Nukes

[Trick37_MatrixForum]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Trick37

In the urban environment, we wouldn’t have placed too many tanks into the towns and cities, thus leaving them to fight in the open spaces, where they’re meant to be.

That's all very well, but 1980s west Germany was heavily built up, especially as you head towards the Rhine.

That’s quite true…..as it is today. However, if we had to fight with our backs to the Rhein, then we would have been in trouble. Yet, getting to the Rhein would have been the question for the Soviet troops…..was it better to go the northern, southern or central (through Fulda) route? I think that’s why, after the fall of the Wall, the Russians declassified their plans of attack, and it called for the northern route since there were far less “natural defenses” (i.e. like through the Fulda Gap) up there where we could reek havoc on their forces.

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Trick37
True, and I’m not really arguing that. However, the Soviets would’ve been taking more and more losses than NATO would have.

Possibly. But remember Russia took tens of millions of losses in the Second World War and still had a huge army at the end of it. Their whole society was just much better geared to producing a mass army at short notice than any of the NATO countries.

True, yet we also have to understand that the Soviets couldn’t have done it with the forces that they had in the forward locations (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) alone. They would’ve had to have moved extra forces in from the Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia itself. Getting them here would’ve taken time, too, as would’ve NATO getting reinforcements to the front. In addition, our ability to interdict those forces either during ground transportation, or while on the trains, would’ve far exceeded Russia’s ability to take out our reinforcements while on the way. This isn’t to say that we wouldn’t have taken losses, or that they wouldn’t have gotten any extra units into Theater, but I don’t think they would’ve gotten enough to the battlefield to make a difference and/or to make that all-important final push to the Rhein.

Now, if the Soviets had started moving forces (i.e. under the guise of “exercises”), like the book The Third World War, August 1985 (by General Sir John Hackett, et al) gave the scenario, then NATO would’ve noticed this and started the REFORGER to Germany ASAP. This would not only have given us the added movement of reinforcements by air (to fall on POMCUS sites) or by sea (bringing their equipment with them), it would’ve also given us time to federalize and call up the National Guard and Reserves, and to get them moving over (obviously that would’ve taken a bit longer, but….). It would’ve also given us, if needed, the time and ability to call our Ready Reserves (former soldiers on an inactive Reserve status), and to even initiate our planned-for Selective Service recall. (The draft may well have had to be initiated, too.) True, it would’ve taken time, and hopefully it would’ve been over before they were needed, but that could’ve been a possibility.

Those were just two examples of scenarios, as would have been put in to motion by possible Soviet attack scenarios.

ORIGINAL: golden delicious
I think the situation in the medium term would be analogous to the first Chinese offensive in Korea; the Americans have better weapons, total air superiority and uncontested control of the sea. But on land they were just swamped. There was nothing they could do except pull back and regroup once their attackers had outreached their supply lines.

Naturally the US Army was better prepared in the 1980s than it was in 1950. But I think the same thing could have occured.

True. However, we must also remember that there was a huge mistake that occurred in 1950, when the Chinese entered the Korean war---namely MacArthur not taking their threats seriously, not anticipating the Chinese actions, and not believing that the Chinese could’ve moved 300,000 troops into North Korea under the cover of darkness. (Note, Patton would’ve figured this out, as he did when the Germans were about to attack in the Battle of the Buldge.)

As for the same thing to have occurred in the 1980s, yea possible, but not likely due to our much better intelligence-gathering capabilities. It would’ve been almost impossible to catch us with our pants down, even if the Soviets had attacked straight out of their barracks (which was another scenario that I didn’t discuss above).

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Trick37
I’m not saying, either, that it would have been a clear-cut victory (sorry if I made it seem that I thought that way). It would, indeed, have been a nasty fight, with unprecedented losses on both sides. I think that the Soviet attack would’ve fizzled at the last minute, just short of their goals. I’m also confident that NATO would’ve been able to counter-attack, which would’ve reeked havoc in their rear areas, thus cutting off supplies and forcing them to seriously consider a “fighting retreat” to try to reestablish the lines (which I think would’ve failed).

I would think that the NATO counterattack would take years to reach large scale proportions, and would not be the "classic" breakthrough and exploitation, but rather a grinding battle to annihilate the countless divisions that the Russians would have been able to throw into the battle.

That's assuming no diplomatic solution was reached. I think that with a) Russia aware that she will inevitably lose but b) NATO unprepared to take two million casualties to win, it would either be that or a nuclear exchange.

