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Somewhere in the forum I saw someone comment about how unkillable Japanese subs seemed to be. He commented that he had retaken Bataan, and had 10 or 15 DDs stationed there on ASW, and the Japanese subs just kept picking away at him, one ship at a time until he had to withdraw. At the time I read it I had only finished playing the 2-month Commonwealth-vs-Japan scenario, and had not had a similar experience. But now I too have had some experiences with the seeming futility of using DDs and MSWs in ASW against Japanese subs, playing the Super Dreadnought scenario, ca. Nov 1926.

I've built a decent base at French Frigate Atoll (FFAtoll) and about two weeks earlier FPs based there with AV support had spotted what appeared to be Jap subs, so I sent out a swarm of recently repaired DDs and MSWs from Pearl. I painstakingly deployed about 35 ships in an exquisite cone-pattern, inexorably encircling, and tightening the noose on the Japanese TFs over the course of a week or so game-time.

It was actually quite an exciting game-play experience, because I'd spot them, then loose them, then respot them, etc. At one point my spotters were telling me there was a Jap BB and two SSs. At another time there was only "one CA"!? etc., Very fun, and realistic fog-of-war stuff (BTW, this is something I really love about this game, and I have to say it is EXCEPTIONALLY well done! the not knowing 100% much of the time is a very refreshing turn compared to many strategy games). Related to this, the AI does not exhibit the common behavior patterns that many AI algorithms in strategy games exhibit of "going straight for your weakest spot," which is also exceptionally refreshing.

What happened next was not quite so "fun," though I will have to admit it was engaging and fun in that frustrating-figuring-it-out sort of way . . . [:@]

Having encircled the Jap TFs in hexes ~109,68 (i.e., east, south-east of FFatoll) my ASW fleet began to close in, and I finally began to get what seemed like more solid Intell on the enemy composition. Seems there were defintely at least two maybe three Jap subs in the area (still there in fact, have not continued play past about 11-18-26 as yet): SS-23, SS-29, and SS-35 (23 and 29 could have been confused for the same boat at one or more episodes of identification.

Over the span of four of five days, with up to 12 DDs & MSW TFs operating in the same hexes, and all surrounding hexes having 2 or more ASW boats in them, these two or three Japanese subs began to pick off my ships! Something like five boats were sunk, and there must have been 30 separate ASW engagements, involving 20 to 30 torpedos fired at my surface boats, and a comparable number of depth charges fired at subs. My combat reports were about 35% "inconclusive" (sub evades, no statement of damage to sub); about 35% "near-misses" (torpedo failed to detonate, or torpedo missed); and the rest divided about half between inconclusive evidence of damage to an SS, and obvious, definite, and conslusive evidence to one of my boats (i.e., five of them sunk!).

Most of the reports of damage to subs said things like:
"near miss . . . sub taking on some water" and "SS-39, 1 hits" etc.

In short, things that indicated that some damage probably had been done but nothing certain like: "oil slick observed, at target hex; ASW commander claims a kill!" or "substantial bubble and debris observed" or "sonograph operating reports major explosions coming from direction of enemy sub" or anything somewhat more conclusive of scoring a sub-kill.

Now I know that anti-sub warfare was still very much hit and miss even in mid 1941, and it was not until 1942 that improved ASW technology really began to take the teeth out of the attack sub threat, so I don't want to sound like I'm complaining that it is not easier to kill subs. But I do have a few questions:

1) Is it intended that subs be "this hard to kill?"

OR,
1a) Is it simply intended that sub-kills be this hard to CONFIRM?

From the allied perspective, subs are indeed "this hard to kill" because I've only lost one sub sank (by a depth charge attack near Laysan, quite early in the scenario), and had maybe 3 or 4 damaged sufficiently by ASW attacks that I felt they needed to IMMEDIATELY return to port, and another 5 to 10 that were slightly damaged, and did not have to immediately go home for repairs.

2) If subs really are this hard to kill, then presumably this is a reflection of a specific understanding of dynamics of sub-ASW combat in the 1920s? Any links to a site, or even a book or something that discusses this would be very interesting and much appreciated (I'd just like to learn more really).

I could believe if this really is an accurate reflection of historical reality [but would just like to confirm that, yes, it IS an accurate reflection, and yes it IS intended to be this skewed in favor of sub survivability]. I know that the U-boats had a field day in the early half of the Battle of the Atlantic in 1940-41, and it was not until toward the end of 1941, with improved search lights, longer-range planes, improved sonar, improved depth charges, and improved convoy doctrine that the U-boat threat was really started to be reversed. Subsequent to this date of course, being a U-boat crewman was an increasingly risky occupation, and in the end some very large proportion of all U-boat crewmen were killed (something like 70%)?.

