The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defense

[bsq]

Russian Air Defence is inefffective. It remains dangerous, but it is ineffective because the Ukrainians realise how dangerous it is and do not play to its strengths. IIf your airforce showed up 'properly' then perhaps that might be a game changer, but is didnt, showing a distinct preference for some pretty ineffective bomb and rocket attacks.

You have a wrong understanding of the structure of the Russian army. Air Defense and Air Force are different branches of the armed forces. Thus, criticism of the Air Force cannot be transferred to the Air Defense Forces. On the basis of trivial logic

I grew up in an era where there was PVO, VVS, ADD and RSVN. Doesnt matter what you call them now, they are all part of the same organisation (VKS) that is currently commanded by the same General who is commaning the 'special operation' (he is an army guy, originally RSVN).

RF Armed Forces

• VKS

• Russian Ground Forces

• Russian Navy

That's it, the entire structure at command level. Nothing else, no separation like I mentioned above, that was all pre 2010 or so.

So to quote back at you. The fact that this operation is now commanded by the General in command of the VKS makes any criticism directly transferrable to the Air Defence Forces. Same boss, same doctrine, same plans, same failure.

Dont try smoke and mirrors, there are a lot of 'thinking' people on this forum who are better informed than you. You seem to be wholly reliant on the BS pushed out by the MFA. Widen your reading, open your eyes. In the west we can do this, you will see a balance of articles. You just see a blinkered, spoon fed version of events that fit the narrative of the Kremlin.

[BDukes]

Dont try smoke and mirrors, there are a lot of 'thinking' people on this forum who are better informed than you. You seem to be wholly reliant on the BS pushed out by the MFA. Widen your reading, open your eyes. In the west we can do this, you will see a balance of articles. You just see a blinkered, spoon fed version of events that fit the narrative of the Kremlin.

He might be the MFA or something similar. He might also be taking us all for a ride for shits and giggles. I've kind of limited my responses in consideration of either.

M

[kevinkins]

Reporter asks politicians and higher ups on recent events:

"So Vladimir, why did you leave Kherson?"
"I don't know, we should have stayed to recapture the glory of the old days.
And there are plenty of open streets to be filled. But go ask the Army, it's on them."

"So Gerasimov, why did you leave Kherson?"
"I don't know, seems logical to me since my men were starving.
But go ask Prigozhin, he's in charge"

"So Yevgeny, why did Russia leave Kherson?"
"Don't bother me, I am cooking lunch. Wait, here have a taste. Good. Yes?
Kherson, who cares. I make money anyway. Go ask that funny guy Zelenskyy
about that stinking city."

"Volodymyr, why did the Russians leave Kherson?"
"Ah, they could not make up their minds, so we made it for them"

And now for something in the news today:

https://www.cnbc.com/2022/11/10/russias ... putin.html

"As news of the withdrawal emerged, Putin supporter and former advisor Sergei Markov likened the withdrawal to a defeat on the scale of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Addressing his thousands of followers on Telegram, Markov said: “the surrender of Kherson is the largest geopolitical defeat of Russia since the collapse of the USSR” and warned that “the political consequences of this huge defeat will be really big.”"

Should be an interesting few weeks coming up.

[Mickeys91]

My only comment on Kherson is the lack of Moscows ability to make up a better excuse for the death of Kirill Stremousov, the Russian-installed deputy head of Ukraine's southern Kherson region due to a "fatal car crash". I mean come on at least maybe fake a "Ukrainian" rocket fired into his home or something resulting death due to collateral damage. That is more believable. I guess just like their manpower and missiles their "excuse" inventory is also depleting.

[FilitchM2]

Russian Air Defence is inefffective. It remains dangerous, but it is ineffective because the Ukrainians realise how dangerous it is and do not play to its strengths. IIf your airforce showed up 'properly' then perhaps that might be a game changer, but is didnt, showing a distinct preference for some pretty ineffective bomb and rocket attacks.

