Scenario Design Questions Regarding Divisional Summaries

[vahauser]

Here is a more lengthy and involved article from bayonetstrength(dot)150m(dot)com

A while ago, I got into a debate on the www.feldgrau.net forum.  I had been scrolling through, looking for a subject I hoped I could offer some insight on, only to find most were too eclectic even for my tastes, when I saw one that seemed right up my street.
Someone asked what was the rifle strength of a 1941 German Infantry Division.  There were a couple of offers of around 17,000, based on the personnel strengths and the number of rifles issued.  Both options are technically valid.  I offered a slightly lower figure: 3240.  My total was based on the number of men in the actual Rifle Squads of the Division, not simply the establishment strength.  It lead to a couple more posts between myself and another contributor who I think reckoned my total was 'absurd'.  Still, I had good reason to defend my position, and the Rag Bag seems an excellent place to argue my case more fully.

What makes a combatant?
Every army, both today and during World War Two, divides its numbers between combat and service elements.  The combat arms, infantry, armour, artillery, reconnaissance and engineer, are often referred to collectively as the 'teeth'.  The service elements, transport, supply, medical, maintenance and training to name a few, are likewise referred to as the 'tail'.  The number of men in the combat arms to those in the service elements is known as the 'tooth to tail' ratio. 
It is a particularly important calculation as it dictates the scope of operations the entire army involved will be able to carry out.  World War Two was arguably the first major conflict in which the tail achieved greater proportions than the teeth, as more men were drawn into the service elements needed to sustain the increasing levels of mechanisation.
This throws up the thorny issue of how many men could actually be described as combatants.  It is difficult because it is entirely subjective.  There are several ways to attempt to qualify a man as a combatant.  He carried a rifle; he served in a unit which actively engaged the enemy; he served on the frontline; he actually saw the enemy.  Any and all of these descriptions are valid.  Yet the reality was that only a fraction of the men in an infantry division would normally be expected to engage the enemy directly.
But that cosy reality could disappear in an instant.  If the enemy broke through into the rear areas the men in the supply and services units could not wait around for the infantry to turn up and repel them, they would have to do the job themselves.  This was exemplified in actions such as the 'Admin Box' in Burma, where cut off rear echelon troops conducted their own defence.  Likewise at Bastogne, all hands were needed to plug the gaps in the frontline.  Still, these and other similar episodes were the exception to the norm.  When a commander was forced to bolster his lines with rear echelon troops it was a sign of desperate times.  Such men were not organised or armed for the task, and in some instances lacked the basic skills of field craft and marksmanship required.  The German Army in particular made an attempt to address these problems mid-war, as the attrition of the Eastern Front thinned the ranks of their reliable infantrymen.  

Battalion Bayonet strengths
Bayonet strength is an old fashioned description of the number of men found in the rifle squads and platoons.  Foxhole strength is a more modern alternative, but I prefer the Napoleonic terminology.  When attempting to offer comparisons between various armies it is important to be consistent, therefore the calculations below are based on the same formula.

Combat Infantry
The leading edge of any unit was provided by the men of its Rifle Platoons.  Every man among its ranks was in a position where he was likely to engage the enemy at anywhere from a couple of hundred yards to point blank.  Uniquely, the German Army deployed both medics and wagon drivers in its Platoon HQs.  The former carried a pistol for self defence but cannot be counted as combatants.  The latter apparently were held back with the Company transport under a 'vehicle leader', so are excluded from this exercise.

Combat Support
The increasing numbers of crew served weapons diverted further men from the rifle troops.  While mortars were ideally held back, machine guns and anti-tank weapons needed to be pressed forward to engage.  However, as their contribution was based on the weapons they served rather than their small arms, it seems reasonable to count them separately.  All support platoons inevitably contained personnel who may be more properly counted in the following category, but for simplicities sake they are treated as complete entities here.

Command & Administration
Every level of unit from Platoon up had some form of Headquarters, encompassing officers, signallers and messengers.  While still drawn into the frontline, their role was more in directing the efforts of the combatants rather than adding to the fire.
Likewise, with anywhere from 500 to 1000 men found in various types of Battalion, specialists were needed to sustain the fighting groups.  Clerks, mechanics, medics, repairmen and drivers were found along the length of a Battalion's lines of communication.

Comparisons

The numerical figure shows the numbers of officers and men who fall into the categories described above, the percentage figure being given in brackets.  Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole.  For a detailed description of the battalions examined here, please refer to the Index page and the Example TOE pages.
Infantry Btn Combat Infantry Combat Support Command & Admin

British (1944) 444 - (52%) 183 - (22%) 218 - (26%)
American (1944) 369 - (42%) 297 - (34%) 205 - (24%)
Russian (1943) 360 - (59%) 184 - (30%) 68 - (11%)
German (1941) 432 - (50%) 150 - (17%) 278 - (33%)
German (1944) 270 - (38%) 222 - (32%) 216 - (30%)

Points of note
There are some interesting points that emerge.
The British Battalion placed half of its manpower directly into its twelve Rifle Platoons.  Anyone who has read even a few accounts of British actions will know the riflemen carried the burden of the advance.  The combat support elements served quite a number of weapons, six mortars, six anti-tank guns and a dozen carriers excluding numerous HQ vehicles.  A full quarter strength deployed in command and admin seems excessive perhaps, but Battalions were self contained and had no Regimental service assets to call upon as did other nations.
The United States Battalion had the lowest allied percentage in its nine Rifle Platoons, quite surprising really.  The larger percentage in combat support is partly due to the inclusion of a Weapons Platoon in each Rifle Company.  I was in two minds as to whether they should be counted as combat infantry given their proximity to the action.  If so, the level is increased to 50%, perhaps a fairer indication?  They served nine light and six medium mortars, six light and eight heavy machine guns and three antitank guns.  The command and admin figures are swelled by the 'Basics', unallocated riflemen included in each Company HQ, seemingly to replace losses in the platoons.  Their numbers were reduced mid 1944, as noted elsewhere on the site.
The Russian Rifle Battalion is striking.  Only around one in ten men not serving in a direct combat capacity and well over half the strength in the nine Rifle Platoons.  The combat support served six light and nine medium mortars, twelve heavy machine guns and two antitank guns.  These figures are based on the final modifications of the December 1942 tables.  During mid 1943 the reduced strength savings detailed in The Red Army pages began to bite.  Oddly, these reductions actually increased bayonet strength while reducing weapon crews.  However, the subsequent reductions began to whittle away at the rifle squads while maintaining the lowered number of support weapons (six medium mortars, nine heavy machine guns and two AT Guns).
The German Battalions are the most revealing.  I thought it worthwhile showing both their versions to demonstrate how savage the mid-war reductions were.  The 1941 model placed great emphasis on the men of the nine Rifle Platoons, with half the strength of the entire Battalion.  Support weapons of twelve machine guns and six mortars had the lowest allocation of personnel in this amateur study.  The command and admin group is by far the largest, and the Germans still held considerable service elements at Regimental level.  The 1944 model shows dramatic changes.  Rifle strength had fallen by over a third, an immense drop.  Weapons crew had increased by half in comparison, but only served an additional four heavy mortars.  The command and admin groups remained practically unaltered.  The 150 man reduction between the 1941 and the 1944 models was borne entirely by the Rifle Platoons, the men released by pruning the Train elements all going to the crew served weapons.

