The Elephant Vanishes : obvert (J) vs Historiker_SqzMyLemon_Canoerebel (A)

[Lowpe]

How did the Soviets set up their altitudes?

Let me know plz, when you run into the P63A.[X(]

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: obvert

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I have no problem with night bombing most things. Only airfields and ports. And then I think it's fine if limited.

As I said, night bombing is the counter the Allies have to entrenched IJ air power. Limiting that severely upsets the tactical options the Allies have to break down IJ airpower.

"Death by B-29" for ports and airbases is unfortunate, but it can be avoided with diligent planning and deployments. Taking that from the Allied toolbox and it stalls the air war in a way that heavily favours Japan.

The fact that the Allies night bomb at all is a net win for Japan, given the massive decrease to sorties that results from night operations.

I completely understand your position. I simply disagree.

The air war is not stalled. With the HR we are using he can strike with all of those B-29s to hit many bases every turn, just not 350 on one base. Results become unmanageable for either side with large numbers, as is true for many aspects of the game design.

I am not a player who plays for historical accuracy, but I like it when the tools used in game do reflect some of their actual period capability. A bit skewed is fine, but since neither side actually got results bombing airfields or ports at night in any part of the war, this seems like one part of the game that can be given a limitation. The limitation still allows for unhistorically damaging night bombing. Just not catastrophically unhistorical night bombing. [:)]

If the Allies could night bomb with this kind of accuracy they would never have risked daylight bombing at all. None of Rabaul's field should have lasted more than a few weeks, and every ship in the port would have been sunk in a few B-17 raids. Kamakazes would have never been an issue because all of the fields would have been closed and the planes destroyed on the ground at night.

B-29s (and strategic bombers in general) were not used in penny packets. They were the big hammer.

I think that your chosen methods of getting "historical damage" forces very bizarre use of B-29's that seriously hampers Allied options in air strategy.

My take is that this is 1945, the Allies are using one of the most technologically advanced airframes in existence, ram packed with gizmos, including radar.

If the Allies want to smash a port, airbase or city by night, then they throw a couple hundred B-29s at it. No questioned asked. The Japanese role is to extract a sufficient toll as to make it unsustainable for the Allies long-term.

This was the dynamic of all air forces defending against strategic bombing efforts - you find methods to make it so expensive to inflict damage that the opposing side stops, or you lose.

ORIGINAL: HansBolter

The few times I have tried bombing airfields with B29s have resulted in abysmal performances.

Heck, I can't even get them to hit individual strategic targets like distinct factories with any degree of accuracy.

They only seem to be good at area bombing hitting manpower.

What are these other players doing to get such accuracy out of them?

My vote goes with MMs take on the air war.

Your argument in response cuts both ways. The Japanese never had the capability to have a huge operational air force with quality pilots in the late war period either so descrying an a-historic ability on the Allied side that counters that is a bit disingenuous. No offense intended.

You need to stack the odds in your favour, as with night bombing there's a high degree of randomness and inefficiency cause by night flying.

You can't control the moonlight and weather, but there's plenty you can control.

- Airbase development: size 9, plenty of aviation support, Air HQ present.
- Pilots: High EXP the better , 70+ is good, more is better. GrdB and Def skills should be through the roof. High EXP pilots are (IMO) one of the key determinants in planes actually performing well in the night bomber role (by not getting lost on the way).
- Leaders: Both in the Air HQ and in the squadrons. Helps get more planes flying.
- Recon: lots of DL hits on target bases well in advance of strikes.
- Targeting: Japan has a limited number of NF squadrons and F squadrons overall. They can't be everywhere at once.
- Radar: If they don't have radar, don't bother using them at night.

That's not an exhaustive list, but it's the core aspects of a successful strategic bomber force.

[obvert]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

B-29s (and strategic bombers in general) were not used in penny packets. They were the big hammer.

As shown by results, 50 B-29s is a big hammer! I feel like I'm repeating myself here, but this doesn't limit using B-29s or any other bomber each turn. Only how many can hit each base.

I think that your chosen methods of getting "historical damage" forces very bizarre use of B-29's that seriously hampers Allied options in air strategy.

Again, (repeating), I'm not interested in playing history. This simply is about historical parameters for a game based in a historical era. If you're playing a Civil War game you're not suddenly going to add night vision goggles to the infantry equipment. [;)]

My take is that this is 1945, the Allies are using one of the most technologically advanced airframes in existence, ram packed with gizmos, including radar.

If the Allies want to smash a port, airbase or city by night, then they throw a couple hundred B-29s at it. No questioned asked. The Japanese role is to extract a sufficient toll as to make it unsustainable for the Allies long-term.

All true, except that during the war they didn't do that!! They threw them en masse against strategic targets and carpet bombed cities! There is no interest on my part in limiting those options because if anything the game is a bit underpowered there.

This was the dynamic of all air forces defending against strategic bombing efforts - you find methods to make it so expensive to inflict damage that the opposing side stops, or you lose.

Strategic. This is the point. Bombing airfields/ports is tactical. Not strategic. It simply didn't happen in the war except in very critical isolated and extremely well-planned situations. Even those were not aways effective.

What you're missing here is that the Allies are not suffering for not being able to use more than 50 planes per target per turn to bomb ports or airfields. They're suffering for lack of well-defended targets. This Manila strike was one of the first he's tried within the HR parameters and it worked really well for him. So what's the prob? [:D]

[mind_messing]

As shown by results, 50 B-29s is a big hammer! I feel like I'm repeating myself here, but this doesn't limit using B-29s or any other bomber each turn. Only how many can hit each base.

Except that it's a rare occasions that 50 planes will actually hit a base, once all the dice rolls are considered.

That deflates damage caused, and makes it increasingly unlikely for Allied night bombing to reach its milestone of closing a IJ airbase for the following turn.

Again, (repeating), I'm not interested in playing history. This simply is about historical parameters for a game based in a historical era. If you're playing a Civil War game you're not suddenly going to add night vision goggles to the infantry equipment.

Except what you're doing in this scenario is preventing the Union from using Henry Rifles because they perform better in a night action than the muzzle loaders of the Confederacy.

All true, except that during the war they didn't do that!! They threw them en masse against strategic targets and carpet bombed cities! There is no interest on my part in limiting those options because if anything the game is a bit underpowered there.

Strategic. This is the point. Bombing airfields/ports is tactical. Not strategic. It simply didn't happen in the war except in very critical isolated and extremely well-planned situations. Even those were not aways effective.