I disagree. I took part in the last big REFORGER in 1988, when we actually moved soldiers and equipment from the States to Germany for the exercises (I came over from Fort Riley, Kansas with the 1st Infantry Division). This was a Corps-on-Corps action, with units that were stationed in Germany making up one Corps, and units that came over from the States making up the other (obviously with German, Canadian, and British forces, too). We got our Corps over here within the allotted 7 days, fell onto our POMCUS site equipment, and deployed to our stations within another weeks. This is what was planned for, and done. We had enough equipment for another Corps here already, and that along with the 3rd Corps from the States (bringing their stuff over by ship) would’ve been enough for a counterattack of the size enough to stop the Soviet advance and at least start negotiations for peace.

I still think that a nuclear exchange would’ve been unlikely as of 1979, unless of course the NATO commanders panicked and gave in to the pressures from their subordinate commanders/politicians to use them. (We know that the Germans would not have wanted the use of nukes on their own soil.)

[wolflars]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious


If the Soviets were serious about conquering Western Europe, they would have mobilised their population in the same way they did in 1941. This would lead to a force hundreds of divisions strong.

Cold War mobilizations would not resemble WW2 at least into the latter years (early on you have a point). Certainly the USSR had the manpower, but they could not have realistically fielded “hundreds” of divisions capable of maneuvering on a modern battlefield without a massive, potentially bankrupting and highly public pre-war build. Frankly I find the notion of the Soviet Horde absurd. The only time these weak units would have made a difference would be in defense of the USSR interior, which, as we all seem to agree, is outside the realm of reality in regards to a NATO push through Russia.

I doubt that the 100 hour length of the campaign is an indication that the coalition had "run out of steam". I think it's an indication of the fact that the Iraqis had been resoundingly defeated in the field and that any more would have a) been gratuitous and b) exceeded the UN mandate.

The Iraqis were kind enough to play their part to be sure and the UN is present only for a legitimacy which can be manipulated. However, one thing you must understand is the role the Gulf War played is US operational thinking. It was an opportunity to test the theory. In most areas it was highly successful. In others it required additional tweaking (air-ground and co-operative unit communication and tactical situational awareness for example along with the dismal performance of the Fast RO-ROs). After the war, the US Army went through the largest transformation it had seen since the 1970s which is still ongoing on not scheduled to be complete for several more years. Entire field manuals were re-written to reflect the new thinking. What is critical to understand here is that the high ops tempo needed to defend Europe required roughly 15-30 days of aggressive operations. The problem that the First Gulf War revealed was that because of the rapid advance and quick disintegration of Iraqi formations, the US Army could not maintain the tempo despite having planned for such contingencies. Many units had out run the logistical tail or were simply physically exhausted after just 3 days. This was a glaring problem in the doctrine, one which was largely addressed by the time of the second war (where different problems emerged—the US has a bad habit of showing up to the current war with the last war’s solution). Obviously, the situation on the ground allowed for a convenient 100 hour cut off, but the ghost that haunted planners in the years following the war was the “what if.” What if they needed more time. What if this had been Europe.

While it appears a smashing victory, the ops folks regarded it as a learning opportunity.



Incidentally, a couple of years after the first Gulf War we had the opportunity to greet and train with a large Russian delegation. Prior to their arrival, the Division command had us remove all of the Soviet-era war trophies from sight. Our battalion, for example, had a T-72 parked out front. After a few days, the cat was out of the bag and the Russians asked to see “their” equipment. When we showed one major the T-72 he explained that our victory was against Iraq, not the equipment. Then we showed him the holes in the turret caused by 25mm AP rounds from a Bradley at 600 to 800 meters. He was shocked to say the least. Years later I would witness a similar but more advanced and heavily armored Bradley completely obliterated by an IED made from a coffee can and some 60mm mortar rounds. I was shocked to say the least.

I just don't see NATO's motivation for this. What I see as an interesting scenario is one where NATO intervenes in either Hungary 1956 or Czechoslovakia 1968. Not exactly a NATO offensive, but more pro-active than their usual role.

Nor do I. It would be hard to conjure something up where this might occur. I like the suggestion for ’56 or ’68. It would require some creative foresight for escalation. My point here is that the US portion of NATO’s capacity depends on a highly aggressive and offensive doctrine based on precision, dislocation, distribution, opportunity, activity, option acceleration and cohesive command. Bottom line is the US doesn’t like to defend as anyone can tell from our foreign policy for the last couple of decades. A scenario that examined this would be interesting since I don’t think one has ever been done for TOAW.

I think all of the modern Korea scenarios are similar with the poor ROK and USA being attacked in their beds. Nobody ever does one where the US attacks first and given her track record it is not outside the realm of possibilities. Although GMT had a great air campaign scenario for their boardgame.

