Rommel - A great general?

[SweArmy]

ORIGINAL: TOCarroll

I HAVE read "Panzer Battles", as well as "Lost Victories", "The German Genarals Talk (and talk, and talk...)", Von Luck's Memoriors, and darn near every book written by an influental German WW2 Tank General that is available in english. "Leading from the front" (a la Rommel) certainly had its disadvantages, including being out of communications with Operations, making bad decisions based on incomplete information (from being out of communications with operations [:'(]), and just plain bad decisions with no one to advise you (see: Dash To The Wire). Certainly Rommels method was not perfect, but it worked well (in general). Nowdays, with improved comms, GPS, computers and the like, it would be outmoded. In WW2, I would use the analogy of an expert quarterback calling audibles. He is "on the field" and Rommel certainly had an intuitative feel for both the battlefield, his opponents, and their weaknesses.

Rommel had his weaknesses. He could be arrogant, delusional (capturing the oilfields), he passed the buck on many mistakes (firing officers for his mistakes), and tended to ignore logistics. However, he adopted a style of command that played to his strengths.[:D] His elnisted men adored him, his troops were trained to a razor sharp edge, and he had an astonishingly quick, intuitative grasp of a very fluid situation. Particularly since he lacked General Staff training, and had to pick up armor tactics and command skills on the fly, I would certainly rate him at least #2 (behind Guderian) in command of an Armored Division, or (small) Corps.

Hmm these are some interesting comments !

Regarding Rommels abilities as a "Panzer general" and the perfomance of command at the front he was nothing special in the German army of those days.
To lead from the front instead from the rear was a part of the German Imperial Army stormtrooptactics from WWI, this was also based om the old German tradition of (what was later known as) Auftragstaktik.
In order to infiltrate and attack with high speed the commander on the spot had to make the decisions so he had a task and some guidance on how to act but then he didnt have to talk to his superior commander during the attack.
As an infantry company commander Rommel was taught these tactics and mastered it in the Italian campaign.

This idea of command was then developed in the Reichsheer after WWI and was the basic for all German officers not only the ones serving in the so-called "fast troops". This means that when Rommel took command of a panzerdivision he could use the same principles of command and tactics that he used in the WWI although not a proper armoured officer like Guderian (who started his career as a signals officer).

(Guderians "Panzerleader" is a book with lots of deviations from what actually happened during WWII and during the development of the German armoured troops. He gives himself credit for a lot of things done by other officers and it doesnt always tell the same "truth" as his own units war diaries).
The tradition from the German Auftragstaktik was then introduced as the normal command and control method in most western countries and is still used today. A command post vehicle for a div cdr today is equipped with radios and computers and the technology means that he has even less need than Rommel to meet with his COS, instead he will be able to follow his subordinate and make these crucial on-the spot decisions that is the symbol for an competent armoured troops officers.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: SweArmy

To lead from the front instead from the rear was a part of the German Imperial Army stormtrooptactics from WWI, this was also based om the old German tradition of (what was later known as) Auftragstaktik.

You're conflating two concepts here- leadership from the front and devolved command.

I really wouldn't regard the former as something traditionally German. If one goes back to the Napoleonic era then leading from the front isn't really unusual at all- Cardigan led the charge of the Light Brigade personally, as did Ney (?) of his cavalry at Waterloo. Then there's the awful losses taken by Generals in the Confederate Army in the American Civil War.

Moreover, aufstragstaktik- as it was put into practice by the Germans in the Second World War- was not a matter of the General officers dashing to the front, but rather trusting their subordinates to know what's the best course is locally, in contrast to the French (in particular) concept of Methodical Battle had the subordinates relying entirely on instructions from the centre, where decisions were supposed to be made on the basis of all possible information- of course in practice it took far too long for this information to be collected and analysed, leading to paralysis in a fluid situation.

In order to infiltrate and attack with high speed the commander on the spot had to make the decisions so he had a task and some guidance on how to act but then he didnt have to talk to his superior commander during the attack.
As an infantry company commander Rommel was taught these tactics and mastered it in the Italian campaign.

