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After reading several Congressional Budget Office documents on the US strategic mobility requirements and capabilities and a host of other documents regarding the US tactical mobility capabilities, I have little doubt that the US could supply an armored corps behind enemy lines.

The US seperates it's airlift mobility into strategic and tactical capabilities. Those two are each categorized and the category or mission that we are interested in is combat support. Combat support is the role of an aircraft that is capable and fitted to airdrop paratroopers, equipment and supplies.

The US strategic mobility airlift capability is primarily the C-17s, C-5s, the retiring C-141s and the less capable KC-10s. This military force can be augmented during war by the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) to a theoretical combined capability of 50 Million Ton-Miles per day (MTM/D). The CRAF can contribute up to 27.8 MTM/D, but realistic expectations are 20.5 MTM/D. The military contingent is capable of over 29 MTM/D and is expected to be able to deploy an entire brigade intercontinentally and it's equipment in a day's notice. The entirety of the strategic mobility is expected to supply two major wars at the same time, including the deployment of a "ready" brigade to the second theater at a moment's notice.

The US tactical mobility airlift capability is rather significant also. The workhorse of the tactical mobility is the C-130 which carries a payload of 23 tons. As this aircraft regularly airdrops functional and sustainable forces of brigade strength, it would actually be from the hundreds of these aircraft that such a mobile corps would be air supplied.

If the 50 MTM/D airlift capability of the strategic lift can supply a war in Korea while supplying a second war in the Persian Gulf, then I'd be shocked if a concentrated effort to supply a mobile corps couldn't be achieved with the assets of our tactical and strategic airlift. I'd wager that the US could even reinforce such a mobile force.

With all of our tactical and 60% of our strategic airlift being capable of delivery by airdrop, their already existant minimal need for air strip quality is not even a factor. Notice that I haven't even mentioned helicopters or prepositioning.


Oops! Meant for this to go in a thread. Grrr.

[ July 21, 2001: Message edited by: JustAGame ]

the question is, how much protection from fighter planes is needed and is there enough fighters in theatre to give this support? a cargo transport carrying 23 tons of supply is a fine target for an enemy fighter/ground missile

Originally posted by JustAGame:

If the 50 MTM/D airlift capability of the strategic lift can supply a war in Korea while supplying a second war in the Persian Gulf......

[ July 21, 2001: Message edited by: JustAGame ]

JustAGame

What do you mean supply a war in Korea and the Persian Gulf?.. I did'nt realise that the
MAC did anything but provide high speed transport for troops to prepositioned sites plus all the 'Need it right this second' jobs
and regular runs. No doubt with its massive lift assets it probably could supply a large force from the air but any situation where the enemy was strong enough to close the lines behind such a force would be a situation where the force would not be used in such a manner (conservative command)
You sure you did'nt drop that one to get a bite?

Nick

PS. SoleSurvivor, the USAF would not even consider it untill ALL air opposition was in the trash bin.

Originally posted by Lokioftheaesir:


JustAGame

What do you mean supply a war in Korea and the Persian Gulf?..

The DoD and Congress meet on the premise that the US must be able to rapidly respond to major wars simultaneously. Planning and spending for our strategic air mobility assets are focused on this goal. In 1997, the Congressional Budget Offices review and study "MOVING U.S. FORCES:
OPTIONS FOR STRATEGIC MOBILITY" examined our needs with specifically addressing the possibility of the two wars being in Korea and the Persian Gulf. While both contingencies enjoy the benefits of predeployment and significant presence already in place, they would still require a total effort and would need substantial rapid intercontinental deployment. It is not trivial that DoD planners were assessing that combination of simultaneous war considering the geopolitical dynamics in 1997.

I did'nt realise that the
MAC did anything but provide high speed transport for troops to prepositioned sites plus all the 'Need it right this second' jobs
and regular runs.

Our strategic military airlift fleet of C-17s, C-141s and C-5s have amazing capabilities to perform their job. When their job is combat support, they can either airdrop their cargo or land in the most inhospitable of makeshift airstrips.

"Moving U.S. troops and military cargo is the role of strategic mobility--the system of equipment, personnel, and logistical know-how that allows the Department of Defense (DoD) to deliver forces over intercontinental distances. Three major types of equipment are used for strategic lift: aircraft to fly cargo and personnel, ships to steam cargo and sustainment supplies from the United States, and ships or warehouses based abroad that the United States uses to "preposition" military stocks closer to regions where conflicts might occur.[CBO, 1997] Since the relevant discussion is limited to airlift, I haven't focused on shipping or prepositioning.

I don't doubt with its massive lift assets it probably could supply a large force from the air but any situation where the enemy was strong enough to close the lines behind such a force would be a situation where the force would not be used in such a manner (conservative command)
You sure you did'nt drop that one to get a bite?

The "threat" is a consideration but never an automatic "kill" for plans to use strategic or tactical airlift. While the modern era hasn't provided us with significant "threats" to strategic airlift operations as performed in the intial days of the Persian Gulf deployment, Panama, Grenada, etc., our tactical airlift (specifically C-130s) have been used extensively in high threat situations. In fact, Khe Senh and An Loc are excellent examples of the use tactical airlift in support of isolated forces in high threat environments. *The story of how our C-130s supplied the South Vietnamese forces at An Loc is a strong testimony to the phrase of "where there is a will, there is way."

Originally posted by SoleSurvivor:
the question is, how much protection from fighter planes is needed and is there enough fighters in theatre to give this support? a cargo transport carrying 23 tons of supply is a fine target for an enemy fighter/ground missile

Indeed, the threat can and does result in losses. What a prize downing a paratrooper loaded C-17 would be for a nation like Iraq. It wasn't because of the lack of interest in accomplishing such a newsworthy victory that Iraq didn't do just that to one of our C-141s or C-5s in the opening days of the Gulf War.

I couldn't begin to discuss the assets required to secure local air supremecy as one would expect is required for such an operation.

In WIR game terms though, the effect of enemy aircraft is not hypothetical as the enemy fighters can and do react.

Maybe the problem isn't a real one since the US isn't likely to face a foe with a dangerously effective and sized airforce.

Originally posted by JustAGame:

........"where there is a will, there is way."

JustAGame

In the end, that 'truism' is the decider.

Nick