confusion, countermanding of orders, and the consequences of poor training and lack of elementary equipment (for example, sights for artillery pieces).
Of 7 radar sets in the islands, only two were operating, and neither of these was at the main airfield, Clark. The Asiatic Fleet withdrew, substantially abandoning the Philippines in favor of fighting with Allied forces further South. Cooperation and coordination between US Army and US Navy forces was never good and often worse than non-existent.

There are three Philippine Constabulary Regiments (light infantry) - 2 on Luzon (in reserve) and one on Mindinao (at Zamboanga, the 10th Military Region HQ and a traditional PC post).

The "301st Provisional Coast Defense Regiment" is really the First Philippine Coast Defense Regiment, and I broke it into two battalions since they are in two hexes.

The US tank battalions have 54 tanks, not 36 as listed.

The Provisional AT unit has 25 guns - odd but true. They are 75mm SPAT guns.

There is a missing AA Regiment - the 60th Coast Artillery AA Regiment. Both it and the 200th have 12 75mm AAA, 24x37mm AAA and 24 Browning AAMG.

12th Regiment, Eleventh Philippine Division is broken down because it is spread around Northern Luzon.

Anyone who wants a file to copy these units from send your request to trevethans@aol.com.

ORIGINAL: el cid again

There are three Philippine Constabulary Regiments (light infantry) - 2 on Luzon (in reserve) and one on Mindinao (at Zamboanga, the 10th Military Region HQ and a traditional PC post).

The "301st Provisional Coast Defense Regiment" is really the First Philippine Coast Defense Regiment, and I broke it into two battalions since they are in two hexes.

Not true. The 1st Philippine Coast Defense Regiment was being formed and was under training from the members of the 91st or 92nd Philippine Scout Coast Artillery Regiment (don't remember which). The 301st Provisional was formed to use the 155mm guns intended for coast defense in the straits south of Luzon and in the Visayas. It included personnel from the 1st CA (and a number of other sources) but was a separate and distinct unit.

The US tank battalions have 54 tanks, not 36 as listed.

Correct and they did have 54 in the early revs. I note that 54 in decimal is 36 in hex and wonder if we had a problem with load/unload tools.

The Provisional AT unit has 25 guns - odd but true. They are 75mm SPAT guns.

The Provisional FA unit had 48 75mm GMC anti-tank guns (out of 50 recently arrived).

There is a missing AA Regiment - the 60th Coast Artillery AA Regiment. Both it and the 200th have 12 75mm AAA, 24x37mm AAA and 24 Browning AAMG.

The 60th Coast AA was stationed on Corregidor and is included in the Corregidor Fortress. The same is true for the three Coast Artillery Regiments, which are also not individually listed in the OOB.

12th Regiment, Eleventh Philippine Division is broken down because it is spread around Northern Luzon.

Anyone who wants a file to copy these units from send your request to trevethans@aol.com.

Correct. There was also a Philippine Scout garrison at Baguio (two companies of 43rd Regiment).

Also, there were three OSP PT boats, not two. Q-111 and Q-112 were prototypes built in Britain but the war in Europe precluded any more being built there. Q-113 was a locally built prototype with the best features of the British built pair. 10 more were on order with estimated delivery in March, 1942 (but were never completed) and additional orders were planned.

The Provisional FA unit had 48 75mm GMC anti-tank guns (out of 50 recently arrived).

These were the precursor to the American M3 GMC, and in fact, several were in turn used by the Japanese after Bataan fell.(I can provide the actual names of the units if anybody needs them for anything, but technically they ARE identical to the M3's....

Not true. The 1st Philippine Coast Defense Regiment was being formed and was under training from the members of the 91st or 92nd Philippine Scout Coast Artillery Regiment (don't remember which). The 301st Provisional was formed to use the 155mm guns intended for coast defense in the straits south of Luzon and in the Visayas. It included personnel from the 1st CA (and a number of other sources) but was a separate and distinct unit.

