Seriously, you rely upon AE praxis to support real world arguments. Maybe at the real Coral Sea they were the victims of a bad die roll. and the commanding officer had been negligent by not spending PPs to change leaders.
Bad die rolls will average out. If the Japanese had consistently had "bad die rolls" in RL then the reason was NOT just "bad die rolls". IRL, in 1942 the Japanese lost 4 CVs and 2 CVLs sunk and lost the cream of their carrier pilots KIA. IJN forces sank 4 CVs (one by SS) and 1 CVL during the same period. The USN veterans of 1942 went on to train the flyers who outright slaughtered their IJN counterparts in 1944.
Given a similar series of match-ups in AE the results should average out to something similar (although the IJ Player can make pilot training better than RL). They do not seem to do that. IMHO Japanese capabilities are overblown in AE and all its predecessors.
Seriously, you rely upon AE praxis to support real world arguments. Maybe at the real Coral Sea they were the victims of a bad die roll. and the commanding officer had been negligent by not spending PPs to change leaders.
Bad die rolls will average out. If the Japanese had consistently had "bad die rolls" in RL then the reason was NOT just "bad die rolls". IRL, in 1942 the Japanese lost 4 CVs and 2 CVLs sunk and lost the cream of their carrier pilots KIA. IJN forces sank 4 CVs (one by SS) and 1 CVL during the same period. The USN veterans of 1942 went on to train the flyers who outright slaughtered their IJN counterparts in 1944.
Given a similar series of match-ups in AE the results should average out to something similar (although the IJ Player can make pilot training better than RL). They do not seem to do that. IMHO Japanese capabilities are overblown in AE and all its predecessors.
At Wake island a Marine Fighter pilot sank a Destroyer with a single bomb hit. After Midway, the Tamikaze was attacked by 25 dive bombers and suffered one damaging near miss. So which one is the expected result?
According to Prados in Combined Fleet decoded. During the practice for Midway, the torpedo attack results were so bad that no one believed the reported result from the Coral Sea battle. The real question is how well were they trained for the very tight confines of Pearl Harbor.
Zimm documents very well the expected hits vs. actual hits. And the results are not pretty. He also makes a very good case that the amount of damage was to a large part because the ships weren't maintained and waterproof doors weren't. The ships crews were allowed to slack also. Leaving open the manhole covers between the torpedo blister and the main body for inspection shows a lack of discipline. There was no inspection Sunday morning. Indicating that they had been left off of loose for awhile.
Zimm makes the argument that the reason the Battleships weren't used more is because Nimitz was afraid too. If you look at the Naval Battle of Guadacanal where the South Dakota lost power to it's main guns and Radar because of a mistake with a circuit breaker, you can understand that.
Posters have already stated that the real reason is because they weren't fast enough keep up with carriers and we didn't have enough tankers to refuel them.
First, they don't have to be with the Carriers. Even an old battleship would have been useful at the Battle of Savo Sound.
Ships like the Colorado have the range to dip down by Pago Pago and spend some time at Guadacanal and return to Pearl with out refueling.
There is no point in believing in things that exist. -Didactylos
I think another factor coming into play with lack of old BB usage early in the war could be the logistics. The fast BB's all had the same main armament (16"/45). Some old BB carried the same (Colorado Class). Of note USS Colorado was deployed to the SoPac in late 1942 to protect Fiji and Samoa. The other ships in that class (Maryland and WeeVee) were repairing PH damage at that time. The remeaining classes used a variety of main armament - some 14"/45, some 14"50, some 12"/50. In addition, before refit many of these ships had 5"/51 secondary batteries that were not DP. Besides the lack of AAA support a South Dakota or North Carolina class could offer, this was yet another shell type that would need to be brought forward to keep the ships supplied.