Divisional implications
Infantry Divisions are notoriously elastic formations.  I wanted to offer some more specific figures than those below, but given the variations, in German units in particular, opted for approximations instead.

Infantry Div Combat Infantry Div total (approx) Bayonet %
British (1944) 3996 18,500 22%
American (1944) 3321 14,500 23%
Russian (1943) 3240 9,500 34%
German (1941) 3888 17,000 23%
German (1944) 1890 12,500 15%
Accurate comparisons between divisions are particularly difficult.
US Divisions operated with supporting arms such as Tank Destroyer and Anti Aircraft Battalions routinely attached, but they were not included in the establishment strength.  A US Division was nearer the size of a British one when these men were counted.
The German 1944 model is the only one not based on nine Infantry Battalions.  Each Regiment had lost its third Battalion, but the Fusilier Battalion is included as this helped alleviate the reductions.

Points of note
Generally speaking, only one man in four was likely to be placed in a unit whose primary mission was to engage the enemy on foot and with small arms.  Three quarters of the Division were tasked with the operation of crew served weapons or command, control and administration duties.  The reformed Soviet Divisions increased their bayonet strength to one in three, the highest of any combatant in the European theatre.
The real shocker is the 1944 German Grenadier Division.  The much vaunted reforms of 1943 were supposedly aimed at reducing the tail to reinforce the weakened teeth arms.  Instead, they reduced bayonet strength from one in four to just one in six.  The numbers of crew served weapons were mostly maintained, and in some areas increased.  The Germans plainly believed that superior firepower was the best defence against the allied onslaught.  The intriguing thing is that the percentage is not too dissimilar from modern day units (a 1990's era US Army Heavy Division posted 16% foxhole strength). 

Exceptions to the rule
Mention should be made of the infantry who served in two other important Divisions; the Armoured and the Airborne.
Armoured Infantry commonly deployed fewer men in the foot assault role than walking units.  A US Armored Infantry Battalion for example was 1001 all ranks in early 1944.  Of that total 504 men were in the nine Rifle Platoons.  But with just three Armored Infantry Battalions there were only some 1500 men from a strength of over 10,000 men.  
In the Airborne Divisions things were very different.  While organised into fighting and admin groups, the propensity for parachute troops to be scattered upon landing meant every man in the Battalion had to be considered a frontline soldier.  When drawn into the more traditional role of infantry later in the war for the allies, much earlier for the German, the distribution of troops took on a more usual appearance.  However, Airborne troops still retained the ability to mobilise their tail units into effective teeth formations.

Summary
The figures above are by no means an attempt to exclude certain types of troops from their role in combat.  The Reconnaissance Regiment of every British Infantry Division was always to be found leading the way, probing routes of advance and often undertaking 'reconnaissance by fire' - a terminological disguise for saying 'if anyone shoots at us we'll know there is someone there!'.  The Reconnaissance units of all armies often operated on foot, fulfilling the same role as Infantry.
Likewise, the Engineers were to be found at the front, repairing bridges or blowing them up as necessary.  Anti-tank guns and machine gun crews, while able to engage at distance, could be found dug in among the rifle pits and trenches.  Their contribution cannot be ignored.
But if there is one thing this exercise has confirmed for my mind, it is this.  I have been reading accounts of wars and battles since I was at school.  Repeatedly, you come across the phrase 'the attack was repulsed with heavy losses inflicted' or such like.  Very rarely does an author attribute an actual number to those losses.  When they do, a total of say 150 men killed and wounded for a single Battalion during a contested offensive, it's easy to think those losses were incurred from a body of some 800 men.  But when looking at the number of infantrymen usually committed, you are talking of those casualties being taken by perhaps 400 men, less if a company was held in reserve.  In this imagined example that is a casualty rate of around one in three.  It is quite a sobering thought. 
It was the responsibility of the men of the Rifle Platoons of an Infantry Division to maintain the integrity of the frontline and keep contact with the enemy.  They required both mundane material support as well as cannon, guns and mortars.  Practically all the other elements of the Division were geared to keeping the riflemen in combat.  When Divisions were pulled back to rest and refit, make good their losses, it was primarily the infantrymen they needed to replace.  A constant flow of men went into their ranks and came out normally only as casualties.  If the infantry component of a unit was savaged, it compromised the ability of the whole to remain in the field.  When you read about Divisions being pulled out to recuperate, it was rarely because of exceptional events such as artillery batteries being overrun, or Headquarters troops being captured.  It was more due to the fact that their bayonet strength had been so depleted by constant exertions the basic squads and sections could no longer function.  
There is tremendous scope for argument as to what truly constituted bayonet strength, this is just my version and does not disagree too much with those of more accredited commentators.  But it is no coincidence that offensives began to stutter and stall as the casualties in the frontline troops began to mount.  Commanders could pour as much fire down as they wanted on the enemy positions, but as in every war before and since exploitation by foot soldiers was the deciding factor.  It was all too easy for a reckless General to burn out his precious reserves of flesh and blood in a foolhardy attack, and then wonder why he could not hold onto the gains they had made.
The riflemen were the lifeblood of every infantry division.  Once drained, it was particularly hard to replenish.  The Second World War was a true 'all arms' conflict, but the burden of attack and defence was carried by a relatively small proportion of the troops involved.

[vahauser]

Based on the above data and commentary in the previous five posts, I’m prepared to make some preliminary observations regarding the 269th Infantry Division during the summer/autumn, 1941.

1 – The antitank rifles and 50mm mortars were quickly found to be ineffective on the Eastern Front and those men were probably converted into extra riflemen/machinegunners.

2 – The combined total number of “rifle squads” (light rifle, rifle, heavy rifle, SMG, etc.) in the division should not exceed 390 (plus or minus).  This will be augmented by engineer and recon squads.

3 – The superior firepower of the MG34 (both as a light and heavy MG) needs to be accounted for.  The MG34 is about 10% more lethal/effective than other rifle-caliber machineguns used by the Soviets/Allies.  [Note: The TOAW “Heavy MG” refers to 12.7mm (.50-caliber) machineguns and not to rifle-caliber machineguns (8mm and smaller) such as the MG34.  The “military” definition of a heavy machinegun is one which has a sturdier mount, more ammunition, and replacement barrels by which fire can be sustained for longer periods.  Thus, an MG34 in a ‘heavy’ configuration has a larger crew (most of whom are dealing with the larger ammunition allotment), a steady tripod mount, and several replacement barrels.  So, the TOAW definition and the “military” definition of a ‘heavy’ machinegun are different and should not be confused.]