3) Do the combat reports ever give anything more conclusive about ASW effects, similar to what I mention above? Or are inconclusive reports pretty much as good as it ever gets?

4) Any hints on more effective tactics for countering subs are appreciated (though I appreciate not wanting to give away _too much_, and deprive forum members of figuring things out on their own [&:] [:@][:D]).

I guess what it boils down to is this: I know how big a change there was in ASW vs. subs in 1941-42 in the Battle of the Atlantic, but next to nothing about 1920s sub warfare, so I don't know if I'm squandering my DDs and MSWs by sending them out to try to accomplish something that any commander of the day would have known was unachievable and suicical, or if I'm repeating the same delusional mistakes that were made in actual history.

One last thing: can anyone tell me how I can change my forum password? I had it reset and now it is some garbled string of letters, and I'd like to change it to something I can remember, but cannot find the button, or preferences window where I have this option.

Subs are meant to be this hard to kill.

A factor in the determination is also whether sub doctrines are on or off, and whether the sub captain is very aggressive or very cautious. Both help determine the level of risks he'll take, and thus how vulnerable his boat will be.

Overall, though, remember that we're in the 20's here, far far away from the ASW technology and training of WWII. It really is that much of a crap shoot.

ORIGINAL: Terminus

Subs are meant to be this hard to kill.

A factor in the determination is also whether sub doctrines are on or off, and whether the sub captain is very aggressive or very cautious. Both help determine the level of risks he'll take, and thus how vulnerable his boat will be.

Overall, though, remember that we're in the 20's here, far far away from the ASW technology and training of WWII. It really is that much of a crap shoot.

Cool. Thanks for confirming that Terminus. I know there are a myriad of factors that weigh in to the ASW-sub encounter outcomes, and I think I made a mistake by staffing as many of my DDs with hyper-aggressive commanders [:-]. Not to mention fighting in deep water.

One other question: Is a TF with an "ASW rating of 10" "ten times" more effective in fighting a sub as one with an ASW rating of 1? Or, is it 10 times more effective to have ten ASW=1 TFs in one hex?

I can imagine that subs work better solo, because it is so difficult for them to communicate visually or via wireless. But perhaps a TF of (say for example) 12 DDs on ASW is optimum (allowing circling tactics with individuals attempting to coordinate a pattern so that they surround the target area with one ASW boat per 30-degrees of arc) with more than twelve being less effective from bungling and crowding, and less than twelve being less effective from gaps in the screen?

1) Is it intended that subs be this hard to kill?
IMHO the number of times subs are hit is quite realistic, the problem is that they should suffer more damage from near misses and above all direct hit... IMHO 1 direct hit should have at least 33% of chance of killing a sub.
BTW at the beginning it was very frustrating for me too! [:)]


2) If so, presumably this is a reflection of a specific understanding of dynamics of sub-ASW combat in the 1920s? Any links to a site, or even a book or something that discusses this would be very interesting and much appreciated (I'd just like to learn more really).
I can suggest to check this forums and this site. You can find a lot of info!

BTW in WWI and 1920s sonar wasn't still a perfect device and it was rarely available... So it was very difficult to detect and to keep tracked a submarine (remember that the Depth Charges of this timeframe could be only launched at the rear of he ship).

Historically, in WWI each German submarine sunk on average at least twice the tonnage that each German submarine sunk on WWII...


3) Do the combat reports ever give anything more conclusive about ASW effects, similar to what I mention above?
Near misses cause on average about 1-5 sys and floatation damage... Direct hit about 30. Combat reports never give away more informations...


4) Any hints on more effective tactics for countering subs appreciated (though I appreciate not wanting to give away too much, and deprive forum members of figuring things out on their own.
Here's some suggestions... Don't send ASW TF to search sea hex for submarines, you'll probably get a 1:2 or worse trade off of kills...
Use your air squadrons to spot and suppress enemy subs... Send ASW TF only when your squadrons spot one of them... You'll get much better results, since a spotted sub has less chances to attack and has more chances of being attacked by your DD.

Don't use MSW for ASW duties... They're too slow (and they slow DDs on the same TF too) and speed (together with maneuvrability) is one of the main factors to avoid a torpedo!

Always put some DD on transport TF... even if they won't hit anything they'll make sub attack less accurate!

ORIGINAL: Anthropoid
One other question: Is a TF with an "ASW rating of 10" "ten times" more effective in fighting a sub as one with an ASW rating of 1? Or, is it 10 times more effective to have ten ASW=1 TFs in one hex?

