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I'm a little surprised to see we are planning to do something similar, with our planned Offshore Combatant Vessel intended to replace the huon class MCM ships, the leeuwin and paluma survey ships, and the armidale class patrol boats...
I wonder if this modular mission thing will work or flop. I hope for the former but fear the latter...
The Danes have mixed those missions on their patrol ships for years using stanflex modules, so it should work out. Unless someone decides to reinvent the wheel, I mean.
The fact that you'll only have a net loss of 6 hulls helps a lot. Given that you don't need minesweepers all the time, it's even close to a wash.
And it sounds like the new vessels will be a lot more capable than Armidales, especially if they embark helos or UAVs.
Sorry guys for getting into the fray with the LCS a bit late. I don't see a lot of difference between the FFG (minus the launchers) and the LCS other than advantages. The LCS is much more maneuverable in terms of 1)shallow water (Littoral) and 2)she can turn on a dime. I think that NAVSEA and the builder Austa got it right even as the name can be misleading. This is what I feel is a concept ship, very much like the aircraft carrier was in the early 1900's and they are still finding ways to improve the carriers. Like a home builder doesn't use just a hammer to build a house, the LCS is a tool in the US Navy tool bag and like any other tool can be effective within its design parameters. I see it being a great ASW, small boat ASuW and anti-mining platform. With its upgraded air and surface radar it should out perform the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates in terms of being a radar picket ship. (I'm not sure though if it would be used as that since the E-3's as I understand are a far superior air and surface search platform).
I would not believe that it would be purposely put into a theater of war that had an imminent possibility of long range SSM's without a CG or DDG with far better capabilities to handle such a threat. Having said that, I understand that their is an uncertainty of situational awareness called Fog of War and not every intent and capability of ones adversary is always known. War planers in the Pentagon who far outrank you, me and everyone else are aware of that and would not put a ship and crew indiscriminately nor without cause into a situation where their would be a certain loss of a ship.
I believe that the LCS has it's purpose and I believe that in the right hands it can be an effective tool but not for every situation. I believe in lightly armored combat scenario's such as drug interaction in the Florida Straits, mining patrol in the Suez Canal or anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, the LCS will serve well.
“There are no extraordinary men...just extraordinary circumstances that ordinary men are forced to deal with.”
Admiral William Frederick Halsey Jr. 1882-1959
OTOH, history shows us how much weight intentions carry when peace time budgets leave you unprepared for the exigencies of war time operations. For example, the Battle Cruiser was intended to be a super scout; designed to find the enemy battle fleet and frustrate enemy scouts and light forces. They were never intended to stand in the line of battle.
I wonder whether future commanders will keep intended purpose in mind when a need arises and an LCS is at hand. I wonder whether or not that's even a realistic expectation.
At one point during the debate for reactivating the battleships the charge was made that while the battleships were incapable in present configuration of achieving the USMCs requirement for naval fire support (63nm in support of amphib forces), it was suggested that the LCS WOULD be able meet it. If memory serves was an article in Proceedings in 95 or that neighborhood.
Regardless, the LCS has monumentally failed to live up to even the minimal expectations, especially for the unit price.
LCS wasn't even being discussed in 1995 and it never had a land-attack or fire support mission. Are you referring to the arsenal ship concept that was floated back then?
Potential systems envisioned to transform the Freedom from a baseline tailored/single-mission LCS into a multi-mission surface combatant include:
32-cell Mk 41 Vertical Launching System
AN/SPY-1F (V) radar
Baseline 9 version of Aegis combat system
Evolved Sea Sparrow anti-air missile
Standard SM-2 surface-to-air missile
76-mm OTA Melara rapid-fire gun (replacing the current
Mark 110 57mm gun)
MH-60R Seahawk helicopter and Fire Scout (or other) UAVs
Longbow Hellfire anti-ship missile
Passive and active electronic warfare systems
Towed sonar array
This is something I have always wondered about...is a frigate cost effective? Does it cost that much less to completely outfit a frigate with all the above weapons than an Aegis destroyer. I am not even sure of a cost comparison.
Zack Howitt says that we can buy ~14 "Sea Control" Frigates vs. 20 LCS and have the same time at sea since a frigate would be able to be out longer. The "Sea Control" Frigate he suggests is an up-armed USCG NSC.
