German victory in Russia??

[moni kerr]

Originally posted by Muzrub:
Thank god...I thought someone would just crack it over what I said.
I dont know if you had read Goebbels diaries for 1945, but it shows again another case were the general staff believed there was going to be a direct attack on Berlin from Poland, but instead it came in Pomerania and The Germans lost thousands of men in man power ie to be drafted soldiers( though Himmler shares part of the blame). Hitler wanted to defend this territory but the Gen staff not so much refused but claimed that the main attack would come to Berlin...
Thus the Germans lost man power and a large section of their manufacturing, and industrial deposits due to yet another miscalculation of the Gen staff.

In clarks book he even mentions the fact that due to stalling tatics by the Gen Staff that panzer units could have been used sooner after the encirclement of Kiev for the push onto Moscow, but the Gen staff not so much Hitler stalled for reasons of resting panzer units instead of pushing the soviets back while they were in dire trouble towards Moscow...This allowed the Soviets time to create greater defences and surely helped in the failing of German troops reaching Moscow.

This stalling both before and after the Kiev encirclement cost them the war.......if Moscow fell would Stalin have remained in power and not just that but Stalin in newly released documents approached the Germans for peace even before the battles surrounding Smolensk.

You can blame Hitler and Goering for Stalingrad but the battle should never had taken place if the gen Staff done what they were told in '41.......

The main Soviet attack on Berlin came from 1st Belorussian front(Zhukov) which was centred on Kustrin on the Oder about 40 miles due east of Berlin. That is essentially on the Polish border. At the end of March 1945 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian front(Konev to the south in Silesia) were poised and preparing for a major push westwards. 2nd Belorussian front(Rokossovsky) was in Pomerania redeploying after its clearing operations had been completed. 1st Belorussian was given the task of encircling and taking Berlin with flank protection provided by 2nd Belorussian to the north and 1st Ukrainian to the south. The General Staff was correct and put the most defensive effort into stopping 1st Belorussian. Thus ensued the battle for the Seelow heights which caused the Soviet advance to falter.

Konev however broke through easily and after consulting with Stalin he swung his schwerpunkt northwest towards Berlin. 2nd Belorussian front was also ordered to swing towards Berlin but by the end of the 3rd day after the offensive started 1st Belorussian had broken the Seelow defenses and was racing to encircle Berlin. So 2nd Belorussian returned to its original task. Konev forces however helped to encircle and capture Berlin.

The General Staff wanted to use all available reserves to stop the Soviets from capturing German territory. Hitler on the other hand wasted these reserves on futile counter attacks and defensive operations in Hungary and Austria.

As for Stalingrad it was Hitler who ordered the diversion of 4th Panzer army away from it's eastward advance to help secure a passage south into the Caucasus where it was not needed. The plan for the '42 offensive was to take Stalingrad if it was lightly held or to blockade it if it was heavily defended. Hitler chose to attack the city and take the oil fields. Just as in Barbarossa he tried to take too many objectives at once leaving the Wehrmacht always "one battalion short" of attaining them. This diversion of effort was Hitler's choice not the General Staff's. They did not overestimate the Wehrmacht's capabilities as often as Hitler did.

[Muzrub]

I am in agrement with you.
But what you said barley touchs on the fact that the battle of Stalingrad may not need to have happened if they didnt delay so much in '41...
As for the useless battles in Hungary and the like though I will admit they were fought on in tough terrain for mobile warfare..the reason for that was to protect what remaining oil fields they had and to try to score a victory to enable a politcal solution to the problem... They knew they were not in a position to win unless they could score some sort of victory and force a political peace either in the east or the west.
These counter attacks through Poland and into Germany also caused serious damage to the soviets not to mention partisan attacks in there rear territories by fueding bands communists and pro democracy groups, by the time they reached Berlin they were using Soviet deportees and prisonors of war some even in half civilian clothes and both were retrained or trained on the spot, they had everything they had in the shop window.
Even Soviet morale was low though they were so close to taking Berlin.

What has been failed to be seen or treated lightly is the politcal reasons behind Hitlers actions. These counter attacks were the last desperate measures of an army and a politcal system fighting for a political solution to there woes.