This is what Rommel did in 1940. But in 1941-4 he WAS that superior commander- and he didn't just trust his subordinates, he went in and took over from them when he felt like it.

[SweArmy]

The german way of leadership and command were not separated issues. Deriving from the "reformation" after the battle of Jena the German way of thinking changed under the lead of Scharnhorst, gneisenau and Clusewitz (and some more...)

This tradition of putting the soldier in centre (as a thinking person) and the methods of Fuhrung nach wisung and Fuhrung nach directiv made it natural to use a devolved command. And as you put it : "Auftragstaktik" was never the general dashing to the front, it was "mission type orders" based upon a mission, resources to accompmlish it and som guidance.
The german tradition evolved from Scharnhorst via von Moltke the elder via the stormtrooptactics of WWI up to hans von Seckt and the Reichsheer before WWII. The abilitty of the germans to manage a chaotic situation was very good and is based on the Clausewitzian way of looking upon the nature of war. This was implemennted in their training and education and is very well described in a book by Martin Samuels : Command or Control. There he compares the German Imperial army with the British army.

When it comes to leading from the front it was once the only method to lead and was of course not invented by the germans. Even the old swedish king Gustavus Adolphus lead up front. (Although he was so near-sighted that he most of the time didnt know where he actually was [:)]) However, today leading from the front is still a concept used by most countries since it is also a part of the commanders possibilities to monitor the activities of his subordinate which is one of the key features in Auftragstaktik. It is also a natural way of excersising leadership.

When Rommel took direct command of subordinate units (this was also done by Guderian and other German generals) it was a way of acting that they had been trained to do, Auftragstaktik didnt mean that you didnt "control" or did a follow up of your subordinates. This was a total contradiction of what the british did during WWI (and sometimes later on) when they lead acccording to something referred to as "umpiring" when you never interferred with a subordinate. The "best" example of this was at Gallipoli where the commander saw a subordinate landing at the wrong besch but didnt correct him.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: SweArmy

ORIGINAL: TOCarroll

I HAVE read "Panzer Battles", as well as "Lost Victories", "The German Genarals Talk (and talk, and talk...)", Von Luck's Memoriors, and darn near every book written by an influental German WW2 Tank General that is available in english. "Leading from the front" (a la Rommel) certainly had its disadvantages, including being out of communications with Operations, making bad decisions based on incomplete information (from being out of communications with operations [:'(]), and just plain bad decisions with no one to advise you (see: Dash To The Wire). Certainly Rommels method was not perfect, but it worked well (in general). Nowdays, with improved comms, GPS, computers and the like, it would be outmoded. In WW2, I would use the analogy of an expert quarterback calling audibles. He is "on the field" and Rommel certainly had an intuitative feel for both the battlefield, his opponents, and their weaknesses.

Rommel had his weaknesses. He could be arrogant, delusional (capturing the oilfields), he passed the buck on many mistakes (firing officers for his mistakes), and tended to ignore logistics. However, he adopted a style of command that played to his strengths.[:D] His elnisted men adored him, his troops were trained to a razor sharp edge, and he had an astonishingly quick, intuitative grasp of a very fluid situation. Particularly since he lacked General Staff training, and had to pick up armor tactics and command skills on the fly, I would certainly rate him at least #2 (behind Guderian) in command of an Armored Division, or (small) Corps.

Hmm these are some interesting comments !

Regarding Rommels abilities as a "Panzer general" and the perfomance of command at the front he was nothing special in the German army of those days...

Oh I think this under-rates Rommel's achievements. He really was quite incredible -- from his first action as a second lieutenant in 1914 to the way he hustled a vastly superior British force out of Mersa Matruh in 1942. Aside from everything else, he had an uncanny ability to anticipate how the enemy would perceive his actions -- and so drive objectively far more powerful forces from the field simply by playing on their fears and assumptions. If he wasn't able to win World War two solely with smoke and mirrors, that's hardly surprising -- what is amazing is just how much he managed to accomplish with the means at his disposal.

A fairly good example of Rommel's style -- and one that suggests the root of his ability -- was what happened in course of Crusader when he suddenly found he'd driven right into the middle of a British field hospital. He just acted as if he owned the place. The British had been captured, he was inspecting, and he was graciously giving the staff permission to continue tending the patients. Then he quickly got back into his car and drove off...

