Matrix Games Forums

Hi all,

One of the best features (for me anyway) of TOAW is the concept of full, limited, or zero cooperation levels between forces. Anyone else think that this concept could have a place in the RDOA/HTTR/COTA engine?? Perhaps not to the extent in TOAW but possibly at the national force levels?? I find it somewhat unlikely that an Australian battalion would have the same degree of "cooperation" in an attack/defence from a Greek battalion that it would enjoy with another Aussie unit.
This engine already excels at so many things like command delays, proficiency, leadership etc. that it just seems that adding functionality like cooperation would be a part of a natural evolution. [&o]

Comments anyone?? [:)]

Rob.

To a certain extent this is covered already in that non-organic units impose a bigger staff load on their commanding HQ. But there is no specific nationality penalty though. It would be fairly easy to implement, though testing to see if its effects aren't too drastic may take time.
 
TT2974 - AI - Increase staff costs of foreign nationality units

It might also be worth pointing out that somewhere in the code and wishlists is the desire to support different national doctrines which would seem partially related to inter-force and inter-service cooperation.

Does your reference to incorporating differences in doctrine imply that the German superiority in small arms tactics, small unit leadership and individual initiative over almost every other army on the planet at the time is not currently a part of the model?

I was wondering how the differences between the performance of a given German company compared to a given Commonwealth company are being handled.

ORIGINAL: HansBolter

Does your reference to incorporating differences in doctrine imply that the German superiority in small arms tactics, small unit leadership and individual initiative over almost every other army on the planet at the time is not currently a part of the model?

I was wondering how the differences between the performance of a given German company compared to a given Commonwealth company are being handled.

Performance of individual companies has nothing to do with the topic of this thread.

Not sure but I would think handled through the individual unit and leader attributes that are built into the game.

ORIGINAL: molotov_billy

ORIGINAL: HansBolter

Does your reference to incorporating differences in doctrine imply that the German superiority in small arms tactics, small unit leadership and individual initiative over almost every other army on the planet at the time is not currently a part of the model?

I was wondering how the differences between the performance of a given German company compared to a given Commonwealth company are being handled.

Performance of individual companies has nothing to do with the topic of this thread.

Abilities or the lack thereof for cooperation between units of different nationalities can be JUST as dependent on differences in doctrine as they are on differences in language, leadership, equipment, etc....

So asking a question about how differences in cababilities at the individual unit level, based on differences in doctrines, is modeled is most certainly germain to the discussion.

Look, I'm new to the game, new to the forum and so far, am enjoying both. What I really don't need is to get into a tiff with a self-appointed thread monitor taking me to task for his mistaken perception that my posts are off topic leading to my getting pissed off enough not to bother to come back to the forum.

Come on HansBolter, yes moletov_billy's reply sounds a little harsh, but give him the benefit of the doubt that he didn't mean to piss you off.

IMHO the points you made that your reply was on topic were perfect and would have been enough.

Please stay and enjoy the forum.

ORIGINAL: HansBolter

Does your reference to incorporating differences in doctrine imply that the German superiority in small arms tactics, small unit leadership and individual initiative over almost every other army on the planet at the time is not currently a part of the model?

I was wondering how the differences between the performance of a given German company compared to a given Commonwealth company are being handled.

Interesting idea. Given that all of these characteristics of the German Army changed drastically during the war, how would you implement them in the game so that they might be altered in future products?

IMO, small arms tactics would amount to training and little else. In other words, how likely was any given unit to apply its doctrine or trained methods in combat under a variety of circumstances. This is covered in the game quite adequately by several variables (morale, training, experience, cohesiveness, etc.)

Leadership is well covered in the game, but is a very hard thing to quantify especially when measuring the performance of hundreds of obscure commanders who may or may not have made a significant difference in the success or failure of their units' operations. The German Army had an excellent command cadre early in the war, but not every commander was superior or even adequate. The question that would need to be answered by the engine would be, again, how likely a given commander would be to follow doctrine under any number of circumstances and how likely that same commander would be to depart from doctrine when the circumstances required him to do so. Obviously we are now entering the very murky waters of AI programming and mind-numbing complexity. CotA, if I am not mistaken, simplifies this somewhat, but, yes, there are variables that would allow a scenario designer to, if they saw fit, apply higher values to German commanders.