Even still, such a scenario with an absurdly aggressive NATO would likely have to take place post 1970s when NATO had some offensive teeth. This is where it would fall apart. TOAW does a nice job at representing WW2 operations. The “deep battle” concept and the ever elusive “decisive battle” are well modeled by the equipment calculations and game engine in general. However, the modern fight is increasingly asymmetric and the doctrines (especially NATO) reflect this. TOAW does not accurately take this into account. This is most evident when examining the use of air and helos. Precision munitions and strikes should be handled differently etc etc. It is also almost impossible to portray successive dislocation. Ironically, the best game ever devised at handling dislocation is probably chess.

Why off the mark? Russia has fielded mass armies in every war they've fought for hundreds of years; I just can't see the NATO powers being able to provide anything to match the scale of the mobilisation of which Russia is capable.

Absolutely agree with the mobilization comment for the long term but the fight is pretty much over before the horde appears. By the time they do show up, they are under equipped, untrained, fairly immobile, and largely ineffective for anything except home defense. And since NATO is unlikely to be capable of an offensive at that point, it is a stalemate at least until cease fire or nukes. Now, of course, if this so called stalemate went on for a considerable period it is hard to say…


Point of clarification about the Korea comment, do you mean after Chinese intervention or the initial blow by the North Koreans? In either case, I don’t think they are good examples but for different reasons. Interestingly (or perhaps disturbingly) enough, the Soviet forward defense during early Barbarossa might provide some example for how the US doctrine intended to fight in Germany. Notable exceptions of course with regards to flexibility and performance and offensive ops.

However, I am talking really about the opening moves here in a post 1970s environment. Again back to that critical first 30 days. Korea was handled by a defensive retrograde, essentially space for time coupled with a disorderly rout. In central Europe, there is no such luxury. Space for time is suicidal largely because of the political consequences and military reality. The Nuke option clock is ticking from moment one. Secondly, space for time really only works when you have a strong second echelon forming or on the way, presumably preparing some masterful counter-stroke. NATO as we’ve said had no such capacity. In order to buy some time for REFORGER and other mobilizations, NATO created artificial “speed bumps.” These were not space for time options but lives for time. Berlin is one by default, and the 11th ACR at the Fulda Gap, as well as the West German Border Guards and others. Retreat, whether organized or a rout, is simply out of the question for most NATO forces until at least some of the mobilizing units fall in on their gear.

Then American forces, in line with their doctrine, begin localized offensives (but I agree with Ben’s notion of no theater wide offensive for NATO). Disrupt, dislocate, and keep the enemy off balance until he picks up his ball and goes home. Again, this is highly dependant on successful REFORGER (likely for the POMCUS sites but I have doubts about any air or sea lift of heavy units based on my decades worth of service in rapid deployment units). Then all those Soviet CAT-II and CAT-III divisions showing up with few tanks (also likely) and prove useless for continuing the attack. In the end, I say flip a coin for the outcome of the first 30 days. After 30 days, all bets are off.

Honestly, I don’t know if this would have worked nor does anyone else. But given the complications in the First Gulf War, I’d say the US doctrine had bigger problems than they admitted. The Soviet doctrine is another story.

@Trick37. The Germans certainly would not have wanted to use nukes on German soil, but don’t forget the French policy.

[Trick37_MatrixForum]

Great posting, Wolflars. [:)]

ORIGINAL: wolflars
@Trick37. The Germans certainly would not have wanted to use nukes on German soil, but don’t forget the French policy.

Yea, I know the French policy...... [X(]

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Trick37
That’s quite true…..as it is today. However, if we had to fight with our backs to the Rhein, then we would have been in trouble. Yet, getting to the Rhein would have been the question for the Soviet troops…..was it better to go the northern, southern or central (through Fulda) route? I think that’s why, after the fall of the Wall, the Russians declassified their plans of attack, and it called for the northern route since there were far less “natural defenses” (i.e. like through the Fulda Gap) up there where we could reek havoc on their forces.

In the long run the Russians would have been better off advancing through the rougher terrain, but they were presumably planning for a short, successful campaign.

True, yet we also have to understand that the Soviets couldn’t have done it with the forces that they had in the forward locations (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) alone. They would’ve had to have moved extra forces in from the Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia itself. Getting them here would’ve taken time, too, as would’ve NATO getting reinforcements to the front.

Yeah. I'm talking about events about six months into hostilities. At that point the professional armies of all concerned would be burnt out, and both sides would have been scrambling to raise new forces.