I cannot testify based on personal knowledge since I was not born yet! But the University of Manila academic who specializes in the Philippine Army and the WWII period (Ricardo Trota Jose) in his history (The Philippine Army, 1935-1942) lists the mobilization dates for both the "first battalion, first coast artillery regiment" and "second battalion, first coast artillery regiment". He also lists a plan to mobilize a "first battalion, second coast artillery regiment" but says (because it was after the war began) it didn't happen. He also describes plans (by MacArthur) to use 7 12 inch guns and another 24 155s in the Visayas area - but the proposal was made in early December and never acted upon because the war came. I suspect you are right that the 301st was the unit intended for that - but the guns never shipped - much less arrived in the Philippines - so the unit should not be in the game. But a previous shipment of 24 155s DID arrive and the first regiment DID form - with two battalions. Since 12 is a proper battalion, I think this makes sense. And I bet the official Philippine plan was to call the later unit the "Second" - based on an assumption its guns would arrive. War was not expected before April - so a request in December might have permitted this. [Adm Hart had secret communications from the President to start a war by creating a naval incident - to which end he outfitted three small vessels - but he instructed the three officers involved - one per vessel - NOT to let it be known war would not wait until spring. Hart didn't get along with Mac and I bet it was not known in USAFFE or Philippine Army circles that the President had decided for war ASAP in November.]


Since the unit intended for the "area south of Luzon and in the Visayas" never got any weapons, it should not be in the OB. Since the First and Second battalions, First Coast Defense Regiment DID form AND fight, they SHOULD be in the OB. My decision remains correct - put in the units that formed and had guns, and take out the one which didn't have anything to fight with. I bet "301" is some sort of US Army designation - since it is not in the official Philippine Army listing.

Also, there were three OSP PT boats, not two. Q-111 and Q-112 were prototypes built in Britain but the war in Europe precluded any more being built there. Q-113 was a locally built prototype with the best features of the British built pair. 10 more were on order with estimated delivery in March, 1942 (but were never completed) and additional orders were planned.

The local boat is confirmed by several sources, but when war came only two were given to USAFFE (which had six of its own). I assume either no crew had been formed or that the boat was only "completed" in some technical sense, but not acceptable for some reason. In any case, since only two were transferred, only two should be listed. I think I saw them in the OB once, but I haven't checked. I don't think I ever saw the 6 US Army ones at all- but it is a long database to check line by line!

Correct. There was also a Philippine Scout garrison at Baguio (two companies of 43rd Regiment).

I have a map drawn and attached to a report by the commander of Fort John Hay, who led a column - first trying to link up with other USAFFE units - then back up into North Central Luzon to set up a resistence base. His map indicates rather different dispositions than official US Army Atlas maps do for regular units. It appears the 11th Philippine Division was not yet in its assigned positions along Lingayen Gulf when the Japanese came ashore - which accounts for no resistence quite nicely. It was still too far South - again logical since it was trying to reach the farthest North positions. But one element did "offer resistence at Buong" - in a counter attack that failed.

The problem with this area is that mostly it was companies and pairs of companies that were involved, and we really cannot break down to company level. I left the Scouts with their parent unit and used a battalion of the 12th regiment to simulate the garrison at Baguio/Fort John Hay. Actually, one of its companies was headed for San Fernando and I don't know exactly where the other two were - except somewhere in the general area - war caught them on the move. Another battalion - third battalion 12th regiment - had a company at Appari and two companies at the next city south (Tuguegarao) in the valley of Eastern North Luzon. They are only 50 miles apart - so because of 60 mile hexes - I combine these two forces into a single battalion unit - and renamed the hex Appari/Tuguegarao. The former Tueguegarao hex I named Ilagan - a real town yet farther South - and put no unit there since there were none. The Map scale has a road from this valley going to Clark passing through Baguio - actually it is farther East - and Balinta Pass on that road was guarded by a battalion. On this scale my battalion at Baguio simulates this by blocking the road passage. Putting no unit at all in this hex (as in both stock and CHS) means the road is not blocked at its southern end - which is not correct. And there is a way to simulate the pass - and the high mountains around Baguio - a battalion in this terrain matters. It is a reasonable compromise, since the road South also connects to Baguio by a different road - and both Balinta Pass and Baguio are in significant mountains - a mile or two high - it just isn't easy to name such big hexes properly.

