Japaense Fuel question - help wanted

EDDUNN115 · Post by **EDDUNN115** » Sun Feb 10, 2002 3:03 am

Whoops! Grigsby....My apologies

Originally posted by ED DUNN:
I remember a great Gary Grisby game for the Apple II platform, "War in the South Pacific" I believe. The combat attrition of ships seemed to follow the war closely and unlimited fuel at Truk never seemed to be a factor.

The bigger issue to me is the repair rates for aircraft/ships. Perhaps as an optional rule/play balance factor the rates for aircraft repair/damage control can be modified.

mogami · Post by **mogami** » Sun Feb 10, 2002 4:09 am

Hello, I think that Joel et-al are right on in the way they are handling fuel. I was very suprised yesturday in nosing about that how much Truk gets over rated. It was feared as some kind of 'Singapore' in the Central Pacific when in fact it had 4 AA guns larger then 20mm and less then a dozen smaller ones. It could repair prehaps 6 small ships at a time (only 1 floating dry dock size 2500 tons) It had no cranes for unloading ships (in fact it had all most no pier space, ships had to unloaded onto smaller vessels and then material moved by hand. When Japan finally (1943) decided to build the place there was a shortage of everything needed. It is a great fleet anchorage. It is not important in a game the scale of UV but in a larger game the Japanese player would need to base quite a few repair ships and tenders here. (making it a prime canidate for a US carrier raid at some point to render it useless again) In UV we can assume the required tenders etc are based here as part of the port capacity. Having a steady stream of tankers run between Palambang and Rabaul looks good except Rabaul too has limits to what ships it has berth room for. It would become quite the juicey patrol area for subs (I'm guessing it already is) Also during this time the entire carrying cap of tankers for Japan is moving 214k tons per month, how many tankers could be diverted to this run (tankers are reluctently sent into combat zones/how are they to be replaced since lossess will definatly increase.
The process would involve a tanker anchoring in Rabaul, unloading to a fuel barge that is then brought along side the ship to be refueled. Figure at least a day to refuel a DD. Then you would need to know how many fuel barges Rabaul has to figure out how many ships it can refuel per day. Are vessels as small as lighters and fuel barges represented in the game? (can they be damaged?)
I tend to always focus on the logistical side of war games (believing everything else is a direct result of logistics). Having unlimited fuel (at Rabaul)would allow 'fantasty' stratagy. (and moving large amounts of oil to Rabaul early in war may become a part of my furture plans in another cough*WITP*cough game.) I am reminded of that great WW2 German Rommel who over and over displayed his lack of logistical understanding
"Why have you stopped advancing?"
"Herr Feld Marshell my panzers have ran out of fuel."
"I don't spare the men I won't spare the machines, get moving at once! my entire battle plan is based on your flank attack"

[ February 09, 2002: Message edited by: Mogami ]

[ February 09, 2002: Message edited by: Mogami ]</p>

Bulldog61 · Post by **Bulldog61** » Sun Feb 10, 2002 4:28 am

I Just ran across a book called "the Reluctant Admiral" it about Yamamoto. After the invasion of Guadalcanal he moved his Flagship the Yamato to Truk. In October he wanted to take the Yamato to Guadalcanal but was (alledgedly) forbidden to by the Naval Genenal Staff becuase fuel stocks were down to 65,000 tons at Kure.

Mike

mogami · Post by **mogami** » Sun Feb 10, 2002 5:17 am

Originally posted by Mike Kraemer:
I Just ran across a book called "the Reluctant Admiral" it about Yamamoto. After the invasion of Guadalcanal he moved his Flagship the Yamato to Truk. In October he wanted to take the Yamato to Guadalcanal but was (alledgedly) forbidden to by the Naval Genenal Staff becuase fuel stocks were down to 65,000 tons at Kure.

Mike

Hi, see my post above under scenario 2 "Bombardment Delux" where this episode is examined. If a 2BB 4CA 1CL (IJN used Cl's as DD leaders) and a DD flotilla making a single mission used over 15k tons of oil. I think in fact the IJN had the oil to send the TF but didn't think it was worth it. If I was the Allied player I would have nightmares about this happening (I mean Kongo and Hiei are nice ships but I class them more with BC rather then BB) I would be much more afraid of Nagato or Mutsu or those 2 monsters coming down). It would be next to impossible to base a lot of BB at Rabaul for any length of time, they would suck the place dry. Both Truk and Rabaul lack shore to ship facilities (electric power, water) So the ships just laying to must keep a portion of their power plant on line. (they can hook up to a water barge if there is one available-otherwise they need to keep condensers on line)

[ February 10, 2002: Message edited by: Mogami ]</p>

Charles2222 · Post by **Charles2222** » Sun Feb 10, 2002 6:13 am

My, my, my, I was thinking this thread was going to die after the original request and to the contrary, I see there's all sorts of fuelish people around here <img src="rolleyes.gif" border="0">

Just let me hide behind the couch before you start firing.