I disagree. I took part in the last big REFORGER in 1988, when we actually moved soldiers and equipment from the States to Germany for the exercises (I came over from Fort Riley, Kansas with the 1st Infantry Division). This was a Corps-on-Corps action, with units that were stationed in Germany making up one Corps, and units that came over from the States making up the other (obviously with German, Canadian, and British forces, too). We got our Corps over here within the allotted 7 days, fell onto our POMCUS site equipment, and deployed to our stations within another weeks. This is what was planned for, and done. We had enough equipment for another Corps here already, and that along with the 3rd Corps from the States (bringing their stuff over by ship) would’ve been enough for a counterattack of the size enough to stop the Soviet advance and at least start negotiations for peace.

I mean a strategic counteroffensive. The forces you're talking about would indeed have been brought over and thrown into the action, and then chewed up like everything else by the immense firepower being thrown at the battlefield.

I still think that a nuclear exchange would’ve been unlikely as of 1979, unless of course the NATO commanders panicked and gave in to the pressures from their subordinate commanders/politicians to use them.

I think it's unlikely that NATO would have ordered a nuclear release (though France may have pressed the button if they believed it was the only way to prevent their own soil being invaded). However I can imagine Russia going to those lengths if they saw it as the only alternative to a humiliating defeat. But more likely their threat to do so would have lead to a negotiated peace, with the Soviet Union left intact but the iron curtain pushed east.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: wolflars

Cold War mobilizations would not resemble WW2 at least into the latter years (early on you have a point). Certainly the USSR had the manpower, but they could not have realistically fielded “hundreds” of divisions capable of maneuvering on a modern battlefield without a massive, potentially bankrupting and highly public pre-war build.

The modern battlefield would rapidly have degenerated in terms of technology as so many advanced and irreplaceable weapons systems were destroyed.

The Iraqis were kind enough to play their part to be sure and the UN is present only for a legitimacy which can be manipulated.

Not so. The Arab powers were unwilling to back anything more than what the UN approved. And without them all sorts of logistical problems may emerge.

The problem that the First Gulf War revealed was that because of the rapid advance and quick disintegration of Iraqi formations, the US Army could not maintain the tempo despite having planned for such contingencies.

Right- but there would be no need for such a rapid advance in a European war. Also, presumably there a huge stocks of supplies in place, which weren't available in the desert.

Years later I would witness a similar but more advanced and heavily armored Bradley completely obliterated by an IED made from a coffee can and some 60mm mortar rounds. I was shocked to say the least.

And that's what Russia would have been putting into the field against you within a year. Only a little more high tech.

I think all of the modern Korea scenarios are similar with the poor ROK and USA being attacked in their beds. Nobody ever does one where the US attacks first and given her track record it is not outside the realm of possibilities.

Moreover there is a strong case for attacking North Korea- and there has been for a good decade or more. The longer we wait, the more difficult the job will be. Of course the problem is that the North Koreans are this huge unknown. They might fight to the death or they might fold overnight.

Absolutely agree with the mobilization comment for the long term but the fight is pretty much over before the horde appears. By the time they do show up, they are under equipped, untrained, fairly immobile, and largely ineffective for anything except home defense. And since NATO is unlikely to be capable of an offensive at that point, it is a stalemate at least until cease fire or nukes. Now, of course, if this so called stalemate went on for a considerable period it is hard to say…

It's this long term I'm looking at. You have an initial period of ferocious action where both sides essentially lose their professional armies. Then both scramble to replace them- and the Russians win the race. Then you have a second active phase where the Russians have a large if poor quality army and NATO still only has the barely reinforced tatters of it's pre-war force. Russia will still not really be able to win, but they're going to make life really tough for NATO.

Point of clarification about the Korea comment, do you mean after Chinese intervention or the initial blow by the North Koreans? In either case, I don’t think they are good examples but for different reasons. Interestingly (or perhaps disturbingly) enough, the Soviet forward defense during early Barbarossa might provide some example for how the US doctrine intended to fight in Germany. Notable exceptions of course with regards to flexibility and performance and offensive ops.

I mean the Chinese intervention. Of course the gap between the quality of these troops and their equipment versus their opponents was much less than in the case I'm envisioning, but I would think the effect would be similar.

However, I am talking really about the opening moves here in a post 1970s environment. Again back to that critical first 30 days.

That seems to be the thing. We're not really that much in disagreement about those first thirty days. A ferocious battle where the Soviets advance a little and both sides become exhausted. After that, things get interesting...

[wolflars]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious


Not so. The Arab powers were unwilling to back anything more than what the UN approved. And without them all sorts of logistical problems may emerge.

I was being somewhat facetious about the UN. The point being the expected outcome in regards to accomplishing goals, both political and military, was a foregone conclusion with the only real variable being the performance of the US forces and an untested doctrine.