The 60th Coast AA was stationed on Corregidor and is included in the Corregidor Fortress. The same is true for the three Coast Artillery Regiments, which are also not individually listed in the OOB.

I see the logic of this. It is historically (pre WWII historically) correct too.
But according to the official US Army history (The Fall of the Philippines) - because there were only two AA regiments, one went to Clark, the other to Manila. So I put them in those locations - as separate units so players have control of them. And since I have difinitive data on the coast defenses - I used that. I followed CHS and stock in not listing them as separate units - but rather created one for each hex - and then called them by the names of the forts they manned - which forts are also immobile (which is right). Only the semi-mobile 155s are treated separately. [Fixed 155s are listed with the forts, mobile 155s are listed with non-fort CD units.] Only one of the forts is truly hardened - Fort Drum - so the fort in the Bataan hex is not given the same fortification value - and will not be as hard to kill. But Fort Drum should be much harder to kill - although possibly not hard enough. [26 feet of concrete were planed off after super heavy guns were brought in - but every system was working. Only a lack of food caused it to surrender.]

But according to the official US Army history (The Fall of the Philippines) - because there were only two AA regiments, one went to Clark, the other to Manila

There were actually three AA Regiments in the Philippines (well, sort of).

At the start of the war there were only the 60th at Fort Mills and the 200th at Clark Field. There was no anti-aircraft protection for Manila. So one battalion of the 200th was detached, reinforced by spare 3in guns from ordnance depots and available personnel from various units, and sent to Manila. This unit was originally called the Provisional AA Regiment but was soon given the official designation of 515th Cst Artillery.

For purposes of CHS this unit (the 515th) is not directly represented. It is accounted for by the un-split 200th and by a few AA guns in the base force at Manila.

ORIGINAL: el cid again

The 60th Coast AA was stationed on Corregidor and is included in the Corregidor Fortress. The same is true for the three Coast Artillery Regiments, which are also not individually listed in the OOB.

I see the logic of this. It is historically (pre WWII historically) correct too.
But according to the official US Army history (The Fall of the Philippines) - because there were only two AA regiments, one went to Clark, the other to Manila. So I put them in those locations - as separate units so players have control of them. And since I have difinitive data on the coast defenses - I used that. I followed CHS and stock in not listing them as separate units - but rather created one for each hex - and then called them by the names of the forts they manned - which forts are also immobile (which is right). Only the semi-mobile 155s are treated separately. [Fixed 155s are listed with the forts, mobile 155s are listed with non-fort CD units.] Only one of the forts is truly hardened - Fort Drum - so the fort in the Bataan hex is not given the same fortification value - and will not be as hard to kill. But Fort Drum should be much harder to kill - although possibly not hard enough. [26 feet of concrete were planed off after super heavy guns were brought in - but every system was working. Only a lack of food caused it to surrender.]

I think you are incorrect in your reasoning here. The 60th CAA was specifically assigned to the defence of Corregidor (Ft. Mills), and indeed all of its guns were in emplacements. One only needs to read the history of the defence of Corregidor Island to determine this. The second regiment was the 515th CAA Provisional. In examining the TO&E of the Coastal AA regiment of 1940 you will find 2 gun AA,1 MG, and 1 Searchlight BN. By late 1941 the TO&E of the regiment had reorganized into 1 gun, 1 MG, and 1 searchlight. The 515th was being formed from units the 200th CAA rgt before the war started. Thus what needs to be adjusted is that the 60th CAA needs to remain as part of Ft Mills defence and the 515th CAA needs to be created.

Another good reference to this is a website dedicated to the survivors of these regiments which were New Mexico NG units, and this will provide a definitive answer to the indentification of the two units in question as to which one went where:

http://members.aol.com/bcmfofnm/

"Two weeks after the war began the Japanese started to make landings on Luzon and their air effort over Clark Field and the Manila area was intensified. Soon the main Japanese landing was made and a decision was reached to withdraw the forces into Bataan. The parent 200th assumed the mission of covering the retreat of the Northern Luzon Force into Bataan while the newly formed 515th assumed a similar mission for the South Luzon Force."