Individual initiative, as I have already mentioned, is a terribly complex thing to program. I would think this would become the area of the player. A small unit could be given any number of tweaks to reflect German initiative, but overall the actual decisions would need to be made by a human player. Any AI, at least with present technology, asked to make the kinds of decisions routinely made by a small unit commander, will fail miserably. The best we can ask for at this point is an abstracted system like the one CotA uses.

In any case, I doubt very much any of this is on topic as the original poster was obviously only referring to the difficulties units from different military backgrounds would have when attempting to operate together. I am sure that this point would equally relate to a German unit attempting to coordinate their movements with an Italian or Rumanian unit, for example, as it would with a British unit attempting to work closely with an American unit.

Cheers

Paul

I know that Bil Hardenberger (Chief Realism Officer) has mentioned doctrine in the past and that Dave has said that the hooks are in the engine to support different doctrines based on national forces, but I don't recall if that also included services. I believe at the moment, that there are no doctrines or differences as to how the AI plays a particular nationality or service.

I think incorporation of doctrine would be an interesting and challenging new aspect of the game moving towards further realism. As I understand it now, much of what I do with mortar, arty, and support weapons probably violates doctrine in terms of the creation of forces and attachments that is ahistoric. It would seem at the moment many wargames allow a player much greater degree of freedom than real commanders actually had. And always there is the question of just how much realism do players actually want. This question has come up in flight sims often where do player simply want the spirit of what one had to do or does one want to have worry about prop-pitch, carberation, cooling vent settings, etc...

PS: All responses are fine. All threads tend to roam. Sometimes the roaming may be even more productive than the actual topic itself and sometimes not ... whatever ...

Sure different doctrines are important, however, I would rather see enhanced attack options, recon, and attack timings perhaps coupled with maneuver graphics...

[;)]

Cabron66, good post BTW. 

IMO the German Army did so well in the early part of the war mostly through better leadership at the higher levels (Division Command and up)... at the tactical level (Company and below) it was primarily a training, experience, and small unit leadership differential, but I would argue that the gap was not as large as Hans suggests.  There is no need to add anything to the game, IMO it already covers all those bases, especially at the command levels we are dealing with here.

Bil

I agree Bil. AFAIK the main doctrinal superiority enjoyed by the German Army was that they encouraged subordinate commanders to use their initiative to achieve their commanders intent and that a reasonable plan executed quickly was far better than the perfect plan executed later. The latter aspect of this becomes more pronounced and hence is of more significance at the operational level rather than the tactical level. In the game this is modelled through orders delay and is affected by the various commander attributes and unit staff qualities. The scenario designer can freely apply above average values to these to German forces if he so wishes. I believe we have done so where historical evidence supported this for COTA.

However, by the time of the Bulge in 1944/5 the edge enjoyed by the Germans was largely eroded due to the loss of many experienced operational commanders. In fact much of the evidence points to a marked German inferiority, especially amongst its inexperienced Volks Grenadier divisions. Even the 12th SS Pz Div displayed a marked lack of flexibility and initiative. But this is not surprising when you consider that 80% of its manpower, including junior officers were largely green.

It's one thing to have a doctrine that encourages subordinate initiative. It's another to have the experienced subordinates who feel confident enough to exercise it. By the war's end there were fewer and fewer of these within the German Army. Conversely there were significantly more such officers within the American Army than there were when it first got blooded in 1942.

ORIGINAL: HansBolter

Abilities or the lack thereof for cooperation between units of different nationalities can be JUST as dependent on differences in doctrine as they are on differences in language, leadership, equipment, etc....

A single unit's performance in combat is seperate from it's ability to cooperate and work with units of other nationalities.
A german unit's abilities in combat are simulated in the engine, though difficulties in cooperation with other units are not. These are seperate things in the real world and as such should be seperated in the game.

Look, I'm new to the game, new to the forum and so far, am enjoying both. What I really don't need is to get into a tiff with a self-appointed thread monitor taking me to task for his mistaken perception that my posts are off topic leading to my getting pissed off enough not to bother to come back to the forum.

This isn't necessary.

ORIGINAL: HansBolter
............. leading to my getting pissed off enough not to bother to come back to the forum.

Well, I guess that molotov_billy just tried to get this thread back to the original topic. Maybe he could have expressed it in a more friendly manner, dunno..... :p

Don't take it personal, I guess everyone welcomes your enthusiasm and you seem to deliver some interesting input, mostly. Maybe keep things a bit more on track [:)].