Right- but there would be no need for such a rapid advance in a European war. Also, presumably there a huge stocks of supplies in place, which weren't available in the desert.

Continuous ops present significant strain regardless of an advance. Certainly there would be no need for long advances but a static defense by the US was out of the question. The strain encountered by US forces in Iraq was worrisome to planners as it indicated how much worse things could have been in a European fight.

And that's what Russia would have been putting into the field against you within a year. Only a little more high tech.

It's this long term I'm looking at. You have an initial period of ferocious action where both sides essentially lose their professional armies. Then both scramble to replace them- and the Russians win the race. Then you have a second active phase where the Russians have a large if poor quality army and NATO still only has the barely reinforced tatters of it's pre-war force. Russia will still not really be able to win, but they're going to make life really tough for NATO.

Everybody finds a way to fight. It’s called fieldcraft. What you are saying about “advanced and irreplaceable” systems and the destruction of the professional army is the crux of your critique of NATO’s war fighting capacity and it is a good point for the phase two part of our imaginary little battle. This is particularly detrimental to aviation. I think I first realized this when I was an 18 year old private. Here I had all these nifty gadgets and training but when it comes down to the infantry fight a 10 year old kid with an AK 47 is just as deadly as anybody else (even more so because he is not adding 50% to his body mass with useless gear).

The race in numbers for phase two goes to the USSR but don’t underestimate the US. The manpower is available along with huge stockpiles of weapons and an adaptable industrial base. The reserve system also functions quite well with an extremely high combat veteran population ratio since 1945 available for recall. The disadvantage lies in the willingness to use it after a 30 day blood bath where hundreds of thousands of people have died. Additionally, the basic weapons systems remain simple enough for both countries to readily train troops quickly. The real problem, of course, is with aviation—especially for the USA. I would still argue the enormous problem of getting these guys from point A to point B for both nations but worse off for the Soviets. Even if the Soviet Premier stamped his foot and hundreds of divisions sprang up all over the USSR, they won’t do any good sitting in cities hundreds of miles from whatever is left of a front line. No offensive capability for both sides for a very long time. Stalemate.

Getting back to the battered NATO forces…well, you are right…they are pretty much screwed. Germany would be a wreck. I wonder what kind of shape the once strong alliance would be in, politically speaking. Consider Norway, Turkey, Greece, Holland, Belgium and poor little Denmark who all would bear the brunt of a full scale assault. After 30 days, they would be pretty much out of the running. Spain? Italy? No help there. France maybe but unpredictable. The UK for sure but despite having some of the finest troops in the world what more could they do? Golden is right about things being tough for NATO in phase two.

And while we seem to agree on phase I and partly phase II, my only reservation is I don’t think a phase two would have been likely past the aforementioned stalemate.

. The longer we wait, the more difficult the job will be.

Indeed

If we just ignore the problem, it will go away. Just like we did with Al-Qaeda…

oh, wait……that’s not right…maybe it’s supposed to be

If we just exacerbate the problem, it will go away. Just like we did with Al-Qaeda…

No, that’s still not right…maybe its…oh, nevermind…..

[ralphtricky]

ORIGINAL: wolflars
Even still, such a scenario with an absurdly aggressive NATO would likely have to take place post 1970s when NATO had some offensive teeth. This is where it would fall apart. TOAW does a nice job at representing WW2 operations. The “deep battle” concept and the ever elusive “decisive battle” are well modeled by the equipment calculations and game engine in general. However, the modern fight is increasingly asymmetric and the doctrines (especially NATO) reflect this. TOAW does not accurately take this into account. This is most evident when examining the use of air and helos. Precision munitions and strikes should be handled differently etc etc. It is also almost impossible to portray successive dislocation. Ironically, the best game ever devised at handling dislocation is probably chess.

Please, if you have concrete ideas on how these can be handled at an operational leve, make sure they're on the 'wish list.'

Thanks,
Ralph

[Trick37_MatrixForum]

Sorry, guys, I've been out of the next for the past few days.  I'll drop back in again soon.
 

[sstevens06]

ORIGINAL: Trick37

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

NATO decided early on in the Cold War that the force required to stop a Soviet conventional offensive in Europe was impractical to maintain in peacetime. Therefore it was NATO doctrine to use nuclear weapons in the event of a full scale war, as the only means of preventing Soviet victory.

Actually, with respect, this isn't 100% true. Yes, in the 50s through the mid-70s NATO most likely would have used nukes, but it was known that this would've led to an all-out strategic strike, thus ending the world as we knew it.