4 – The 20 flamethrowers need to be accounted for.

5 – A military police platoon is present in the division.

6 – A bridging column is present in the division.

[Silvanski]

Check out this old thread on GS.. it gives TOE examples prepared by Jon Martina

http://forums.gamesquad.com/showthread.php?t=3401

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

1 – The antitank rifles and 50mm mortars were quickly found to be ineffective on the Eastern Front and those men were probably converted into extra riflemen/machinegunners.

Probably replacing lost riflemen who could not immediately be replaced from Germany rather than simply adding to the rifle strength of the division.

4 – The 20 flamethrowers need to be accounted for.

This one is easy. An engineer squad has an AP value of five, because they are assumed to be armed with flamethrowers.

5 – A military police platoon is present in the division.

Yes but this is not really relevant at this scale. At regiment scale, I would include this platoon in the HQ.

6 – A bridging column is present in the division.

What were its capabilities? Would the division be able to use this column to cross the Dnepr? I'm assuming not. Therefore it would be inappropriate to include bridging teams. The engineer squads offer a limited amount of bridging capacity which probably get a lot closer to the actual abilities of the unit.

Anyway, all your sources deal with this mythical "generic German infantry division". The identity of 269. Infanterie isn't shrouded in mystery. In fact we know it was a 4. Welle Division. My link above to Niehorster's archive gives the specific structure of this type of division.

[vahauser]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: vahauser

1 – The antitank rifles and 50mm mortars were quickly found to be ineffective on the Eastern Front and those men were probably converted into extra riflemen/machinegunners.

Probably replacing lost riflemen who could not immediately be replaced from Germany rather than simply adding to the rifle strength of the division.

4 – The 20 flamethrowers need to be accounted for.

This one is easy. An engineer squad has an AP value of five, because they are assumed to be armed with flamethrowers.

5 – A military police platoon is present in the division.

Yes but this is not really relevant at this scale. At regiment scale, I would include this platoon in the HQ.

6 – A bridging column is present in the division.

What were its capabilities? Would the division be able to use this column to cross the Dnepr? I'm assuming not. Therefore it would be inappropriate to include bridging teams. The engineer squads offer a limited amount of bridging capacity which probably get a lot closer to the actual abilities of the unit.

Anyway, all your sources deal with this mythical "generic German infantry division". The identity of 269. Infanterie isn't shrouded in mystery. In fact we know it was a 4. Welle Division. My link above to Niehorster's archive gives the specific structure of this type of division.

Yes, the 269th was a 4th wave division (formed in August 1939). But, by the summer of 1941 all of those 'early-wave' divisions had undergone transformations/reorganizations (in addition to two years' worth of experience/training/combat). Therefore, I have absolutely no problem with lumping all the pre-war 1939 divisions (regardless of wave) together into 'generic' divisions. And you'll notice that pretty much every East Front scenario does likewise.
EDIT: I realize that the 'First-Wave' divisions were "regular army" and that the later waves were not (sort of like the distinction between the Regular Army and National Guard divisions in the US Army in WW2). But I would depict that by simply giving the "Regular Army" divisions a slightly higher Proficiency rating.

The problem is with the 'Engineer' classification itself. I prefer the use of Assault squads (a la Directive 21) to depict those squads especially capable of assaulting. Further, flamethrowers (and satchel charges and antitank mines [aside: in this case, antitank mines refers not to mines planted into the ground but instead were magnetic hand-delivered shaped charges, sort of like hand-delivered panzerfausts, that brave men used to kill enemy AFVs]) are lethal in an antitank role. Thus, an Assault AT- squad would be a perfect representation of 1941 German assault teams. Unfortunately, there is no such thing in the standard TOAW III .eqp file. So, the nearest approximation is a Heavy Rifle AT- squad. This comes closest to representing German 1941 assault teams.

Regarding the divisional Military Police and Bridging Columns, all I'm saying is that all those divisional assets need to be accounted for somewhere (stripped out and given to higher HQ support units, for example).

Regarding the obsolete/useless antitank rifles and 50mm mortars. This gets interesting. If you look at that equipment summary posted in Post #18 above (from the dasheer(dot)org webpage), you'll notice that it gives 378 light machineguns. Now, the standard rifle company has 12 rifle squads. There are 27 companies in the division. But, if you convert those antitank rifle and 50mm mortar crews into rifle squads, you get 14 squads per company instead of 12. And 27 times 14 equals? You guessed it. 378 rifle squads. Which exactly matches the 378 light machineguns listed on the dasheer(dot)org webpage.

Addendum: Here is why I'm basically unhappy with the 269th Infantry Division as depicted in the Soviet Union 1941 scenario. The 269th was a battle-tested combat-veteran division in the summer/autumn 1941. I would give it a proficiency of no lower than 80%. However, that 80% Proficiency rating depends on all the organic components of the division operating as a team. It also depends on all those divisional specialists (signals, artillery, maintenance, supply, veterinary, etc.) doing their jobs at that high level of proficiency. But, if all those specialists are stripped away from their specialties and forced to use their rifles, then you no longer have an 80% proficiency division. In fact, you don't have much of a division at all at that point. So, including all those specialists as 'emergency' riflemen defeats the very definition of an 80% proficiency division, since if they are ever used, then the division cannot be operating at 80% proficiency (maybe 50%, or even 40%). Thus, only the troops operating at the proficiency rating of the division (which by definition means doing the jobs they are most skilled at) should be represented.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: vahauser
Addendum: Here is why I'm basically unhappy with the 269th Infantry Division as depicted in the Soviet Union 1941 scenario. The 269th was a battle-tested combat-veteran division in the summer/autumn 1941. I would give it a proficiency of no lower than 80%. However, that 80% Proficiency rating depends on all the organic components of the division operating as a team. It also depends on all those divisional specialists (signals, artillery, maintenance, supply, veterinary, etc.) doing their jobs at that high level of proficiency. But, if all those specialists are stripped away from their specialties and forced to use their rifles, then you no longer have an 80% proficiency division. In fact, you don't have much of a division at all at that point. So, including all those specialists as 'emergency' riflemen defeats the very definition of an 80% proficiency division, since if they are ever used, then the division cannot be operating at 80% proficiency (maybe 50%, or even 40%). Thus, only the troops operating at the proficiency rating of the division (which by definition means doing the jobs they are most skilled at) should be represented.

As I've pointed out elsewhere, the rear-area squads that are represented are already de-leveraged by the fact that only a fraction of them are modeled. In other words, of the 17,000 odd troops in the division, perhaps 5,000 were front-line combat troops, the rest in the rear - that leaves 12,000 or so. But I'm only modeling about 3,000 of them - effectively rating them at 1/4 proficiency or there abouts.