The semi-mobile 155 guns were actually guns with no sighting equipment because they were designed for mounting on Panama mounts, special fixed locations providing gun mounts and fire control. Thus there would be more Panama Mounts than guns, the guns being moved to positions as needed. However, since these mobile guns were without sights or fire control appuratus they must remain as part of the defensive fortifications and not be seperate. Indded they would be incapable of operating outside the domain of fixed defecnsive works. Later on the 155mm Gun M1 was use by mobile CA regiments providing them with the ability to engage naval targets and act as long range artillery for land forces.

ORIGINAL: Don Bowen

But according to the official US Army history (The Fall of the Philippines) - because there were only two AA regiments, one went to Clark, the other to Manila

There were actually three AA Regiments in the Philippines (well, sort of).

At the start of the war there were only the 60th at Fort Mills and the 200th at Clark Field. There was no anti-aircraft protection for Manila. So one battalion of the 200th was detached, reinforced by spare 3in guns from ordnance depots and available personnel from various units, and sent to Manila. This unit was originally called the Provisional AA Regiment but was soon given the official designation of 515th Cst Artillery.

For purposes of CHS this unit (the 515th) is not directly represented. It is accounted for by the un-split 200th and by a few AA guns in the base force at Manila.

Don is correct in this. All base units in the game are equipped with intrinsic AA. This AA capability can account for much of the AA units which are not in the game. To add all of these unit would probably, at least on the Allied side, fill up every slot. I have identified well over 60 regiments assigned to either the West Coast, Panama Canal Zone, or the Pacific Theatre up to mid 1943. It was during Mid-1943 that two things happened to the Coastal Anti-Aircraft Regiments. First, an independent Anti-Aircraft command was established which absorbed all of the Coastal AA units. Second, the regimental system was removed and in favor of independent BN's. Thus if we were to accurately portray this there would literally be hundreds of BN's in the Pacific theatre. The compromise was to let the AA units be represented by making them organic to the Base units, since that would be their primary mission.

There were actually three AA Regiments in the Philippines (well, sort of).

At the start of the war there were only the 60th at Fort Mills and the 200th at Clark Field. There was no anti-aircraft protection for Manila. So one battalion of the 200th was detached, reinforced by spare 3in guns from ordnance depots and available personnel from various units, and sent to Manila. This unit was originally called the Provisional AA Regiment but was soon given the official designation of 515th Cst Artillery.

For purposes of CHS this unit (the 515th) is not directly represented. It is accounted for by the un-split 200th and by a few AA guns in the base force at Manila.

I didn't change this - because of what the Army history says - but there ARE three AA units in CHS - there is also a "Marine AA regiment" - whatever that may be? I have not got rid of it although I have not yet found a reference to it either. But Marines tend to man guns on ships and naval stations - Mounting 51 used always to be a Marine mount on a major ship - before they took the Marines off most ships. So it does not seem impossible there is a Marine AA unit - de facto if not formally.

Don is correct in this. All base units in the game are equipped with intrinsic AA. This AA capability can account for much of the AA units which are not in the game. To add all of these unit would probably, at least on the Allied side, fill up every slot. I have identified well over 60 regiments assigned to either the West Coast, Panama Canal Zone, or the Pacific Theatre up to mid 1943. It was during Mid-1943 that two things happened to the Coastal Anti-Aircraft Regiments. First, an independent Anti-Aircraft command was established which absorbed all of the Coastal AA units. Second, the regimental system was removed and in favor of independent BN's. Thus if we were to accurately portray this there would literally be hundreds of BN's in the Pacific theatre. The compromise was to let the AA units be represented by making them organic to the Base units, since that would be their primary mission.

The only thing wrong with this approach is that it is NOT what is in CHS or stock. And I think what is there - representing AA regiments for early war formations - is correct. I also cannot reconcile the official Army history with the view that the two air base complexes were not covered. [In fact, there is both testimonial and photographic evidence the Army history "The Fall of the Philippines" is correct on this, and from both sides.] However, the situation was dynamic and involved three or four stages:
pre war, opening of the war, what happened after there were no air bases to defend, and possibly something later in the prolonged defense of Bataan. My focus is only on the second of these - what was the situation when the war began? First, we have difinitive data for 8 December 1941.
Second, it is the start of our scenario. So other things may be "true" - but we don't care what was the normal assignment in peacetime (e.g. a unit at Fort Mills) nor what happens after the war begind (because players control that).