Now, the career of ninety nine generals out of a hundred would have come to an end right there.

[TOCarroll]

I would like to thank SweArmy & Colin Wright (as well as golden and others) for adding lots of fresh information to my trove. Amazing how people keep turning up new stuff on WW2[:D]!
 
I think one point that has NOT been made, is that by the time of El Alimen (First), and probably even before Gazala, Rommel was physically a very sick man. While the Afrika Korps relied on superior weapons and tactics for the early campaign, Rommel's leadership was definitely a factor. (Oddly enough, he seemed to get a better standard of performance out of the Italian mobile troops that the Italian command.---In Crusader the Artere Division stopped a British attack by using an anti-tank screen, and whan that was bypassed, they had the sand to shoot the track of the English tanks).
 
Anyway my point is Rommel's leadership skill, whatever you rate them, would naturally diminish with failing health. Advancing on Alexandria when he had to have a doctor on hand 24/7 was an ambitious move, not a wise one.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: SweArmy

This tradition of putting the soldier in centre (as a thinking person) and the methods of Fuhrung nach wisung and Fuhrung nach directiv made it natural to use a devolved command. And as you put it : "Auftragstaktik" was never the general dashing to the front, it was "mission type orders" based upon a mission, resources to accompmlish it and som guidance.

Right. But this wasn't what Rommel tended to do in the desert.

The german tradition evolved from Scharnhorst via von Moltke the elder via the stormtrooptactics of WWI up to hans von Seckt and the Reichsheer before WWII. The abilitty of the germans to manage a chaotic situation was very good and is based on the Clausewitzian way of looking upon the nature of war.

Maybe I need to read the nether parts of his book, but Clausewitz doesn't strike me as having much to do with Aufstragstaktik. He doesn't say much about what people ought to do- so much as what they will do naturally. Moreover the Germans fell into the trap of grandiose, centrally orchestrated and timetabled schemes along with everyone else. Witness the Schlieffen Plan.

When it comes to leading from the front it was once the only method to lead and was of course not invented by the germans. Even the old swedish king Gustavus Adolphus lead up front. (Although he was so near-sighted that he most of the time didnt know where he actually was [:)]) However, today leading from the front is still a concept used by most countries since it is also a part of the commanders possibilities to monitor the activities of his subordinate which is one of the key features in Auftragstaktik. It is also a natural way of excersising leadership.

It's one thing to monitor the activities of subordinates. Manstein did this very well, appearing at the front from time to time. Rommel had the habit of disappearing for prolonged stretches, putting his HQ in a difficult position. Had he not had the benefit of an excellent staff to take over from him, this could have produced disaster.

This was a total contradiction of what the british did during WWI (and sometimes later on) when they lead acccording to something referred to as "umpiring" when you never interferred with a subordinate. The "best" example of this was at Gallipoli where the commander saw a subordinate landing at the wrong besch but didnt correct him.

Well there are a number of perfectly good reasons for this. Much as you just accept the umpire's ruling in a sporting event, it undermines the authority of an officer to have his judgement overruled in front of his own subordinates. Naturally errors should be corrected after the event to prevent them happening again, but very likely in the heat of battle it's best just to get on with what you're doing anyway.

That's not to say this is necessarily the best approach- just that it has its points.

[miral]

Re some of these points: see Robert Citino's excellent book, The Defeat of the Wehrmacht, the German Campaigns of 1942. One of his main points is that the German Army and the Prussian Army before it have always been weak on logistics, even the staff trained officers.

[ColinWright]

To my mind, the two most impressive generals whose career I am reasonably familiar with would be Nathan Bedford Forrest and Rommel. I'll point out that most of the criticisms made of Rommel were necessarily a consequence of the practices that made him so successful. If you are winning a battle because you are personally leading the fuel convoy through a minefield, you are necessarily absent from headquarters. It's absurd to criticize a general for behavior that won him the battle when behaving as the critic would desire probably would have cost him the battle.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

To my mind, the two most impressive generals whose career I am reasonably familiar with would be Nathan Bedford Forrest and Rommel.