Every major combat ship used in the SoPac in late 1942/early 1943 could be fully supplied with one of five shells: 16"/45, 8"/55 , 6"/47, 5"/38, and/or 5"/25. Just adding a handful of old BB of different class would have added another three or four shell types that would be needed to keep them fully supplied. Add in different ammo types (AP/HE/Common/Starshells) and it just didn't make a lot of sense
"We have met the enemy and they are ours" - Commodore O.H. Perry
At Wake island a Marine Fighter pilot sank a Destroyer with a single bomb hit. After Midway, the Tamikaze was attacked by 25 dive bombers and suffered one damaging near miss. So which one is the expected result?
Both events should lie on the fringes of the bell curve. IRL the IJN CVs engaged US CVs on more or less even odds on 4 occasions in 1942. The RL result was that after each fight the engaging IJN carriers were hors de combat for a significant period of time thereafter. IRL exploitation of what might at first glance appear to be a victory for the IJN was impossible. That general result should occupy the middle of the curve and at least one standard deviation on either side of the middle. The IJ Player currently seems to enjoy a significant advantage in 1 to 1 combat between carriers during the entire period when, IRL, the IJN suffered such significant losses at roughly 1 to 1 odds that its carrier force was rendered impotent (cancelling all (realistic) hopes of further maritime offensive operations).
If the IJN Player gets there first with the most he ought to win. But just showing up ought not to be enough except as the most outlandish statistical result of combat.
At Wake island a Marine Fighter pilot sank a Destroyer with a single bomb hit. After Midway, the Tamikaze was attacked by 25 dive bombers and suffered one damaging near miss. So which one is the expected result?
Both events should lie on the fringes of the bell curve. IRL the IJN CVs engaged US CVs on more or less even odds on 4 occasions in 1942. The RL result was that after each fight the engaging IJN carriers were hors de combat for a significant period of time thereafter. IRL exploitation of what might at first glance appear to be a victory for the IJN was impossible. That general result should occupy the middle of the curve and at least one standard deviation on either side of the middle. The IJ Player currently seems to enjoy a significant advantage in 1 to 1 combat between carriers during the entire period when, IRL, the IJN suffered such significant losses at roughly 1 to 1 odds that its carrier force was rendered impotent (cancelling all (realistic) hopes of further maritime offensive operations).
If the IJN Player gets there first with the most he ought to win. But just showing up ought not to be enough except as the most outlandish statistical result of combat.
Amen.
Wayne Hughes (author of Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat and the Navy expert in this area) estimated two as the expected number of deckload strikes needed to sink or disable a fleet carrier in 1942. When both sides launched, that was the most common outcome. When one side got the drop on the other, the lost flight decks didn't contribute to the counterstrike.
Harry Erwin
"For a number to make sense in the game, someone has to calibrate it and program code. There are too many significant numbers that behave non-linearly to expect that. It's just a game. Enjoy it." herwin@btinternet.com
Seriously, you rely upon AE praxis to support real world arguments. Maybe at the real Coral Sea they were the victims of a bad die roll. and the commanding officer had been negligent by not spending PPs to change leaders.
Alfred
Just started a new campaign this weekend using John's "Babes" scenario modded to a my own beta. My intrepid Japanese flyers failed to sink a single battleship. To add insult to injury.....Neither PoW or Repulse were sunk. Only two lightly damaging hits were scored on the former and in return, John's revised AA figures DOUBLED the Japanese historical AA losses. ****THE GAME IS BROKEN.***** ****BABES IS BROKEN***** ***JWE IS BROKEN!!!***** IMHO....AE consistantly UNDERVALUES Japanese capabilities and does not properly reflect their WARRIOR SPIRIT.
ORIGINAL: Nikademus
Just started a new campaign this weekend using John's "Babes" scenario modded to a my own beta. My intrepid Japanese flyers failed to sink a single battleship. To add insult to injury.....Neither PoW or Repulse were sunk. Only two lightly damaging hits were scored on the former and in return, John's revised AA figures DOUBLED the Japanese historical AA losses. ****THE GAME IS BROKEN.***** ****BABES IS BROKEN***** ***JWE IS BROKEN!!!***** IMHO....AE consistantly UNDERVALUES Japanese capabilities and does not properly reflect their WARRIOR SPIRIT.