:rolleyes:

[moni kerr]

Originally posted by Muzrub:
I am in agrement with you.
But what you said barley touchs on the fact that the battle of Stalingrad may not need to have happened if they didnt delay so much in '41...
As for the useless battles in Hungary and the like though I will admit they were fought on in tough terrain for mobile warfare..the reason for that was to protect what remaining oil fields they had and to try to score a victory to enable a politcal solution to the problem... They knew they were not in a position to win unless they could score some sort of victory and force a political peace either in the east or the west.
These counter attacks through Poland and into Germany also caused serious damage to the soviets not to mention partisan attacks in there rear territories by fueding bands communists and pro democracy groups, by the time they reached Berlin they were using Soviet deportees and prisonors of war some even in half civilian clothes and both were retrained or trained on the spot, they had everything they had in the shop window.
Even Soviet morale was low though they were so close to taking Berlin.

What has been failed to be seen or treated lightly is the politcal reasons behind Hitlers actions. These counter attacks were the last desperate measures of an army and a politcal system fighting for a political solution to there woes.




:rolleyes:

Exactly what delays in '41 are you refering to and how do these delays affect the early capture of Stalingrad in '42?

The battles in Hungary beginning on the 5th of March '45 were supposed to cut up several Soviet armies, protect the oilfields and push the Soviets back over the Danube. The war according to Hitler. So the entire 6th SS panzer army was committed to offensive operations where the attacker could not possibly hope to hold what little ground would be gained against a superior enemy who saw what was comming. The weather conditions were bad, heavy snow followed by thaw prevented rapid movement(repeated daily throughout March). Add to that a well prepared defense with plenty of minefields and AT guns and the results were predictable. Although Tolbukhin asked for more reserves STAVKA refused to committ the 9th Guards army. The Soviets gave ground but the German attack became stuck and it spent itself. On the 16th the inevitable Soviet counter offensive began against the north face of the salient the Germans had carved out. 6th SS panzer army barely escaped encirclement, but the the entire German south wing was unhinged and the Soviets had a clear path to Vienna. Balck reported that the troops were saying the war was lost and they had lost faith in the High Command(ie Hitler). All that because Hitler insisted on holding oilfields which were destroyed and conducting grandious offensive schemes which the Werhmact was no longer capable of and which the strategic situation rendered as futile.

There was no possibility of a political solution, everyone except Hitler knew that. Defeat was inevitable.

The Red Army by 1945 was not as desperatly short of manpower as you suppose. Certainly not as desperate as the Germans who were throwing children and old men into the battle and resorting to mass executions to prevent desertion. I can find no references to low Soviet morale. They had been beating the Werhmact regularly since late '43 to the point where they were tactically superior to the Werhmact in every way. Their confidence was supreme.

[Muzrub]

The delays I am refering to is the period after the encirlcement of large numbers of soviet troops in the Ukraine just prior to the adavance on Moscow ( a period of 5-6 weeks). My other point about Stalingrad is if they didnt waste vital time in '41 Moscow may have been taken and Stalingrad my not have to evolve as it did.
The Soviets did us ex pows and young concripts from soviet deportees in Germany to make up numbers.They even used pro communist Austrain militia in Vienna even Goebbels admitted that some Austrains did take up arms against the german defenders in order to assist the soviets.
I do not dispute that the Germans were desperate for man power by late 44-45, but soviet man power was also being streched to the limit as were the troops tiring of war.

What other option did Hitler have than to try for a politcal solution, why fight constant defensive battles when they acheive nothing but the prolonging of a losing war.
I agree with what you said militarly in your posts in your discription of what happened, I am quite adept in military history, but other solutions had to tried.

[Ed Cogburn]

Originally posted by Muzrub:
I do not dispute that the Germans were desperate for man power by late 44-45, but soviet man power was also being streched to the limit as were the troops tiring of war.

The Soviets were in far better shape than the Germans. The Germans were using anybody between the ages of 15 and 65, basically. The USSR still had millions of men to call up according to some in a debate in the ArtWar forum about this issue. They were also taking women too, as many as 800,000, and if desperate enough they could have taken millions more into the Army.

The Soviets were certainly tiring of the war as was everyone else, except Hitler, but the Soviets could see the end coming, the light at the end of the tunnel, as they kept getting closer to Berlin. The Germans had nothing to look forward to.

What other option did Hitler have than to try for a politcal solution, why fight constant defensive battles when they acheive nothing but the prolonging of a losing war.