It's better IMHO to have 8 to 12 DD on a ASW TF... ASW rating means only how many ASW weapons are deployed on the ships included on that TF. More ships is better because they have more chances to do a successfull attack once the sub has been detected.

ORIGINAL: Pkunzipper

1) Is it intended that subs be this hard to kill?
IMHO the number of times subs are hit is quite realistic, the problem is that they should suffer more damage from near misses and above all direct hit... IMHO 1 direct hit should have at least 33% of chance of killing a sub.
BTW at the beginning it was very frustrating for me too! [:)]

2) If so, presumably this is a reflection of a specific understanding of dynamics of sub-ASW combat in the 1920s? Any links to a site, or even a book or something that discusses this would be very interesting and much appreciated (I'd just like to learn more really).
I can suggest to check this forums and this site. You can find a lot of info!

BTW in WWI and 1920s sonar wasn't still a perfect device and it was rarely available... So it was very difficult to detect and to keep tracked a submarine (remember that the Depth Charges of this timeframe could be only launched at the rear of he ship).

Historically, in WWI each German submarine sunk on average at least twice the tonnage that each German submarine sunk on WWII...

Wow! TWICE as much [X(]! THAT right there answers most my questions!

3) Do the combat reports ever give anything more conclusive about ASW effects, similar to what I mention above?
Near misses cause on average about 1-5 sys and floatation damage... Direct hit about 30. Combat reports never give away more informations...

That seems a bit of a shame, no? I mean in real life, wouldn't there at least sometimes be a bit more conclusive evidence of the sub having been really badly damaged or sunk, e.g., repeated loud explosion noises on the sonograph, debris, and oil slick, bubbles? I'm only a novice naval history buff, so I may be off base, but I would think that when a sub really goes kablooie!, and rips wide open, it MUST make a rather distinctive set of signs on the surface? True, a lot of the times a sub that sank probably just leaked and slowly sank lower, and lower until the hull imploded. But I would think that even that would make a distinctive sound that would at least sometimes be audible on the sonagraph (which as I understand it is simply a set of microphones under water, not an actual sound wave producer/receive as in "sonar"). I would think that ships with any ASW capacity would at least have a sonagraph, and thus would have some, if highly tentative, capacity to listen to what was going on underwater in the vicinity. The veracity of my logic is suggested by the fact that ANY details about combat effects on the sub are given at all. If it is realistic and appropriate that I be told "near miss" or "1 hit" when there appears to have been such an impact of ASW attack, why should there not also (at least sometimes) be reports that of more dramatic evidence of damage (explosion sounds, debris, bubbles, metal ripping noise, grating, etc.??). My guess is that this is simply one of those small, minor details that has been left out, and the error has been made here to retain the fog of war, but it would not seem to be too much work to go back in and attach half-dozen or 12 new text-lines to the sub-results data so that there were sometimes these sorts of more dramatic reports from ASW-sub combat. Would seem to be a promising inclusion in any new patches??

4) Any hints on more effective tactics for countering subs appreciated (though I appreciate not wanting to give away too much, and deprive forum members of figuring things out on their own.
Here's some suggestions... Don't send ASW TF to search sea hex for submarines, you'll probably get a 1:2 or worse trade off of kills...
Use your air squadrons to spot and suppress enemy subs... Send ASW TF only when your squadrons spot one of them... You'll get much better results, since a spotted sub has less chances to attack and has more chances of being attacked by your DD.

Don't use MSW for ASW duties... They're too slow (and they slow DDs on the same TF too) and speed (together with maneuvrability) is one of the main factors to avoid a torpedo!

Always put some DD on transport TF... even if they won't hit anything they'll make sub attack less accurate!

Thanks! very helpful! All ideas I was contemplating, so thanks for confirming my suspiciouns [:)] And thanks for the link to the sub site!

ORIGINAL: Anthropoid


That seems a bit of a shame, no? I mean in real life, wouldn't there at least sometimes be a bit more conclusive evidence of the sub having been really badly damaged or sunk, e.g., repeated loud explosion noises on the sonograph, debris, and oil slick, bubbles? I'm only a novice naval history buff, so I may be off base, but I would think that when a sub really goes kablooie!, and rips wide open, it MUST make a rather distinctive set of signs on the surface? True, a lot of the times a sub that sank probably just leaked and slowly sank lower, and lower until the hull imploded. But I would think that even that would make a distinctive sound that would at least sometimes be audible on the sonagraph (which as I understand it is simply a set of microphones under water, not an actual sound wave producer/receive as in "sonar"). I would think that ships with any ASW capacity would at least have a sonagraph, and thus would have some, if highly tentative, capacity to listen to what was going on underwater in the vicinity. The veracity of my logic is suggested by the fact that ANY details about combat effects on the sub are given at all. If it is realistic and appropriate that I be told "near miss" or "1 hit" when there appears to have been such an impact of ASW attack, why should there not also (at least sometimes) be reports that of more dramatic evidence of damage (explosion sounds, debris, bubbles, metal ripping noise, grating, etc.??). My guess is that this is simply one of those small, minor details that has been left out, and the error has been made here to retain the fog of war, but it would not seem to be too much work to go back in and attach half-dozen or 12 new text-lines to the sub-results data so that there were sometimes these sorts of more dramatic reports from ASW-sub combat. Would seem to be a promising inclusion in any new patches??