Just curious "Nik". What were your aircraft losses at PH? [&:]
Seriously, you rely upon AE praxis to support real world arguments. Maybe at the real Coral Sea they were the victims of a bad die roll. and the commanding officer had been negligent by not spending PPs to change leaders.
Alfred
Just started a new campaign this weekend using John's "Babes" scenario modded to a my own beta. My intrepid Japanese flyers failed to sink a single battleship. To add insult to injury.....Neither PoW or Repulse were sunk. Only two lightly damaging hits were scored on the former and in return, John's revised AA figures DOUBLED the Japanese historical AA losses. ****THE GAME IS BROKEN.***** ****BABES IS BROKEN***** ***JWE IS BROKEN!!!***** IMHO....AE consistantly UNDERVALUES Japanese capabilities and does not properly reflect their WARRIOR SPIRIT.
[:'(]
[:D]
You forgot another heinous ommision in AE. There are no ninjas plus there is no leader with the stats which Shintaro would warrant, were he to be included, as he should be, in the game. Yep no doubt about it, the game is broken.[:)]
You forgot another heinous ommision in AE. There are no ninjas plus there is no leader with the stats which Shintaro would warrant, were he to be included, as he should be, in the game. Yep no doubt about it, the game is broken.[:)]
Alfred
NO NINJAS?
curses......now we have no counter to the Atomic Bomb.
In fairness to JWE....his AA losses over Pearl were within tolerance (tolerance being everything MUST correspond to historical....anything else is Ahistorcal). Including op losses 14 planes were lost to AA or it's influence. 2 a2a kills scored on the defenders.....1 on the attacker.....which can be blamed on me since my mod attempts to address bloodiness. Given there were 86 A6M escorts, the defenders got off likely losing 2 in exchange for one. in my case.....Ahistorical however is Historical.
Because i say so. [:'(]
However 10-13 AA losses over Pow and Repulse is unacceptable. Obviously JWE is a Prince of Wales Fanboi.....a fact i find Repulse-ive.
Only half the historical aircraft were destroyed on the ground....oh and a Midget scored a hit.....which i also blame on JWE. He's a CSA Hunley fan.
You forgot another heinous ommision in AE. There are no ninjas plus there is no leader with the stats which Shintaro would warrant, were he to be included, as he should be, in the game. Yep no doubt about it, the game is broken.[:)]
Alfred
NO NINJAS?
curses......now we have no counter to the Atomic Bomb.
In fairness to JWE....his AA losses over Pearl were within tolerance (tolerance being everything MUST correspond to historical....anything else is Ahistorcal). Including op losses 14 planes were lost to AA or it's influence. 2 a2a kills scored on the defenders.....1 on the attacker.....which can be blamed on me since my mod attempts to address bloodiness. Given there were 86 A6M escorts, the defenders got off likely losing 2 in exchange for one. in my case.....Ahistorical however is Historical.
Because i say so. [:'(]
However 10-13 AA losses over Pow and Repulse is unacceptable. Obviously JWE is a Prince of Wales Fanboi.....a fact i find Repulse-ive.
Only half the historical aircraft were destroyed on the ground....oh and a Midget scored a hit.....which i also blame on JWE. He's a CSA Hunley fan.
Frankly, I find it very disturbing that you have made no mention of the Thai resistance to the Japanese invaders. I'm certain the absence of that resistance will directly lead to the early fall of Singapore.[:)]
Frankly, I find it very disturbing that you have made no mention of the Thai resistance to the Japanese invaders. I'm certain the absence of that resistance will directly lead to the early fall of Singapore.[:)]
Alfred
Without Ninjas, the Japanese modified combat odds can never achieve more than 1:1!
