Japanese Strategies
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madflava13
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You guys are absolutely right about the Phillipines being used as a staging base for US Naval assets. For example, there was a US sub tender (The Canopis or Holland, I think) that stayed in the region until well into 1942. There were hundreds of island coves and inlets for a ship like that to hide in. I believe once all the US subs pulled out, the ship was immobilized and served as a machine shop for the ground forces... If a huge ship like a sub tender can hide in the region, imagine how many PT boats and smaller surface combatants can be kept there... These units can then harrass shipping and slow the progress of Japanese expansion. Thats why the Japanese needed to take the Phillipines.
"The Paraguayan Air Force's request for spraying subsidies was not as Paraguayan as it were..."
I am forced to point out that by that logic then the USA was foolish for leaving Rabual behind.
Obviously that is not all there is to the equation.
Obviously that is not all there is to the equation.
“It is clear that the individual who persecutes a man, his brother, because he is not of the same opinion, is a monster.”
Voltaire
'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'
French Priest
"Statistic
Voltaire
'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'
French Priest
"Statistic
Yes, and these are only the kinds of things that can be simulated in a game. The Philippines had some industry and a pro-U.S./anti-Japanese public. I can't imagine leaving a large U.S. military force comprised of land, sea, and air assets so close to Japanese possessions and seaways. The ways for the U.S. military or the Filipinos to interfere with an orderly empire are too numerous to list. The occassional PT boat or sub strike in the sea lanes guided by local aerial reconaissance that provides instant and timely information and position. Using the Philippines as the home base of an entire network of spies or coastwatchers for the region. The Japanese fleet couldn't have operated anywhere south of Japan without being spotted.
By not attacking the islands, you allow the U.S. unfettered access within the very heart of the empire. Okay, so you patrol some of the seas within the Philippines with ships. But they get shot at from coastal guns or PT boats or mines or whatever. How do you prevent that? At the end of the day, you find that you have to occupy them with an army to prevent these problems.
No brainer in my book.
By not attacking the islands, you allow the U.S. unfettered access within the very heart of the empire. Okay, so you patrol some of the seas within the Philippines with ships. But they get shot at from coastal guns or PT boats or mines or whatever. How do you prevent that? At the end of the day, you find that you have to occupy them with an army to prevent these problems.
No brainer in my book.
My argument for Rabaul may be weak. Seems to me that the Japanese did not have a friendly native population that would assist them in their activities. Furthermore, the Japanese at Rabaul would have been, with the exception of food and water, entirely dependent on Japanese supplies to even exist. In the Philippines, there would have been large stocks of civilian fuel, oil, boats, ships, and even some aircraft. There was industry sufficient to sustain them (though possibly not the POL). Third, once you bypassed Rabaul, I'm not sure it really acted as a threat to anything - it was easy to route everything around it. Not so the Philippines because it so strategically stands between Japan and its raw materials.
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Doug Olenick
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- Joined: Tue Sep 26, 2000 8:00 am
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Byron is correct. The Philipines, if nothing else, could have supplied our troops with food for an extended period of time. Rabaul is much small in comparison with a very small indigineous population incapable of growing enough to feed the 100,000 plus Japanese troops on hand.
Better to leave it, Truk and other strongholds to become prisoner of war camps where no guards are needed.
MacArthur may have been an egostical head case, but he knew how to come up with a good strategy.
Better to leave it, Truk and other strongholds to become prisoner of war camps where no guards are needed.
MacArthur may have been an egostical head case, but he knew how to come up with a good strategy.
Disclaimer:The following is an opinion, and is worth every penny it cost.
All,
Sure the locals could supply the U.S. with food and fuel but for what? They destroyed all meaningful air power on Dec 8 and the ships there were 3rd line at best. If the Japanese own everything in a 800 mile radius from the Philipenes how would the U.S. resupply? I see the Philipenes as nothing more than a big Rabaul, a big prison camp you dont have to garrison. So what if the locals are friendly and have food and water? There is not a lot those troops could have done with no planes or ships other than coastwatch, which would have been important. I think the Japanese could have "Island Hopped" Phil and left them there once the air power was gone, I just dont think it was within their mindset to do so. I dont know anywhere that the Japanese bypassed a base instead of take it. We couldnt even get men and planes to Wake after Dec 8, FAR closer than Manila is to any other base. Look how much trouble we had resupplying Guadalcanal, again closer to us than them, and FAR closer than Manila. I think the Japanese bought into the Mac's hype used forces that could have better been used elswhere, like Espiritu Santo, or Fiji.