Lets get something straight here. In the end HITLER WAS INSANE. He had started losing it years earlier, by '45 he had lucid moments, but he was also pushing unit counters around a map planning bizarre counterattacks with counters that represented units already destroyed. People tried to explain, but he refused to accept reality and would often have these fits of rage, when someone would try to convince him to pull a unit back to take up defensive positions for example. The last thing he would ever do is surrender. And the last thing the USSR or Western Allies would do is accept anything less than total unconditional surrender. By '45 any negotiated settlement was impossible.

[Muzrub]

I do admit that the Germans were desperate.
They had no reserves and were pushed to the limit.I doubt any of what you say, I know full well the position they were in by '45.

In my original post I outlayed the idea that not all was Hitlers fault, the Gen staff played a major role in the the outcome of the war.
I also pointed out that some of the conclusions that Hitler came to may well have been militarly poor but were important to him for politcal-economic reasons. The Gen staff fought a war based on their pure military knowledge.
Hitler was trying to fight a war militarly-polictally-economically...and as such ideas clashed, but Hitler was always going to have his way in the end.

Hitlers grasp of the military situation in in the east was at its high point in '41 and his wish to constantly push on were thwarted by the generals of the time, and once his military views became unbalanced he always used to refer to the times in '41, in his mind if the Generals followed his orders then the war would have been won and this mode of thinking lead to his mistrust in the General staff ( not to mention july '44).Thus this was one of the main reasons for his tantrums and bullying of his Generals in the later period of the war as well as wounds recieved from the bomb plot and the medication he was recieving from Dr Morrell which contained high levels of arsnic which leads to nervous disorders and mental instability as well as death eventually, this medication speed up many of Hitlers physical problems ie Parkensons desease. So is it no wonder the man was having serious issues by '45.

Also in '45 some of the Nazi elite were convinced that the coalition between the west and the east could break down. This was why they beleived that if the could force a stalemate on either front they could have a peace with either of the oppsosing enemies.
Now we all know full well that this was not going to be the case but they clung to idea that it was a possibilty. By April '45 there were serious problems in the allied camp one being the Lublin commitee and who was going to govern Poland...the wast wished that the polish government in exile (London) could rule but Stalin was never going to allow this, you could see that by the way the Soviets treated the Warsaw uprising in '44 they rufused assistance to the western allies in supplying the insergents. In the case of Romania they begun arresting pro-democracy aggitators which lead to icy relations with the west again, they interefered in the Finnish elections, and were putting pressure on Turkey who had joined the war by then on the allied side. The Sovies had designs on the Dardenalles.
They also demanded extra votes in the ill faited San Fransisco conference. Is it no wonder when you look at the bigger picture that you can see where these riduculous dreams of disunity came from. These are just a few examples of what the Nazis believed could tear the alliance apart.

[frank1970]

Only desperation urged those Nazis to think there would be an alliance between Germany and the Western Allies.

Hitler was the Führer, which means he was the man who had to order. Someone who did not do Adolph wanted went into KZ. Guderian was released as chief of OKH, when he told his Führer that the war was lost and Germany should think about defending, not attacking.

The only mistake the General staff made was that they did not shoot Hitler in 1941. Then war would have ended in the East and in the West, Germany would have won territory and everything would have been fine and the OKH would have done all right.
The success in the end shows whether something was wrong or right. Germany lost the war, so everything was wrong.

[moni kerr]

Hitler's only chance for a negotiated peace was with Stalin. Churchill and Roosevelt were determined to destroy Nazism. Stalin on the otherhand was quite practical and could be bargained with. A very destructive war between the Western Capitolist powers and Germany was very much to his liking. But Hitler persisted in his illusion that the West would never allow Germany to be conquered by the Soviets and that they would repudiate their alliance with Stalin in order to prevent this from happening.

Before Citadelle Stalin was receptive to peace overtures. The territories held by Germany were a good bargaining chip. After Citadelle the Germans lost the initiative for good and the Soviets knew that they could reconquer their lost land. At this point the Soviets through the Swedes made it known to certain Germans that they required a signal of German seriousness if negotiations were to be persued; the resignations of Ribbentrop and Rosenburg. But Hitler had said at one point that there could be no negotiations, the war with the Soviets was a war of extermination. He also said that he might negotiate but only after Germany regained the initiative in the east.