Also note that only a handful of divisions are independently modeled in the scenario. The bulk of the forces are in Corps. And those Corps are modeled in two parts - a frontline part and a rear-area part. That separates them so that they function independently. Also, in the case of the Germans, their rear-area parts are debilitated as combat elements. This was done by slashing their transport quantities. So if they are used in frontline combat they will tend to drop to 1 movement point.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

Yes, the 269th was a 4th wave division (formed in August 1939). But, by the summer of 1941 all of those 'early-wave' divisions had undergone transformations/reorganizations (in addition to two years' worth of experience/training/combat). Therefore, I have absolutely no problem with lumping all the pre-war 1939 divisions (regardless of wave) together into 'generic' divisions.

... that's neither here nor there. The German army had different organisations for the different divisions, and even as late as 1941 the later waves were being given different tasks on the battlefield. It's not like these TO&Es aren't available: Niehorster has published them on his website. Clearly, one should use the right organisation rather than just doing a copy-paste.

This is an example of something that's definitely wrong. If we know the division had x equipment, why should it be given y equipment?

And you'll notice that pretty much every East Front scenario does likewise.

Just because something is popular doesn't mean it is right.

Unfortunately, there is no such thing in the standard TOAW III .eqp file.

So make your own equipment types. It's never been easier. Again, why compromise when you can get it right?

Regarding the divisional Military Police and Bridging Columns, all I'm saying is that all those divisional assets need to be accounted for somewhere (stripped out and given to higher HQ support units, for example).

Do they? That bridging column was presumably used to cross the sort of minor rivers that simply would not appear in a 15-50km/hex scenario. So those assets should be removed as well. By the same token, the military police platoon would be used to ensure that the elements of the division moved smoothly together. As they're all in one unit in this case, this function is not necessary in TOAW. Adding them at the corps or army level would be unrealistic; clearly, these units would remain with the division and continue to perform their tasks- not go off 100 miles away and assist some other division in crossing a major river.

Regarding the obsolete/useless antitank rifles and 50mm mortars. This gets interesting. If you look at that equipment summary posted in Post #18 above (from the dasheer(dot)org webpage), you'll notice that it gives 378 light machineguns. Now, the standard rifle company has 12 rifle squads. There are 27 companies in the division. But, if you convert those antitank rifle and 50mm mortar crews into rifle squads, you get 14 squads per company instead of 12. And 27 times 14 equals? You guessed it. 378 rifle squads. Which exactly matches the 378 light machineguns listed on the dasheer(dot)org webpage.

This is a coincidence. If you look at a couple of the sources above (such as the table in your post #17), you'll note that there are LMGs in various parts of the division. They weren't all up the front with the combat infantry.

I would give it a proficiency of no lower than 80%.

Proficiency again is a subjective value. Is there anything wrong with this division being at 75% if every other unit is also 5% lower than you would expect?

But, if all those specialists are stripped away from their specialties and forced to use their rifles, then you no longer have an 80% proficiency division. In fact, you don't have much of a division at all at that point. So, including all those specialists as 'emergency' riflemen defeats the very definition of an 80% proficiency division, since if they are ever used, then the division cannot be operating at 80% proficiency (maybe 50%, or even 40%). Thus, only the troops operating at the proficiency rating of the division (which by definition means doing the jobs they are most skilled at) should be represented.

It's an interesting point. I'd be more inclined to have these rear area troops as extra replacements for rifle squads. The unit has a lot of immediately available replacements- but that doesn't mean everyone is going to be up at the front from day 1.

[vahauser]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: vahauser

Yes, the 269th was a 4th wave division (formed in August 1939). But, by the summer of 1941 all of those 'early-wave' divisions had undergone transformations/reorganizations (in addition to two years' worth of experience/training/combat). Therefore, I have absolutely no problem with lumping all the pre-war 1939 divisions (regardless of wave) together into 'generic' divisions.

... that's neither here nor there. The German army had different organisations for the different divisions, and even as late as 1941 the later waves were being given different tasks on the battlefield. It's not like these TO&Es aren't available: Niehorster has published them on his website. Clearly, one should use the right organisation rather than just doing a copy-paste.

This is an example of something that's definitely wrong. If we know the division had x equipment, why should it be given y equipment?

And you'll notice that pretty much every East Front scenario does likewise.

Just because something is popular doesn't mean it is right.

Unfortunately, there is no such thing in the standard TOAW III .eqp file.

So make your own equipment types. It's never been easier. Again, why compromise when you can get it right?

Regarding the divisional Military Police and Bridging Columns, all I'm saying is that all those divisional assets need to be accounted for somewhere (stripped out and given to higher HQ support units, for example).

Do they? That bridging column was presumably used to cross the sort of minor rivers that simply would not appear in a 15-50km/hex scenario. So those assets should be removed as well. By the same token, the military police platoon would be used to ensure that the elements of the division moved smoothly together. As they're all in one unit in this case, this function is not necessary in TOAW. Adding them at the corps or army level would be unrealistic; clearly, these units would remain with the division and continue to perform their tasks- not go off 100 miles away and assist some other division in crossing a major river.

Regarding the obsolete/useless antitank rifles and 50mm mortars. This gets interesting. If you look at that equipment summary posted in Post #18 above (from the dasheer(dot)org webpage), you'll notice that it gives 378 light machineguns. Now, the standard rifle company has 12 rifle squads. There are 27 companies in the division. But, if you convert those antitank rifle and 50mm mortar crews into rifle squads, you get 14 squads per company instead of 12. And 27 times 14 equals? You guessed it. 378 rifle squads. Which exactly matches the 378 light machineguns listed on the dasheer(dot)org webpage.

This is a coincidence. If you look at a couple of the sources above (such as the table in your post #17), you'll note that there are LMGs in various parts of the division. They weren't all up the front with the combat infantry.

I would give it a proficiency of no lower than 80%.

Proficiency again is a subjective value. Is there anything wrong with this division being at 75% if every other unit is also 5% lower than you would expect?

But, if all those specialists are stripped away from their specialties and forced to use their rifles, then you no longer have an 80% proficiency division. In fact, you don't have much of a division at all at that point. So, including all those specialists as 'emergency' riflemen defeats the very definition of an 80% proficiency division, since if they are ever used, then the division cannot be operating at 80% proficiency (maybe 50%, or even 40%). Thus, only the troops operating at the proficiency rating of the division (which by definition means doing the jobs they are most skilled at) should be represented.

It's an interesting point. I'd be more inclined to have these rear area troops as extra replacements for rifle squads. The unit has a lot of immediately available replacements- but that doesn't mean everyone is going to be up at the front from day 1.

By the summer of 1941, no two German infantry divisions had the same organization. Even if there was an "ideal" TOE for 4th-Wave divisions in 1939, by the summer of 1941 none of those divisions matched that TOE. Every division deviated from the "ideal" TOE, and the farther away in time (and combat experience) the division was from its 'original' TOE, the greater the deviation. But here is the real problem: the TOE data for the other combatants is even more problematic than it is for the Germans. For instance, how many Soviet divisions were even close to their TOEs (and I'm not talking about full strength or not, I'm talking about basic things like how many battalions and what kind of battalions they were)? A scenario is only as strong as its weakest link. Generic German infantry divisions, based on better data than is likely to ever be available for the other combatants, is never going to be the weak link.