Ringbolt
All,
Sure the locals could supply the U.S. with food and fuel but for what? They destroyed all meaningful air power on Dec 8 and the ships there were 3rd line at best. If the Japanese own everything in a 800 mile radius from the Philipenes how would the U.S. resupply? I see the Philipenes as nothing more than a big Rabaul, a big prison camp you dont have to garrison. So what if the locals are friendly and have food and water? There is not a lot those troops could have done with no planes or ships other than coastwatch, which would have been important. I think the Japanese could have "Island Hopped" Phil and left them there once the air power was gone, I just dont think it was within their mindset to do so. I dont know anywhere that the Japanese bypassed a base instead of take it. We couldnt even get men and planes to Wake after Dec 8, FAR closer than Manila is to any other base. Look how much trouble we had resupplying Guadalcanal, again closer to us than them, and FAR closer than Manila. I think the Japanese bought into the Mac's hype used forces that could have better been used elswhere, like Espiritu Santo, or Fiji.
Ringbolt
LtCom: "Sgt. Lee, is that a Navy
Cross I see you wearing?"
Sgt. Lee: "No Sir, it's three."
Cross I see you wearing?"
Sgt. Lee: "No Sir, it's three."
But when they committed to take the Philippines, which was before Pearl, they couldn't be sure that we could not resupply it. Secondly, you would have bypassed so much military hardware, that you would have to divert a considerable portion of your fleet and air arm to make sure what was left did not cause any trouble. Leaving that much in your rear would be, well, a pain in the rear!
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Doug Olenick
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The PI sits directly astride Japan's main supply route to its resource area. In addition, the Japananese had no idea they destroyed all our air power in the region early on and did not know whether we could fly in more planes. Rabaul, once pacified and cut off, posed no threat to the Allied logistical situation.
On the other hand Clark and the other airbases were a threat in being. If at any time we could reactivate them the Japanese logistical situation would be doomed. Just think, what if the PI could have held out for another four months or long enough for the US to try and break the siege.
After Midway the US had a little less to fear from the IJN and might have looked at heading to the PI instead of Guadalcanal as the best place to strike back. The Japanese had to consider this in their planning.
Finally, the Philipines did supply Japan with a great deal of food. So it was important for non-military reasons.
On the other hand Clark and the other airbases were a threat in being. If at any time we could reactivate them the Japanese logistical situation would be doomed. Just think, what if the PI could have held out for another four months or long enough for the US to try and break the siege.
After Midway the US had a little less to fear from the IJN and might have looked at heading to the PI instead of Guadalcanal as the best place to strike back. The Japanese had to consider this in their planning.
Finally, the Philipines did supply Japan with a great deal of food. So it was important for non-military reasons.
I question the decision, because I question the need to attack America at all. The whole purpose of the war for the Japanese was to secure the resources of NEI and British Malaya. If you ignore the Philipines and do not attack Pearl Harbor. I dought very much that FDR could get America behind a war to save European colonial possessions. Yes the Philipines lay astride the shipping lanes to SE Asia, but if there is no war between the US and Japan what does that matter? Yes the US would have poured forces into the Philipines and made it into a formidable base,in the aftermath of a Japanese move in SE Asia, but then what? The US would be forced into the unfamilar position of initiating a war. A war under such circumstances would have far less support than a war initiated by the Japanese with a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. In any case even if the US does declare war. The Philipines due to the fact that it would be almost entirely surrounded by Japanese bases is easily isolated and therefore ineffective as a forward base. Furthermore under these circumstances an intact US Fleet would be compelled to sail to the relief of the islands. Resulting in all likelyhood in even a bigger defeat than Pearl Harbor. Such a disasterous defeat in a war not fully supported by the people could very well have resulted in the negotiated peace the Japanese were looking for.Originally posted by byron:
I think the Japanese took the Phillipines because, from there, the U.S. could interdict all of the seaways leading to Indochina and the Indies with both subs and aircraft. I doubt you could starve out the population, but I guess you could cut it off from military resupply.