The West was unwilling to negotiate with Hitler and Hitler was unwilling to negotiate with Stalin. So the chance for a political solution was nil.

[Muzrub]

Stalin was an option earlier in the campaign for sure but only while there seemed to be no chance for a Soviet Victory..
Has anyone hear read "The service" The memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen, who was Hitlers head of military espionage in Russia and then went on to become chief of the West German intelligence agancy.
He states that the Soviets would have attacked by '43-44, so Hitlers early strike was the correct course for Germany to follow.
But Hitlers belief that this was a war which would end in the total collapse of either country probably would have come true if there was a seperate peace or not. Stalin wanted expansion either in eastern europe-western europe and in the middle east namely persia (Iran-Iraq) and in turkeys regions, also in the far east.
This would have ended with another conflict anyway.
With my above posts I myself am not puting forward the idea that they did have a chance to sue for a seperate peace. What I am saying is they believed they could by winning a late victory or stalemate.

I agree Frank it would have been best if Hitler was just shot but poses some interesting questions.

1: Would Germany have been sucked into a vacum and lost all they gained by his assaination? would soldiers have continued to fight, because beleive it or not not all the troops were nazi's but many did believe that what the party had done for Germany was for the good.

2: In losing would some of the diehards and people believe once again in the stab in back theory and just create a bigger monster in future?

3: Could the officer corp so early in '41 been justified in killing Hitler and with that could they have maintained control of the populace and police agencys?

4: Who could have maintained power in Germany? politacally, the Gen staff, moderate Nazis?

[moni kerr]

Muzrub,

Your assertion that the blame for delays was the fault of the general staff and not Hitler does not correspond with known facts. The delay was Hitler's in August 1941. Check out a thread in The Art of Wargaming forum titled Hitler's Panzers East. In it abradley is posting some exerts from a book, here is one such post;

The nearness of the German victory over the Soviet Union probably comes into clearest focus on that date in the middle of July. Then, based on its earlier performance in Soviet Russia, the 7th Panzer Division lay only three days from Moscow. That division, of course, could not have continued its advance on 16 July because it was (temporarily) exhausted from the battles it had fought to get to Jarcevo and the tough fighting still involved in the destruction of the Smolensk pocket. But by 4 August that pocket was burned out and the German mobile divisions were resting and rehabilitating for the advance directly against Moscow. If the German army plan for the invasion (the "Halder Plan") had continued to function, we can estimate ACC would have launched its final drive to Moscow on or about 12 August, and gone on to seize that city in a double envelopment similar to those earlier at Minsk and Smolensk by 28 August. In actuality, Hitler refused to give the armor the "green light"(7) for Moscow, debated for weeks with his generals over the further conduct of the war, and finally ordered about half the strength of ACC southward into the Ukraine on 25 August. Hitler achieved a brilliant tactical success in that move. Gen. Heinz Cuderian, probably the pre mier armor commander of the war, led the mobile divisions south and linked up with the tanks of Panzer Group Kleist shortly before noon on 15 September.(8) At that moment, anti-tank and motorized infantry units of Guderian's 3rd Panzer Division set lines of encirclement southeast of Lochwiza around a vast Soviet pocket in the central Ukraine. The Germans eventually took 665,000 prisoners out of that cauldron - seven times the number of Germans and Romanians who would be captured at Stalingrad early in 1943. But the effort and time expended the south also lost World War II for the Germans. In the meantime, 7th Panzer Division would mark time around Jarcevo for an extravagant 78 days. The division was held there not due to logistics difficulties, casualties, or Soviet resistance, but because of Hitler's determination to assure immediate and certain control over the central Ukraine. The enormity of the situation can be made clear by asking the question: what if the same division had been halted with the other German armor along the Meuse River in Belgium after 13 May 1940 for 78 days, while Hitler procrastinated about future objectives and then finally ordered a drive into Lorraine to assure the immediate and certain control over the iron ore of France? The answer, of course, is that the German army could scarcely have won the French campaign, let alone the larger Russian campaign, under such restrictive operational directives. But perhaps the two most immediate and strongest arguments that support a picture of the German army overwhelming the Soviets in August 1941 are those based on the actual performance of the invaders in their advance south that summer, and in their following advance east at Vyasma and Bryansk in October. In the former case, powerful elements of AGC moved 55Okm south against strong Soviet resistance in the Ukraine. From that it's hard to escape the conclusion the same attacking mobile force, advancing earlier on 12 August along with the rest of ACC, would have been capable of an equally successful drive in a shorter period in the direction of Moscow. The Vyasma-Bryansk battle of October similarly shows the epic possibilities of the first months of Barbarossa in terms of the defeat of the Soviet Union. On 2 October, 7th Panzer Division and the other German divisions around it attacked along a main axis of advance through Vyasma toward Moscow. By that time the Soviet high command had already had more than two months to fortify a defensive front and mass its forces for the defense of Moscow. It would seem, then, that AGC should have had little real prospect of a successful renewed advance to Vyasma, let alone Moscow. The new offensive had to be prosecuted against the main concentration of the Red Army, hunkered in prepared positions, with its psychological equilibrium regained and a clear mission to halt any German advance. Yet, in an astonishing and still largely undetailed example of operational prowess, 7th Panzer Division advanced in a period of four days (106 hours) to Vyasma, and there linked up with 10th Panzer Division to form a new pocket of approximately 55 Soviet divisions. In fighting of gigantic proportions lasting from 2-14 October, ACC broke up and destroyed the mostly encircled forces defending Moscow, taking 650,000 prisoners in two pockets at Vyasma and farther south at Bryansk. But as the Red Army and Soviet government were revealed to be powerless to prevent a German advance to Moscow, the climatological circumstances of autumn rain and cloud cover that prevented the drying of the entirely unpaved road system halted the German mobile divisions. Presented with yet another unearned opportunity to survive, and aided by the half-miraculous and also unearned circumstance of the coldest winter in the recorded climatological history of Europe,(9) the Soviets survived Operation Barbarossa in 1941.