ORIGINAL: Nikademus
Only half the historical aircraft were destroyed on the ground....oh and a Midget scored a hit.....which i also blame on JWE. He's a CSA Hunley fan.
Doing manly things
In a manly way
On a ship all filled with
men, men, men, men
I bumped into your "review" of my book while researching WITP. I need to register a protest. Your comments and reviews are inaccurate in reflecting both the tone of my book and the arguments that I have made. You have misquoted most of the points in which you dispute, or taken them out of context, or not represented the issue in its full context. It would take the full book to correct your misrepresentations, but ley me just give one example.
You said:
"Zimm then naturally follows the angle that more fighters in the air defending would automatically and exponentially increase KB's losses...."
Here is what is in the book:
"Kill rates drop off in large encounters - fighters with a 30% chance of a kill in a 4 v. 4 encounter might have a 20% chance of a kill in a 50 v. 50 fight. With more aircraft in the 'fur-ball,' pilots had to spend more time evading enemy fighters and had to abort more attacks when other aircraft got in their tail." (page 284).
I said nothing about the kill rate increasing exponentially, rather, I argued that the rates were less than a linear extrapolation.
It appears that you want to take everything that I mention in the book in the worst possible light. When I make an argument for something, it is a "screed;" when I try to make a balance presentation on a point, I am "contradicting" myself, or was "forced to admit" something. In discussing the performance of the Shokaku and Zuikaku aviators, I guess I missed the fellow with the samurai sword behind my back "forcing" me to admit that they performed well; what you missed telling the people in this forum is that in support of my assessment of their performance I gave calculations of what they would have been expected to achieve under normal wartime condition, gave their actual results in the strike, and offered a number of reasons why the performance was so much higher than would be expected.
For the rest of the people in this forum, I would be happy to discuss any of the points made in the book and amplify my views and the evidence behind them. I would also suggest that you look to some of the other reviews of the book for a more balanced assessment then that offered by Nikademus.
I offer the same to you, Nikademus, but I think that first an apology is order for some of the more inflammatory characterizations that you flung in my direction. I value discourse on the topic, particularly since I am working on another book on a related subject, and I would like to get all the facts right. And, as an "old wargamer," I value my reputation in this community.
One last thing that made me smile. You refer to Evans and Peattie regarding the need for aviators to practice to maintain their skills. Well, I was taught to fly by my father, and Instructor Pilot, in our own aircraft. I have certifications in hang gliding and parachuting. I have 20 years of navy experience, including two tours on aircraft carriers where I obtained a fair dinkum idea of what is involved in carrier quals. I think my feel for what is involved in aviation is probably a bit more extensive than what you absorbed from Dave and Mark's book, particularly considering that they got that information from me. Check in Kaigun: you will find my name listed as one of the technical experts that Dave Evans and Mark Peattie consulted in writing their books.
I must make clear, at the outset, that I neither defend nor condemn Nikademus' review. I have not read the book (sorry 'bout that, but will rectify soon) so clearly cannot get specific.
I am frankly astonished and pleased that someone of your caliber engages these threads. I wish more of you would do this; it would make discussions so much more robust. Thank you for dropping in.
We are a relatively insular community. We speak often among, and between, ourselves, but do not often have the opportunity to receive outside, real world, input. We must rely on our personal perceptions of source material and argue amongst ourselves as to its validity. Kinda like the scientific method, writ small.
Again, I wish more of you would engage, and help us out a bit. Nik gave your book a hard hit, but we all know Nik. Critical opinion is critical opinion, but it doesn't throw anyone off the purchase track.
For what it's worth, I will apologize for Nik's 'out of school' characterizations. They are relevant to us, in our context, but understand how they are offensive to authors. I too have been cited by published authors, and know the difference between critique and criticism. Yeah, ok, guess I'm defending Nik a bit, but it's only a contextual thing. I'm sure he will send you a long message explaining his whys and wherefores and grovelling. Heck, I would.