There were extensive heavy bomber raids conducted on Japanese airbases in the run up to Okinawa to destroy kamikaze airframes on the ground.

I think you're missing the point. You're throttling the effectiveness of night attacks on targets that you consider tactical. At this point, the major strategic stumbling block for CR to attain victory is the IJ Air Force. He is impaired from prosecuting a strategy to break IJ Air Power due to HR's protecting what you consider tactical-level targets. To CR, the airbases contain planes and squadrons, so degrading them is a strategic target.

What you're missing here is that the Allies are not suffering for not being able to use more than 50 planes per target per turn to bomb ports or airfields. They're suffering for lack of well-defended targets. This Manila strike was one of the first he's tried within the HR parameters and it worked really well for him. So what's the prob?

I disagree, I think they're suffering terribly.

Emphasis mine.

As the current rule-set overwhelmingly favours the defender. You're going to see at most 50 planes during the night phase. That allows you to get a 1-1 ratio of defending CAP to attacking bombers by using one or two fighter squadrons (assuming average IJ fighter squadron size is 27-49 planes).

Most critically, there's little the Allies can do little to overcome concentrated IJ air power at large inland airbases.

On top of that, with that low limit on Allied attacking aircraft, you can effectively "nickel and dime" the assets IJ dedicates to night CAP. If a base has no major industry, then a single squadron on night CAP can provide an efficent counter to night bombing and not overstress the IJ's daytime efforts.

No ability to concentrate B-29s on airbase attack means that it is near impossible to attrition IJ air concentrations.

It's fair to pick at CR for tactically misusing some assets, but I've been following a while and I think that a large part of his difficulty in progressing in the air war is down to the pretty restrictive HR's on B-29s hitting airbases. You're not going to dispense with the HR, but I'd suggest upping the limit to 100 B-29's, or even better 150. That would go a long way to keeping night bombing a viable route to prosecute against large IJ air concentrations.

[obvert]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

As shown by results, 50 B-29s is a big hammer! I feel like I'm repeating myself here, but this doesn't limit using B-29s or any other bomber each turn. Only how many can hit each base.

Except that it's a rare occasions that 50 planes will actually hit a base, once all the dice rolls are considered.

That deflates damage caused, and makes it increasingly unlikely for Allied night bombing to reach its milestone of closing a IJ airbase for the following turn.

Again, (repeating), I'm not interested in playing history. This simply is about historical parameters for a game based in a historical era. If you're playing a Civil War game you're not suddenly going to add night vision goggles to the infantry equipment.

Except what you're doing in this scenario is preventing the Union from using Henry Rifles because they perform better in a night action than the muzzle loaders of the Confederacy.

All true, except that during the war they didn't do that!! They threw them en masse against strategic targets and carpet bombed cities! There is no interest on my part in limiting those options because if anything the game is a bit underpowered there.

Strategic. This is the point. Bombing airfields/ports is tactical. Not strategic. It simply didn't happen in the war except in very critical isolated and extremely well-planned situations. Even those were not aways effective.

There were extensive heavy bomber raids conducted on Japanese airbases in the run up to Okinawa to destroy kamikaze airframes on the ground.

I think you're missing the point. You're throttling the effectiveness of night attacks on targets that you consider tactical. At this point, the major strategic stumbling block for CR to attain victory is the IJ Air Force. He is impaired from prosecuting a strategy to break IJ Air Power due to HR's protecting what you consider tactical-level targets. To CR, the airbases contain planes and squadrons, so degrading them is a strategic target.

What you're missing here is that the Allies are not suffering for not being able to use more than 50 planes per target per turn to bomb ports or airfields. They're suffering for lack of well-defended targets. This Manila strike was one of the first he's tried within the HR parameters and it worked really well for him. So what's the prob?

I disagree, I think they're suffering terribly.

Emphasis mine.

As the current rule-set overwhelmingly favours the defender. You're going to see at most 50 planes during the night phase. That allows you to get a 1-1 ratio of defending CAP to attacking bombers by using one or two fighter squadrons (assuming average IJ fighter squadron size is 27-49 planes).

Most critically, there's little the Allies can do little to overcome concentrated IJ air power at large inland airbases.

On top of that, with that low limit on Allied attacking aircraft, you can effectively "nickel and dime" the assets IJ dedicates to night CAP. If a base has no major industry, then a single squadron on night CAP can provide an efficent counter to night bombing and not overstress the IJ's daytime efforts.

No ability to concentrate B-29s on airbase attack means that it is near impossible to attrition IJ air concentrations.

It's fair to pick at CR for tactically misusing some assets, but I've been following a while and I think that a large part of his difficulty in progressing in the air war is down to the pretty restrictive HR's on B-29s hitting airbases. You're not going to dispense with the HR, but I'd suggest upping the limit to 100 B-29's, or even better 150. That would go a long way to keeping night bombing a viable route to prosecute against large IJ air concentrations.

Dude. He can use as many as he wants!!

1. Use 1,000 and hit a Strat target. NF gone after a few rounds regardless of the amount I've got in place. Add 50 on night bombing airfield and presto, no more day fighters up to meet the 300 sweeping Allied Corsairs and Jugs and the 400 B-24Js. One base done.

2. Bomb adjacent targets with 50/each. He can hit an island worth of bases and rough up ALL of the fields. He can hit night and then day! (which he hasn't tried in combo much at all. I can think of about 20 different things I'm afraid he'll try but hasn't, and all of them would work within the parameters of this rule).

You're simply not thinking creatively about this, and ignoring the fact that it couldn't be done at this level at night during this era. (Please drop me a list of night bombing raids on Okinawa if you have them, as I've never found anything that resulted in anything but sporadic losses unless it was a one-off well planned raid. We all know that whatever those raids accomplished, they didn't stop Kamis from being effective. In game island bases can be closed for good and ALL of the airframes destroyed, so he has an advantage there already over history).

3. This isn't just about the Allies late. This is about the entire game, and before NF are online, BOTH sides will suffer from ridiculously large losses on airfield/port strikes at night. This about achieving a good game throughout and the capability of the B-29 (especially the B-29B) make the rule almost a non-factor late.

If he thinks it's a factor, great!! [&o]I love that he isn't trying out different ways of making use of what he has and continuing to simply milk-run the most obvious targets most days while completely ignoring strategic options.