[frank1970]

The killing of Hitler was planned several times before, by military staff, too.
After the Brauchtisch-Affair they wanted to try a revolt, but German military usually do what is ordered.
After the almost defeat in winter 1941, the officers and soldiers knew, that the war could not be won. The group who tried to kill Hitler in 1944 was created at that time.

Who would have taken power? Yes, that is an very interessting question. I think the former SA formations would have made it. They had a very large number, they had veterans in their corps and they hated the SS and the other Nazi formations. (because of the Röhm-Putsch, where all SA leaders were arrested and a lot of them were killed by SS forces, who were ordered by Hitler.)
The SA was a more familiar group for the Germans than the other Nazi groups.

The loosing of territory:
Germany would have made peace with France, which was at that time very disappointed with Great Britain (shelling of French fleet, attack on Syria...). Germany would have got back all the territory she lost in WW1.
In the East there would be German stalite states like a Nazi-Poland, a Nazi-Ucrania,... . The Russian territory conquered would be given back, but therefore they would have got oil or something. (Stalin knew that he could not win at this point, but loose everything, including his power or even life.)

With creating a "independent" Poland, the British would not have to fight with Germany any longer, as they fought for the existance of Poland. And after making peace in the east there would be very great ressources in Germany to attack Britain.

There is a very interesting book about what would have happened when Germany won the war. Its name is "Fatherland", but I like the film even more. Not the main plot, but the little details.

[Muzrub]

"Liddell Harts history of the second wrold war"

"Brauchitsch temporized, instead of at once pressing for a different plan. He argued that before any futher operations were started, the Panzer forces must have a rest to overhaul their machines and get up replacments"
"Meanwhile the high-level discussion about the course to be followed went on, and it continued even after the panzer forces could have resumed their drive"
This was before August 21 and before the drive towards Kiev.
"After serveral weeks had slipped away in such discussions, the cheif of the general staff, Halder, spurred Brautitsch to put forward proposals for a speedy advance on Moscow"
By the time these dicussions were completed and the panzers were ready for action again Hitler saw the opportunity to strike south in to the Ukraine. Though he had already formulated this idea in his directive on July 19th.
This vital time before the adavance on Moscow and Kiev is the time I am talking about.
It allowed the rains to interefer with the surrounding of the soviets in the Kiev pocket and added even more time to the eventual attack on Moscow.....which allowed the weather to hamper progress even more than the Germans ever could have imagined.


Frank with the questions. I think the war for poland turned into a war against National socialism for the west saw that as an even bigger threat than communism as they found out in the end they used "belzeebub to chase out the devil".
As swiss diplomat and historian Professor Carl J .Burckhardt found in 1925, the western democracies saw Germany as the main evil in all cases instead of looking to the east and seeing a major world power on the grow covering an area for the far east to europe.
So the western democracies did not help the struggling Weimer Republic out of fear of Germany getting to strong again and this allowed the likes of Hitler to gain power.