Yes, I've been designing my own WW2.eqp file for over a year now. A work in progress that is significantly helped by discussions like this one.

Agreed that the LMG thing was a coincidence. However, that 378 rifle squads seems to pass the smell test and some reality checks. As of today, I would build the 269th Division around a base of 378 rifle squads (minus the antitank rifles and 50mm mortars, which are converted to riflemen).

Regarding engineers. The pionier battalion had ~800 men in it. That is a large battalion! When you also consider the engineers floating around the division as parts of other units (e.g., each infantry regiment had some engineers organic to it), you are starting to look at a lot of engineers. How many engineer squads should be depicted in the division? That is a very good question. Note that the Soviet Union 1941 269th and the Russian War 1941-44 269th have organic bridging squads shown.

Regarding military police. From what I can tell, the 269th had one platoon of MPs (I'm not sure how many TOAW MP squads that translates into). Including the division's MPs or not might not matter, but considering the traffic jam penalties in TOAW, then the scenario designer had better be aware of how big a traffic nightmare he wants to make if he doesn't at least recognize that the 269th had an organic MP presence. Note that only the Directive 21 depiction of the 269th has organic MPs shown.

Regarding rifle 'replacements', I prefer to represent these using the Replacements Editor.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

By the summer of 1941, no two German infantry divisions had the same organization. Even if there was an "ideal" TOE for 4th-Wave divisions in 1939, by the summer of 1941 none of those divisions matched that TOE.

You'll notice if you go to Niehorsters page, he describes the deviations from standard TO&E for each division.

Your philosophy seems to be that because we can't fix everything, we should fix nothing. So what's the point in designing units at all? My argument would be that we should take advantage of quick wins: we know how these divisions were organised, so lets get them set up properly so as much as possible is correct.

Agreed that the LMG thing was a coincidence. However, that 378 rifle squads seems to pass the smell test and some reality checks. As of today, I would build the 269th Division around a base of 378 rifle squads (minus the antitank rifles and 50mm mortars, which are converted to riflemen).

I'd go for something in between. My guess is those AT rifles weren't actually scrapped. The Germans seem to have continued to use AT rifles to some extent at least into 1942.

Regarding engineers. The pionier battalion had ~800 men in it. That is a large battalion! When you also consider the engineers floating around the division as parts of other units (e.g., each infantry regiment had some engineers organic to it), you are starting to look at a lot of engineers. How many engineer squads should be depicted in the division?

Three companies of three platoons each in the battalion, three platoons in each regiment. Three squads per platoon. So that would make 36 squads. Thing about engineers is that they use a lot of auxiliary equipment which doesn't show up in a TOAW unit. That's probably what all those 800 men are doing.

Regarding military police. From what I can tell, the 269th had one platoon of MPs (I'm not sure how many TOAW MP squads that translates into). Including the division's MPs or not might not matter, but considering the traffic jam penalties in TOAW, then the scenario designer had better be aware of how big a traffic nightmare he wants to make if he doesn't at least recognize that the 269th had an organic MP presence.

I would think that would be factored into the units' proficiency etc.

Regarding rifle 'replacements', I prefer to represent these using the Replacements Editor.

Agree. That's what I was getting at.

[Central Blue]

Regarding engineers. The pionier battalion had ~800 men in it. That is a large battalion!

The following source is from 1942, but it does provide some detail on large pioneer battalions:
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/d ... 101_10.pdf

article on bridging here:http://www.lonesentry.com/manuals/tme30 ... 5sub8.html

[vahauser]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: vahauser

By the summer of 1941, no two German infantry divisions had the same organization. Even if there was an "ideal" TOE for 4th-Wave divisions in 1939, by the summer of 1941 none of those divisions matched that TOE.

You'll notice if you go to Niehorsters page, he describes the deviations from standard TO&E for each division.

Your philosophy seems to be that because we can't fix everything, we should fix nothing. So what's the point in designing units at all? My argument would be that we should take advantage of quick wins: we know how these divisions were organised, so lets get them set up properly so as much as possible is correct.

Agreed that the LMG thing was a coincidence. However, that 378 rifle squads seems to pass the smell test and some reality checks. As of today, I would build the 269th Division around a base of 378 rifle squads (minus the antitank rifles and 50mm mortars, which are converted to riflemen).

I'd go for something in between. My guess is those AT rifles weren't actually scrapped. The Germans seem to have continued to use AT rifles to some extent at least into 1942.

Regarding engineers. The pionier battalion had ~800 men in it. That is a large battalion! When you also consider the engineers floating around the division as parts of other units (e.g., each infantry regiment had some engineers organic to it), you are starting to look at a lot of engineers. How many engineer squads should be depicted in the division?

Three companies of three platoons each in the battalion, three platoons in each regiment. Three squads per platoon. So that would make 36 squads. Thing about engineers is that they use a lot of auxiliary equipment which doesn't show up in a TOAW unit. That's probably what all those 800 men are doing.

Regarding military police. From what I can tell, the 269th had one platoon of MPs (I'm not sure how many TOAW MP squads that translates into). Including the division's MPs or not might not matter, but considering the traffic jam penalties in TOAW, then the scenario designer had better be aware of how big a traffic nightmare he wants to make if he doesn't at least recognize that the 269th had an organic MP presence.

I would think that would be factored into the units' proficiency etc.

Regarding rifle 'replacements', I prefer to represent these using the Replacements Editor.

Agree. That's what I was getting at.

You raise an interesting viewpoint regarding "historical" vs "generic" TOEs. This is one reason that more and more I am starting to prefer the hypothetical scenarios like Europa 1947.

Yes. The PbR39 antitank rifle was converted in many cases to the GbR39 antitank grenade launcher, which did have a better AT performance. However, riflemen were far more valuable and generally useful. If I was the divisional commander, I'd order my quartermaster to stockpile those GbR39s, just in case, and then boost my rifle companies with some extra riflemen. I personally think that this is exactly what happened historically in the majority of cases. In TOAW terms, the antitank rifle teams really are pretty worthless. Actually, they are a hindrance--they take up space and contribute next to nothing. I'll take extra rifle squads every time--just like what happened historically.

The engineer TOEs I know of say four squads per platoon in 1941, which yields a divisional total of 48 instead of 36 engineer squads for the division. I don't know which way to go here. 36 seems like too few engineers given a division of 17,000 men. 48 might be closer to "historical", but it might also give the division too great an engineering potential in TOAW terms. I'm undecided about this right now.

Here is another factor to consider that has been addressed by some of the divisional TOEs shown earlier in the thread for the 269th--the antitank assets were in the process of being reorganized in 1941. The 37mm AT gun was known to be mediocre (at best) and the 50mm AT gun was entering service. Also, the antitank battalion itself was undergoing organizational changes, too. This needs to be dealt with.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

You raise an interesting viewpoint regarding "historical" vs "generic" TOEs. This is one reason that more and more I am starting to prefer the hypothetical scenarios like Europa 1947.