While CHS and stock OBs do not, in general, have AA in most base units, or not anything approaching realistic quantities, I have for this area carefully included it. Thus where there are fixed 3 inch AA guns at coast defense forts, I put them in the forts. For example, in San Francisco there is an old battery of these - and it remained part of a coast gun regiment even after a true AAA regiment was attached to the command. The guns were used for practice instead of firing the big guns (if I remember right), and were retained mainly for that reason, I suppose. Similarly, there are six identified fixed 155s in the Philippines - 4 at one fort and 2 at another - and these I list with the forts. There are additional 155s of more than one type - and they serve more than one service. There are coast defense guns, there are howitzers of the regular type, and they serve in US coast defense regiments, Philippine Scouts coast defense regiments, the First (non-scout) Philippine coast defense regiment, and apparently both US and Philippine artillery regiments/groups/battalions. I have a photograph of a 155 concealed on Lingayen Gulf - a wheeled gun set up for coast defense - and the unit assigned to that area was a regular artillery unit which does NOT list ANY 155s in most references! It is not a coast defense gun, but it is being used as such, and it is clearly mobile.

ORIGINAL: el cid again

I didn't change this - because of what the Army history says - but there ARE three AA units in CHS - there is also a "Marine AA regiment" - whatever that may be? I have not got rid of it although I have not yet found a reference to it either. But Marines tend to man guns on ships and naval stations - Mounting 51 used always to be a Marine mount on a major ship - before they took the Marines off most ships. So it does not seem impossible there is a Marine AA unit - de facto if not formally.

This is the Provisional Marine Battalion that was used to man the AA guns at Cavite. It was an "illegal" unit that was formed by Asiatic Fleet from replacement personnel enroute to the 4th Marines in China but retained in the Philippines.

The Asiatic Fleet frequently requested permission to withdraw the 4th Marines from China as their position would be untenable in the event of war. Washington refused on political grounds so Asiatic Fleet simply did not sent replacements on to China. Once sufficient personnel had been retained "pending transport" a provisional battalion was formed.

The two units remained separate when the 4th Marines finally reached the Philippines, with the 4th at Subic Bay and the provisional battalion remaining at Cavite. Eventually the provisional battalion was merged into the 4th, along with the other marines from the Cavite and Subic Marine Barracks. To this was added the Naval Infantry Battalion and a mixture of personnel including air corps and even some Philippine scouts.

ORIGINAL: el cid again
I have a photograph of a 155 concealed on Lingayen Gulf - a wheeled gun set up for coast defense - and the unit assigned to that area was a regular artillery unit which does NOT list ANY 155s in most references! It is not a coast defense gun, but it is being used as such, and it is clearly mobile.

If you are talking about the Photograph in the Green Books, it is a mobile 155mm of the 86th FA Bn (PS). A battery from this unit was emplaced at the southern end of Lingayen Gulf but the Japanese landed further North and the battery did not come into action and was soon withdrawn.

Don pretty much hit a homer with the Philippine OOB. Surprised to see this rehashed really.[:(]

This is the Provisional Marine Battalion that was used to man the AA guns at Cavite. It was an "illegal" unit that was formed by Asiatic Fleet from replacement personnel enroute to the 4th Marines in China but retained in the Philippines.

Ah. THAT "marine battalion"!! I know about it. It is usually listed as infantry - and it even had a number - something like "12th" - not to be confused with a real Marine battalion - this unit is composed of sailors from all sorts of activities no longer with a job for various reasons.

If you are talking about the Photograph in the Green Books, it is a mobile 155mm of the 86th FA Bn (PS). A battery from this unit was emplaced at the southern end of Lingayen Gulf but the Japanese landed further North and the battery did not come into action and was soon withdrawn.

