ORIGINAL: ezz
Not sure the South really knew the chances of winning .
This is common to many to many wars { including the present day!!} that there is an overestimation of own and an underestimation of the enemies abilities.
1 Southerner is worth 10 Northeners.... was proved pretty an empty boast pretty early on , yet was genuinely felt to be true at the time, much as Europeans greatly underestimated the fighting qualities of the Imperial Japanese before Pearl Harbour.
The chances of Germany defeating The USSR or Japan the Commenwealth and the USA are remote indeed.
Yet both thought the enemy inferior and morally weak compared to thier own societies.
The South THOUGHT that they could win but this doesn't mean that they ACTUALLY could win.
Frame of mind and reality doesn't deminish the fact they could win. For the Confederacy, winning is simply defined by continuing to exist as an independant nation. This could have been accomplished on the battlefield, through war weariness in the North or foriegn intervention.
Political decisions in the South pretty much snuffed out all of these options. There should have been someone in charge of all of the Confederate armed forces from the very beginning. This would have allowed a nationwide military strategy, rather than everything being theater level. Jefferson Davis tried to fill this role, but was ineffective. The weak central government made it difficult to ensure the military had everything they needed and when they needed it. The cotton embargo took away the only real international currency the Confederacy had. They passed on the option to buy almost a dozen ships early in the war in exchange for cotton. Generals commanded Confederate armies when they had no skills to do so. Political connections with Jefferson Davis allowed this to continue.
Tactically speaking, the Confederacy won a great many battles. The problem was no real thought was given to the strategic, at least until the Federal armies threatened something. With the single instance when Longstreet's corps was sent to join Bragg for a while. I can't think of any other occasion where units were shifted from one theater to another. For the Confederacy, the war couldn't be won in the West, but it could be won in the East. Had they shifted men to Lee's army to give him the chance to attack at something close to even odds for a change might have made a big difference. By 1864, all of those chances were gone. Grant had a death grip on Lee at this point. Lee won the battles, but he couldn't get away from Grant long enough to go on the offensive. Prior to 1864, I believe they could have won the war on the battlefield if they had ever managed to achieve a regional superiority of units. No effort was made to do this.