Why is anyone questioning the decision? They took it easily enough, and it seems to be a natural bulwark against an invasion of Japan from the south.
Gee, guy, I don't know. Guess the Japanese figured that their plans would likely force the U.S. into a war and, with the various embargoes placed upon them by the U.S., better to strike first that wait for the inevitable. Certainly if you don't want the U.S. to enter the war, you don't attack the Philippines; but if you are fighting the U.S., you've got to dispose of the P.I. in the beginning.
But I let Skeets do all my thinking and writing for me.
But I let Skeets do all my thinking and writing for me.
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madflava13
- Posts: 1501
- Joined: Wed Feb 07, 2001 10:00 am
- Location: Alexandria, VA
Granted the PI Air was old and useless except for a couple B-17s and P-40s, but imagine the damage even a single Omaha class CL could cause to a convoy of tankers full of oil. You could definitely stash a bunch of ships in and around the PI and use them as raiders like the Germans did in the Atlantic. Japan had to respect that, along with the other ideas mentioned here.
As for attacking the US, I agree with the statement that war was inevitable anyways. Plan Orange was created because planners saw that well in advance on our side as well as the Japanese. If Japan attacked the DEI and singapore, I think the US would have reacted regardless of an attack on Pearl. We were running war patrols in the Atlantic in 1940, even though we weren't at war. The same thing would have happened in the Pacific.
Last thing - And I apologize for not remembering who said it, but whoever said the US Fleet would be destroyed worse than at Pearl if it was in the PI is wrong. If we moved the fleet to the PI, they would have been on a war footing, or else the move wouldn't have happened. I don't see the US napping in that scenario. We'd take losses, but nothing like Pearl, IMHO.
As for attacking the US, I agree with the statement that war was inevitable anyways. Plan Orange was created because planners saw that well in advance on our side as well as the Japanese. If Japan attacked the DEI and singapore, I think the US would have reacted regardless of an attack on Pearl. We were running war patrols in the Atlantic in 1940, even though we weren't at war. The same thing would have happened in the Pacific.
Last thing - And I apologize for not remembering who said it, but whoever said the US Fleet would be destroyed worse than at Pearl if it was in the PI is wrong. If we moved the fleet to the PI, they would have been on a war footing, or else the move wouldn't have happened. I don't see the US napping in that scenario. We'd take losses, but nothing like Pearl, IMHO.
"The Paraguayan Air Force's request for spraying subsidies was not as Paraguayan as it were..."
well you can easily isolate the PI in Pacwar.
I just did it.
The computer insists on using up all its
supply replacing aircraft.
Then they cant fly.
I just did it.
The computer insists on using up all its
supply replacing aircraft.
Then they cant fly.
“It is clear that the individual who persecutes a man, his brother, because he is not of the same opinion, is a monster.”
Voltaire
'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'
French Priest
"Statistic
Voltaire
'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'
French Priest
"Statistic
But, Chiteng, you've got to separate the limitations of a game - especially one as early as PacWar - from reality. A game simply can't simulate the various and imponderable effects of having so much materiel in your rear. If cut off, the Americans may not have been able to steam a full fleet out of Manila Bay or launch a hundred P40's to intercept a raid (which is the kind of action that the game contemplates), but it would have been able to keep single ships, subs, and aircraft operating indefinitely in a way that would have been a terrible nuisance to the Japanese. The fact that PacWar won't let you fly a squadron of aircraft is based on a necessarily simplified supply system. In the game, if you're cut off, then you are out of supply and you can't operate. In reality, if you were cut off in a land as vast as the P.I., you could cannibalize parts and fuel from all across the nation. A cruiser could use fuel oil (I'm guessing) from oil cannibalized from merchants or ferries. It is naive to think that everything just stops just because you have cut off a land mass that is large enough to be a nation.
We're not saying that the forces that would be left behind would be fully effective, but they could have indefinitely run on a shoe string at a level sufficient to provide invaluable intelligence on Japanese movements throughout the entire southwestern Pacific as well as interdict sea lanes. And the interdiction would have been pinpoint because the Americans would have had at least one serviceable aircraft to put up on recon. There's no way the Japanese could patrol for those kinds of recon flights or naval interdictions without a vast commitment of resources - the same kind of commitment (with the exception of ground forces) that it would have required to take the P.I. in the first place.