This rule has nothing to do with Strat bombing any base and he simply hasn't decided to do that regularly, or explore targets to see what the defenses are with smaller packages or even up to the 50/per target for airfields and ports. He can do it. I know he can because I'm sitting here looking at what I have, but I'm trying my damndest to make sure he sees a wall of resistance everywhere.

I've played this part of the game before, and Jocke got a lot out of Strat bombing even though he did it the old fashioned way, from the Marianas. He obliterated Tokyo and Osaka. Then went for airframe factories and took out my favs. Pretty soon no supply left to run anything in outlying areas and bases were getting hit all over wiping hundreds of planes off every few days. Maybe I didn't set things up as tightly then but I'm still playing Japan with mostly service 3 airframes, mediocre flak and not enough NF to go around.

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: obvert

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

As shown by results, 50 B-29s is a big hammer! I feel like I'm repeating myself here, but this doesn't limit using B-29s or any other bomber each turn. Only how many can hit each base.

Except that it's a rare occasions that 50 planes will actually hit a base, once all the dice rolls are considered.

That deflates damage caused, and makes it increasingly unlikely for Allied night bombing to reach its milestone of closing a IJ airbase for the following turn.

Again, (repeating), I'm not interested in playing history. This simply is about historical parameters for a game based in a historical era. If you're playing a Civil War game you're not suddenly going to add night vision goggles to the infantry equipment.

Except what you're doing in this scenario is preventing the Union from using Henry Rifles because they perform better in a night action than the muzzle loaders of the Confederacy.

All true, except that during the war they didn't do that!! They threw them en masse against strategic targets and carpet bombed cities! There is no interest on my part in limiting those options because if anything the game is a bit underpowered there.

Strategic. This is the point. Bombing airfields/ports is tactical. Not strategic. It simply didn't happen in the war except in very critical isolated and extremely well-planned situations. Even those were not aways effective.

There were extensive heavy bomber raids conducted on Japanese airbases in the run up to Okinawa to destroy kamikaze airframes on the ground.

I think you're missing the point. You're throttling the effectiveness of night attacks on targets that you consider tactical. At this point, the major strategic stumbling block for CR to attain victory is the IJ Air Force. He is impaired from prosecuting a strategy to break IJ Air Power due to HR's protecting what you consider tactical-level targets. To CR, the airbases contain planes and squadrons, so degrading them is a strategic target.

What you're missing here is that the Allies are not suffering for not being able to use more than 50 planes per target per turn to bomb ports or airfields. They're suffering for lack of well-defended targets. This Manila strike was one of the first he's tried within the HR parameters and it worked really well for him. So what's the prob?

I disagree, I think they're suffering terribly.

Emphasis mine.

As the current rule-set overwhelmingly favours the defender. You're going to see at most 50 planes during the night phase. That allows you to get a 1-1 ratio of defending CAP to attacking bombers by using one or two fighter squadrons (assuming average IJ fighter squadron size is 27-49 planes).

Most critically, there's little the Allies can do little to overcome concentrated IJ air power at large inland airbases.

On top of that, with that low limit on Allied attacking aircraft, you can effectively "nickel and dime" the assets IJ dedicates to night CAP. If a base has no major industry, then a single squadron on night CAP can provide an efficent counter to night bombing and not overstress the IJ's daytime efforts.

No ability to concentrate B-29s on airbase attack means that it is near impossible to attrition IJ air concentrations.

It's fair to pick at CR for tactically misusing some assets, but I've been following a while and I think that a large part of his difficulty in progressing in the air war is down to the pretty restrictive HR's on B-29s hitting airbases. You're not going to dispense with the HR, but I'd suggest upping the limit to 100 B-29's, or even better 150. That would go a long way to keeping night bombing a viable route to prosecute against large IJ air concentrations.

Dude. He can use as many as he wants!!

1. Use 1,000 and hit a Strat target. NF gone after a few rounds regardless of the amount I've got in place.

2. Bomb adjacent targets with 50/each. He can hit an island worth of bases and rough up ALL of the fields. He can hit night and then day! (which he hasn't tried in combo much at all. I can think of about 20 different things I'm afraid he'll try but hasn't, and all of them would work within the parameters of this rule.

You're simply not thinking creatively about this, and ignoring the fact that it couldn't be done at this level at night during this era. (Plee drop me a list of night bombing raids on Okinawa if you have them, as I've never found anything that resulted in anything but sporadic losses unless it was a one-off well planned raid.

3. This isn't just about the Allies late. This is about the entire game, and before NF are online, BOTH sides will suffer from ridiculous large losses on airfield/port strikes. This about achieving a good game throughout and the capability of the B-29 (especially the B-29B) make the rule almost a non-factor late.

If he thinks it's a factor, great!! I love that he isn't trying out different ways of making use of what he has and continuing to simply milk-run the most obvious target most days while completely ignoring strategic options.

This rule has nothing to do with Strat bombing any base and he simply hasn't decided to do that regularly, or explore targets to see what the defenses are with smaller packages or even up to the 50/per target for airfields and ports. He can do it. I know he can because I'm sitting here looking at what I have, but I'm trying my damndest to make sure he sees a wall of resistance everywhere.

1. Strategic bombing doesn't damage the airbase, or have any impact on the planes at the airbase that aren't flying night CAP.

2. As I said above, the 50 aircraft limit favours the defender excessively (IMO). I also think you're underestimating the capability of the USAAF at this time.

3. I disagree. I'd welcome being shown what you consider inflated losses on airbase/port attack so that I have a reference point to see what you consider ridiculous. I'm more flexible - if you've 300 ships in a port or planes at an airbase, night bombing should take a toll as punishment for not properly dispersing assets.

I also fundamentally disagree that the B-29 makes your rule a non-factor.

I'll be as reductionist as possible. My issue is this

- the major barrier to CR's progression is your air force.
- HR's exist limiting the use of his most flexible asset (B-29's) to attack airbases at night to trivial levels.
- said HR allows min-maxing of IJ squadrons on night CAP to the benefit of the defender.
- this has serious implications to CR's ability to close airbases and degrade IJ airpower.

[obvert]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing
1. Strategic bombing doesn't damage the airbase, or have any impact on the planes at the airbase that aren't flying night CAP.

We can go around and around if you want, but please read what I'm writing first.

If he flies 500-1,000 at a base that has a big airfield and lots of NF, he can add 50 on airfield strikes while being able to overwhelm the defenses with the majority on Strat bombing. The NF only last so long and the airfield strikes will degrade any daytime CAP for the next phase when the airfield can then be obliterated.