ORIGINAL: Arjuna
However, by the time of the Bulge in 1944/5 the edge enjoyed by the Germans was largely eroded due to the loss of many experienced operational commanders. In fact much of the evidence points to a marked German inferiority, especially amongst its inexperienced Volks Grenadier divisions. Even the 12th SS Pz Div displayed a marked lack of flexibility and initiative. But this is not surprising when you consider that 80% of its manpower, including junior officers were largely green.

I am constantly amazed every time I read something saying how supreme the German system was.. and yet after 1943 I believe they were outclassed by the Allies, not just tactically, but operationally as well. Just read about the American 6th Armored Division's reaction when a German Infantry Division attacked it from the rear... the Div Commander stopped the Division in its tracks, turned around and counter-attacked destroying the German Division which could not react as quickly. This example shows how far the German Army had deteriorated by Summer '44.

Bil

ORIGINAL: Bil H

I am constantly amazed every time I read something saying how supreme the German system was.. and yet after 1943 I believe they were outclassed by the Allies, not just tactically, but operationally as well. Just read about the American 6th Armored Division's reaction when a German Infantry Division attacked it from the rear... the Div Commander stopped the Division in its tracks, turned around and counter-attacked destroying the German Division which could not react as quickly. This example shows how far the German Army had deteriorated by Summer '44.

Bil

A lot of what is considered "truth" is still remnants of the original propaganda that surrounded the the German military in 1940/41.

I have found myself in many arguments over at Subsim, with serious submarine grogs, regarding the uboat, both in terms of quality and reliability. Despite volumes of evidence to the contrary (see Blair's 2 volume treatise), most thought every one could hit 200 meters without crushing, that they had a large impact on the war, and that their diesels never broke down. The reality, of course, was something a bit more realistic.

One of the Allied official histories (forget which one) records the comment made by a Bavarian infantryman following his capture near Olympus. His unit had basically marched up to the dug-in Allied defences in column and had been badly shot up. When asked why they had attacked in such a bizarre manner, his comment was "our officers, they are not very good".

Jentz' Panzertruppen also describes several attacks in the East in 1942 that read like the boy scouts decided to go tank commanding. Units getting lost, getting bogged, shooting at each other, sending incorrect reports about their own casualties, and my personal favourite - not bothering to recover precious disabled vehicles because "we'll advance and get them later" - followed by further retreats so the vehicles were never recovered.

ORIGINAL: Bil H

I am constantly amazed every time I read something saying how supreme the German system was.. and yet after 1943 I believe they were outclassed by the Allies, not just tactically, but operationally as well.

I don't think so. The German "Blitz" was a result of the stringent use of the "combined arms"-doctrine, outlined by Guderian. Air raids conducted by the Luftwaffe in France '40 and Russia in 1941, coupled with fast thrusts conducted by armoured formations, used to be the recipe for the "Blitz". Many german weapons/vehicles (especially armour and AT weapons (PAKs)) were relatively weak at the time of the first successes (1939-1941). When officers demanded stronger weapons, especially for further thrusts into Russia, exquisite tanks and cannons had been produced, joining the frey in mid '42. But all efforts in development, even until 1943/44 pointed to an offensive orientation, while all formations on all fronts were already defending or even retreating, after the last big offensive in the East ('43, Kursk?).

I'd say that the Allied air superiority (US+Russian sup.) hampered many German efforts after the Normandy invasion.
The African theater suffered of the British naval superiority in the Mediterranean, harassing German/Italian supply lines, plus, Hitler regarded the African theater as auxiliary theater, just worth to receive a minimum of supplies/resources, although this Area was the staging area for the landings on Sicily and on the Italian mainland.

The vast superiority of the Russian war machine (manpower + this vast number of tanks) in the East around 1943, and the shitload of Allied supplies/materials pumped to the Western and Southern (Italian) front, created a 3:1 (or even 5:1?) ratio in favour of the Allies, as the massive Russian operations destroyed a shitload of divisions, in '44.

That said, I tend to think it's been rather a mix of Allied superiority regarding resources, coupled with a shitload of bad strategic decisions in the OKW in general, in particular rather Hitler's personal mistakes in many cases. Plus, the main orientation of the Wehrmacht (according to its size/outfit) was offensive, not defensive, so you can't judge like that, imho, as many (if not all) high ranked Wehrmacht officers (in opposition to many SS officers) were long-term (professional) soldiers, or veterans of WWI. I'm convinced that they would have brought up different strategies if they'd have had a chance to do so.

