War Career of the USS Seal
Moderators: wdolson, MOD_War-in-the-Pacific-Admirals-Edition
Presidential Unit Citation
I'll have to do some research to see how many of those were awarded, thanks!
Bruce R Hugo
RE: Presidential Unit Citation
I'll have to do some research to see how many of those were awarded, thanks!
My very quick (and probably very approximate research) suggests 16 Unit sitations to naval units in WWII of which approximately 4 were to subs.
RE: Presidential Unit Citation
This is a great way to do an AAR, so much easier to read and enjoy than detailed combat reports.
War Carrier of the Seal
[center]Part XI: Breaking the DEI Barrier[/center]
With the Rabaul campaign wrapped up and most of its occupying troops freed up for the next phase of the allied advance, planning began for the reoccupation of Java and Sumatra. The island of Timor was identified as a necessary stepping stone in the path from Australia and Java and an invasion force formed up for Lautem on the eastern tip of Timor and left Rabaul on 7/12/43. The landings were preceded by a battleship bombardments on 7/19 and began on 7/21. The Japanese opposed the landings vigorously but not with aircraft carriers: in incredibly unlucky timing, on the same day that the first troops hit the beach at Timor the Kaga and her air groups were located midway between the Hawaiian islands and the West coast as they savaged an eastbound convoy. With the threat of a seaborne air attack diminished, the heavy escorts were split from their carrier task forces and subjected Lautem to another heavy bombardment on 7/23/43.
The Lautem invasion also caught a Japanese reinforcement convoy flat-footed. Carrier planes sank several transports and merchants in the area and sent the rest scattering, many with smoking holes in their decks. Over the next two weeks the Japanese attempted to maintain their garrison with smaller vessels making quick runs with troops and supplies the these efforts were costly in the face of US carrier air strikes. Lautem fell to the allies on 8/8/43 after heavy fighting that had continued nearly every day since the initial clashes.
With Lautem secure, the second stage of the Timor offensive began with landings at Koepang on the opposite end of that island on 8/16/43. Initially the only defensive successes were those obtained by I-boats which managed to put two torpedoes into the CV Essex. But by 8/23/43 Japan had managed to gather its strength for a series of night surface actions. The first pitted the three Japanese heavy cruisers and three destroyers against a larger defending allied force of three CA’s, five CLs, and 3 DD’s. The Japanese had lost little of their skill at night fighting and the CA Quincy was mortally damaged in exchange for the CA Atago. But the advantage went to the allies when carrier aircraft put two torpedoes into the withdrawing CA Haguro the next morning.
The Japanese were back four nights later in another action is which they were outgunned and yet outfought the allies: the CA San Francisco was torpedoed in an action that resulted in damage to the CA Maya and DDs Shimakaze and Hatakaze. This time it was the Japanese who managed to maul a damaged survivor – the San Francisco was torpedoed and sunk by a submarine. And four days after this battle the Japanese were back with the CA Takao, CA Suzuya, CL Abukuma, and two destroyers against a surface group almost twice that size. The CA Canberra was torpedoed and hit nine times and survived only by a timely flooding of the magazine spaces. The Takao was also hit several times shell fire and was reported to be heavily damaged and engulfed in flame. The Abukuma and DD Huroshio were also hit but managed to escape detection by carrier aircraft the next day. But a strike by unescorted Betties slipped past the transport group and managed to hit the CVE Breton with a 500 lb bomb. None of these measures could stop the inevitable; Koepang was wrested from the Japanese the next day (9/1/43).
The Japanese carriers that had struck the sea lane between Oahu and the west coast in late July made an appearance again on 9/7/43, but it was not in opposition to the Timor landings. Instead the Kaga and Shokaku had slipped by a weak allied air search screen into the Indian Ocean and ambushed a Capetown convoy. Thirteen merchants were sent to the bottom and several others were forced to scatter for friendly ports. Their next target was Addu which was hammered by air strikes. The Enterprise and Saratoga had been operating in this general area providing cover for the Colombo and Madras convoys to Akyab, but the Enterprise was in the Colombo shipyard having I-boat torpedo damage repaired and no serious consideration was given to taking on the two Pearl Harbor veterans with just the Saratoga.
Just as the commitment of the Japanese carriers to convoy raiding had left the Timor theater free for aggressive allied action, the concentration of allied carriers near the Timor seemed to give the Japanese the green light for use of their still formidable surfaces forces against Rabaul. It was a disaster. The first victims were CLs Oi and Isuzu which were first damaged by SBDs and TBFs from Rabaul and then run down and demolished by an allied cruiser group. Then a Japanese surface group containing battleships was sighted north of New Britain. A dive bomber attack scored no hits but Avengers put two torpedoes into the Hiei. An afternoon strike added another torpedo hit to the Hiei’s woes. The enemy task force pressed on through the night and engaged a defending cruiser group in a confused night action pitting the BB Nagato, CA Mogami, CL Kiso and three destroyers against two CAs, four CLs, and 3 destroyers. The Kiso and Northampton took the brunt of the damage but the latter at least survived the action. The two battered forces took their worst losses the next day from other platforms; the CLAA Atlanta was torpedoed and sunk by a submarine and the still floating Hiei was found by Avengers again and was sunk by three torpedoes.