2. As I said above, the 50 aircraft limit favours the defender excessively (IMO). I also think you're underestimating the capability of the USAAF at this time.

A while ago when having this same conversation with Bullwinkle he pulled out a very good example of a night strike on Wewak. This did do some damage, and also degraded the day CAP so that when the main daylight strike arrived there was less resistance, and the low flying B-25s were able to take out virtually all of the remaining aircraft on the base.

My problem with historical examples of night strikes is that they were incredibly rare, not very effective against any pinpoint target (RAF estimated their strikes could not get better than 5 miles to target accuracy) and did not close airfields.

The USAAF was the most advanced Air Force in the world in the era and they chose to use their strategic assets almost exclusively in area bombing as pinpoint target bombing was found to be largely ineffective. They did hit airfields, did close them in the day, but not at night as far as I've been able to find. Maybe they didn't have to, but there is no evidence (I can find ) that they could either.

3. I disagree. I'd welcome being shown what you consider inflated losses on airbase/port attack so that I have a reference point to see what you consider ridiculous. I'm more flexible - if you've 300 ships in a port or planes at an airbase, night bombing should take a toll as punishment for not properly dispersing assets.

I also fundamentally disagree that the B-29 makes your rule a non-factor.

I'll be as reductionist as possible. My issue is this

- the major barrier to CR's progression is your air force.
- HR's exist limiting the use of his most flexible asset (B-29's) to attack airbases at night to trivial levels.
- said HR allows min-maxing of IJ squadrons on night CAP to the benefit of the defender.
- this has serious implications to CR's ability to close airbases and degrade IJ airpower.

As you've seen the "trivial level" is quite effective, and could be in any base on map if he chose to employ it with some preparation.

My NF are largely stationed near strategic assets. he can hit airfields much more easily than say Tokyo. At night, in the day, or both. Psychology is preventing him from doing so, because he is used to being able to simply bludgeon the Japanese airfare. He spent the last year trying the same tactics overt and over and getting relatively poor results. I'm not highly inclined to consider changing any rules that pre-exist his part in this game to make things easier.

I'm playing a late war Allied game. I have no rule on night bombing, but I self-impose one and don't break it, and I feel no need to use more than 50 of any bomber at night.

[witpqs]

ORIGINAL: obvert

ORIGINAL: mind_messing
1. Strategic bombing doesn't damage the airbase, or have any impact on the planes at the airbase that aren't flying night CAP.

We can go around and around if you want, but please read what I'm writing first.

If he flies 500-1,000 at a base that has a big airfield and lots of NF, he can add 50 on airfield strikes while being able to overwhelm the defenses with the majority on Strat bombing. The NF only last so long and the airfield strikes will degrade any daytime CAP for the next phase when the airfield can then be obliterated.

Just FYI, this wording made it a lot more clear to me too. [8D]

[mind_messing]

We can go around and around if you want, but please read what I'm writing first.

If he flies 500-1,000 at a base that has a big airfield and lots of NF, he can add 50 on airfield strikes while being able to overwhelm the defenses with the majority on Strat bombing. The NF only last so long and the airfield strikes will degrade any daytime CAP for the next phase when the airfield can then be obliterated.

Except 50 planes on airbase attack...isn't actually 50 planes on airbase attack. Leader/EXP rolls, night mission roll, moonlight, flak, NF, weather.

It might be 50 planes in theory, in practice it's never going to be that high except in exceptional circumstances.

A while ago when having this same conversation with Bullwinkle he pulled out a very good example of a night strike on Wewak. This did do some damage, and also degraded the day CAP so that when the main daylight strike arrived there was less resistance, and the low flying B-25s were able to take out virtually all of the remaining aircraft on the base.

My problem with historical examples of night strikes is that they were incredibly rare, not very effective against any pinpoint target (RAF estimated their strikes could not get better than 5 miles to target accuracy) and did not close airfields.

The USAAF was the most advanced Air Force in the world in the era and they chose to use their strategic assets almost exclusively in area bombing as pinpoint target bombing was found to be largely ineffective. They did hit airfields, did close them in the day, but not at night as far as I've been able to find. Maybe they didn't have to, but there is no evidence (I can find ) that they could either.

An airbase in not a pinpoint target, and it's reflected like that in the game. Airbase attacks are separated into the planes, the airbase itself and the runways. Hitting a specific factory in the middle of a city is reasonably tricky. Plastering a large airbase, with most of the surface area being a flat, rectangular concrete surface is much more straightforward. That's reflected in the game design.

As you've seen the "trivial level" is quite effective, and could be in any base on map if he chose to employ it with some preparation.

I'd disagree, the damage is trivial. He bombed unopposed and destroyed 9 planes. That's trivial in itself, and compared to the number of planes stationed at those bases it would be even more so.

I'm not highly inclined to consider changing any rules that pre-exist his part in this game to make things easier.

That's absolutely fine, but I'd use the word fairer instead of easier.

[Bearcat2]

ORIGINAL: obvert

........................

You're simply not thinking creatively about this, and ignoring the fact that it couldn't be done at this level at night during this era. (Plee drop me a list of night bombing raids on Okinawa if you have them, as I've never found anything that resulted in anything but sporadic losses unless it was a one-off well planned raid. We all know that whatever those raids accomplished, they didn't stop Kamis from being effective
..............................

No night bombing of airfields, because there were either light or no opposition to daytime bombing of the airfields.



The 313th Bmb Wing [6th, 9th, 504th, 505th Bmb Grp B-29's]bombed Airfields in Truk & Iwo Jima, later they bombed the airfields on Okinawa. The Okinawan airfields were not used in Kamikaze attacks off Okinawa, the planes came Kyushu and Formosa.