Forrest seems to have understood the human factor in tactics very well. His talents precisely suited the situation he was in and I can't imagine him doing as well in different circumstances.

I tend to think that general's personalities are independent of the prevailing military circumstances. Of course, men like Forrest and Rommel were excellent at what they did, but called upon to do something else I expect they would have shone less brightly.

If you are winning a battle because you are personally leading the fuel convoy through a minefield, you are necessarily absent from headquarters.

Essentially, he made a choice between leaving that fuel convoy thing up to a subordinate, or leaving the rest of the battle in the hands of a subordinate. I know I'd be more comfortable doing the former. Also less likely to lead to me getting hit by something unpleasant- as happened to Rommel more than once, to the detriment of his command.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

To my mind, the two most impressive generals whose career I am reasonably familiar with would be Nathan Bedford Forrest and Rommel.

Forrest seems to have understood the human factor in tactics very well. His talents precisely suited the situation he was in and I can't imagine him doing as well in different circumstances.

Why not? By that logic, one would be reluctant to admit a star high school student to a good university. After all, with the different circumstances and all, there's no reason to expect him to continue to excel.

One contemporary who had time to reflect -- Jefferson Davis -- commented after the war that if Richmond had realized the true scope of Forrest's genius, they would have given him far greater responsibilities. As it was, they knew he was a great cavalry general -- but thought that was as far as it went.

I tend to think that general's personalities are independent of the prevailing military circumstances. Of course, men like Forrest and Rommel were excellent at what they did, but called upon to do something else I expect they would have shone less brightly.

As noted, that reasoning simply doesn't furnish grounds for criticism. Both Forrest and Rommel shone in every assignment they were called upon to undertake -- and the range and variety of those assignments was really quite varied. It's absurd to take this and then move to a conclusion that they would have done worse under other circumstance.

Take Forrest. Aside from consistently whipping forces twice his size, better trained, with far better arms, etc, he also consistently and clearly advocated the correct course of action when he was involved in larger battles. At Fort Donelson, when the other commanders decided to surrender, Forrest decided it would be possible to slip out -- and did so, along with everyone who joined him. At Shiloh, when everyone else was congratulating themselves on the first day's success, it was Forrest who went out, took a look at the Union troops pouring ashore at Pittsburg Landing, and suggested immediate withdrawal. At Chickamauga, it was again Forrest who kept demanding immediate pursuit of the withdrawing Federals.

Forrest shone in every assignment he was given -- and gave every indication that he would have continued to shine if his responsibilities had been increased. There're no grounds at all for assuming the opposite.

If you are winning a battle because you are personally leading the fuel convoy through a minefield, you are necessarily absent from headquarters.

Essentially, he made a choice between leaving that fuel convoy thing up to a subordinate, or leaving the rest of the battle in the hands of a subordinate. I know I'd be more comfortable doing the former. Also less likely to lead to me getting hit by something unpleasant- as happened to Rommel more than once, to the detriment of his command.

[/quote]

To accept your argument requires overlooking the obvious point that the fuel convoy didn't get through until Rommel intervened directly -- and that if it hadn't gotten through when it did, the Germans would have lost. So apparently, winning the Turner Prize for correct generalship would ecessitate accepting defeat. I imagine Rommel would pass on the prize and take the win.

Rommel -- by displaying an uncanny ability to divine the expectations and concerns of his opponents, by always being willing to take a risk, by ignoring those orders from above that didn't suit him, by providing inspiring leadership and insisting on the best from his subordinates as well as himself -- won victories that few if any other generals would have been able to win. Criticizing him starts to become a bit like decrying Renoir's excessive use of color -- the 'flaws' were part of his genius, and a Rommel who had behaved correctly would have been inferior to the actual Rommel.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Why not? By that logic, one would be reluctant to admit a star high school student to a good university. After all, with the different circumstances and all, there's no reason to expect him to continue to excel.

At university, one takes the subjects one knows well and focuses in on them to the exclusion of others.

