Originally posted by Tanaka With Tanaka commanding the surface fleets (without being fired) and Yamamoto and Yamaguchi commanding the air fleets (without being killed)
the war would have been very interesting indeed.
I plan on putting this into effect immediately in WITP.
Interesting command structure. You plan to divide the IJN into "surface fleets" and "air fleets" with independent commanders not under Yamamoto's centralized control? Hmm. Also, how good is Tanaka going to be at strategy? I always see him on the admiral's bridge of a task force flagship.
I see a lot of Midways and worse in the future of the Yamato people.
Put my faith in the people
And the people let me down.
So, I turned the other way,
And I carry on anyhow.
The IJN's plan at Midway was worse than complicated or convoluted; it was in fact possessed of the most dangerous atribute a operation plan can have, that of being contradictory to its own goals.
First, the IJN plan depended on surprise, yet they neglected to take the steps to insure surprise was secured, such as changing the naval code or suspending unnecessary operations that might point to a Central Pacific Target (such as Operation K, the aborted seaplane recon of Pearl Harbor).
Second, the plan depended on the combiend might of the IJN fleet crushing the remnents of the USN fleet, yet Yammamoto dividided his force into three fleets separated beyond supporting distance, allowing the USN task force to strike at one or the other without interference from the other groups.
Third, even though the stated purpose was to draw the entire US fleet into battle where it could be destroyed, a strong diversionary force was sent to Aleutians, with the likely result that some or all of the US fleet would be drawn to fight against it, sparing it from immediate destruction by the Mobile Fleet to the South and giving it an opportunity to disengage.
Fourth, while it was assumed that Midway was vital enough to cause the entire US fleet to rush out into the jaws of certain desrtuction in a last ditch effort to save the island base, little thought was given to the idea that perhaps the Americans would already have their fleet deployed to guard such a base prior to the IJN attack,
Fifth, despite the plans dependence on surprise, no one of consequence in the IJN consider that attacking a base of such obvious importance would not necessarily prove a great surprise to the Americans.
Sixth, despite the fact that the plan for Operation MI had one of the strictest timeframes imaginible and its odds for success were based on a combination of strict adherence to the timeframe and a ship-by-ship estimate of available US carrier strength, no thought, outside of the abortive and easily dismissed Operation K, was ever given to actually reconning Midway Island or the US fleet.
I think you said it all Nimits. Hard to believe that the Japanese were so sloppy but basically they threw the dice and got craps. Interesting to see how you tally Leyte Gulf. The Japanese still hadn't learned a lesson.
Col Saito: "Don't speak to me of rules! This is war! It is not a game of cricket!"
Originally posted by Drex I think you said it all Nimits. Hard to believe that the Japanese were so sloppy but basically they threw the dice and got craps. Interesting to see how you tally Leyte Gulf. The Japanese still hadn't learned a lesson.
Considering the limitations on the IJN, especially with respect to fueling the fleet....
I think they did quite well at Leyte. In fact comming within reach of
a operational victory. It didnt happen, no. But it could have.
“It is clear that the individual who persecutes a man, his brother, because he is not of the same opinion, is a monster.”
Voltaire
'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'
Which part of Leyte are we talking about? Surigao Strait was one of the last old fashioned surface clashes and a great victory. The battle off Samar SHOULD have been a crushing Japanese victory except, in the words of the Combined Fleet website, "combination of exhaustion, crummy visibility, relentless air attacks, and an American destroyer screen that fought like wolves over their cubs" spoiled their chance.
The US Navy could probaly win a war without coffee, but would prefer not to try -- Samuel Morison
I'm not a naval strategist but the Japanese plan did draw Halsey out of the way( but he sank Ozawa's four out of six carriers) and left the San Bernadino Strait open. Kurita had lost some Capital ships on the way but still had an overwhelming naval force. But it was the courage of Taffy 3 destroyers and pilots that kept Kurita on the defensive. The Surigao Strait force was a suicide run that never should have happened. I think they could have used Nishimura's force elsewhere since Ozawa's bait worked against Halsey. The Japanese still had this penchant for multiple force plans: they made it too complicated to coordinate.
Col Saito: "Don't speak to me of rules! This is war! It is not a game of cricket!"
Interesting command structure. You plan to divide the IJN into "surface fleets" and "air fleets" with independent commanders not under Yamamoto's centralized control? Hmm. Also, how good is Tanaka going to be at strategy? I always see him on the admiral's bridge of a task force flagship.
I'm not sure if this is what he meant, but the Japanese Navy did have 'Air Fleets' during the war, which were comprised of wings of aircraft but no ships. Although I dont know why he would put Yamamoto or Yamaguchi in charge of them.
"Money doesnt talk, it swears. Obscenities, who really cares?" -Bob Dylan
"Habit is the balast that chains a dog to it's vomit." -Samuel Becket
"He has weapons of mass destruction- the world's deadliest weapons- which pose a direct threat to the
Originally posted by SoulBlazer Which part of Leyte are we talking about? Surigao Strait was one of the last old fashioned surface clashes and a great victory. The battle off Samar SHOULD have been a crushing Japanese victory except, in the words of the Combined Fleet website, "combination of exhaustion, crummy visibility, relentless air attacks, and an American destroyer screen that fought like wolves over their cubs" spoiled their chance.
Exactly greg. the battle of Leyte Gulf was 3 battles: Surigao Straits, Samar and Cape Engano. this is the over-complexity that I am talking about. Ozawa's sacrificial bait worked but perhaps Nishimura couold have aided Kurita. Surprise was lost at Surigao but San Bernadinao Straits was wide open. But without air support Kurita was doomed.
Col Saito: "Don't speak to me of rules! This is war! It is not a game of cricket!"
Originally posted by Snigbert Interesting command structure. You plan to divide the IJN into "surface fleets" and "air fleets" with independent commanders not under Yamamoto's centralized control? Hmm. Also, how good is Tanaka going to be at strategy? I always see him on the admiral's bridge of a task force flagship.
I'm not sure if this is what he meant, but the Japanese Navy did have 'Air Fleets' during the war, which were comprised of wings of aircraft but no ships. Although I dont know why he would put Yamamoto or Yamaguchi in charge of them.
Yamaguchi and Tanaka under Yamamotos overall control of course! And by air fleets I mean carrier task forces
Lol, if the legendary Yamamoto was alive, played UV and visited and discussed on this forum, the veterans here would be quietly correcting and encouraging the newbie to KISS (keep it simple stupid), concentrate his forces, scout and keep trying, he'll get it right one day.
Originally posted by Mike_B20 Lol, if the legendary Yamamoto was alive, played UV and visited and discussed on this forum, the veterans here would be quietly correcting and encouraging the newbie to KISS (keep it simple stupid), concentrate his forces, scout and keep trying, he'll get it right one day.
And telling me that I should have kept my mouth shut!!!