So I dont think the west would have stopped their war with Germany poland or no poland.

[frank1970]

You should not forget:
France was history, there was no real France in 1941, but a German controlled government.
France sure would have accepted peace, when getting her POWs back.
The US were not in war with Germany in October/November 1941.
There would have been only England.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor would have made war between the US and Japan.
The Brits would have got much less lend and lease-goods.
England would stay alone against the most modern army of that time. There would have been one of the largest airfleets and a large number of subs.
Germany would have had 2 years to build all the planes and ferries and barges to invade England. Churchill would have seen that there was no chance of winning fighting alone against Germany. He did not like Germany, but he loved England. He would have made peace after a formal rebuilding of Poland.

[Muzrub]

I see your point...but the western democracies were under the illusion that the Soviets would one day become a free state.
Germany would have only been able to conquer the western zones of the Soviet union but I think the Soviet Hardliners would of held on and fought a protractive battle in the far east.....and with the attack on the US from Japan the US would have entered the war.
Economically the US would not want a strong independent Europe that Germany may have been able to create.
They still would have sided with England in the reinforcemnet of any Soviets still fighting. If this was to become the case would the US have used the bomb on Berlin?
Just as if Hitler passed on the moderate nazi's would have gained power, the same could be said for the Soviets, but their leader would have been a true war lord fighting for the fertile western plains.

[shane056]

Hmmm, an interesting topic, but I will attempt to keep my reply to an economy of words, providing in depth details to back up my views if so required...

My view after reading and studying many books etc (like many in this forum topic) is that the German general staff (OKH) and Hitler were both half right in their respective strategies to be pursued for this campaign... Remembering that "Errors in tactics can be made good in the next battle" whereas "Errors in strategy can only be made good in the next war".. The crux of a successful campaign in Russia is and always will be the pursuance of a correct and logical strategy from day one..

My proposed strategy, is as follows...
1] Treat the local eastern population and the soviet PoW's with the same considerations as was done in France (this alone is almost a war winner by itself). Exploit the willing enthusiasm of the eastern peoples in this campaign. Eliminate the potential for partisan activity.
2] Heeresgruppe Nord with more armour (4 Pz Divs) and infantry attached, is to take Leningrad and link up with the Finns, which it could clearly have done so by August, and leave the clearing out of the Baltic States till later. 18th Army is to fully support 4th Pz Gruppe, in it’s drive on Leningrad.
3] Heeresgruppe Mitte with initially enough armour (7 Pz Divs) and infantry, is to take Minsk, and then re-inforced by the divisions coming out of the Balkans, is then to take Smolensk, and then to rest and rehab.
4] Heeresgruppe Sud with additional armour (6 Pz Divs) and infantry (ie.. a strong panzer korps attached to 11th army), is to carry out a pincer movement (using 11th Army in Romania) to destroy the bulk of the soviet Southwest Front in the western Ukraine, and to take Kiev.
5] By Late August, but more probably by Beginning of September, HG Mitte (with 9 Pz Divs) is to launch the attack on Moscow, with HG Sud advancing through Kiev clearing up the flank situation between it and HG Mitte using 1st Pz Army (4 Pz Divs) and 6th Army. This strategy would mean that HG Sud is not strong enough on it’s right flank to advance beyond the lower Dnepr and so the Crimea and the Donets Basin would remain in soviet hands for 1941, which is the trade off for it to be strong enough on it’s left flank to assist in the Moscow offensive by being totally responsible for clearing up the flanks between it and HG Mitte. HG Nord is to support HG Mitte with it’s 16th Army on HG’s Mitte left flank. 18th Army is to now clear out the Baltic States etc, and 4th Pz Gruupe is to rehab itself as the OKH reserve. The Finns would now be able to cut the Murmansk railroad at Belomorsk
6] About half way through this Moscow offensive, the 4th Pz Gruppe after the successful taking of Leningrad, and after it’s rehab, would be re-deployed from HG Nord, and used to re-inforce HG Mitte for the final 2nd phase of the Moscow offensive, resulting in it’s encirclement and capture.
7] At this point (say late September), and as, peace feelers were already being put out by the soviets, now enter into serious negations and bargaining with Stalin, to obtain an armistice on German terms. This is where the long sought after oil and other resources can be bargained for, and obtained at peppercorn rates… Game over…
8] If the armistice is not obtained, then rail in fresh infantry Divs from France to replace the worn out ones in HG Mitte to ensure that Moscow is retained during winter, and cease all operations by Mid October and bed the German Army down into strong defensive positions, for the winter break… In a nut shell this is my view, but it is a brief one as I have not touched on the Luftwaffe, Kreigsmarine and Armaments / Munitions output, and probable operations into 1942, which are also closely linked into a war winning strategy …Shane