I am glad to see the author dropping in, but his name dropping and self justification do not make Nik's criticisms any less valid. I would argue that Nik is speaking from a more genuine perspective than the author. The book is the author's child after all. We all know that authors have to work really hard to find a new perspective on something that has been so thoroughly explored before. Almost every book adds to the whole of our knowledge and I think Nik's pure book review was helpful. The other divergences were for us and should not be taken seriously by the author.
Thank you for your note. I originally came to the site because of my interest in WITP. I have had an ambition to build my own Pacific War campaign simulation for a long time. Back in the 1990s I published a WW II surface warfare simulation called Action Stations!, and I always wanted to expand it to carriers and airpower, and then go to the strategic level. But WITP and WarPlan Orange have been sitting on my shelf for many moons, and I wanted to find out if upgrading to the WITP Admiral’s Edition would be worthwhile before wading into the manual. Advice solicited.
Regarding Nikademus’ opinion of Attack on Pearl Harbor, I assert that he has misrepresented the book in many ways. In a previous posting I showed one of the more egregious examples. In scanning his comments I see that much of it is based on his opinion, not facts or data. Consequently, that is one reason why I mentioned (i.e. “name dropped”) some my qualifications – a reader has to make a decision on who he is to trust.
Let me offer up some of my views on the issue of aircrew quality, about which Nikademus avers that I have a “bug up my bum.”
First, you have to understand the context of the discussion. The data shows that the overall results of the Japanese attack on the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor seriously underperformed both the potential of the attack and the Japanese expectations. The Japanese had 16 priority targets (8 BB and 8 cruisers). They were expecting, and ought to have achieved, 27 torpedo hits, 5 to 8 AP bomb hits, and 49 GP bomb hits. The level bombers did great, but the torpedo bombers seriously underperformed expectations. There were 19 torpedo hits, of which 6 were either overkill or wasted against inappropriate targets, and the dive bombers did nothing to advance the objective of the attack (including the 5 hits on Nevada, which I argue were superfluous since Nevada was already out of the war for six months due to a torpedo hit, and the Japanese know that their GP bombs could not penetrate battleship armor). The Japanese had the potential to sink or destroy 14 of the 16 priority targets, with additional hits available, but they placed killing hits on only three. The attack achieved about one-fifth of its potential.
Why? I detail in the book the command errors, planning errors, and execution errors that contributed to this poor result. In that context, it is also reasonable to question the quality of the aircrew and the effectiveness of their training.
Many – I would contend, most – of the general history books on the Pacific War revere the combat abilities of the early-war Japanese aviators. Burton wrote of these historians: “Japanese aviation abilities, heavily downplayed before the war, were suddenly accorded almost mystical reverence.” Nikademus believes that it is silly to claim this in 2011, and he cites Shores. I will admit that I have not read much of Shores’ work yet – I have two of his books on my shelves awaiting the time – they were not consulted for Attack because of my impression that there would not be much information on Pearl Harbor. If Nikademus could provide me with a citation and reference to which of Shore’s works supports his position I would be grateful.
Be that as it may, most readers – most historians – do not appear in 2011 to be as informed as Nikademus. Books claiming that the Japanese were all elite pilots remain in print and continue to appear. I have given five public talks on the Attack to audiences that range from the “interested general public” to defense department professionals, and in each there has been surprise that I would offer data that suggests that the Japanese were not the superpilots of legend. You can go to various web sites and watch television specials to see the myth repeated again and again, citing these legacy sources.
Consequently, it seemed worthwhile to address this issue in the book, both to document the corrective evidence, and for completeness in investigating the poor performance of the raiders. I am bewildered as to why Nikademus is so upset that I devoted a portion of the book to the topic.
Claims of the Japanese aviator’s prowess are generally buttressed by a few points:
1) A claimed average of 800 hours per aircrew;
2) The high attrition rate in the flight training program, implying selectivity;
3) The approximate two month period of intensive training before the attack.