And remember what Skeets or Madman (who I never agree with, it seems) said about reinforcing later on. We were not able to reinforce the P.I. in time to save it. But, if you never assaulted them head on, the forces on the P.I. would have still been there in considerable strength in June after Midway when the Allies could have (and would have loved to have) reinforced it. And then where would you be? An Okinawa away from Japan! Of course, in December 1941 the U.S. didn't know that they would decisively win the carrier war in June of 42, but the Japanese didn't know that Pearl Harbor would be as successful as it was when they planned the invasion of the P.I. They were prudent in planning to eliminate the largest U.S. military force west of Hawaii and so close to Japan.
The British spent phenomenal resources to try and keep a couple of German capital ships bottled up in Norway and Germany. In the big picture, the raiders may not have been able to do much, and a mere computer game would reflect as much. But in the real world, militaries do not let such threats go unchecked. If the Brits could have conducted an invasion that would have eliminated the threat from the raiders, they would have.
We're not getting anywhere with this. Some of us view it one way (rather absolutely), and you all will obviously continue to view it your way relying in part, unfortunately, on a game that was released on a 5 1/4" diskette as some accurate representation of all dimensions of a war.
Madman: I wonder what the implementation of Plan Orange would have looked like. It would have been impressive with a full fleet of angry battleships sailing west, but they could still easily have botched it. Unless some admiral changed his tactics on the fly and used the carriers properly, the plan was to use the planes as scouts to find the main surface fleet of the Japanese. I could easily see a Midway in reverse due to Japanese tactics being light years ahead of ours in that opening battle. The Japanese carriers may not have done critical damage to the battleships, but might have forced them to withdraw after sinking the American carriers.
We're not saying that the forces that would be left behind would be fully effective, but they could have indefinitely run on a shoe string at a level sufficient to provide invaluable intelligence on Japanese movements throughout the entire southwestern Pacific as well as interdict sea lanes. And the interdiction would have been pinpoint because the Americans would have had at least one serviceable aircraft to put up on recon. There's no way the Japanese could patrol for those kinds of recon flights or naval interdictions without a vast commitment of resources - the same kind of commitment (with the exception of ground forces) that it would have required to take the P.I. in the first place.
And remember what Skeets or Madman (who I never agree with, it seems) said about reinforcing later on. We were not able to reinforce the P.I. in time to save it. But, if you never assaulted them head on, the forces on the P.I. would have still been there in considerable strength in June after Midway when the Allies could have (and would have loved to have) reinforced it. And then where would you be? An Okinawa away from Japan! Of course, in December 1941 the U.S. didn't know that they would decisively win the carrier war in June of 42, but the Japanese didn't know that Pearl Harbor would be as successful as it was when they planned the invasion of the P.I. They were prudent in planning to eliminate the largest U.S. military force west of Hawaii and so close to Japan.
The British spent phenomenal resources to try and keep a couple of German capital ships bottled up in Norway and Germany. In the big picture, the raiders may not have been able to do much, and a mere computer game would reflect as much. But in the real world, militaries do not let such threats go unchecked. If the Brits could have conducted an invasion that would have eliminated the threat from the raiders, they would have.
We're not getting anywhere with this. Some of us view it one way (rather absolutely), and you all will obviously continue to view it your way relying in part, unfortunately, on a game that was released on a 5 1/4" diskette as some accurate representation of all dimensions of a war.
Madman: I wonder what the implementation of Plan Orange would have looked like. It would have been impressive with a full fleet of angry battleships sailing west, but they could still easily have botched it. Unless some admiral changed his tactics on the fly and used the carriers properly, the plan was to use the planes as scouts to find the main surface fleet of the Japanese. I could easily see a Midway in reverse due to Japanese tactics being light years ahead of ours in that opening battle. The Japanese carriers may not have done critical damage to the battleships, but might have forced them to withdraw after sinking the American carriers.
re Bryon:
Not at all. My original post on this topic was a simple musing.
Politicly the Japanese HAD to take the Phillipines.
However the question comes,
Did they have to invade at the outset?
Did they have to stay there once they destroyed
the USA presence.
Since the IJA was a pack of carpet eaters I can
say I agree that Japan would never willingly leave. But that doesnt equate with making it WORTH staying. If nothing else it would provide slave labor.
Not at all. My original post on this topic was a simple musing.