Just read about the American 6th Armored Division's reaction when a German Infantry Division attacked it from the rear... the Div Commander stopped the Division in its tracks, turned around and counter-attacked destroying the German Division which could not react as quickly. This example shows how far the German Army had deteriorated by Summer '44.

Bil

Well, just like in every Army back then, you had fine soldiers/commanders and dilettantes in charge of things. I wouldn't judge the entire German military by putting your fingers on such events.
Example: In April 1945 (!) the Hermann Göring Panzer Division (evolved from a pure Police Regiment to an elite division, especially with the inclusion of a Panzer-Grenadier (sister) Division, later on) fought in different theaters, and parts of this formation (the Fallschirm{parachute}-Panzer Division 1) destroyed the Soviet 1st Polish Division in an operation near Königsbrück. While this Polish formation might have had inferior equipment, compared to the regular Soviet forces (not sure though), the Göring formation performed extremely well, despite the fact that Germany surrendered only a few weeks later, in May '45.
That said, one has to keep in mind that most operations used to be directed/ordered by Hitler himself, especially after the assasination attempt on 20th of July '44, when he took over the complete control, as he figured that his mistrust towards the general officers was justified. It is well known that the performance of generals and subordinates would've been way better/different, if there would have been room for more flexible operations/orders/movements.
Another example: the overstretched supply lines in 1941/42 in Russia called for the withdrawal of several formations and the adjustment of front lines, in order to avoid Russian pincer-movements and encirclements (e.g. Stalingrad), but Hitler refused most of these plans; he rarely agreed to withdraw vital troops.

ORIGINAL: Crimguy

Despite volumes of evidence to the contrary (see Blair's 2 volume treatise), most thought every one could hit 200 meters without crushing, that they had a large impact on the war, and that their diesels never broke down. The reality, of course, was something a bit more realistic.

Well, the max. dive depth evolved during the war. The first VII (A) U-boats, completed in 1936, were issued with a guideline value of 100 m dive depth - these submarines used to build the main bulk for operations in the Atlantic Ocean, later on, while smaller subs, initially designed to perform patrols at Germany's coasts, used to conduct operations in the Baltic Sea and in the British channel.
The VII-U-boats were almost outdated in 1939, and suffered of the limited range (a good number ran out of fuel on their way back to French bases) and of the relatively small number of torpedos that could be carried along.

In 1940 the dockyards' design engineers issued a value of 150 m (Type VII C 41), 180 m in 1943, and later on , for the VII C 42 (there are accounts that the last VII-version {C 42) had been re-designed), a guideline value of 300 m. At least one of this version had been completed, but there are no accounts of such a version being tested under combat conditions, as the new U-boats XXI - XXIII were supposed to outperform any Allied submarine, so all other U-boat-programmes were halted in 1944. Only a few XXI were actually servicable in 1944, with at least 12 of these XXI submarines conducting operations until the end of the war.
Some of these units performed dive tests, reaching depths of 190-220 m without major damages. There are accounts estimating a maximum depth of 240-250. The guideline value of the XXI-U-boats used to be 135 m (called "construction depth", opposite to the "desctruction depth"), though.
Speed: 15.5 kn surfaced, 17.7 knots submerged, 3.5 knots stealth speed (with a special stealth "sneak" engine", which could hardly be detected by U-hunter/killer groups, if at all. This was the first "real" submarine, as its speed (submerged) exceeded the speed performance when being surfaced, and the time it could stay submerged exceeded most if not all Allied subs.
Also, its basic design had been taken over by engineers when constructing post-war subs, their design influenced the design of the first subs using nuclear-power, as well.

So much about propaganda/theory and facts. :p

Sorry, very off-topic, and long blah-blah, but I felt like providing some input. [:D] HansBolter is allowed to punish me now [;)][;)]

ORIGINAL: GoodGuy

ORIGINAL: Bil H

I am constantly amazed every time I read something saying how supreme the German system was.. and yet after 1943 I believe they were outclassed by the Allies, not just tactically, but operationally as well.

I don't think so. The German "Blitz" was a result of the stringent use of the "combined arms"-doctrine, outlined by Guderian. Air raids conducted by the Luftwaffe in France '40 and Russia in 1941, coupled with fast thrusts conducted by armoured formations, used to be the recipe for the "Blitz". Many german weapons/vehicles (especially armour and AT weapons (PAKs)) were relatively weak at the time of the first successes (1939-1941). When officers demanded stronger weapons, especially for further thrusts into Russia, exquisite tanks and cannons had been produced, joining the frey in mid '42. But all efforts in development, even until 1943/44 pointed to an offensive orientation, while all formations on all fronts were already defending or even retreating, after the last big offensive in the East ('43, Kursk?).