The 800 hours claim is, in my view, not impressive. Take a chotai of 9 pilots, 8 nuggets with 500 hours each and one honcho with China War experience and 3,000 hours. Average: 777 hours. But this group is not going to perform like 800-hour pilots – it is like the old adage, “if you place your head in the furnace and your feet on a block of ice, on average you are comfortable.” In reality, the only experienced pilot will be spending most of his time watching out for the nuggets, and the overall performance of the unit will be more like 500 hours than 777 hours.
A component of the cited 800-hour average is the approximate 2-month period of intensive training for the raid. According to the log book of one dive bomber pilot, they were racking up about 30 hours a week during this training period. 8 weeks, 240 hours of training, and the new nugget has 740 hours of training, just about at the 800-hour average.
So, the 800 hour average figure really does reflect a bunch of nuggets just out of training leavened by a few experienced leaders.
This fits in with the testimony. The Japanese trained to a one-year cycle. In September they did their annual shuffle – bringing in the new aviators and discharging or transferring the experienced people. People from the previous cycle were not retained, as the Japanese believed that carrier duty was so arduous that 1 year was the most an individual could take before they were too exhausted to be combat effective.
The additional problem was that 500 flight hours of Japanese training was not the same as 500 hours of US training. US fighter pilots left basic training and went to their squadrons with time in type, training in air combat maneuvering, formation flying proficiency, aerial gunnery and strafing training using live ammunition, carrier deck maneuvering training, ground touch-and-gos on a simulated flight deck, and at least 5 actual carrier deck landings. When they got to their squadrons they had all the pieces to fly combat immediately (although most squadrons put them immediately into their tailored training programs, with the rest of the pilots). My understanding is that a Japanese pilot was to be trained in all these skills AT THE SQUADRON LEVEL. They came out of basic knowing how to fly, spin recovery, some basic acrobatics, some cross country flights, and not much more. They were to become combat aviators from the training they were to receive in their squadrons. They learned to fly in basic and fight in their squadrons, while US pilots learned to fly and fight in basic.
Thus, the Japanese fighter pilots has to LEARN formation flying in the weeks before Kido Butai departed – not, as Nikademus claims, just refresher training for proficiency.
This system was dreadful, and ill-served Japan in the future war. Many other observers have noted that, while the US brought back experienced aviators into training roles, the Japanese did not, and most of their aviators would not get rest and eventually perish while in the front lines. Well, the system did that. The experienced aviators were not needed to teach basic training to newbies, any pilot could do that. They were needed to teach tactics and pass on their combat experience, which in the Japanese system was to be performed in the front lines by the experienced pilots! So, the greenies were sent forward, and because of losses had to be committed before they were fully trained, and they went down in flames next to the veterans who were supposed to be their instructors.
As I also stated, there was a severe shortage in carrier-qualified aviators. The Japanese did not do a good job in anticipating their manning requirements. 1941 saw Zuiho, Shokaku, Zuikaku, Shoho, and Taiyo commissioned, increasing the carrier aircraft capacity by over a third. The Japanese had not ramped up their training program to provide sufficient aviators to fill these slots! They had to scramble to fill all the slots just for Kido Butai, stripping aviators that were to go to other carriers. After that, some of the escort and light carriers were used as aircraft transports in the beginning of the war due to a lack of aviators, and some carriers had obsolete Type 97 fighters because of a shortage of Zeros. Kido Butai tried to raid the training establishment for more aviators, especially Zero pilots, but were largely unsuccessful.
The point is that the aviators on Kido Butai were not some elite group with China War experience, but rather mainly the regular product of the training establishment with some odds-and-ends sweepings from whatever they could steal from the ground establishment, with only the leadership positions filled with experienced aviators. I do not know percentages for these groups, but the math would imply that the experience was concentrated on the chotai leader level and up.