In the armed forces, officers at higher command have to cope with a wide range of aspects of which they have no prior experience. The other arms, inter-service co-operation, logistics...

Plenty of officers have demonstrated that a good brigade or division commander does not make a great general. You know this to be the case.

[wmorris]

Welll... the subject is irresistable.

I've come to view Rommel as a master tactician (both on the small and grand tactics scale) possessing magnificently inspiring personal leadership. In this vein, the previously drawn parallel with Forrest seems very accurate, including the (contrasting) observation that Forrest made astonishingly few tactical or operational errors.

It also seems to me that Rommel came to differ fundamentally with the NS leadership relatively late (fairly obvious, given that he didnt get fired, like Rundstedt, Hoppner, Guderian, or Schmidt et. al)

As far as memoirs go, before talking about the Germans, I have to say that the class of all WWII memoirs IMO is Defeat into Victory by FM William Slim. It is frankly self-critical, remarkably fair (even to the Burmese turncoat-cum-ally Aung San) and strategically perceptive. In addition, it is humorous, tautly edited, and entertaining.

Rommel's Infanterie Greift An was justly considered a text material worldwide. As for his conduct later, some of his subordinates openly or indirectly complain of his failure to keep a grasp on his entire force. His death precluded a reply to this.

Manstein's work is largely apologetics. This doesn't diminish the quality of his command, but he apparently had an axe to grind that he never wielded face to face with Hitler, and he had concerns about possible war crimes, whether real or fabricated.

Guderian stands out in that he excelled at every level of command as well as administratively as Inspector General of Panzertroops. He was rightly considered indispensable despite being in disfavor and constantly speaking his mind. It can justly be said that he was the only man ever to face down Hitler.

Speaking of those who spoke their minds, I hate, hate, hate that Rundstedt never wrote his memoirs.

Erhard Raus' memoir Panzer Operations and his many contributions to the postwar papers published by the US Army show him to have been both a remarkable tactician and an innovator. He, along with Gotthard Heinrici seem to be the originators of "zone defense" tactics, that gave greater success with less force than prior German practice. He too came to be a nuisance due to truth-telling and got the sack after several remarkable operational performances.

[Krec]

Rommel was respected as a general by some of  his peers/adversaries , now weather he was a great general is up to debate. 
 

[Veers]

ORIGINAL: wmorris
As far as memoirs go, before talking about the Germans, I have to say that the class of all WWII memoirs IMO is Defeat into Victory by FM William Slim. It is frankly self-critical, remarkably fair (even to the Burmese turncoat-cum-ally Aung San) and strategically perceptive. In addition, it is humorous, tautly edited, and entertaining.

Seconded. Excellent read.

[Catch21]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Oh I think this under-rates Rommel's achievements. He really was quite incredible -- from his first action as a second lieutenant in 1914 to the way he hustled a vastly superior British force out of Mersa Matruh in 1942. Aside from everything else, he had an uncanny ability to anticipate how the enemy would perceive his actions -- and so drive objectively far more powerful forces from the field simply by playing on their fears and assumptions. If he wasn't able to win World War two solely with smoke and mirrors, that's hardly surprising -- what is amazing is just how much he managed to accomplish with the means at his disposal.

A fairly good example of Rommel's style -- and one that suggests the root of his ability -- was what happened in course of Crusader when he suddenly found he'd driven right into the middle of a British field hospital. He just acted as if he owned the place. The British had been captured, he was inspecting, and he was graciously giving the staff permission to continue tending the patients. Then he quickly got back into his car and drove off...

Now, the career of ninety nine generals out of a hundred would have come to an end right there.

[&o]Nice.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Why not? By that logic, one would be reluctant to admit a star high school student to a good university. After all, with the different circumstances and all, there's no reason to expect him to continue to excel.

At university, one takes the subjects one knows well and focuses in on them to the exclusion of others.

In the armed forces, officers at higher command have to cope with a wide range of aspects of which they have no prior experience. The other arms, inter-service co-operation, logistics...

Plenty of officers have demonstrated that a good brigade or division commander does not make a great general. You know this to be the case.

You persist in using this argument as if it demonstrates something.