Bombing an airfield at night had more to do with terrain, my father flew night bombers in WW2, bombed trains, tanks, artillery, trucks, air fields and bridges, obviously weather was the biggest factor in finding targets.
One of the more successful night bombing atacks of the war was when He-111's bombed Poltava destroying 47 of 73 B-17s

An example of B-29's supporting the 10th Army, 6th Bmb Grp

26 17 Apr Kanoya East Airfield 10 Tactical raid on Kyushu
27 18 Apr Kushira Airfield 10 Southern Kyushu
28 21 Apr Kanoya East Airfield 22 Tactical support
29 22 Apr Kanoya East Airfield 16 Tactical support
30 24 Apr Hitachi A/C Co, Tokyo 12 Daylight Precision
31 26 Apr Matsuyama West Airfield 18 Tactical support
32 27 Apr Miyakonoajo Airfield 6
33 28 Apr Miyakonoajo Airfield 18
34 30 Apr Tachikawa Aresenal, W of Tokyo 7 Daylight Precision
35 3 May Inland Sea Harbors 32 Mining
36 5 May Kure Harbor Area 34 Mining
37 7 May Kanoya, Ibuski Airfield 20 Tactical support
38 10 May Usa Airfield 22 Daylight Precision
39 11 May Nittigahara Airfield 11 GP bombs by radar
40 14 May Nagoya Urban Area 31 Night Incendiary
41 16 May Nagoya Urban Area 33 Night Incendiary
42 19 May Tachikawa Arsenal 30 Precision by radar
43 23 May TokyoUrban Area - Incendiary 33 Lost Lt Boynton, Lt Snyder, Lt Anderson crews
44 25 May TokyoUrban Area - Incendiary 24 Lost Lt Foc crew
45 29 May Yokohama Urban Area 25 Incendiary
46 1 June Osaka Urban Area 27 Daylight Incendiary
47 5 June Kobe Urban Area 29 Daylight Incendiary
48 7 June Osaka Urban Area 27 Incendiary by radar
Secondary Industrial Cities
49 9 June Kawasaki A/C Co, Akashi 26 Precision by radar
50 15 June Amagasaki 35 Incendiary by radar
51 18 June Yokkaichi 30 Night Incendiary
52 19 June Shimoneski Straits 2 Radar search
53 20 June Fukuoka 29 Night Incendiary
54 22 June Kawasaki A/C Co, Akashi 29 Daylight Precision
55 26 June Kawasaki A/C Co, Akashi 38 Daylight Precision
56 28 June Moji Urban Area 30 Night Incendiary
57 1 July Ube Urban Area 35 Night Incendiary
58 3 July Himeji Urban Area 35 Night Incendiary
59 5 July Marcus Island 3 Precision
60 6 July Shimizu 36 Night Incendiary

The 9th Bmb Grp:
"18 through 28 Apr 45 - Our attacks during this period put the B-29 into tactical operations. Direct support of the Okinawa Campaign, a tactical role, established our versatility. Flying in direct support of the Navy we frustrated Jap attempts to alleviate the situation on Okinawa. Our raids were concentrated on southern Kyushu airfields. With relatively small forces, we attacked the airfield at Kokubu the 18th; Kanoya East Airfield and again Kokubu Airfield the 21st; Kanoya Airfield and Kushira Airfield on 22 April. It was on Kushira that we dropped all our bombs within 1,000 feet of the briefed aiming point. Miyazaki Airfield was the target on 26 April; Kokubu Airfield being again twice blasted on 27 and 28 Apr. Our heaviest enemy opposition was received on the 28th, when we claimed 2 destroyed, 2 probables and 6 damaged. On this mission, Lt. Brown and his crew, were forced to bail out. Except for the navigator, the entire crew was rescued. We received a commendation from the 5th. Fleet Commander for our share in this vital task."

505th Bmb Grp"
"Two days after this mission the tactical support pounding of Kyushu
Airfields was resumed. Nittagahara Airfield was the target on the
26th for 23 planes loaded with explosives and fragmentation bombs.
The next day, the 27th, twelve B-29s took off for another visit to
Kokubu Airfield. Two of the bombers had to land at Iwo on the flight
up, and another plane got separated from the Group and joined a
formation to bomb Kanoya Airfield.
About 35 Jap fighters met the raiders this time and pressed their
initial attacks with phosphorus bombs. Most attacks were made out
of the sun; a second method of assault was to come in on a high
nose approach, diving down and pulling out slightly below level,
within 100 to 500 yards of formation. They hurled their bombs into
the formation as they broke away. No planes were damaged, however, although the bombers flew directly through the phosphorus
plumes and streamers. Crews could smell the odor of bursting
bombs, while the gunners fired on the attackers.
While other planes of the Bomber Command spread all over Kyushu,
hitting at scores of airfields used to stage Jap fighter and bomber
attacks against Okinawa and the American Naval Forces off of the
island, 22 of our planes headed for Kokubu.
Fighter opposition was on the largest scale yet encountered. The
enemy had become fully aware of the sharp curtailment our raids
were having on their air operations. Our first squadron crews met
50 to 60 enemy planes immediately after bombs-away. The ensuing
air battle lasted 15 minutes; 30 to 40 attacks were made. The second
squadron of B-29s ran into 15 persistent enemy fighters from UP to the
target and out again to land's end. These passes were unaggressive ,
with phosphorus bombs being reported. Our gunners fire was heavy
and murderous. Total claims were: 21 enemy planes destroyed, 7
probables.
Airstrips at Tachikowa were the targets for the final mission of the
month.
Cloud cover made it impractical to bomb the primary target, so the
planes moved over to the city of Hamamatsu and made a radar run.
Two aircraft had to land at Iwo---one with #3 engine out---and Capt.
Johnson, with #3 engine feathered and an oil leak in #2. Considerable
fighter resistance was met in this strike, and a good number of the
enemy fighters were knocked down. One of our tail-gunners was killed
by enemy fighter fire, and two of our planes suffered battle damage."

[obvert]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

We can go around and around if you want, but please read what I'm writing first.

If he flies 500-1,000 at a base that has a big airfield and lots of NF, he can add 50 on airfield strikes while being able to overwhelm the defenses with the majority on Strat bombing. The NF only last so long and the airfield strikes will degrade any daytime CAP for the next phase when the airfield can then be obliterated.

Except 50 planes on airbase attack...isn't actually 50 planes on airbase attack. Leader/EXP rolls, night mission roll, moonlight, flak, NF, weather.

It might be 50 planes in theory, in practice it's never going to be that high except in exceptional circumstances.

[/quote]

The rule is 50 planes per target per base. Not 50 planes "set" per target per base. He already sets more than 50 knowing he'll get slightly fewer that will fly. His strikes have usually been close to 50 hitting the target. He set 6 groups for the Manila strike, which would be more than 50 total planes. I'm also not going to nitpick if it's 51 that hit. [:)]

A while ago when having this same conversation with Bullwinkle he pulled out a very good example of a night strike on Wewak. This did do some damage, and also degraded the day CAP so that when the main daylight strike arrived there was less resistance, and the low flying B-25s were able to take out virtually all of the remaining aircraft on the base.