The result of an all-out strategic strike "ending the world as we know it" wasn't really possible until the mid-late 1960's at the earliest. The mutual stockpile of US and Soviet nuclear weapons and their corresponding delivery systems simply weren't there until that timeframe, especially on the Soviet side. Surely there were many nuclear weapons in the aggregate during the 1950's and early 1960's, but their reliability, as well as that of their delivery systems, again especially on the Soviet side, was questionable.

That NATO would have used nuclear weapons in a conflict with the Soviets goes without saying, since any Soviet attack (or counter-attack) would have employed all assets, including nuclear, chemical, and biological, from moment it began. There is plentiful evidence, principally from declassified Cold War-era documents (Parallel History Project, National Security Archive), that Soviet war planning assumed a full-scale mass nuclear fire strike would be their first action in a war with NATO. There is additional evidence based on Soviet military doctrine (and training) at the time, which was exclusively focused on offensive operations. The reason is that there is really no such thing as 'defensive operations' on a nuclear battlefield. Since the Soviet knew that any conflict with NATO would be nuclear from the outset, they didn't waste any time or resources on defensive operations/preparations.

However, once the new equipment started getting fielded in the late 70s/early 80s (i.e. M1 tanks, M2 Bradleys, Apaches.....Leopard 2 tanks, etc), it was thought to be possible to stop the Soviets and to wait on reinforcements for a counterattack. At that point, our equipment was far superior to the Soviet equipment.

The NATO navies also would've played a big part of it, especially with the newer surface ships and submarines (i.e. Los Angeles class) that were being fielded. These, along with superior carrier aircraft, could well have stopped the Soviet attempt to rule the Atlantic, thus allowing for a free flow of reinforcements to arrive into Europe.

Of course, a big part of the strategy to beat the Soviet ground forces would've been to convince France to "play ball" if the balloon went up. Without them, it may well have been a bit hard to beat the Soviets, especially if they came through the northern route.

I agree with you regarding the superiority of NATO equipment. I would argue NATO have always had technological superiority over the Soviets, though the disparity widened significantly during the late 1970's/early 80's.

Unfortunately given the fact that any Soviet/NATO conflict would have started out with a massive Soviet nuclear attack, superiority of NATO equipment, the Battle for the Atlantic, nor France "playing ball" would have counted for much. The only determinant of who would win and how quickly is each side's effectiveness in locating and neutralizing enemy nuclear weapons delivery platforms.

[Trick37_MatrixForum]

ORIGINAL: sstevens06

ORIGINAL: Trick37

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

NATO decided early on in the Cold War that the force required to stop a Soviet conventional offensive in Europe was impractical to maintain in peacetime. Therefore it was NATO doctrine to use nuclear weapons in the event of a full scale war, as the only means of preventing Soviet victory.

Actually, with respect, this isn't 100% true. Yes, in the 50s through the mid-70s NATO most likely would have used nukes, but it was known that this would've led to an all-out strategic strike, thus ending the world as we knew it.

The result of an all-out strategic strike "ending the world as we know it" wasn't really possible until the mid-late 1960's at the earliest. The mutual stockpile of US and Soviet nuclear weapons and their corresponding delivery systems simply weren't there until that timeframe, especially on the Soviet side. Surely there were many nuclear weapons in the aggregate during the 1950's and early 1960's, but their reliability, as well as that of their delivery systems, again especially on the Soviet side, was questionable.

That NATO would have used nuclear weapons in a conflict with the Soviets goes without saying, since any Soviet attack (or counter-attack) would have employed all assets, including nuclear, chemical, and biological, from moment it began. There is plentiful evidence, principally from declassified Cold War-era documents (Parallel History Project, National Security Archive), that Soviet war planning assumed a full-scale mass nuclear fire strike would be their first action in a war with NATO. There is additional evidence based on Soviet military doctrine (and training) at the time, which was exclusively focused on offensive operations. The reason is that there is really no such thing as 'defensive operations' on a nuclear battlefield. Since the Soviet knew that any conflict with NATO would be nuclear from the outset, they didn't waste any time or resources on defensive operations/preparations.

Therefore I would say that the possibility for a nuclear attack in Europe, if the SOviets attacked, would've been before both countries stockpiled enough to "end the world as we know it" since the Soviets would most likely think that they would have somewhat of a country to govern once it's all said and done. However, once the stockpiles were made so, it would've been less likely for nuclear weapons, except in desperate measures (i.e. if we were getting our butts kicked, or if the Soviets were losing and/or there was a coups or threat of it).

ORIGINAL: sstevens06

ORIGINAL: Trick37
However, once the new equipment started getting fielded in the late 70s/early 80s (i.e. M1 tanks, M2 Bradleys, Apaches.....Leopard 2 tanks, etc), it was thought to be possible to stop the Soviets and to wait on reinforcements for a counterattack. At that point, our equipment was far superior to the Soviet equipment.