It doesn't. Rommel succeeded brilliantly at every level of command: from that of a platoon commander in 1914 to that of an Army commander in 1942. It's not as if Rommel never rose to command any formation larger than a division.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

It doesn't. Rommel succeeded brilliantly at every level of command: from that of a platoon commander in 1914 to that of an Army commander in 1942. It's not as if Rommel never rose to command any formation larger than a division.

The army he commanded in Africa was distinctly small, and he focused his attentions almost solely on small sections of it. Furthermore, aspects which you would dismiss- politics and logistics- were not his strong suits, and it showed.

Anyway, Rommel ended his career with an Army Group command which you are careful to ignore in the above.

[ColinWright]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

It doesn't. Rommel succeeded brilliantly at every level of command: from that of a platoon commander in 1914 to that of an Army commander in 1942. It's not as if Rommel never rose to command any formation larger than a division.

The army he commanded in Africa was distinctly small, and he focused his attentions almost solely on small sections of it. Furthermore, aspects which you would dismiss- politics and logistics- were not his strong suits, and it showed.

Anyway, Rommel ended his career with an Army Group command which you are careful to ignore in the above.

...and? I'm not intimately familiar with the details of the Normandy campaign -- but from Rommel's point of view, I'm not sure there was all that much hope no matter what he did.

We are left with you advancing an argument which, while it might apply to some other cases, has nothing to do with Rommel's career at all. He excelled at every level of command, and indeed, the formations he commanded -- company, division, army -- executed some of the most spectacular feats of arms of the twentieth century.

One has to wonder just what he could have done to satisfy you. Thrown Overlord back into the sea, seized the landing craft, crossed to England, conquered the British Isles? Presumably, you'd just point to his failure to follow up with an invasion of the United States.

[BriteLite]

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

To my mind, the two most impressive generals whose career I am reasonably familiar with would be Nathan Bedford Forrest and Rommel. I'll point out that most of the criticisms made of Rommel were necessarily a consequence of the practices that made him so successful. If you are winning a battle because you are personally leading the fuel convoy through a minefield, you are necessarily absent from headquarters. It's absurd to criticize a general for behavior that won him the battle when behaving as the critic would desire probably would have cost him the battle.

You and I are akin in thought. wmorris said"Welll... the subject is irresistable." So much so I must post.

After Lee surrendered at Appomatox he was asked the name of the greatest soldier on either side. He responded "A man I have never seen, sir. His name is Forrest." The unpredictable nature of Forrest in military operations can be attributed to Rommel also. Opponents had difficulty anticipating either man. Both had the ability to strike when/where least expected. Few field commanders compare to either's ability at reading an opponent's actions/reactions. Lee himself shared these remarkable quailities.

The criticism's I have read concerning Rommel and his actions in the field are generally made by military men trained in the classic execution of the art of war. IMHO the mistake here is Rommel(Forrest also) devised operations based on maneuver to achieve surprise and local superiority. He brought to N Afrika the lessons he had learned and the tactics he had utilised in France. His weakness became a lack of understanding the problem of supplying his operations. For various reasons, Ultra, RN and RAF foremost, Italy could not supply forces in N Africa. An example is a fuel convoy Rommel(El Alamein) anticipated, being attacked with all ships sunk.

As stated earlier, Rommel had first hand knowledge of Allied airpower and the impact on movement during the Overlord operation. Rommel asked the panzer divisions being kept in reserve be released to him to be moved forward closer to potential landing zones. Hitler and Rundstedt refused. Conjecture at best but interesting to consider is what impact a panzer group may have had at Omaha or the British beaches. The point is Rommel correctly judged the reserve deployment would not be capable of providing immediate support to the landing zones.

I have recently purchased TOAW3. Still very early on the learning curve I am enjoying the game. I am an "old boardgamer" form the late 60's. My favorite game was and is War in Europe(SPI) so I am not intimidated by the number of units.

I am most interested learning the game mechanics. The programming of various events is most fascinating.

[Shawkhan]

...Have you read the book by Peter Tsouras,'Disaster at D-Day'? It shows what might have happened if Rommel hadn't left his post at the critical hour and the use of reserves had worked out just a little better.