It should also be noted that most of the China War experience came not to the tailhook squadrons, but to the IJNAF land-based squadrons. The carrier squadrons launched only a handful of strikes before the war moved inland and out of their range. A few tactical squadrons of Zeros were moved forward. But the idea that all the experienced Japanese naval aviators were steely-eyed veterans with hundreds of hours of China War combat experience is dead wrong.
The additional problem embedded in the Japanese system is that the wholesale August-September transfers would totally rip apart unit cohesion. I have five tailhook navy aviators in my group at APL, and they testify that it would take about three months to rebuild unit cohesion after such a mass migration. A lack of unit cohesion in some units was very evident in the Pearl Harbor attack, especially among the carrier attack bombers from the Soryu and Hiryu carrying torpedoes in the attack.
The other thing is the rate in which the training hours were accumulated during the workups to the Pearl Harbor raid. Experienced pilots can get something out of 30 flight hours a week, but nuggets cannot. There was just too much information being pumped into them, without the needed context to fit it together – the needed foundation needs time to be internalized, and that time was not available. I saw a related phenomenon when I was the head of curriculum for Operations Research at the Naval Postgraduate School. The OR curric is very heavy on advanced mathematics, statistics, and computer programming, and the professors literally firehosed the students (because the profs like to get to the cutting edge stuff quickly, their primary interest). Well, in education and training there is a concept called “soak time.” You can fire-hose the student and they can study for the tests and get the grade, but they will not have absorbed more than a fraction of the material. We had to do a lot of re-teaching in the advanced coursed. Dumping 240 flight hours on to a nugget over two months might seem impressive, but the training just will not be as effective as the same number of hours over a more reasonable period.
My bottom line in evaluating the situation is that the 800-hour claim is not as impressive as is accepted in the western histories.
This correlates well with some other data points. A) the original plan called for a night launch, with the strike to arrive over the harbor at dawn. This plan was changed to a dawn launch because the 5th carrier division did not achieve night carquals. How many hours of night training was thus wasted? What does this say about the proficiency of the aviators? B) The entire operation was delayed (IIRC, one week?) when the planners assessed that the aviators were still insufficiently trained.
As for the Japanese attrition rate in training, this is more a symptom of a dysfunctional organization than a sign of excellence. Read Saburo Sakai’s memoires, and he relates (IIRC) thing like men being washed out for failing at kendo, or not being able to climb a greased pole, or not being able to stand on your hands for a specified duration. That, and the brutal and demeaning treatment. During the war and immediately after the US Navy and Army lined up a bunch of scientists to try to devise tests to identify good fighter pilots candidates. They learned that a very high percentage of the top ten percenters (those that accounted for more than 50% of the kills) were late bloomers. The Japanese method of washing out candidates was so capricious that they undoubtedly lost a large number of these potential late bloomers.
We have also the testimony of several of the Japanese aviators that the 5th Division was really young and “really green.” Nicademus would have you believe that these comments reflected the snobbishness of the other carriers (based on – what, Nick? Your own unimpeachable opinion?). Nick must have missed the Kate pilot from the 5th Division, who echoed this opinion. At 19 he stated that he was one of the more experience carrier attack aviators on his ship - he recalled that his gunner and radioman were even younger - and the only one on his ship who had actually dropped a practice torpedo. His testimony fits in well with all the other facts related above.
That is a fair summary of the arguments. Where there are opinions expressed, they are based on facts, testimony, and a pretty fair understanding of how military organizations operate. I would submit that Nikademus offers only his own opinions, and the secondary sources he mentions would need to be double-checked first – after all, if Nikademus cannot quote my views or arguments accurately, how are we to feel secure that his sources are being cited accurately?
There are other points where Nikademus is in error. He misquotes my points shamelessly.
For example, I never stated that the 5th Division did not have any experienced pilots!
I never said that Blue kills would go up exponentially if more US fighters were aloft!