Supervisor · Post by **Supervisor** » Sun Feb 10, 2002 12:13 pm

I don't have any hard numbers but my reading has indicated that poor logistics planning and operating capabilities limited Japanese operations even in 1942. Has anyone seen any material that focuses on IJN/IJA logistics operations in this area? I think mostly we mirror image western pratices and capabilities in these areas because that's where we have data. Second most of us as tank and carrier pushers don't like logistics in games when it keeps us from launching the assualt without mercy.

I haven't read "A War to be Won" but I understand from hearing the author's speak that Japanese logistics was horrible and there's certainly ample ancedotal evidence from Japanese soldiers and sailors to the point. Guadacanal was not called "Starvation Island" by the IJA for nothing. I'll see what I can find out. We have several specific questions to answer:

1. What were fuel, ammunition and other stockpiles in the area.

2. What was Japanese carrying capacity?

3. How were those supplies handled and comsumed?

Otherwise, we're just guessing.

Adnan Meshuggi · Post by **Adnan Meshuggi** » Sun Feb 10, 2002 6:24 pm

Hm, well the starving island.. yep but why ? Because the japs couldn´t support their troops... why couldn´t they support their troops ? Because of allied air supramacy...

if the japs sunk the allied carriers and kill many crusiers and battleships, they can supply the troops with large slow ships.

We should think about the game handling, if someone only want to replay the guadalcanar scenario, fine...

Maybe we could use a switch, one with limited fuel and one without....

just my 2 cents...

Paul Goodman · Post by **Paul Goodman** » Sun Feb 10, 2002 10:52 pm

The tactical supply of troops and aircraft are not the question. In effect, the question is whether or not Truk should be considered a fuel source of adequate capacity to be approximated as an infinite source within the constraints of the game. The conclusion is yes. The ability of the Japanese player (and the historical Japanese situation) to deliver troops, fuel, munitions, and food to these areas is an entirely different matter. Historically, the Japanese failed utterly. Can you do better? That is probably the essence of the game.

Speaking of the game. With the fuel question answered and no significant problems reported by the beta boys and (I'm sure) the little PBEM bug solved, we're ready to go Gold, right? Right...?, please right.

Paul

Zakhal() · Post by **Zakhal()** » Mon Feb 11, 2002 2:12 am

Jeez its bin 10 years since the last decent pacwar game. Release it! <img src="tongue.gif" border="0">

Bulldog61 · Post by **Bulldog61** » Mon Feb 11, 2002 2:46 am

The challenge with unlimited fuel at Truk is that it gives the IJN an operational capacity that didn't exist. Take half a dozen battleships base them at Truk and continuously cycle them to bombard Guadacanal. If they could have, they would have. If you have unlimited fuel at Truk you can in the game

Mike

Lex Morton · Post by **Lex Morton** » Mon Feb 11, 2002 3:30 am

As someone has pointed out even Yamamoto was over-ruled in his efforts to send in the 'big boys' AKA Yamato and Mushashi.Therefor it follows to me that supply should NOT be unlimited as it would depend on Supreme HQ in Tokyo (or where-ever) to decide to allocate alot of very scarce fuel for a 'big push'.This permission should come and go in irregular 'waves' during a campaign and should be linked,relatively loosely tho,to such things as objectives(hidden ones preferably),total amount of forces committed in theatre,desparation (and size) of infantry forces cut off from supplies.The Japanese should know in advance (maybe a week?) when the fuel supply (and how much)is first released down the pipeline to his sector(in this case Truk).He can plan based on that but some of his tankers may well be intercepted by US subs etc before it arrives so that should be randomised in too.I would like to see (but wont) off map holding areas or boxes where a player could chose to send his subs or DDs or cruisers or whatever as either offensivly positioned 'raiders' or as passive escorts.Supply not reaching Chuuk?Re-task 10 DD's and a couple of CLs as escorts to the Java Sea box for example.