The NATO navies also would've played a big part of it, especially with the newer surface ships and submarines (i.e. Los Angeles class) that were being fielded. These, along with superior carrier aircraft, could well have stopped the Soviet attempt to rule the Atlantic, thus allowing for a free flow of reinforcements to arrive into Europe.

Of course, a big part of the strategy to beat the Soviet ground forces would've been to convince France to "play ball" if the balloon went up. Without them, it may well have been a bit hard to beat the Soviets, especially if they came through the northern route.

I agree with you regarding the superiority of NATO equipment. I would argue NATO have always had technological superiority over the Soviets, though the disparity widened significantly during the late 1970's/early 80's.

Unfortunately given the fact that any Soviet/NATO conflict would have started out with a massive Soviet nuclear attack, superiority of NATO equipment, the Battle for the Atlantic, nor France "playing ball" would have counted for much. The only determinant of who would win and how quickly is each side's effectiveness in locating and neutralizing enemy nuclear weapons delivery platforms.

I also saw those declassified war plans, which called for tactical nuclear strikes on all NATO military installations throughout Europe. That, in itself, would've allowed the Soviets to basicall "walk through" Western Europe at will. However, I don't think they would've done it because WARSAW Pact countries would've gotten the same (if not more deadly) responses from NATO, and it would've led to an all-out strategic strike and counter-strike between both sides.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: wolflars

Everybody finds a way to fight. It’s called fieldcraft. What you are saying about “advanced and irreplaceable” systems and the destruction of the professional army is the crux of your critique of NATO’s war fighting capacity and it is a good point for the phase two part of our imaginary little battle. This is particularly detrimental to aviation.

Well, I think aviation would adapt better than heavy armour. It's easier to keep a fighter jet out of harm's way than an MBT.

The race in numbers for phase two goes to the USSR but don’t underestimate the US. The manpower is available along with huge stockpiles of weapons and an adaptable industrial base.

You're right that NATO (not just the US) will be able to mobilise more in the end, but there will be a lot more of a strain in doing so. Western societies are just not geared for this kind of total mobilisation in the way that a totalitarian (and particularly Russian) state is. In the 40s, Russia produced a vast army within a year or two of getting started. American mobilisation begin in 1940 and was still getting into gear when the war ended.

Getting back to the battered NATO forces…well, you are right…they are pretty much screwed. Germany would be a wreck. I wonder what kind of shape the once strong alliance would be in, politically speaking. Consider Norway, Turkey, Greece, Holland, Belgium and poor little Denmark who all would bear the brunt of a full scale assault. After 30 days, they would be pretty much out of the running. Spain? Italy? No help there. France maybe but unpredictable. The UK for sure but despite having some of the finest troops in the world what more could they do? Golden is right about things being tough for NATO in phase two.

I would say the politics wouldn't be too bad. Soviet Russia has a bad track record when it comes to going back on its word and I would think that France et al would see co-operation with NATO as the only alternative to subjugation.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: sstevens06

The only determinant of who would win and how quickly is each side's effectiveness in locating and neutralizing enemy nuclear weapons delivery platforms.

I would add that figuring out how operational warfare works in the new environment would be a key to victory. Obviously, if you can't concentrate, more or less all established thinking goes out the window. So how do you attack?

[wolflars]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious



Well, I think aviation would adapt better than heavy armour. It's easier to keep a fighter jet out of harm's way than an MBT.

Survivability and adaptability, sure. But, we our talking about a quick and lethal fight where the “professional” military is taking unsustainable losses. I’m thinking pilot shortages will become apparent. I also believe helicopter losses would likely be prohibitive. As for the mechanized arm, despite heavy losses, it is more sustainable. New tanks crews can be trained in a matter of days.

Just how useful heavy armor is in the phase two battle is up for grabs. Without the offensive capacity to shoot and scoot, the battle is quickly degenerating into a fierce urban slugfest. AH-64s and M1s are far less useful under these conditions.

American mobilisation begin in 1940 and was still getting into gear when the war ended.

Interesting that you mention this. I am currently working on a funded research project examining the limitations of the American mobilization effort in World War Two.

ORIGINAL: golden delicious


...figuring out how operational warfare works in the new environment would be a key to victory. Obviously, if you can't concentrate, more or less all established thinking goes out the window. So how do you attack?

And that is THE question.

[sstevens06]

ORIGINAL: wolflars

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

...

...figuring out how operational warfare works in the new environment would be a key to victory. Obviously, if you can't concentrate, more or less all established thinking goes out the window. So how do you attack?

And that is THE question.