You have a wrong understanding of the structure of the Russian army. Air Defense and Air Force are different branches of the armed forces. Thus, criticism of the Air Force cannot be transferred to the Air Defense Forces. On the basis of trivial logic

I grew up in an era where there was PVO, VVS, ADD and RSVN. Doesnt matter what you call them now, they are all part of the same organisation (VKS) that is currently commanded by the same General who is commaning the 'special operation' (he is an army guy, originally RSVN).

RF Armed Forces

• VKS

• Russian Ground Forces

• Russian Navy

That's it, the entire structure at command level. Nothing else, no separation like I mentioned above, that was all pre 2010 or so.

So to quote back at you. The fact that this operation is now commanded by the General in command of the VKS makes any criticism directly transferrable to the Air Defence Forces. Same boss, same doctrine, same plans, same failure.

Dont try smoke and mirrors, there are a lot of 'thinking' people on this forum who are better informed than you. You seem to be wholly reliant on the BS pushed out by the MFA. Widen your reading, open your eyes. In the west we can do this, you will see a balance of articles. You just see a blinkered, spoon fed version of events that fit the narrative of the Kremlin.

In short, to make sure you are not better informed. Surovikin never served in the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN). He served in the infantry until 2008. It was only in 2017 that he was appointed commander of the Air Force (VKS). On Ukraine, he commanded the southern group of troops and only since October he was the commander of the SVO troops.
Regarding open eyes. I read different sources. And I see that, in general, open western sources are heavily biased and often rely on blatantly incorrect Ukrainian data, which makes it difficult to analyze.
And then, perhaps the reason is my imperfect English, perhaps you and others responding in the thread. But I am not claiming that the Russian army has no problems. Since Kiev has not yet been taken, it is obvious that there are quite a few. But I don't want to see blatant slander and criticism without taking reality into account. And mixing the Air Force (VVS) and Air Defense Forces (PVO) (regardless of their organizational structure) and even more so transferring responsibility to the Air Defense Forces for the actions of the aviation behind the front lines is blatantly superficial yellow newspaper nonsense.

[FilitchM2]

My only comment on Kherson is the lack of Moscows ability to make up a better excuse for the death of Kirill Stremousov, the Russian-installed deputy head of Ukraine's southern Kherson region due to a "fatal car crash". I mean come on at least maybe fake a "Ukrainian" rocket fired into his home or something resulting death due to collateral damage. That is more believable. I guess just like their manpower and missiles their "excuse" inventory is also depleting.

Good observation. Yes, that is a sign worth paying attention to. That the reasons for the withdrawal are not military at all. And the true driving forces behind these events are also not visible to us.
Perhaps we should give up trying to analyze the military and observe. Then we will not have to be ashamed of our hasty conclusions.

[kevinkins]

Observe:

“They attacked a country that was no threat to Russia and yet their military is being beaten on the battlefield,” Milley said.
CNBC

Russia only managed to seize Mariupol by destroying it. Gen. Milley called the Russian invasion a "tremendous strategic mistake."
NPR

"Big decisions about Ukraine are President Vladimir V. Putin's to make, but the Kremlin and state media are distancing him from the setback."
NYT

"Putin’s decision not to attend the G20 summit in person saves him the embarrassment of being confronted – or shunned – by other world leaders over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The meeting will take place just days after the Kremlin announced Russian forces would retreat from a large swathe of Kherson – one of four Ukrainian regions Putin previously said Russia planned to annex in violation of international law."
CNN

"In many places, searching the web is a gateway to a wider world of information, but in Russia, it is part of a system that helps trap people in an alternative reality."
BBC

[BobTank63]

Just want to point out that the reason for retreating from Kherson was not due to political reasons, but due to logistical failures compounded by Ukrainian rocket strikes on Russian supply lines and supply depots

From the Institute for the Study of War: "The UAF developed a tactic to...conduct multiple precision strikes across the key Antonivskiy Bridge and the road that ran atop the Kakhovka Dam in such a way as to break the roadways in a line across them, rendering them unusable...UAF continued to strike the bridges as the Russians sought to repair them, targeting the repair equipment as well as the roadways until the Russians finally gave up."