If you want to skip ALL these admittedly too late in the design concepts then an easy workaround is that fuel usage (and underusage) should count,just as presumably sinking a CV does,in the victory conditions and determination.

Hope some of that made some sense! <img src="biggrin.gif" border="0">

Lex Morton

PS Great work on the oil breakdown Mogami!

[ February 13, 2002: Message edited by: Lex Morton ]</p>

Paul Goodman · Post by **Paul Goodman** » Mon Feb 11, 2002 3:34 am

Well, I'm not so sure. Why would they have done that. Why would you do that? The only time we see the major elements of the Combined Fleet sortie is when a major reinforcement by the Imperial Army is going to happen. Perhaps fuel was a consideration, but I've never seen that stated, whereas later, nearly every move the Combined Fleet (Mobil Fleet) makes reflects the necessity of accessing fuel from Borneo. If the Japanese are going to have a regular capital ship run from Truk to Guadalcanal, soon or later the U.S. is going to find a couple of torpedoes that work.

My question, previously asked, is why, when Henderson Field had been decimated by night action, major units didn't just stay around, executing a leisurely bombardment of the airfield, making it impossible for air reinforcement and field repair to occur. It does not appear that aircraft carrier inteference would be likely. Only the Enterprise was left and she was damaged.

GO GOLD! GO GOLD!

Paul

Ludovic Coval · Post by **Ludovic Coval** » Mon Feb 11, 2002 3:52 am

Paul,

Did you have source stating that Japenese were aware of Henderson state after the bombing ?

Regards,

Ludovic Coval
Battleline Designer/Developer

Supervisor · Post by **Supervisor** » Mon Feb 11, 2002 11:45 am

Posted by Adnan Meshuggi:

posted February 10, 2002 08:24 AM
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hm, well the starving island.. yep but why ? Because the japs couldn´t support their troops... why couldn´t they support their troops ? Because of allied air supramacy...
if the japs sunk the allied carriers and kill many crusiers and battleships, they can supply the troops with large slow ships.

We should think about the game handling, if someone only want to replay the guadalcanar scenario, fine...

Maybe we could use a switch, one with limited fuel and one without....

Actually, Guadacanal was only my example. Japanese operational tempo through out the entire regional campain certainly doesn't reflect unlimited logistics capability even where they had air superiority. They had supply problems in New Guinea even before the Allies built up overwhelming air superiority.

And as someone else posted they failed to deliver enough beans, bullets, fuel and reinforcements to Guadacanal even before it's airfield was a significant threat. Or to use their superiority in suface naval assets when they could have been decisive. The why is the question.

Paul Goodman · Post by **Paul Goodman** » Mon Feb 11, 2002 6:32 pm

Good point, Ludovic. One thing I seem to see over and over again is Japanese commands guaranteeing something would be done; then claiming it was done, even if it was not. So, having "guaranteed" that the Combined Fleet would knock out Henderson, I would certainly think that the Combined Fleet would presume that the field was rendered unusable after a full nights bombardment by two battleships and several heavy cruisers. This same line might be applied to the aircraft carrier situation. It seems to me that the Japanese command MUST have thought that the U.S. had no more carriers in the area and would base their actions on that.

Throughout the entire campaign, I think the Combined Fleet plans are conservative in the extreme. Even if the night bombardment was not totally successful, it is hard to imagine that Henderson could have launched aircraft while under heavy cruiser bombardment.

Paul

elmo3 · Post by **elmo3** » Mon Feb 11, 2002 6:41 pm

Originally posted by Ludovic Coval:
Paul,

Did you have source stating that Japenese were aware of Henderson state after the bombing ?