They're certainly easier to design as one can fudge certain aspects. However one still has to pay some attention to reality when designing a hypothetical scenario. A lot of the hypotheticals out there are not very well thought-out.

In TOAW terms, the antitank rifle teams really are pretty worthless. Actually, they are a hindrance--they take up space and contribute next to nothing.

They certainly are pretty worthless- though don't take up much space. They're passive defenders and have 0 weight, so the only thing they use up is transport.

The engineer TOEs I know of say four squads per platoon in 1941, which yields a divisional total of 48 instead of 36 engineer squads for the division. I don't know which way to go here. 36 seems like too few engineers given a division of 17,000 men. 48 might be closer to "historical", but it might also give the division too great an engineering potential in TOAW terms. I'm undecided about this right now.

You proposed the solution yourself above. The platoons in the regiments could be assumed to be assault engineers with no real engineering cabability, and could be represented as Heavy Rifle Squads or similar.

Here is another factor to consider that has been addressed by some of the divisional TOEs shown earlier in the thread for the 269th--the antitank assets were in the process of being reorganized in 1941. The 37mm AT gun was known to be mediocre (at best) and the 50mm AT gun was entering service. Also, the antitank battalion itself was undergoing organizational changes, too. This needs to be dealt with.

Yeah. You'd want a transition type TO&E. This would look roughly as follows (using 1. Welle organisation as an example);

66/3 37mm AT Guns (one would want to analyse how many guns were left in divisions at the end of the scenario)
6/48 50mm AT Guns

As replacements become available, the division will gain more and more 50mm AT guns, whilst the 37mm AT guns will not be replaced. There are two problems with this;
a) If the division takes heavy losses early in the scenario, or worse still evaporates, it could end up with a total AT strength of only a handful of guns as few 50mm AT Guns are available
b) Conversely, if the division survives unscathed to the latter part of the scenario, it could end up with a complement of over 100 AT Guns. This isn't as bad as the above, however, as the 37mm AT gun will presumably be virtually worthless at this point. In any case, even simply moving across the map will cause a few guns to be lost to replacements.

[vahauser]

Based on everything posted in this thread, the screenshot below shows my depiction of the 269th Infantry Division, summer/autumn 1941.



Notes:
1 – The movement rate of 15 (based on 25km hexes and 1-week turns) is deliberate. I prefer using odd numbers for large formations and I reserve even numbers for smaller (and/or faster) formations. For example, the maximum movement rating at this scale is 26. So, I would rate panzer divisions at 25 and smaller, faster formations (like panzer recon battalions) at 26. The reason odd numbers is chosen for the larger and/or slower formations is to reward rear-area movement along roads (where the infantry division would get to move all 15 hexes), but only allow 7 hexes of movement (in good weather and open terrain) into enemy territory. The 180 horse teams and 80 trucks accomplish this.

2 – The division gets a base of 378 rifle squads (324 for the inherent rifle squads in the rifle companies + 54 for converting the 50mm mortars and the ATRs into riflemen). [I can show you the math if you really want to see all that number crunching.] That 378 is modified as follows:
a) Since the MG34 LMG is ~10% more lethal than standard LMGs, then the 378 rifle squads is reduced by 36 (which is ~10% of 378) and those 36 become heavy rifle squads to account for the increased lethality of the MG34 LMGs.
b) Further, the front-line combat NCOs tended to use SMGs, so an additional 12 rifle squads are converted to heavy rifle squads to account for the increased firepower (representing a ~3.4% increase in firepower) of those SMGs. [My .eqp database ratings spreadsheet yields no significant difference in firepower between “SMG” and “Heavy Rifle”. The two are basically interchangeable in my database. Hence, I don’t need to call those SMGs “SMG squads” and can keep things simple by just incorporating the extra firepower and calling those squads “Heavy Rifle”. They are functionally identical in my .eqp database.]

3 – Therefore, 330 rifle squads + 48 heavy rifle squads = the base 378 rifle squads (modified as above).

4 – The 116 MG34 heavy MGs are taken directly from the Handbook on German Military Forces.

5 – The 36 105mm howitzers and 12 150mm howitzers are taken directly from the Handbook on German Military Forces and is based on the fact that the 105mm guns (originally used as the counterbattery component of the artillery regiment) were gradually replaced by 150mm howitzers. Exactly when this occurred, I have no idea, but it definitely happened, and probably during 1941. Since this is guesswork done in order to keep things generically simple, the “textbook” TOE for the artillery regiment would be: 4 105mm guns, 36 105mm howitzers, 8 150mm howitzers. However, since TOAW doesn’t always translate “textbook” data perfectly, I think that the extra range provided by the 105mm guns is not as valuable as the extra hitting power of the 150mm howitzers (and evidently my historical counterparts agreed since those 105mm guns were in fact replaced by 150mm howitzers at some point in the war). So, to keep things simple, I just replaced those 4 105mm guns with 4 150mm howitzers from the start of Operation Barbarossa.

6 – The 36 recon rifle squads is a simplification. I didn’t want to mess with all the complications of motorcycle squads, cavalry squads, etc. I just lumped them all into the recon rifle squads. They are all functionally equivalent in TOAW terms anyway, especially when they are not separate formations and are part of the same division at the divisional scale. Indeed, since the cavalry component of the divisions was done away with in the summer/autumn 1941 anyway (since horses were dying faster than they could be replaced), and since the motorcycle component of the infantry division is problematic to say the least, then this is not a silly or frivolous simplification. So, I think that 36 recon rifle squads is a good overall depiction of the recon capabilities of the division at this scale.

7 – the 3 SdKfz 221 armored cars are taken directly from the Handbook on German Military Forces.

8 – The 42 engineer squads are based on a compromise between 36 and 48 in addition to the comments and suggestions given elsewhere in this thread. I think that 48 squads need to be accounted for (since the TOE data is strong that 48 “engineer” squads should be part of the division), and those remaining 6 squads are going to be accounted for in the assault component of the division.

9 – The 30 assault AT- squads are derived from a number of places. 20 of those squads are taken directly from the Handbook on German Military Forces (since the 20 divisional flamethrowers need to be accounted for). 6 squads are accounted for from the “engineer” assets of the division that weren’t accounted for as engineer squads. The remaining 4 squads are accounted for on the basis that each regiment always had some exceptionally brave/skilled men who could be given “assault gear” (satchel charges, antitank mines, etc.) and be relied on to carry out assaults.

10 – The 54 81mm mortars are taken directly from the Handbook on German Military Forces.

11 – The 20 75mm infantry howitzers and 6 150mm infantry howitzers are taken directly from the Handbook on German Military Forces.