"The Russians were left at the end with barges ferrying supplies, equipment, and reinforcements from the east to the west bank. The UAF attacked the barges and landing areas as well, but the ferry system was in any case insufficient to supply the 20,000-some Russian mechanized troops trying to hold their lodgment on the western bank of the river."

Source: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgr ... ovember-13

As for Ukrainian and Russian air defenses, Perun made an excellent video on the subject. I recommend giving it a look: https://youtu.be/xCEzEVwOwS4

[kevinkins]

The same article, which is a good summary, mentions the Russians are planning to use freed up forces for ill advised and poorly coordinated "offensives" to the north of the Kherson area. Instead of placing their conscripts into defensive positions, they are being going to be fed piecemeal into a NATO backed well prepared mobile defensive network.

Any attempt at a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities at this time would overwhelmingly favor Russia. Putin should desire such a ceasefire in his own interest. He should recognize that he needs to give his forces time to recover and allow the reservists flowing into the theater time to integrate into their units, train up, and prepare for serious combat. He should want to stop the Ukrainians from capitalizing on the emotional lift of their recent victories. The fact that Putin continues to whip his generals to offensives in these circumstances is thus a grave error from a military perspective. It likely results from whatever psychological factors led Putin to order the invasion in the first place but also increasingly from Putin’s need to show his toughness to the hardline faction led, at least in public, by Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Putin is unlikely to be willing to seek a ceasefire, therefore, unless it is accompanied by tremendous Ukrainian or international concessions.

Which ain't likely going to happen.

[BobTank63]

I actually just found another good source on the Ukrainian air war: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/p ... ir-defence

[FilitchM2]

Just want to point out that the reason for retreating from Kherson was not due to political reasons, but due to logistical failures compounded by Ukrainian rocket strikes on Russian supply lines and supply depots

From the Institute for the Study of War: "The UAF developed a tactic to...conduct multiple precision strikes across the key Antonivskiy Bridge and the road that ran atop the Kakhovka Dam in such a way as to break the roadways in a line across them, rendering them unusable...UAF continued to strike the bridges as the Russians sought to repair them, targeting the repair equipment as well as the roadways until the Russians finally gave up."

"The Russians were left at the end with barges ferrying supplies, equipment, and reinforcements from the east to the west bank. The UAF attacked the barges and landing areas as well, but the ferry system was in any case insufficient to supply the 20,000-some Russian mechanized troops trying to hold their lodgment on the western bank of the river."

Source: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgr ... ovember-13

As for Ukrainian and Russian air defenses, Perun made an excellent video on the subject. I recommend giving it a look: https://youtu.be/xCEzEVwOwS4

Hard to say that logistic was a main problem. 20000 troops were moved less than several days. About 100000 civilians went from Kherson for about a month. Antonovskiy bridge was used up to end. I think that political reason was a main.

[FilitchM2]

The same article, which is a good summary, mentions the Russians are planning to use freed up forces for ill advised and poorly coordinated "offensives" to the north of the Kherson area. Instead of placing their conscripts into defensive positions, they are being going to be fed piecemeal into a NATO backed well prepared mobile defensive network.

Any attempt at a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities at this time would overwhelmingly favor Russia. Putin should desire such a ceasefire in his own interest. He should recognize that he needs to give his forces time to recover and allow the reservists flowing into the theater time to integrate into their units, train up, and prepare for serious combat. He should want to stop the Ukrainians from capitalizing on the emotional lift of their recent victories. The fact that Putin continues to whip his generals to offensives in these circumstances is thus a grave error from a military perspective. It likely results from whatever psychological factors led Putin to order the invasion in the first place but also increasingly from Putin’s need to show his toughness to the hardline faction led, at least in public, by Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Putin is unlikely to be willing to seek a ceasefire, therefore, unless it is accompanied by tremendous Ukrainian or international concessions.

Which ain't likely going to happen.