Politicly the Japanese HAD to take the Phillipines.
However the question comes,
Did they have to invade at the outset?
Did they have to stay there once they destroyed
the USA presence.
Since the IJA was a pack of carpet eaters I can
say I agree that Japan would never willingly leave. But that doesnt equate with making it WORTH staying. If nothing else it would provide slave labor.
“It is clear that the individual who persecutes a man, his brother, because he is not of the same opinion, is a monster.”
Voltaire
'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'
French Priest
"Statistic
Voltaire
'For those with faith, no proof is needed. For those without faith, no proof is enough'
French Priest
"Statistic
Well I can not disagree more. US Fleet in early 42 was simply no match for the IJN. 6 Fleet and 3 light carriers against 3 US Fleet carriers. The Japanese at that time had the best trained carrier pilots, the best carrier planes and the best torpedo in the world. USN doctorine was flawed at that time, in that it still relied on the big gun battle. With no pearl harbor they would not know any better and those old BB's with there woefully inadequate AA would most certainly sent to the bottom somewhere in the Philipine Sea.Originally posted by madflava13:
Granted the PI Air was old and useless except for a couple B-17s and P-40s, but imagine the damage even a single Omaha class CL could cause to a convoy of tankers full of oil. You could definitely stash a bunch of ships in and around the PI and use them as raiders like the Germans did in the Atlantic. Japan had to respect that, along with the other ideas mentioned here.
As for attacking the US, I agree with the statement that war was inevitable anyways. Plan Orange was created because planners saw that well in advance on our side as well as the Japanese. If Japan attacked the DEI and singapore, I think the US would have reacted regardless of an attack on Pearl. We were running war patrols in the Atlantic in 1940, even though we weren't at war. The same thing would have happened in the Pacific.
Last thing - And I apologize for not remembering who said it, but whoever said the US Fleet would be destroyed worse than at Pearl if it was in the PI is wrong. If we moved the fleet to the PI, they would have been on a war footing, or else the move wouldn't have happened. I don't see the US napping in that scenario. We'd take losses, but nothing like Pearl, IMHO.
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Doug Olenick
- Posts: 88
- Joined: Tue Sep 26, 2000 8:00 am
- Location: ny
Gee, I had no idea I was the official Byron spokesman.....
Well in that role:
The decision to attack the US instead of just going after the Dutch and British was based on the belief that the US would have to react to such an overt move. It was a gamble. Perhaps if the Japanes ignored the US territories and pinned their hopes on the American public not wishing to involve itself in a war that might have worked.
We will never know. Thank God they decided to attack Pearl Harbor or there would be no Pacwar, Carrier Strike, Great Naval Battles, etc. to buy, play and argue about.
Well in that role:
The decision to attack the US instead of just going after the Dutch and British was based on the belief that the US would have to react to such an overt move. It was a gamble. Perhaps if the Japanes ignored the US territories and pinned their hopes on the American public not wishing to involve itself in a war that might have worked.
We will never know. Thank God they decided to attack Pearl Harbor or there would be no Pacwar, Carrier Strike, Great Naval Battles, etc. to buy, play and argue about.
Exactly. See? Good things do come out of war. Well done, Skeets. Your check is in the mail.
Timjot: I have the same concerns you do about the first battle between the U.S. Fleet and the IJN. I think Madman was pointing out that if the U.S. was not attacked, the Pacific Fleet would make a deliberate move to the Philippines. I also think Madman is assuming that they would have waited until more of the existing carriers could go. Assuming the Ranger stayed in the Atlantic and the Hornet has finished its shake-down, that would give the U.S. six carriers - if you don't count the Langley. Madman is assuming that they're sailing west looking for a fight, and they'll go with as much force as can be mustered, including more than three carriers.
Timjot: I have the same concerns you do about the first battle between the U.S. Fleet and the IJN. I think Madman was pointing out that if the U.S. was not attacked, the Pacific Fleet would make a deliberate move to the Philippines. I also think Madman is assuming that they would have waited until more of the existing carriers could go. Assuming the Ranger stayed in the Atlantic and the Hornet has finished its shake-down, that would give the U.S. six carriers - if you don't count the Langley. Madman is assuming that they're sailing west looking for a fight, and they'll go with as much force as can be mustered, including more than three carriers.