And I certainly never used “cutting derogatory language” in referring to the Japanese, certainly not to the extent that Nik has used cutting and derogatory language in referring to my work (double standard here, Nik?).
There are others.
It is very clear to me that Nikademus does not comprehend what he reads, or that his preconceived notions warp his interpretations of what he reads, based on a comparison of what I wrote and what Nikademus claimed that I wrote. It is frustrating to me as an author to put together what I feel is a pretty important work, only to have someone misrepresent the book, claim that it is junk, and convince others that the book is not worth reading.
I appreciate the opportunity to offer some corrections to the discussion.
But this is getting a bit long.
Best regards, Alan Zimm
Thanks once again for taking the time to post. If you are interested in taking an in depth look at the game, might I suggest a pbem with Nik? He has a very good grasp of the nuts and bolts of the game, having been a leading modder and a plank owner. He is also very willing to pass that knowledge on.
With regard to your return to Nik's review, Nik has bought your book and is therefore entitled to have an opinion on it. He is also entitled to freely express his views. If his depth of knowledge does not meet your expectations of a reviewer, it would surely just put him in the same category as most reviewers and should not unduly bother a published author of your experience?
The people who play this game have probably, like Nik and I, read many books on the subject. We still buy more. I would imagine that most people who would have bought your book pre Nik's review would still do so post review, for the simple reason that we always buy books on this subject.
I certainly do not object to Nikademus posting his opinions on The Attack on Pearl Harbor. He is fully entitled to his opinion. He is fully entitled to criticize what I have written. He is fully entitled to bring out information that shows if I was wrong, and information that supports his opinions. I am not trying to suppress him in any way.
However, I would think that I have the same right to defend myself and my work against what could be viewed as slander, which is formally defined as a malicious, false, and defamatory statement or report.
I have already shown where some of his statements are false, and his terminology referring to my work (a "screed"; a "tear"; "cutting derogatory language") certainly could be considered impugning. I don't know if malicious applies, because malicious implies a motive, and his motive is not clear. Is it a simple case of envy, or trying to promote himself as smarter than all the rest of us? I have met folks who like to try to enhance their own feeling of self-importance by tearing down what they themselves could not create. I don't know if this applies to Nikademus, but on the other hand, I don't think that anyonce could consider his posts as "constructive criticism."
I am (and was) trying to get down to the truth. I am happy to change any view where I am wrong. If you look at the acknowledgement section of my book, you will find that I circulated the manuscript to a bunch of folks for criticism, and in a number of cases changed the text of the book in response to evidence presented by my collegues and reviewers. But it really is irritating when someone first lies about the contents of the book, then trashes it based on the lies.
A serious author, who is comfortable with his subject matter and his his conclusions, does not come onto the internet to engage with juveniles and morons.
The fact that he is here, says a lot; both about him and about us. Mr Zimm is interested in the game and that says even more; both about him and about us. He is a resource that we can consult, once he learns our foibles. I, for one, welcome him. I note he has actually got himself a login. That should tell us something, too.
Both Alan and Nik have set forth their views, openly. Okey, dokey. Just like Global Warming, historical truth is not a matter of consensus. Alan and Nik both put their puds on the table, and should be allowed to go private to iron out their differences. Hopefully, one, the other, or both will come back with ... yeah ... well ... ok, I could have 'splained that better, but here's what I really meant. That is what critical commentary is supposed to be about.
Welcome to our space, Alan Zimm. We may not bathe regularly, but neither are we a hive mind; occasionally we show flashes of competence. Get to know us and ya just might like us.
[ed] Oh, Jeez. Look, Nik did a review, and he put some 'personality' in it. And the the author responded, and put some of his own 'personality' in it. Let them work it out, for Cris' sake. This ain''t the Opra Winfrey book club, and Zimm ain't a troll, so back the frik off and let the man speak ! OK !! Woof !!!