[Muzrub]

I see what you are saying Shane but:
Could the Germans have been able to keep up supply to these units racing headlong into the interior of Russia?.
The soviets didnt have the road net work of western Europe and a different rail gauge.

But my problem is could the Germans have left the Donets region be?. Coal output by '42 would have reached 200 million tons but with the taking of the basin only 80 million was to be able to be produced.
With the loss of this vital area coke output was down to about 40% of Russia's pre war output, and this inturn was affecting Iron and steel production. Iron ore production would reach only 13 million tons intsead of the planned 40 million, pig iron only 7 million of the planned 22 million and steel only 8 million instead of 28 million tons.
Soviet arms production was also likey to suffer from other raw material shortages and the Germans new that manganese ores in the urals and Siberia were inadequate for the local steel industry....what manganese there was was being transported from Chiatura in the Caucasus....
So the Germans needed to be as far east as the could on the southern front in order to spring board into the Caucasus and if the achieved the capture of the Caucasus early in 42 they could cut the arms production by another 30%.

Or would the loss of Moscow offset the survival of the donets basin?.
Politically it would have been a great Victory but would have acheived victory in the long run.

Moscow strategic objectives for the winter of 1942-43 state "The principl Russian objective is not one of regaining lost territory or pushing the enemy back to the west; rather, the Russian war leadership intends to crush the German armys striking power".
"For the Russians, a small village in which a large munitions dump has been located is more important than any city, however magnificent the winter quarters it might seem to offer the German troops."

They would have continued the struggle and become stronger over the winter of '41 without the loss of the Donets basin..and the Germans would have had no spring board in the south to push on into the caucasus early in spring, and this itself could have lead to an over extended front in the south and in other regions by the end of '42 and this could have lead to something even greater than just the loss of 290 000 troops in Stalingrad.

[shane056]

[QUOTE]_____________________________________________________________________
Originally posted by Muzrub:
I see what you are saying Shane but:
Could the Germans have been able to keep up supply to these units racing headlong into the interior of Russia?.
The soviets didnt have the road net work of western Europe and a different rail gauge.
____________________________________________________________________

Thankyou Mazrub for replying to my post… Supply was and always continued to be a problem for the Wehrmacht, that was never fully resolved by them, but being the master improvisers that they were, they managed to keep sufficient enough logistics moving to sustain the forward tip of the wedge ie.. the mobile units…examples of this as follows
A] 41st Pz Korps (Pz Grp 4) advance to the lower Luga by Mid July’41, where it was halted not so much by a lack of supply, which it is was suffering from, but due to orders from above, and this was through very marshy terrain, where they improvised with corduroy roads.
B] 2nd and 3rd Pz Gruppe’s rapid advance to Smolensk by Mid July, followed by 2nd Pz Gruppe’s head long dash southwards to link up with 1st Pz Gruppe by Mid September’41. This was a logistical challenge of the highest order and yet these were accomplished, through major improvisations, and great ingenuity, with them all resulting in German victories.
C] 1st Pz Gruppe’s advance deep into the Dnepr bend, followed by a turn northwards to advance through Kremenchug to link up with 2nd Pz Gruppes’s leading units, followed by a turn southwards to link up with 11th Army along the coastline of the sea of Azov by early October’41, all with the same logistical challenges and improvisations as above. Again all these problems were overcome sufficiently to produce a stunning victory... Lets not forget, that Panzer Divisions without sufficient supply are nothing more than stationary expensive scrap metal deposits, as was demonstrated at Stalingrad, but in the halcyon days of 1941 this was not the case..
So my view is yes the supply situation was chronic at times but through, their clearly demonstrated ingenuity, improvisation and adaptation abilities, the Wehrmacht would have been able to maintain sufficient enough moving supply to execute the strategy as outlined above. Any advance well beyond Moscow though, would be out of the question, as hardening of the supply arteries would have well and truly set in, and that is why I have stated that all operations would have been halted by mid October (at the latest) as I would envisage that supply would be absolutely chronic, but >>> “Moscow would be in German Hands”.
As I do not wish to take up a huge amount of space in replying to all your other good points at one go, plus as it is 02:10 hrs in the morning here in Western Australia, I will do so next time round… Shane