Me personally we should cap the LCS at 20, use them as forward deployed assets in the Pacific, Caribbean and Arabian Gulf where we need patrol boats. Up-arm them with surface to surface missiles such as the RB-15 MK IV or NSM (Naval Strike Missile).
I cannot post links since I am new to the forums, checkout episode 33 of Sea Control on CIMSEC's website cimsec[dot]org.
They should have called the damn things Corvettes instead of the pretentious sounding LCS -- most of the problems associated with what they are supposed to actually do would have evaporated. People know what a Corvette is, an LCS -- not so much.
Regards,
Feltan
This is something I have always wondered about...is a frigate cost effective? Does it cost that much less to completely outfit a frigate with all the above weapons than an Aegis destroyer. I am not even sure of a cost comparison.
I imagine that part of the answer is what you want the ship to do. Using Burke class destroyers to chase speedboats off the coast of Somalia seems a poor use of taxpayers funds given that a frigate or corvette would be at least as effective in this role and much cheaper to purchase and operate. On the other hand, a Burke class ship is probably more useful in high-end warfare roles than a combination of frigates or corvettes of an equivalent value and crew size. Most mid-sized and larger navies have a mix of high and low end combatants, and the logic behind this seems sound.
Trying using an LCS modded with Kongsberg Naval Strike Missiles, which they scaled modeled and can be mounted without too much modification to the existing structure and would be easy to include in future variants. Taking an LCS and steaming at flank speed all sensors off can destroy most ships out there with out being detected, 3 lcs's in a wolf pack being supported by a DDG/CG for air defense would be one of the most potent surface combatant groups on the sea. I would post the mock ups but this is my first post, google image search Naval strike missile lcs and its right there.
The latest (classified) US Naval War College games broke several rules with LCS. We don't have all the details obviously, but a couple of things you can glean from Open Source:
1. They don't have the legs and were never intended to run with an Expeditionary Strike Group (the new name for Carrier Strike Groups), yet the games put them right at the perimeter, presumably sipping from the AORs a bit more than the rest.
2. They embarked a specific mission module only. In this case, the still-fledgling ASW. What was really effective (theoretically) was putting together a VDS equipped LCS with a TACTAS equipped Burke for serious hunter-killer combo. Between the two of them, they could have up to four MH-60s or three MH-60s and two MQ-8Bs, which really provided a LOT of versatile Aviation support.
Most of the general public/peanut-gallery concern is with LCS as an independent steaming unit. In wartime, there is no independent steaming, unless the situation is absolute desperation. That being said, LCS in it's current Flight 0 configuration is already better armed and more capable of self-defense than the Cyclone-class PC and both current classes of Minesweepers, which were really the two ship-types LCS was intended to replace. Myself, having been on a PC and seeing an MIW sweep up close, I'll take LCS any day. Neither of them have enough firepower to hold off anything bigger than a fisheries patrol boat and they also couldn't launch fast-movers. Even PC armed with Griffin Missile is still nothing compared to the reach of an LCS with the current SuW package. And it's cheaper to send off on a Pirate Hunt, Show-the-flag and one of the Navy's pillars of Maritime Strategy: Interoperability with Allies. Let's face it - LCS is the equivalent of many other navies' major combatants/capital ships, and it's easier for them to learn US operations/US tactics and can relate to the size and capability of a ship that they likely have an equivalent of, versus an Aegis-equipped Arleigh Burke. [8D]
However, that's no fun in gaming, is it?
The Future Surface Combatant committee will decide the fate of LCS as an upgraded platform. SECDEF Hagel did not specifically tell DoD to not restart LCS in the future - it is entirely possible that a heavily-upgunned LCS will be the winning recommendation by the Study Committee, effectively reversing the 20-ship cut.
That being said - realistic options:
1. Lockheed Martin had been flogging export versions of the LCS, including upgunned and larger tonnage variants. The largest one would have added another 500 to 1000t, SPY-1F and two 8-cell Mk.54 VLS, which would have given up to 32 ESSMs quad-packed to a cell. Tomahawk and LRASM would not be possible in the cell since it's not strike length, but it would be able to carry ASROC, which would give organic fire capability to the ASW mission.