My problem with historical examples of night strikes is that they were incredibly rare, not very effective against any pinpoint target (RAF estimated their strikes could not get better than 5 miles to target accuracy) and did not close airfields.

The USAAF was the most advanced Air Force in the world in the era and they chose to use their strategic assets almost exclusively in area bombing as pinpoint target bombing was found to be largely ineffective. They did hit airfields, did close them in the day, but not at night as far as I've been able to find. Maybe they didn't have to, but there is no evidence (I can find ) that they could either.

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

An airbase is not a pinpoint target, and it's reflected like that in the game. Airbase attacks are separated into the planes, the airbase itself and the runways. Hitting a specific factory in the middle of a city is reasonably tricky. Plastering a large airbase, with most of the surface area being a flat, rectangular concrete surface is much more straightforward. That's reflected in the game design.

Well, good point. An airbase is actually an abstract for many airfields spread over a 46 mile hex. In big bases that means very many airfields. So even less likely that 4Es could close them all or wipe out 50-100% of the airframes in the hex. This is most bases in Japan, where about half the bases are size 5 or larger.

In reality an airbase with high fort levels would have planned dispersal and revetments to protect planes. So the size would benefit the defense, not increase the hit rate of bombing strikes at night. Night makes the fields and the nearby lake look a lot like flat level concrete, and it's just not shown that night strikes on airfields in the war were effective.

As you've seen the "trivial level" is quite effective, and could be in any base on map if he chose to employ it with some preparation.

I'd disagree, the damage is trivial. He bombed unopposed and destroyed 9 planes. That's trivial in itself, and compared to the number of planes stationed at those bases it would be even more so.

What strike? The Manila strike destroyed ~50+ airframes on the ground with 65+ hits to the base/ fields in thunderstorms. This is a level 9 base, and luckily I didn't have much in it. Only three fighter groups, an FB group and some search and ASW. It was a well-designed strike, and he swept and crushed the remainder in the morning with a very small B-24 follow-up.

I'm not highly inclined to consider changing any rules that pre-exist his part in this game to make things easier.

ORIGINAL: mind_messing
That's absolutely fine, but I'd use the word fairer instead of easier.

He's had Sakhalin since June 44 and the KB was halved on Dec 8, 41. It's been pretty fair and a hard fought game, especially since Sqz took over and definitely once Dan rolled it back six months and got his chance to reprep and plan his late game. He's never mentioned night bombing as a concern, and if he did I'd listen, but Dan is a tough opponent and I'm sure he'll come up with new ways to get the job done as he has continually so far.

[mind_messing]

Well, good point. An airbase is actually an abstract for many airfields spread over a 46 mile hex. In big bases that means very many airfields. So even less likely that 4Es could close them all or wipe out 50-100% of the airframes in the hex. This is most bases in Japan, where about half the bases are size 5 or larger.

Except that's not how the game works. The centralized versus dispersed debate has gone on since the game launched, but it's handwaving to provide an explanation for a design decision. The game engine considers it as one big airbase and that's all that matters. It's one big airbase, with one damage set for airbase, service and runways.

In reality an airbase with high fort levels would have planned dispersal and revetments to protect planes. So the size would benefit the defence, not increase the hit rate of bombing strikes at night. Night makes the fields and the nearby lake look a lot like flat level concrete, and it's just not shown that night strikes on airfields in the war were effective.

That's not the case in game.

Airbase size has no impact on damage protection. Fortification levels are what protects from bombing. Both are completely separate and require separate development. Developing airbases without fortification doesn't make airbases better protected. In my experience, I've only really seen serious damage reduction at the higher fortification levels. Forts between 1-6 doesn't seem to get you very much.

What strike? The Manila strike destroyed ~50+ airframes on the ground with 65+ hits to the base/ fields in thunderstorms. This is a level 9 base, and luckily I didn't have much in it. Only three fighter groups, an FB group and some search and ASW. It was a well-designed strike, and he swept and crushed the remainder in the morning with a very small B-24 follow-up.

It was an unopposed strike. I'd say it's safe to bet that the Allies had a high DL. Those two factors alone matter a great deal in determining the outcome of night bombing raids, regardless of other factors.

He's had Sakhalin since June 44 and the KB was halved on Dec 8, 41. It's been pretty fair and a hard fought game, especially since Sqz took over and definitely once Dan rolled it back six months and got his chance to reprep and plan his late game. He's never mentioned night bombing as a concern, and if he did I'd listen, but Dan is a tough opponent and I'm sure he'll come up with new ways to get the job done as he has continually so far.

I understand, but in my view the 50 plane rule is doing more for keeping Japan fighting than your own pilots, than flak or just about anything else.

[obvert]

ORIGINAL: Bearcat2

ORIGINAL: obvert
........................

You're simply not thinking creatively about this, and ignoring the fact that it couldn't be done at this level at night during this era. (Plee drop me a list of night bombing raids on Okinawa if you have them, as I've never found anything that resulted in anything but sporadic losses unless it was a one-off well planned raid. We all know that whatever those raids accomplished, they didn't stop Kamis from being effective
..............................

No night bombing of airfields, because there were either light or no opposition to daytime bombing of the airfields.

See bold below.

Our heaviest enemy opposition was received on the 28th, when we claimed 2 destroyed, 2 probables and 6 damaged. On this mission, Lt. Brown and his crew, were forced to bail out. Except for the navigator, the entire crew was rescued. We received a commendation from the 5th. Fleet Commander for our share in this vital task."

About 35 Jap fighters met the raiders this time and pressed their
initial attacks with phosphorus bombs.

Fighter opposition was on the largest scale yet encountered. The
enemy had become fully aware of the sharp curtailment our raids
were having on their air operations. Our first squadron crews met
50 to 60 enemy planes immediately after bombs-away.

Considerable fighter resistance was met in this strike, and a good number of the
enemy fighters were knocked down. One of our tail-gunners was killed
by enemy fighter fire, and two of our planes suffered battle damage."

The airfield strikes you point out are all daytime raids by small numbers of B-29s that did encounter opposition. Why didn't they then bomb at night? Well, there is also a clue below.

Cloud cover made it impractical to bomb the primary target, so the
planes moved over to the city of Hamamatsu and made a radar run.

Radar runs were suitable for hitting cities, but not so much airfields. There is no mention of night strikes here other than city attacks.