This makes sense. The 86th was the only artillery unit in the area. And I know a battery was placed. And it DID fire - by mistake - at shadows - three nights BEFORE the real invasion! The only thing wrong with this is that the 86th is usually llisted with 75s or 105s, not with 155s. I think it DID have a battery of 155s - but I am not sure why? There were, however, 24 new ones sent from the US for the Philippine Army, and possibly not all were issued. There are other possibilities.

Don pretty much hit a homer with the Philippine OOB. Surprised to see this rehashed really

This is a critical area. I call it "the center of the chessboard." And by not having units at proper strength in weapons, for example, it contributes to the inability to defend as long as should be (or was) done. The next CHS has fixed heavy weapons for the Japanese - and we were told they were fixed for the Allies - but in the Philippines they were still using old data.

The data for Philippine Army was fairly good - better than most OB data and as good as some of the better listings. But it does exclude quite a few units, and it does have units which never formed. The "301st Provisional" and the "2nd Division" are examples of the latter. CD for the Visayas was requested on 1 December - too late for action - so even if the unit was forming up - it had no guns. And a 2nd Regular Division was planned, but never formed - unless somehow this is meant to refer to the Philippine Constabulary (which formed up 2 regiments on Luzon and was supposed to form one at Zamboanga to beef up 101st Division). The Constabulary was para-military in character, and could form light infantry at need - it was reasonably common to form companies for special missions - particularly on Mindinao (where the Constabulary was born - there is even a Gary Cooper movie about this). Clearly the scholarly materials collected by Trota were not available before.

More disturbing for me are deployment issues. Four points in the Visayas and two more on Mindinao were defended. There was no "division" in the North of Luzon. 51 Division always had responsibility for defending Lemon Bay - and it actually did cover it - although in the event it was moving because First Regular Division came in to help - and got caught during displacement and routed. But it is anything but an "empty hex" as shown. Many units should be in Manila - but are not. And the light units - elements of 12th regiment - the entire regiment - were spread out around Northern Luzon. Part of this is the map itself - the critical hex NE of Clark contains both Baguio City and Balinta Pass - and it is non-malarial - and a major source of minerals, and a good source of food, timber and rice. It is highland terrain, with many mountain ridges and swift rivers.
I fixed that - but it isn't easy to do - since this is a hard code matter.

Another problem is the absense of many significant points in the Vasayas and two on Mindinao, while beaches and minor islands are given. I traded the latter for the former. There are also cities in the wrong hex - Iloilo and Tacloban for example. By fixing all these points I am able to deploy better - and there is a proper net of adjacent ports that should move supplies around as well. Yet another issue is supply generation: Manila was not given heavy industry - it is one of the great manufacturing cities of Asia - and local supply points and resources were not generated at the points required. Not required by troops - often the rates are too small to be of use to a major force- but required for accuracy. The Philippines was a rich place, with the second most valuable currency in Asia (the Peso was pegged at 50 cents US and it was backed in silver).
It is hard to find an inhabited place which does not export food, and there are many mines, including the largest copper mine in Asia. You would not guess from our map that Cebu was the second most important city, even including a shipyard, or Tacloban was important. And Davao does not dominate Davao economically as it should, rated entirely too small as a port or resource center.

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Another problem is the absense of many significant points in the Vasayas and two on Mindinao, while beaches and minor islands are given. I traded the latter for the former. There are also cities in the wrong hex - Iloilo and Tacloban for example. By fixing all these points I am able to deploy better - and there is a proper net of adjacent ports that should move supplies around as well. Yet another issue is supply generation: Manila was not given heavy industry - it is one of the great manufacturing cities of Asia - and local supply points and resources were not generated at the points required. Not required by troops - often the rates are too small to be of use to a major force- but required for accuracy. The Philippines was a rich place, with the second most valuable currency in Asia (the Peso was pegged at 50 cents US and it was backed in silver).
It is hard to find an inhabited place which does not export food, and there are many mines, including the largest copper mine in Asia. You would not guess from our map that Cebu was the second most important city, even including a shipyard, or Tacloban was important. And Davao does not dominate Davao economically as it should, rated entirely too small as a port or resource center.

I'd be very interested in the data and/or corrections that your have for the Philippine locations. Please post them or send them to me.