Regards,

Ludovic Coval
Battleline Designer/Developer

Ludovic

There is a specific reference in McGee's book to the Japanese intercepting a message from Guadalcanal after the first battleship bombardment. The US message stated that the airfield had been pounded.

elmo3

mogami · Post by **mogami** » Mon Feb 11, 2002 7:26 pm

Greetings, If the game mechanics only allot a certain amout of fuel to the Japanese player per day/week/month I still do not see it being a problem. The player has one enormous advantage over the actual Japanese, he knows what lies ahead. He knows in advance how long the game will be and has a clear knowledge of what he has to do to achive victory. If starting from turn 1 he develops a plan to move/store/conserve fuel he should at some point be able to mount some kind of serios sustained offensive at whatever target he chooses. The timing of this offensive being detirmined by when he has the required supply built up. Meanwhile he can keep the Allied player/AI guessing by fients and light units. (It would not hurt if he could engage US Carriers during the build up phase.) Unlimited fuel at Truk does present the problem of the Japanese using mass amounts they would not actually have available. If half the total monthy production is given to the player (107k tons) he could send the 2 monsters down 6 times before running out of fuel. The rest of his fleet would remain immobile.
So even if he is alloted as high as half I don't see where he could over whelm the Allies.
I think one good solution would be to allow Truk and Rabaul unlimited storage (there were over 360 miles of tunnel facilites at Rabaul by wars end-fuel storage is not complex and could be quickly/cheaply increased as needed) Then decided what the allotment is to be and how often it arrives in Truk (example if monthy allotment is 100k tons per month then have 25k tons arrive per week or 10k tons every third day does not matter as long as the Japanese player has something to plan with. Then he must use his on board assets to move it where he wants (would not have to be Rabaul) but I would set storage limits else where to what he builds. The US player will no doubt have unlimited fuel someplace on the map and have to move supplies forward. The forward fuel depots of both sides would be important targets.

[ February 11, 2002: Message edited by: Mogami ]</p>

Ron Saueracker · Post by **Ron Saueracker** » Wed Feb 13, 2002 12:12 am

Any decisions made on the fuel question? If the Japanese didn't send down the Yamato and friends there was probably a few good reasons; fuel, doctrine, warnings from on high. I always thought fuel was of great import, but I call upon as well the Japanese fleet in being doctrine that emphasised saving the battleline for the still envisioned classic Jutland engagement. For some reason, the battleship was still viewed as the premier arbiter of sea power by many high ranking Japanese officers, and they did not want these ships squandered off Guadalcanal. When reading up on prewar Japanese strategy, the Kongo, Haruna, Hiei, and Kirishima, along with other fast torpedo armed light forces, were to whittle down the US Battle Fleet in order to equalize the odds for a classic engagement. They were viewed as somewhat expendable. This, to me, is more the reason why the slower BBs were not used.

But...was it not Raizo Tanaka who stated that Guadalcanal was the "fork in the road" for Japanese fortunes and that it was here that the ultimate naval battle should be fought? He stated this as it was Japan's last crack at bringing the Allies to the peace table due to the still relative parity between the two forces, thanks of course to Midway. This statement obviously benefited from hindsight and reflection, but is that not what wargames are about...revionist history?

Fuel should be an issue, but so should doctrine. Why not have different doctrines for strategic reinforcements, just as you have various doctrines for Japanese sub performance. Let it alter the pipeline depending upon whatever results are achieved by players in this theatre.

Ron Saueracker · Post by **Ron Saueracker** » Wed Feb 13, 2002 1:35 am

Revisionist history is what I meant <img src="smile.gif" border="0">

More thoughts along the theatre aspects of the game. How do you propose to deal with the Midway issue as regards this theatre for the full campaign game? I think that if the Japanese suffer a tactical as well as a strategic defeat during the Coral Sea phase, I think that a: The Japanese should alter their plans and commit Nagumo to another attempt in this theatre, or b: The Japanese strike at Midway in the Central Pacific theatre and suffer the historical consequences thereby instigating the Allied invasion of Guadalcanal (or wherever) on or near the historical date. The reinforement/withdrawl pipeline will ensure the South Pacific theatre remains a backwater until the need arrises for a surprise invasion (ie. Guadalcanal airfield or some other threat to Australia's lifeline or a change towards offensive doctrine by the allies by threatening Rabaul or with their own airfield). This can be affected by altering the reinforements pipeline to reflect changes in strategic doctrine, potentially abstractly solving the fuel issue.

If one starts the game on Aug 7th, we are without the problem of "Midway" and can rewrite history. Let our accomplishments dictate the strategic doctrine of our superiors in this theatre, and they can worry about allotting us enough fuel to get the job done (by allocating the reinforcements in the pipeline...let fuel only be more of a tactical issue)

ratster · Post by **ratster** » Wed Feb 13, 2002 1:59 am

Yeah, Joel Billings stated earlier(in this thread) that they'll probably leave it the way it is; Unlimited fuel at Truk, but it's up to the player to move it everywhere else from there.