I get that night bombing did happen sporadically, and the Poltava example is a rare one where the conditions played a big part in the success. The Soviets didn't allow radar in base, didn't allow US AA guns and only brought in truck mounted 50cal MG AA. It's said that the lack of dispersal or revetments increased the damage caused, as well as the AA that did operate perfectly outlining the area of the field for the boomers coming in.

[obvert]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I understand, but in my view the 50 plane rule is doing more for keeping Japan fighting than your own pilots, than flak or just about anything else.

What do you base that on? He hasn't tried night bombing fields regularly before this? How would he have known it wouldn't work, and why does limiting bombing on one base affect the overall damage done? He can still use multiple targets or large raids with multiple types of target in one base.

You have no evidence for this claim and it's a bit ridiculous. This rule is keeping me going? [:D][:D][:D]

[mind_messing]

ORIGINAL: obvert

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I understand, but in my view the 50 plane rule is doing more for keeping Japan fighting than your own pilots, than flak or just about anything else.

What do you base that on?

There's no ability for the Allies to close airbases during the night phase, except by naval bombardment.

He hasn't tried night bombing fields regularly before this? How would he have known it wouldn't work,

Can't really comment without disclosing a discussion in his AAR.

and why does limiting bombing on one base affect the overall damage done?

As that one base might be important to close for a tactical or strategic goal.

More importantly, having 10% damage on ten bases makes a trivial impact on air operations. 100% damamge stops air operations.

It's also far quicker for ten bases to repair 10% damage than one base to repair 100% damage.

He can still use multiple targets or large raids with multiple types of target in one base.

See above.

You have no evidence for this claim and it's a bit ridiculous. This rule is keeping me going?

It's meaning that you need to have minimal consideration for the night phase attacks on non-strategic targets. With a max of 50 planes attacking any given airbase at night, you can min-max IJ air deployments. Airbases aren't being close by night raids, you're not having to counteract the night bombing fatigue/morale spirals, or having to relocate squadrons in anticipation of night raids.

In short, it's made B-29s have very little flexiblity, giving them a binary choice:

- fly at night at (well defended) strategic targets en-mass and suffer accordingly.
- fly in small numbers at airbases and fail to inflict lasting damage.

At the very least, upping the minimum to 100 or 150 would give CR the ability to keep you honest (not in the literal sense) with night CAP and inflict some serious punishment for improper or insufficent planning.

IMO that has really stalled CR's ability to degrade IJ air power. YMMV

[Bearcat2]

ORIGINAL: obvert


............................

I get that night bombing did happen sporadically, and the Poltava example is a rare one where the conditions played a big part in the success. The Soviets didn't allow radar in base, didn't allow US AA guns and only brought in truck mounted 50cal MG AA. It's said that the lack of dispersal or revetments increased the damage caused, as well as the AA that did operate perfectly outlining the area of the field for the boomers coming in.

There was no reason to switch to night bombing when your losses for the 3 Bmb Grp, over 400 sorties attacking airfields, was 1 plane. I don't have the losses for the 4th Bmb Grp- 506th

[obvert]

ORIGINAL: Bearcat2

ORIGINAL: obvert


............................

I get that night bombing did happen sporadically, and the Poltava example is a rare one where the conditions played a big part in the success. The Soviets didn't allow radar in base, didn't allow US AA guns and only brought in truck mounted 50cal MG AA. It's said that the lack of dispersal or revetments increased the damage caused, as well as the AA that did operate perfectly outlining the area of the field for the boomers coming in.

There was no reason to switch to night bombing when your losses for the 3 Bmb Grp, over 400 sorties attacking airfields, was 1 plane. I don't have the losses for the 4th Bmb Grp- 506th

Completely agree. But this is not evidence that night bombing would have been effective in closing airfields or destroying Japanese planes. The Pacific was much different than Europe, with more difficult terrain, fewer lights and recognizable landmarks to follow, and much more varied weather conditions year round.

[obvert]

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

ORIGINAL: obvert

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

I understand, but in my view the 50 plane rule is doing more for keeping Japan fighting than your own pilots, than flak or just about anything else.

What do you base that on?

There's no ability for the Allies to close airbases during the night phase, except by naval bombardment.

He hasn't tried night bombing fields regularly before this? How would he have known it wouldn't work,

Can't really comment without disclosing a discussion in his AAR.

and why does limiting bombing on one base affect the overall damage done?

As that one base might be important to close for a tactical or strategic goal.

More importantly, having 10% damage on ten bases makes a trivial impact on air operations. 100% damamge stops air operations.

It's also far quicker for ten bases to repair 10% damage than one base to repair 100% damage.

He can still use multiple targets or large raids with multiple types of target in one base.

See above.

You have no evidence for this claim and it's a bit ridiculous. This rule is keeping me going?

It's meaning that you need to have minimal consideration for the night phase attacks on non-strategic targets. With a max of 50 planes attacking any given airbase at night, you can min-max IJ air deployments. Airbases aren't being close by night raids, you're not having to counteract the night bombing fatigue/morale spirals, or having to relocate squadrons in anticipation of night raids.

In short, it's made B-29s have very little flexiblity, giving them a binary choice:

- fly at night at (well defended) strategic targets en-mass and suffer accordingly.
- fly in small numbers at airbases and fail to inflict lasting damage.

At the very least, upping the minimum to 100 or 150 would give CR the ability to keep you honest (not in the literal sense) with night CAP and inflict some serious punishment for improper or insufficent planning.

IMO that has really stalled CR's ability to degrade IJ air power. YMMV

You continue to avoid actually providing any evidence, citing any parts of this actual game, or doing anything to support what you're saying over and over and over. At the same time you completely ignore all of the points I've made, reasonably and thoughtfully, to defend my position. It's not a winning strategy for convincing someone what you think is the correct course! [;)]

[CaptBeefheart]

I see that CR is cool with your HR, so that's the important thing. How goes the war?

Cheers,
CB

[obvert]

[font="Times New Roman"]August 2, 1945[/font]

---

This is farther than either Dan or I have been in game so far. I believe my game with Jocke ended in late July as he was approaching 2:1 and after my BBs stopped short on a bombardment run and were sunk.

In this one I have a few less assets available on the sea, but more in the air. I've been able to employ the J7W which Jocke bombed out of production last time around, and it's proven a very good point defense plane. No range, so it can't sweep, but in numbers on high CAP it's a tough cookie.