12 – The antitank/antiaircraft assets of the division are in transition in the summer/autumn 1941. Both the quantities of equipment and the organization of the antitank battalion are changing at this time (and will change even more as the war goes on). The quantities depicted here are taken directly from the Handbook on German Military Forces as well as from comments/suggestions from people in this thread.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

1 – The movement rate of 15 (based on 25km hexes and 1-week turns) is deliberate.

375km per week or 53.5km per day. My understanding is that decent infantry put out about 40km per day in ideal conditions. I'd be inclined to go with a movement rate of 13, which I believe is the standard for leg infantry in TOAW anyway. I wouldn't bother with any trucks at all, regardless of their actual presence in the division.

5 – The 36 105mm howitzers and 12 150mm howitzers are taken directly from the Handbook on German Military Forces and is based on the fact that the 105mm guns (originally used as the counterbattery component of the artillery regiment) were gradually replaced by 150mm howitzers.

I believe the German 105mm "howitzer" had the range of the TOAW 105mm Gun. Same for the 150mm Howitzer/Gun. Otherwise, this seems to have been the organisation of the German artillery regiment for the entire early war period.

6 – The 36 recon rifle squads is a simplification. I didn’t want to mess with all the complications of motorcycle squads, cavalry squads, etc. I just lumped them all into the recon rifle squads.

Problem with recon rifle squads is that they have an AP value of just 1. There seem to have bee two companies with 9 LMGs each in the recon battalion, with one (cavalry?) platoon in each regiment. My inclination would be 18 Assault recon teams (lovingly renamed bicycle rifle squads in a modified .exe) and 9-18 rifle recon teams to reflect the balance, given your remark about recon cavalry.

9 – The 30 assault AT- squads are derived from a number of places. 20 of those squads are taken directly from the Handbook on German Military Forces (since the 20 divisional flamethrowers need to be accounted for). 6 squads are accounted for from the “engineer” assets of the division that weren’t accounted for as engineer squads. The remaining 4 squads are accounted for on the basis that each regiment always had some exceptionally brave/skilled men who could be given “assault gear” (satchel charges, antitank mines, etc.) and be relied on to carry out assaults.

You seem to be double counting some manpower here. If you're going to have assault teams, these should come out of the number of engineer squads, and I don't think it's necessarily appropriate to treat each flamethrower as a single assault team. Perhaps 12 Assault squads and 36 engineer squads.

12 – The antitank/antiaircraft assets of the division are in transition in the summer/autumn 1941. Both the quantities of equipment and the organization of the antitank battalion are changing at this time (and will change even more as the war goes on). The quantities depicted here are taken directly from the Handbook on German Military Forces as well as from comments/suggestions from people in this thread.

Note that in June 1941, the division seems to have had 47mm AT(e) guns rather than 50mm AT guns. To cover the entire campaign, I suppose it might be simpler to use 50mm AT guns for both weapons.

Regarding the re-equipping with 50mm AT guns, up to the end of 1941 I understand that there were a total of 2462 50mm AT guns produced. Between 120 divisions (give or take), that's only 20 guns per division. A few hundred 47mm Guns might raise this to 24. So I'd suggest the following organisation instead of what I recommended above;

6/24 50mm AT Guns
63/36 37mm AT Guns

On the assumption that as long as there were not enough 50mm guns to equip the entire division, some 37mm guns would remain, especially in the regiments.

[Scout_Pilot]

GD,

You make an excellent point about the pioneer assets, especially in German battalions and regiments. In the article at the following link, it is noted that engineers organic to combat units belonged to the branch of the parent unit (i.e. the men in an infantry regiment's engineer platoon/company would belong to the infantry branch, not the engineer branch). As such, they typically served as assault troops, and had limited "engineering" training (and capability). How this can best be represented in TOAW unit organizations is probably by use of generic Assault Squads.

http://www.lonesentry.com/manuals/tme30 ... sub11.html

OTOH, the divisional pioneer battalion had the more traditional engineering mission. This was true at the beginning of WWII; however in 1943, the German divisional pioneer battalion mission began to evolve more toward the infantry pioneer role. At this time, the TOE of the divisional pioneer battalion in panzer and panzer-grenadier divisions became very similar to that of the infantry battalion by addition of a weapons company with heavy mount MG-42's and 81mm mortars.

The following is also from the lonesenty website. It is from a WWII, US Army publication (Military Intelligence Service, Information Bulletin No. 18, June 15, 1942), titled "The German Armored Division". What's not mentioned is that the pioneer battalion had flamethrower teams assigned, almost certainly for assaulting prepared defensive positions.


Section V: ARMORED ENGINEER BATTALION

The armored engineer battalion consists of headquarters, 3 light motorized companies (possibly only 2 in some cases), 1 motorized heavy bridge column, and 1 supply park. The motorized companies have 4 officers and 183 enlisted men each, and are armed with 9 light machine guns, 153 rifles, and 34 pistols. The heavy bridge column comprises all the equipment and personnel necessary for construction of a bridge of 28-ton capacity. It has 6 officers, 184 enlisted men, and is armed with 1 light machine gun, 153 rifles, and 36 pistols. The supply park has 2 officers and 48 enlisted men, and is armed with 1 light machine gun, 36 rifles, and 14 pistols. The personnel and engineer equipment is moved in passenger cars, trucks, tractor trailers, and motorcycles.

45. The armored engineer battalion is able to follow tanks everywhere on the battlefield. In cases where not all the battalion vehicles are armored or capable of moving across country, only the armored engineer company of the battalion can be used in direct support of the tank brigade.

46. The task of the armored engineers is to provide the armored division on the march and in battle with the necessary facilities for movement. These include:

a. Seeking out and removing obstacles in the line of advance;

b. Clearing lanes through mine fields;

c. Marking mined areas;

d. Constructing crossings and bridges with improvised or standard equipment capable of carrying all vehicles of the armored division.

In addition, armored engineers cooperate especially in the attack against permanent defenses.

[vahauser]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: vahauser

1 – The movement rate of 15 (based on 25km hexes and 1-week turns) is deliberate.

375km per week or 53.5km per day. My understanding is that decent infantry put out about 40km per day in ideal conditions. I'd be inclined to go with a movement rate of 13, which I believe is the standard for leg infantry in TOAW anyway. I wouldn't bother with any trucks at all, regardless of their actual presence in the division.

5 – The 36 105mm howitzers and 12 150mm howitzers are taken directly from the Handbook on German Military Forces and is based on the fact that the 105mm guns (originally used as the counterbattery component of the artillery regiment) were gradually replaced by 150mm howitzers.

I believe the German 105mm "howitzer" had the range of the TOAW 105mm Gun. Same for the 150mm Howitzer/Gun. Otherwise, this seems to have been the organisation of the German artillery regiment for the entire early war period.

6 – The 36 recon rifle squads is a simplification. I didn’t want to mess with all the complications of motorcycle squads, cavalry squads, etc. I just lumped them all into the recon rifle squads.