The offensive in the north of the Kherson region in the last couple of months was carried out only by Ukrainian troops. Accordingly, further analysis is of the same quality.

[kevinkins]

That's the point. Now Russia will go on an offensive there and burn their conscripts out against a well designed UA mobile defense in depth. The offensive is being used to placate Putin since he was reluctant to lose Kherson. Fortunately, Putin's ego continues to get in the way of sound strategy. They should leave Ukraine, or at the least, dig in and statically defend the most important industrial regions of Donbas. Russia has demonstrated that it's mobile operations will be cut to shreds.

[BobTank63]

Just want to point out that the reason for retreating from Kherson was not due to political reasons, but due to logistical failures compounded by Ukrainian rocket strikes on Russian supply lines and supply depots

From the Institute for the Study of War: "The UAF developed a tactic to...conduct multiple precision strikes across the key Antonivskiy Bridge and the road that ran atop the Kakhovka Dam in such a way as to break the roadways in a line across them, rendering them unusable...UAF continued to strike the bridges as the Russians sought to repair them, targeting the repair equipment as well as the roadways until the Russians finally gave up."

"The Russians were left at the end with barges ferrying supplies, equipment, and reinforcements from the east to the west bank. The UAF attacked the barges and landing areas as well, but the ferry system was in any case insufficient to supply the 20,000-some Russian mechanized troops trying to hold their lodgment on the western bank of the river."

Source: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgr ... ovember-13

As for Ukrainian and Russian air defenses, Perun made an excellent video on the subject. I recommend giving it a look: https://youtu.be/xCEzEVwOwS4

Hard to say that logistic was a main problem. 20000 troops were moved less than several days. About 100000 civilians went from Kherson for about a month. Antonovskiy bridge was used up to end. I think that political reason was a main.

Logistics were definitely the main issue. General Sergei Surovikin specifically called out that Russia couldn't keep the right bank supplied when requesting permission to withdraw.

[BobTank63]

The same article, which is a good summary, mentions the Russians are planning to use freed up forces for ill advised and poorly coordinated "offensives" to the north of the Kherson area. Instead of placing their conscripts into defensive positions, they are being going to be fed piecemeal into a NATO backed well prepared mobile defensive network.

Any attempt at a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities at this time would overwhelmingly favor Russia. Putin should desire such a ceasefire in his own interest. He should recognize that he needs to give his forces time to recover and allow the reservists flowing into the theater time to integrate into their units, train up, and prepare for serious combat. He should want to stop the Ukrainians from capitalizing on the emotional lift of their recent victories. The fact that Putin continues to whip his generals to offensives in these circumstances is thus a grave error from a military perspective. It likely results from whatever psychological factors led Putin to order the invasion in the first place but also increasingly from Putin’s need to show his toughness to the hardline faction led, at least in public, by Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Putin is unlikely to be willing to seek a ceasefire, therefore, unless it is accompanied by tremendous Ukrainian or international concessions.

Which ain't likely going to happen.

The offensive in the north of the Kherson region in the last couple of months was carried out only by Ukrainian troops. Accordingly, further analysis is of the same quality.

I would like to clarify the article makes no mention of any offensive north of Kherson by Russian troops. I think Kevin misspoke.

The article says that the likely redeployment area is the Donetsk frontline, where Russia has been attacking recently.

[kevinkins]

OK, Donetsk is northeast not directly north of Kherson. I was thinking of the overall strategic map, not an operational one focusing on the liberated city Kherson directly.

Edit: got my boy scout compass out.

[bsq]

OK, Donetsk is northwest not directly north of Kherson. I was thinking of the overall strategic map, not an operational one focusing on the liberated city Kherson directly.

Its North East , but the point you make still stands. However, if they redeploy troops away from the defensive lines on the South/South East Banks of the Dnipro, then that is an open invitation for the UKAF to cross the river. If they leave them where they are, then the newly delivered AW rockets for HIMARS will literally 'shred' the Russian army, being as they are anti personnel weapons.