As to distincitive evidence, usually when a sub is sunk it does leave debris or an oil slick. However, subs also can release oil or jettison debris as a means of fooling an enemy warship, so that in itself is not a sure guarantee. Sometimes a sub can make a loud noise (assuming it implodes when it reaches crush depth), but if the sub has flooded out, then the pressure is equalized and the sub would not implode.

As to hearing a contact, the only sonar available in the game are basic hydrophones. ASDIC, or active sonar, wasn't first installed on a ship until 1920 by the British, and by 1924 only a training flotilla of 4 ships was equipped. The US Navy wouldn't install its first actual sonar sets until 1931, and Japan not until the late 1930s and even the '40s! (Many Japanese ships didn't even have sonar in WW2). So while Sonar existed in the time frame, the sudden outbreak of war and the urgent need for destroyers would make installing the sets few and far between for the British, while the US and Japan would have to do without.

The only true SONAR device used by these ships is the hydrophone. The problem with it is if a ship is going at over 8-12 knots, it can't hear anything. So even though the last DC pattern was on target, because the ship is moving so fast they wouldn't hear any "death booms" or other evidence. At best they would just loose the contact.

As to more detailed stuff, combat reports are always skimpy. In the sense that it is the information sent by the TF commander to you, the theater commander. If you want more detailed stuff, watch the combat animation. There you will see things like "submarine commander evades pattern" "Near miss to port rattles sub" "Near miss causes minor damage to sub" etc, etc. But Combat Reports post combat are just a short summary of the battle sent up to higher HQ. So while in combat you see the dramatic stuff, post combat it is just a measure of hits achieved.

As to inclusion in later patches, I don't know. On the one hand I think it would be good to put all of the info in the AAR as seen on the combat screen (BB XX Fire YY, DD ZZ hit by YY, flooding), but on busy turns that would be a lot to sort through, especially if posting an AAR on the forums.

Hydrophone was a very aprossimative device...

If the sub moves deep at a very slow speed (less than 3 knots) it, almost surely, couldn't be heard by something that is hearing on the surface, since the propellers of the sub are moving so slowly that makes very weak noises...

As Tankerace said, an escort ship, in order to use the hydrophone, must travel at very low speed (and her hearing ability is at the maximum at full stop). So it becomes an easy prey if the subs is still hanging at peryscope depth and has still 1 torpedoes on the tubes..
In addition it was almost impossible to use the hydrophone while escorting a convoy, since the noises of the merchants would make almost impossible to hear anything underwater...

During an attack run, hydrophone becomes totally ineffective to gather any info on the attacked sub, since the DD has to run away from her own just discharged depth charges and the splash of the depth charges in the water and their explosions would cause a big hole on the hydrohone detection (even several seconds after the explosion).
One of the most common submarine tactics on both WWI and WWII, was to move on silent run (< 3 knots) untill the DD dropped the depth charges, then to change the course of 90 degrees and to run away at full speed untill the explosion were heard and then again on silent run.

Wow. Amazing stuff. Thanks for the information on this stuff guys.

I would love to read a book that focuses on the role of submarines in the early 20th century. It sounds like they really were an important, powerful, even determining factor when they were used properly.

I'm an anthropologist (physiology and consumer psych type stuff) by trade but I've always been interested in military history, and over the past few years have read a dozen or so books in various areas of military history. Two of my favorite recent ones were "Shattered Sword: Untold Story of Midway" and "War" the reprint of the 1970s book by the Canadian scholar. If any of you guys can recommend a good book I'd love to hear about it!

You can find a lot of books HERE (search on warship section on the left).

Subs can be killed - if you make it your top priority. And you should, from day one. That means massing out your DDs on the forward bases, mining expected enemy submarine bases, hunting down milch cows - solo AP/AKs sent out to die in vain but refuel a bunch of subs in the process a few hexes away from your bases, massing out long-range aircraft - go blimps! - up front...