I'd say that the Allied air superiority (US+Russian sup.), hampered many efforts after the Normandy invasion. The vast superiority of the Russian war machine (manpower + this vast number of tanks) in the East around 1943, and the shitload of Allied supplies/materials pumped to the Western and Southern (Italian) front, created a 3:1 (if not more, some say 5:1) ratio in favour of the Allies, as the massive Russian operations destroyed a shitload of divisions.

That said, I tend to think it's been rather a mix of Allied superiority regarding resources, coupled with a shitload of bad strategic decisions in the OKW in general, in particular rather Hitler's personal mistakes in many cases. The main orientation of the Wehrmacht (according to its size/outfit) was offensive, not defensive, so you can't judge like that, imho, as many (if not all) high ranked Wehrmacht officers (in opposition to many SS officers) were long-term (professional) soldiers, or veterans of WWI. I'm convinced that they would have brought up different strategies if they'd have had a chance to do so.

Just read about the American 6th Armored Division's reaction when a German Infantry Division attacked it from the rear... the Div Commander stopped the Division in its tracks, turned around and counter-attacked destroying the German Division which could not react as quickly. This example shows how far the German Army had deteriorated by Summer '44.

Bil

Well, just like in every Army back then, you had fine soldiers/commanders and dilettantes in charge of things. I wouldn't judge the entire German military by putting your fingers on such events.
Example: In April 1945 (!) the Hermann Göring Panzer Division (evolved from a pure Police Regiment to an elite division, especially with the inclusion of a Panzer-Grenadier (sister) Division, later on) fought in different theaters, and parts of this formation (the Fallschirm{parachute}-Panzer Division 1) destroyed the Soviet 1st Polish Division in an operation near Königsbrück. While this Polish formation might have had inferior equipment, compared to the regular Soviet forces (not sure though), The Göring formation performed extremely well, despite the fact that Germany surrendered only a few weeks later, in May '45.
That said, one has to keep in mind that most operations used to be directed/ordered by Hitler himself, especially after the assasination attempt on 20th of July '44, when he took over the complete control, as he figured that his mistrust towards the general officers was justified. It is well known that the performance of generals and subordinates would've been way better, if there would have been room for more flexible operations/orders/movements.
Another example: the overstretched supply lines in 1941/42 in Russia called for the withdrawal of several formations and the adjustment of front lines, in order to avoid Russian pincer-movements and encirclements (e.g. Stalingrad), but Hitler refused most of these plans; he rarely agreed to withdraw vital troops.

ORIGINAL: Crimguy

Despite volumes of evidence to the contrary (see Blair's 2 volume treatise), most thought every one could hit 200 meters without crushing, that they had a large impact on the war, and that their diesels never broke down. The reality, of course, was something a bit more realistic.

Well, the max. dive depth evolved during the war. The first VII (A) U-boats, completed in 1936, were issued with a guideline value of 100 m dive depth - these submarines used to build the main bulk for operations in the Atlantic Ocean, later on, while smaller subs, initially designed to perform patrols at Germany's coasts, used to conduct operations in the Baltic Sea and in the British channel.
The VII-U-boats were almost outdated in 1939, and suffered of the limited range (a good number ran out of fuel on their way back to French bases) and of the relatively small number of torpedos that could be carried along.

In 1940 the dockyards' design engineers issued a value of 150 m (Type VII C 41), 180 m in 1943, and later on , for the VII C 42 (there are accounts that the last VII-version {C 42) had been re-designed), a guideline value of 300 m. At least one of this version had been completed, but there are no accounts of such a version being tested under combat conditions, as the new U-boats XXI - XXIII were supposed to outperform any Allied submarine, so all other U-boat-programmes were halted in 1944. Only a few XXI were actually servicable in 1944, with at least 12 of these XXI submarines conducting operations until the end of the war.
Some of these units performed dive tests, reaching depths of 190-220 m without major damages. There are accounts estimating a maximum depth of 240-250. The guideline value of the XXI-U-boats used to be 135 m (called "construction depth", opposite to the "desctruction depth"), though.
Speed: 15.5 kn surfaced, 17.7 knots submerged, 3.5 knots stealth speed (with a special stealth "sneak" engine", which could hardly be detected by U-hunter/killer groups, if at all. This was the first "real" submarine, as its speed (submerged) exceeded the speed performance when being surfaced, and the time it could stay submerged exceeded most if not all Allied subs.
Also, its basic design had been taken over by engineers when constructing post-war subs, their design influenced the design of the first subs using nuclear-power, as well.