Indeed that is the very question I was attempting to answer in my Berlin Crisis 1961 scenario. While treatment of nuclear weapon effects in pre-TOAW III versions was seriously flawed, we can begin to draw some preliminary conclusions from numerous playtests:

- As GD points out, massing for offensive (or defensive) operations becomes a suicidal impossibility on a nuclear battlefield. Any such activity would inevitably be detected by the opposing side and quickly targeted with punishing nuclear strikes.

- Defensive postures which usually work in conventional settings against Soviet-style echeloned offensives (e.g., multi-layered mobile defense) become irrelevant on the nuclear battlefield. Corps-, Army-, and Army Group-level reserves become priority targets for nuclear strikes as soon as they are detected.

- Key operational units in conventional settings are usually at the Division- and/or Division subunit-level. On a nuclear battlefield "ant" units such as nuclear-capable SSM Batteries and Battalions, as well as nuclear-capable air units of all types become inordinately important as both offensive platforms and targets. Operational efforts increasingly and exclusively tend to focus around detecting, fixing, and neutralizing enemy nuclear-capable units.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: wolflars
Interesting that you mention this. I am currently working on a funded research project examining the limitations of the American mobilization effort in World War Two.

Wow. It seems there are far more jobs in that sort of field over there than in this country.

Of course, part of the limitation was deliberate. As I understand it, FDR was presented with a total war plan by the defence department in 1941, and he rejected it.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: sstevens06

- As GD points out, massing for offensive (or defensive) operations becomes a suicidal impossibility on a nuclear battlefield.

Well, I found planning for a defence fairly easy. The situation is ideal for defence in great depth, with small units holding strongpoints each sufficient to require serious force to reduce but too small to be worth a nuclear attack. In our games, I set up the NATO brigades in a static checkerboard pattern, and planned to only coalesce the defence after the initial nuclear exchange had exhausted both sides.

[Trick37_MatrixForum]

ORIGINAL: wolflars

ORIGINAL: golden delicious
American mobilisation begin in 1940 and was still getting into gear when the war ended.

Interesting that you mention this. I am currently working on a funded research project examining the limitations of the American mobilization effort in World War Two.

True, we were still in the midst of our mobilization in 1945, but we had provided equipment, ammunition, aircraft and ships not only for us, but for Russia, the UK, Brazil, and a lot of the Allied forces. In addition to that, we had 16 million men in uniform by the end of the war in 1945. Had it gone on longer, who knows how many men in uniform we would've had.

In comparison, the Russians had about 42 million men in uniform at the end of WW2.

I wonder if Patton would've beaten Zhukov.........?

[Martin_Goliath]

An interesting discussion with lots of insights! Bringing it back to the digital battlefield, which TOAW scenarios involving nuclear weapons do you gentlemen find well worth the while? Berlin Crisis '61 by Stevens has already been mentioned. Where can it be found?

[shunwick]

MarGol,

Berlin Crisis 61 is available from rugged defense but it is not usable for TOAW 3 only COW because it requires a modified exe. I don't know if it has ever been updated. The version at rugged defense was submitted for play test.

Best wishes,

[sstevens06]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: sstevens06

- As GD points out, massing for offensive (or defensive) operations becomes a suicidal impossibility on a nuclear battlefield.

Well, I found planning for a defence fairly easy. The situation is ideal for defence in great depth, with small units holding strongpoints each sufficient to require serious force to reduce but too small to be worth a nuclear attack. In our games, I set up the NATO brigades in a static checkerboard pattern, and planned to only coalesce the defence after the initial nuclear exchange had exhausted both sides.

Interesting. If I'm not mistaken what you describe is pretty close to the NATO defensive doctrine at the time. US (and Belgian) Infantry (Mechanized) Divisions of the period were organized according to the "Pentomic" TO&E, in which the Divisions were divided into five "battle groups" of approximately reinforced battalion-stength. The thinking was that each "battle group" was powerful enough to hold ground, but not large enough that a concentrated nuclear attack on one would significantly diminish the Divisions' overall combat power.

The "Pentomic" Division was specifically organized to operate on a nuclear battlefield. Similarly, the so-called "Zukhov" re-organization of the Soviet Army, which began in 1957, was intended to address the new realities of a nuclear battlefield. Soviet Divisions were streamlined, and standardized into two types: Tank and Motorized Rifle; Mechanized and Infantry Divisions were all either transformed into Tank or Mechanized, or elminiated from the Order of Battle. The Corps-level formation was eliminated, and Army organization was also standardized into two types: Tank and Combined-Arms.

I definitely think this topic need thoroughly re-examination, now that Ralph has corrected the "nuclear attack bug" you discovered in ACoW.