[Yogi Yohan]

Originally posted by moni kerr:
Your assertion that the blame for delays was the fault of the general staff and not Hitler does not correspond with known facts. The delay was Hitler's in August 1941.

[/QUOTE]

If the Commander in Chief and his Generals debate for weeks, even though the CiC has given clear and unambigous orders (that the Generals happen to disagree with), who is procrastinating? The CiC or the Generals?

The delay of July-August 1941 must be blamed on the Wehrmacht Generals who did not do as they were told out of disdain for Hitlers military abilities. Hitlers decision to capture the flanks first meant that Moscow could probably not be captured in 1941, this is true. But the obstruction of the Generals of Army Group Centre meant that Leningrad also was not captured and that the Moscow offensive was doomed from the start.

Also, lets remember that taking Moscow by no means assured victory. It is very doubtfull that the loss of Moscow would have been vastly more damaging than the loss of the Donbass and Buddeny's army.

So, in conclusion, it's hard to say what it was exactly that lost the war for Germany, Hitlers "flanks first"-strategy or the reluctance of his Generals to carry it out.

[Kuniworth]

hm...I find this forum very interesting, all you WIR fanatics certainly poscess a great deal of historical knowledge. That makes this forum great!

Well I discussed this topic a lot with my friends and my russian girlfriend.

As mentioned above Germanys chances of defeating the Soviet union was demolished by the failure to close the campaign in 1941. I dont even think a sucessful Fall Blau regarding the caucasus-offensive would have led to an automatic surrender considering the war-readiness the Soviet-state had gained.

From my point of view Germanys chance of victory very much agrees with the strategy behind Barbarossa;

1. Germany would have to destroy the main force directly at the borders. Estimated 2,5 million at the western borders and the remaining 3 million in reserves in order to make it impossible on short time to replace the losses. Possible another 5 million.

2. A knock-out blow advance to Murmansk-Astrakhan line within 6 months. With the fall of western europe much of Russias war-capability of diffrent reasons would be in jeopardy.

Germanys chances of knocking out Russia very much lays in the fact that they would have to keep the red army deminishing at the level achieved in june-september. Remember that the red army by september infact were smaller than der wehrmacht in western europe. If Germany could have kept up the mayhem then maybe....

In the end its all down to speed and force. The psycological factor shouldnt be underestimated. A powerful undefeated german army killing more than the soviets could mobilized in COMBINATION with the taking of territory would hit hard on russian morale and win the war.

Now, could Hitler have pulled this through? Well, thats open to debate. We all agree on the practical difficulties but could Germany actually do this. Yes but only if it took 6 months, was a combination of territory-conquering and total annihilation of the red army. This is of course impossible so its all down to lower the opponents morale in a quick seemingsly unbreakable blow. Germany could maybe have reached a truce or a still stnad but NEVER brake the war-machine of the Soviet union. The fall of Moscow and other vital cities might have led to this.


Finally;

The Moscow-kiev debate continues to leave unsolved questions. I just would like to make two remarks;

1. Soviet union would definetly not have fallen if Moscow was lost. But the importance the to sides gave Moscow made the city the scene of massed troop concentrations. Had Germany taken Moscow in october-november 41 (and thereby eliminating the last reserves of Zhukov) the Soviet-regime might not have recovered in time to put up a solid difence further east. But once again were talkin about destruction of millions and millions of soldiers.

2. I dont agree that leaving the soviet immobilized troops at Kiev would be seen as a serious threat to the armies of Army Group center. 2nd Army(AGC) and the armies under Rundstedt could have contained the Army. Remember that Kleist already cleared much resistance south of Kiev-area along the dniepr-bend.

[mogami]

Hi, I like digging up old threads from time to time to see if any new ideas have came to light. Or if the orginal posters still feel the same. WIR is one of my all time favorite games.