So much about propaganda/theory and facts. :p

Sorry, very off-topic, and long blah-blah, but I felt like providing some input. [:D] HansBolter is allowed to punish me now [;)][;)]

There are numerous accounts of the Type VII's (even VIIB's) and IX's sustaining incredible depths, but it might be that they are the exception rather than the rule. Too many subs were never heard from again, possibly from going too far below their rated crush depth.

The Type XXI hardly counts in this analysis. It was truly a modern sub, but only 6 or so were built, and I think only one saw any action (could be wrong on that part).

What the guys who built it say, and what reality are are debateable, and I don't think their subs were really any better than their American counterparts.

ORIGINAL: Crimguy
The Type XXI hardly counts in this analysis. It was truly a modern sub, but only 6 or so were built, and I think only one saw any action (could be wrong on that part).

Around 12 were servicable, some time between 1944-1945. There's a brilliant book, in fact a complete summary of all german submarine operations, the descriptions are backed up by Doenitz's personal diary, the official U-Boat command war-diary, and the OKW war-diary and documents from Bletchley Park. The author of this book (Die Boote im Netz, might translate to "The boats {caught} in the net") started to do some more research when some British documents about the Bletchley Park operation had been released in the 80s.
According to him, and the diaries, several XXI saw action. Many accounts say that 12 were completed, and all started for combat operations. I could even tell their designations, in detail, if you'd insist on that. :p

Anyway, I'd say that they were better than their american counterparts, since their design focused on boosting the abilities when being submerged.

There's a neat report of a XXI-Commander who left his Norwegian U-boat base for a last sortie (his 1st sortie on a XXI sub), during the last 3 or 4 weeks of the war: He received the message about Germany's unconditional surrender from the U-boat high command, along with the order to head to the nearest port, or to surrender to the closest Allied unit. Right after he received the message he gave the order to dive, because a Hunter/Killer-Group passed by. He was able to get extremely close and was in a perfect position to destroy the biggest ship in this formation, I think it was a heavy cruiser. The XXI wasn't even detected, and left the area, in order to head to its Norwegian base.
The funny thing was, the cruiser got order to get to this same base, and the cruiser's commander didn't believe the XXI crew when he first learned about their course/position. He checked the sub's diary/notebook and was stunned, as they told the truth. Hehe [:D]

On a sidenote, most of the remaining XXIs had been destroyed either by their own crews or by air raids, the rest had been handed over to the Allies in Norway. Several were sunk on their first sortie, trapped in the shallow waters of the Skagerrak.

One XXI, which was sunk by airforce bombers in a german harbour, but had been lifted and confiscated by the allies, was handed over to the german Navy around 20 yrs later.

Btw, do me a favour and avoid quoting huge posts, if you just wanna post 5 or 6 lines as reply.....better for the readers' eyes = more concise :p

There would have been more XXI if Churchill wouldn't have insisted on bombing the XXI dockyards, which severely delayed the production/completion.

EDIT: this would be a feature-list of a typical US sub used at later stages in the war:
new design better than old S-class

• 1500 tons, 300' long, 10,000 mi. range at 20 knots
• underwater 9 knots, up to 72 hours
• 4 electric motors for underwater, 252 batteries
• 4 diesel motors for surface
• carried 24 torpedos (4 stern tubes, 6 bow)
• Mark 10 contact torpedo, Mark 16 magnetic torpedo
• 4 deck guns: one 5", one 40mm, two 20mm forward
• crew of 70 - tours of 60 days
• periscope depth of 63' and extended 12' out of water
• not visible until in range at 1200 yds

[/i]

XXI:

• underwater 17,94 kn with electric engine (up to 100 hours) - 18,04 kn using Diesel + electric engine (snorkel)
• 15,37 kn surfaced
• "construction depth" 175 m, tests at Norway's coast displayed 220 m max. depth
• 6 bow tubes, featuring a fast (semi?)-automatic reload-mechanism
• brilliant compression-body design (looked like an "8"), covered by a tube- or bead-shaped hull...dunno the word

[/i]

The only feature where a US sub could outperform the XXI was the surface speed, the american ones managed to put up around 20 kn surfaced, oh wait....and they had air condition/air filters, I think the XXIs didn't have A/C at all ![:D]