Problem with recon rifle squads is that they have an AP value of just 1. There seem to have bee two companies with 9 LMGs each in the recon battalion, with one (cavalry?) platoon in each regiment. My inclination would be 18 Assault recon teams (lovingly renamed bicycle rifle squads in a modified .exe) and 9-18 rifle recon teams to reflect the balance, given your remark about recon cavalry.

9 – The 30 assault AT- squads are derived from a number of places. 20 of those squads are taken directly from the Handbook on German Military Forces (since the 20 divisional flamethrowers need to be accounted for). 6 squads are accounted for from the “engineer” assets of the division that weren’t accounted for as engineer squads. The remaining 4 squads are accounted for on the basis that each regiment always had some exceptionally brave/skilled men who could be given “assault gear” (satchel charges, antitank mines, etc.) and be relied on to carry out assaults.

You seem to be double counting some manpower here. If you're going to have assault teams, these should come out of the number of engineer squads, and I don't think it's necessarily appropriate to treat each flamethrower as a single assault team. Perhaps 12 Assault squads and 36 engineer squads.

12 – The antitank/antiaircraft assets of the division are in transition in the summer/autumn 1941. Both the quantities of equipment and the organization of the antitank battalion are changing at this time (and will change even more as the war goes on). The quantities depicted here are taken directly from the Handbook on German Military Forces as well as from comments/suggestions from people in this thread.

Note that in June 1941, the division seems to have had 47mm AT(e) guns rather than 50mm AT guns. To cover the entire campaign, I suppose it might be simpler to use 50mm AT guns for both weapons.

Regarding the re-equipping with 50mm AT guns, up to the end of 1941 I understand that there were a total of 2462 50mm AT guns produced. Between 120 divisions (give or take), that's only 20 guns per division. A few hundred 47mm Guns might raise this to 24. So I'd suggest the following organisation instead of what I recommended above;

6/24 50mm AT Guns
63/36 37mm AT Guns

On the assumption that as long as there were not enough 50mm guns to equip the entire division, some 37mm guns would remain, especially in the regiments.

Good point. 13 is a better movement rating for standard German infantry divisions. EDIT: However, I'm happy with the total transport (trucks + wagons) of ~270. I think that 240 horse teams + 30 trucks yields a movement rating of 13 for the 269th as I've depicted it (compared with the previous 180 horse teams + 80 trucks that yielded a movement rating of 15).

My modified WW2.eqp file does not have 'recon rifle teams'. Instead, I've made them 'recon rifle squads', with the same basic characteristics as other rifle squads except that they are recon capable. I also have 'recon SMG squads' and 'recon assault squads' (which are reserved for special forces/commandos). So, at the divisional scale, all I'm really concerned about is getting the "recon" value for the division correct. 36 recon squads (of whatever flavor) seems to be about right.

Regarding assault squads. I'm pretty happy with 30 assault squads as a divisional total for a veteran 'early-wave' division. Precisely where those squads are coming from is not absolutely crucial, and here's why. The bayonetstrength(dot)com website indicates 388 base rifle squads for an 'early-wave' division. I accounted for 378 base rifle squads in my depiction of the 269th. Thus, there is a little 'wiggle room' for exactly this sort of thing (i.e., this issue regarding the number of divisonal assault squads). And therefore, I'm not really 'double counting' anything. My point is that a highly skilled/proficient combat-veteran division like the 269th in the summer/autumn 1941 would definitely have a substantial pool of skilled/brave men capable of performing dangerous assault-type missions (and not just assaults against prepared defenses--I'm equally interested in the tank-assault aspects of these men; those 'infantry assault' and 'tank assault' badges did not just get awarded to combat engineers, you know). I would be more inclined to reduce the number of assault squads (or perhaps do away with them altogether) in less skilled, less veteran divisions (for example, I would be inclined to not assign any assault squads at all to security divisions, or Luftwaffe field divisions).

Your suggestions/comments regarding the antitank assets of the division (for the summer/autumn 1941) are reasonable. My only (trivial) change to your suggestion would be:
6/24 50mm AT guns
66/36 37mm AT guns

I'm comfortable leaving the divisional artillery at 36 105mm howitzers and 12 150mm howitzers. I'm not sure if you were suggesting otherwise.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

The fact is scenario design is subjective. You will never reduce it to a science. If it were possible to do so, we would not still have an active scenario design forum for TOAW some eleven years after the game was released.

And I'd say what he ended up with was pretty subjective.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

Regarding the re-equipping with 50mm AT guns, up to the end of 1941 I understand that there were a total of 2462 50mm AT guns produced. Between 120 divisions (give or take), that's only 20 guns per division. A few hundred 47mm Guns might raise this to 24. So I'd suggest the following organisation instead of what I recommended above;

6/24 50mm AT Guns
63/36 37mm AT Guns

On the assumption that as long as there were not enough 50mm guns to equip the entire division, some 37mm guns would remain, especially in the regiments.

Starting to get pretty close to where I ended up. If you factor in that TOAW doesn't do equipment transitions very well, you can then jump to skipping that too. For example, the above will be down to 36 37mm very quickly, just due to stragglers. Even combat will send most to the "on hand" column rather than true kills. Since there's no room for them, they won't be coming back.

The transient condition of the division at the start of the scenario is what I call "minutia". It's more chrome than game changer - unless it's really understrength (like the SS Nord Division). What's important is the total force mix.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

375km per week or 53.5km per day. My understanding is that decent infantry put out about 40km per day in ideal conditions. I'd be inclined to go with a movement rate of 13, which I believe is the standard for leg infantry in TOAW anyway. I wouldn't bother with any trucks at all, regardless of their actual presence in the division.

Soviet Union 1941 has German infantry MPs of 6 (@50km/hex; 1-week turns). 'So that would be 12 @ 25km/hex. I penalized the German movement allowance 10% due to their poor intel on Soviet road systems. Ditto on the trucks - they were for logistics.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: vahauser

EDIT: However, I'm happy with the total transport (trucks + wagons) of ~270. I think that 240 horse teams + 30 trucks yields a movement rating of 13 for the 269th as I've depicted it (compared with the previous 180 horse teams + 80 trucks that yielded a movement rating of 15).

Why all this transport? I suppose it serves to create traffic penalties, but it will also increase transport asset sharing when the division is stationary, meaning a static line at Leningrad will improve supply to troops cross the Dnepr.

My modified WW2.eqp file does not have 'recon rifle teams'. Instead, I've made them 'recon rifle squads', with the same basic characteristics as other rifle squads except that they are recon capable.

Fair enough.

My point is that a highly skilled/proficient combat-veteran division like the 269th in the summer/autumn 1941

Well, I'm sure it's well trained, having been in being for nearly two years, but I have to point out that 269. Infanterie did not see significant action until Summer 1941. So it's not combat-veteran.

I'm comfortable leaving the divisional artillery at 36 105mm howitzers and 12 150mm howitzers. I'm not sure if you were suggesting otherwise.

I would suggest 105mm Gun and 150mm Gun to reflect the real ranges of the weapons that were in the division.