CR employs another good night strike on Takao, all within the rules with 44 planes hitting the base, and I'll again be forced to constrain operations (not that much was going on here with the DS nearby). I can't afford to spread NF thin as the Home Island industry is the only real target I'm concerned about right now. The return on a strike like this is decent with 22 planes lost for one downed B-29, but he can get 500-1,000 VPs a day on a Strat strike in some bases on the Home Islands, so it makes sense to keep these assets protecting the big factory centers.

The Allies move one hex from Manila on Luzon. Not long until the 3,000 VP swing here to the Allies. They also take Samah from the fortress unit there.
[font="Trebuchet MS"]--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFTER ACTION REPORTS FOR Aug 2, 1945
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Night Air attack on Takao , at 84,65

Weather in hex: Partial cloud

Raid spotted at 29 NM, estimated altitude 7,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 9 minutes

Japanese aircraft
no flights

Allied aircraft
B-29-25 Superfort x 23

Japanese aircraft losses
Ki-100-II Tony: 1 destroyed on ground
Ki-49-IIb Helen: 1 destroyed on ground
Ki-67-Ia (T) Peggy: 1 destroyed on ground
Ki-56 Thalia: 1 destroyed on ground
Ki-43-IV Oscar: 1 destroyed on ground
E13A1b Jake: 2 destroyed on ground
B5N2 Kate: 2 destroyed on ground

Allied aircraft losses
B-29-25 Superfort: 9 damaged

Airbase hits 7
Runway hits 23

Aircraft Attacking:
14 x B-29-25 Superfort bombing from 7000 feet
Airfield Attack: 20 x 500 lb GP Bomb
9 x B-29-25 Superfort bombing from 7000 feet
Airfield Attack: 20 x 500 lb GP Bomb

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Takao , at 84,65

Weather in hex: Partial cloud

Raid spotted at 22 NM, estimated altitude 10,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 6 minutes

Japanese aircraft
no flights

Allied aircraft
B-29-25 Superfort x 7

Japanese aircraft losses
Ki-102b Randy: 1 destroyed on ground

Allied aircraft losses
B-29-25 Superfort: 2 damaged

Airbase hits 3
Runway hits 1

Aircraft Attacking:
7 x B-29-25 Superfort bombing from 7000 feet
Airfield Attack: 20 x 500 lb GP Bomb

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Takao , at 84,65

Weather in hex: Partial cloud

Raid spotted at 45 NM, estimated altitude 10,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 13 minutes

Japanese aircraft
no flights

Allied aircraft
B-29-25 Superfort x 5

Japanese aircraft losses
Ki-43-IV Oscar: 1 destroyed on ground
Ki-49-IIb Helen: 1 destroyed on ground
H8K2-L Emily: 1 destroyed on ground
L2D2 Tabby: 1 destroyed on ground
Ki-100-II Tony: 1 destroyed on ground

Allied aircraft losses
B-29-25 Superfort: 2 damaged
B-29-25 Superfort: 1 destroyed by flak

Japanese ground losses:
4 casualties reported
Squads: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled
Non Combat: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled
Engineers: 0 destroyed, 1 disabled

Airbase hits 8
Airbase supply hits 1
Runway hits 21

Aircraft Attacking:
5 x B-29-25 Superfort bombing from 7000 feet
Airfield Attack: 20 x 500 lb GP Bomb

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Takao , at 84,65

Weather in hex: Partial cloud

Raid spotted at 29 NM, estimated altitude 10,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 9 minutes

Japanese aircraft
no flights

Allied aircraft
B-29-25 Superfort x 4

No Japanese losses

Allied aircraft losses
B-29-25 Superfort: 2 damaged

Aircraft Attacking:
4 x B-29-25 Superfort bombing from 7000 feet
Airfield Attack: 20 x 500 lb GP Bomb

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Night Air attack on Takao , at 84,65

Weather in hex: Partial cloud

Raid spotted at 31 NM, estimated altitude 8,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 9 minutes

Japanese aircraft
no flights

Allied aircraft
B-29-25 Superfort x 5

No Japanese losses

Allied aircraft losses
B-29-25 Superfort: 3 damaged

Aircraft Attacking:
5 x B-29-25 Superfort bombing from 7000 feet
Airfield Attack: 20 x 500 lb GP Bomb

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sub attack near Lingga at 51,87

Japanese Ships
xAK Hokusei Maru, Torpedo hits 2, on fire, heavy damage
PB Hinode Maru #20

Allied Ships
SS Subtle

SS Subtle launches 6 torpedoes at xAK Hokusei Maru
Subtle bottoming out ....

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on TF, near Bintan at 51,86

Weather in hex: Light rain

Raid detected at 18 NM, estimated altitude 6,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 7 minutes

Allied aircraft
Avenger II x 8
Thunderbolt II x 14

No Allied losses

Japanese Ships
xAK Seisyo Maru, Torpedo hits 4, and is sunk

Aircraft Attacking:
8 x Avenger II launching torpedoes at 200 feet
Naval Attack: 1 x 18in Mk XII Torpedo

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Morning Air attack on Singapore , at 50,84

Weather in hex: Severe storms

Raid detected at 75 NM, estimated altitude 15,000 feet.
Estimated time to target is 22 minutes

Allied aircraft
B-25D Mitchell x 5
Spitfire F.XIV x 7
Thunderbolt I x 13
Wellington GR.XIII x 3
Beaufort VIII x 14
A-20G Havoc x 12
B-24J Liberator x 23
B-25J1 Mitchell x 3
B-25J11 Mitchell x 28
P-38L Lightning x 21

Allied aircraft losses
Wellington GR.XIII: 1 damaged
Beaufort VIII: 5 damaged
A-20G Havoc: 4 damaged
A-20G Havoc: 1 destroyed by flak
B-24J Liberator: 9 damaged
B-25J1 Mitchell: 1 damaged
B-25J11 Mitchell: 11 damaged
B-25J11 Mitchell: 1 destroyed by flak

Japanese ground losses:
23 casualties reported
Squads: 0 destroyed, 1 disabled
Non Combat: 0 destroyed, 2 disabled
Engineers: 0 destroyed, 0 disabled

Airbase hits 1
Airbase supply hits 1
Runway hits 3

Aircraft Attacking:
5 x B-25D Mitchell bombing from 11000 feet
Airfield Attack: 6 x 500 lb GP Bomb

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sub attack near Babeldaob at 86,96

Japanese Ships
E Uku
E Mokuto

Allied Ships
SS Haddo, hits 27, on fire, heavy damage

SS Haddo launches 6 torpedoes at E Uku

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------[/color][/font]