In my AAR on the forum I am up to 8 sub kills by 12/30/1922. Granted, it came at a price, mainly from IJN anti-ASW TFs running into my ASW ones...

P.S. Subs have been toned down in 1.20. It's up to you what you want to do... =)

quote]ORIGINAL: Rysyonok

Subs can be killed - if you make it your top priority. And you should, from day one. That means massing out your DDs on the forward bases, mining expected enemy submarine bases, hunting down milch cows - solo AP/AKs sent out to die in vain but refuel a bunch of subs in the process a few hexes away from your bases, massing out long-range aircraft - go blimps! - up front...

In my AAR on the forum I am up to 8 sub kills by 12/30/1922. Granted, it came at a price, mainly from IJN anti-ASW TFs running into my ASW ones...

P.S. Subs have been toned down in 1.20. It's up to you what you want to do... =)
[/quote]

Thanks Rysyonok. I actually had one combat animation report on an ASW attack that was about as definitive as I one could ever expect. Something like "direct hit, major explosion, sub severely damaged, taking on lots of water . . ."

This will be quite fun to figure out!

ORIGINAL: Anthropoid
Thanks Rysyonok. I actually had one combat animation report on an ASW attack that was about as definitive as I one could ever expect. Something like "direct hit, major explosion, sub severely damaged, taking on lots of water . . ."
This will be quite fun to figure out!

I set my sub/ASW animations to 2-3 second delay to enjoy all of the details =) It's one of the best aspects of the game in my opinion. I particularly enjoy it when the attacked sub turns around and sinks of the attackers =)

P.S. Ever seen 4 direct hits back to back?

ORIGINAL: Rysyonok
Subs can be killed - if you make it your top priority. And you should, from day one.

I forgot to say why, didn't I.

As both sides run out of DDs and have to switch to converted AKs, BBs become invincible as fewer and fewer ships have torpedoes armed. That makes every single sub priceless.

running ASW TF's is rather dicey in WPO. You never know when an enemy battlecruiser squadron will appear from the mist and sink all those pretty pretty tincans.

to pkunzipper: I'm having PC trouble. Will get back to PBEM asap.

Ok, nice to know!
I was thinking you gave up after the last battle... [:D][:'(]

Just started reading "War in the Pacific" by Harry Gailey. First synthesis of that region I've read, and seems like a good overview. I had not realized it, but it sounds like the hypothetical scenario portrayed in the game is not too far from reality. Given that their defeat seemed like simply a matter of time and perserverance (from my perhaps admittedly biased American perspective) I have always been naively amazed that the Japanese decided to declare war on the U.S. and lead off with a surprise attack on Pearl.

German fascism always seemed more "sensical" albeit thoroughly misguided. Seems to me the Germans very well could have expected to have sustained substantial gains with their aggression, but the Japanese . . . it just never seemed logical to go beyond their stalemate with China and drag themselves in the Tripartite Pact, and then to top that off attack Pearl and rouse the sleeping isolationist giant. The more I learn about Japanese society in that time period, and the role of the Generals in particular, it doesn't seem quite so surprising after all. Irrational, poorly thought out, reprehensible, sure, but not so surprising.

I had one battle where I just massacred a bunch of AKs and TKs, and a couple DDs, but my torpedoes don't seem to be doing so well.

Also, it seems like even when I get a hit, the escourts seem to chase off my subs before they can confirm a kill. I guess that it does take a while for a merchant boat with its back broken to actually sink, so the realism is quite apt.

It's the Fog of War setting. If you sink an enemy ship, but can't confirm it immediately, it can take quite a while for the ship's name to appear in the statistics...

I actually love the Fog of War settings in this game! I love it that my fliers are telling me there is a BB, or a CA off the coast of French Frigate then when the boat is actually engaged it turns out to be an SS!! The not knowing for sure about kills (waiting to find out that the enemy has stricken the boat from their registry, only via indirect, circuitous sources of intell, and only weeks or months later), that is all very realistic, and refreshing in a strategy game!

The other refreshing thing is how the AI behaves. I've observed that it definitely WILL respond to what you do, i.e., it is not simply on its own auto-pilot, but it does not ONLY respond, nor does it behave in a strictly opportunistic fashion.

Examples: I started Super Dreadnought as U.S. with first turn auto off, and methodically moved around nearly every unit in the Phil on turn one: Japanese did not even invade Phil for SEVERAL weeks, sent in only a token force and occupied only Aparri, and then they went and invaded Midway!

Same scenario on restart, let the first turn lapse as more of a simulation of Japanese surprise and American unpreparedness: Japanese within a matter of days invaded north Luzon with a massive force.