2. As mentioned elsewhere, reducing the space in the mission bay area forward of the hangar space would allow for placement of quad-pack Anti-Ship Missiles. Harpoon is too long in the tooth, but LRASM and Kongsberg is a possibility.
3. Many options choose to reduce the amount of space continguously forward of the hangar bay, which reduces the number of MH-60s and/or MQ-8Bs aboard. That's a bit of a trade-off, an increase in organic fires, at the cost of what was one of the strengths of LCS; a larger than average aviation complement.
4. Railguns and the like aren't a possibility on LCS - the electrical power of even a DDG-1000 Zumwalt would be hard-pressed to fire one. Note that you need a LOT MORE space than even the vaunted Mission Bays of LCS. If the experiment goes off as planned, a railgun will go to sea aboard one of the Joint High Speed Vessels, which has at least 4x the volume space of an LCS. That's a lot of space that will likely be fully filled by the railgun's support equipment and powerplant.
5. Lasers - well, right now, they're going to sea aboard an LPD. Again, space and power constrained. DDG-1000 and Flight III Arleigh Burke are the direction posts for future combatants, with their hybrid electrical drives and the ability to generate massive amounts of surplus electrical power. Railguns and Lasers will make it to sea as standard weapons fits, but in the mid to late 2000s, possibly not even 2100 given the average life of a surface combatant is 50 years now.
6. What will change LCS is the ability to host MQ-8 Charlies, not Bravos. Charlie will be able to carry 300lbs more payload, more than double the flight-time (8 hours effective aloft) and will have on-board surface search radar AND electronic warfare. The principle that the first to detect is the first to kill applies now more than ever. Imagine TWO of those being available per LCS hull; that is a lot of capability extending your sensor sphere, especially in tough littoral environments. EW also gives the commander soft-kill options, fuzzing up the OPFOR's picture.
The Kongsberg won't require any change to the mission bay as they would be mounted aft of the main battery (lcs 2) and within the "superstructure" (lcs 1 and 2). But you are right on the money Juramentado with what the intent was with this class of ships, low level conflict sea control, the LCS was never intended to be a capital ship and nor serve in the same function as one, I would rather the navy purchase 3 lcs's to perform low intensity missions instead of one ddg to free up the existing fleet of DDG/CG. Also with the LCS's well deck able to hold 2 11m NSW rhib's you could use them as a perfect nonstandard maritime platforms to conduct a range of missions from dedicated VBSS to seal delivery, much like the PC was intended for but lacked the speed, firepower, and range. Use the LCS to move close to a enemy shore undetected disembark the SWCC units who in turn deliver your SEAL elements, complete the mission and get back to the ship who would provide aviation support if things went wrong.
No. In 1995, the USMC stated that their requirements for fire support was 63nm. The arsenal ship trainwreck that preceeded the current LCS trainwreck was envisioned as a massive crusie missile platform.
My point was that part of the marketing for the LCS modular design when it came about was that it could be tailored to support different warfare packages, including the USMC requirement. Things and times may have changed, but regardless the LCS is an operational failure (IIRC every ship has experienced catastrophic failures during simple transit ops) that provides no real benefit to the warfighter. Based on the cost of the venture and its overruns, it is unlikely the Navy could get the funding to significantly upgrade its combat power in peacetime. IMO, and that of others, it simply comes up in the red in the cost/benefit calculation.
I think, for speed, cost, firepower against sea and ground, and comes in numbers, the Pegasus (decommissioned), Hayabusa and the newest Hsun Hai could fulfill some general operations for near-shore patrol and fire supports.
But if it comes with ASW and better seaworthiness, then USN needs a bigger ship to add these two features. Unfortunately, LCS is a wrong answer as we see that.
The issue is for the size/cost of the LCS it's capabilities as a warship are very limited in relation to the frigates it is replacing as the workhorse of the fleet. Mostly in the self defense AAW role. It also has had extensive maintenance issues, I am a vendor for the diesel engine control system and aware of issues that I can't discuss any further than to say the project (LCS) in my eyes is a mess.
"To meaningless French Idealism, Liberty, Fraternity and Equality...we answer with German Realism, Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery" -Prince von Bülov, 1870-