The Japanese had not yet run out of ships and on 9/11 an apparent second prong in the surface operation was bent back when SBDs based at the Shortlands damaged the CA Mikuma. This ship was still limping back to safety when a force of new aircraft carriers making its first transit from the West coast to Rabaul detected the Mikuma and her escort. Despite the air groups having a large number essentially green combat pilots, the Mikuma took (reportedly) eight bomb hits and the DD Kisaragi was hit once.
As the invasion of Koepang was wrapping up and final preparations were being made for the next action (landings at Maumere on the island of Flores) the Japanese carrier force finally made an appearance. The carriers supporting the landing of supplies and reinforcements at Koepang were attacked by a strike of 25 Zeros and 32 Jills flying from a previously undetected carrier group operating southeast of Celebes. 62 Hellcats and Wildcats providing air cover shot down seven of the escorts and 20 of the torpedo bombers and drove the remaining aircraft off before the strike got to within anti aircraft gunnery range of the allied forces. The carriers covering the landings could not pursue the Japanese without leaving the amphibious groups vulnerable to land based air attack, so the carriers that had just arrived at Rabaul were ordered to make a sweep around New Guinea to neutralize any other approaching Japanese warships and to hopefully catch and neutralize the Celebes carriers.
The resulting carrier battle, dubbed the “Battle Off Biak” in Morrison’s classic account, began as the US carriers steamed along the northeast coast of New Guinea. Japanese long range reconnaissance planes had been shadowing the task force since before it departed Rabaul and the Akagi, Kaga, and Shokaku were waiting within range of land based air support of Biak, Sorong, and Babeldaob. The initial setup was almost perfect for the Japanese: attacking from beyond counterstrike range of the heavier allied bombers, the Japanese carriers launched three waves of Zeros, Jills, and Vals before noon. The third strike even managed to coordinate with additional land based escorts. All three waves were shredded by the combat air patrol; only during the third strike did any of the attacking aircraft manage to make runs on their targets and these resulted in no hits.
The US carriers steamed toward their Japanese counterparts through the morning and were able to launch strikes at maximum range just after noon. As the US task force waiting for the results of this attack, more enemy strikes arrived. A total of 21 Zeros, 54 Vals, and 5 Jills attacked in three waves; none managed to penetrate the CAP. TBFs found the Akagi and put a torpedo into her, the Kaga was hit by three bombs and four torpedoes. The Shokaku was also present but managed to avoid being attacked. A late evening strike scored seven bomb hits on the Akagi and three on the Kaga and this time the Shokaku did not escape attention, taking four bomb and one torpedo hit. Air losses for the day were 19 F6Fs, 12 F4F’s, 22 TBDs and 4 SBDs in exchange for 71 Vals, 29 Zeros, 8 Kates, and 5 Jills.
The next day was a cleanup action. A single strike from the unblemished US carriers found the Akagi, already devastated by a reported torpedo and seven bomb hits, still afloat and remedied this with an additional two torpedo hits. The last large carrier battle of the war was over. The Japanese obtained some consolation when the CVL Bellau Wood and CV Essex were each hit twice by submarine launched torpedoes on 9/29 and 10/11 respectively, but both ships survived to reach repair facilities and were back in the war within a few months. But allied intelligence assessed the Akagi, Kaga, and Shokaku as sunk.
Maumere fell to the allies on 9/29/43. The way was cleared for the invasion of Java.
With the Rabaul campaign wrapped up and most of its occupying troops freed up for the next phase of the allied advance, planning began for the reoccupation of Java and Sumatra. The island of Timor was identified as a necessary stepping stone in the path from Australia and Java and an invasion force formed up for Lautem on the eastern tip of Timor and left Rabaul on 7/12/43. The landings were preceded by a battleship bombardments on 7/19 and began on 7/21. The Japanese opposed the landings vigorously but not with aircraft carriers: in incredibly unlucky timing, on the same day that the first troops hit the beach at Timor the Kaga and her air groups were located midway between the Hawaiian islands and the West coast as they savaged an eastbound convoy. With the threat of a seaborne air attack diminished, the heavy escorts were split from their carrier task forces and subjected Lautem to another heavy bombardment on 7/23/43.
The Lautem invasion also caught a Japanese reinforcement convoy flat-footed. Carrier planes sank several transports and merchants in the area and sent the rest scattering, many with smoking holes in their decks. Over the next two weeks the Japanese attempted to maintain their garrison with smaller vessels making quick runs with troops and supplies the these efforts were costly in the face of US carrier air strikes. Lautem fell to the allies on 8/8/43 after heavy fighting that had continued nearly every day since the initial clashes.
With Lautem secure, the second stage of the Timor offensive began with landings at Koepang on the opposite end of that island on 8/16/43. Initially the only defensive successes were those obtained by I-boats which managed to put two torpedoes into the CV Essex. But by 8/23/43 Japan had managed to gather its strength for a series of night surface actions. The first pitted the three Japanese heavy cruisers and three destroyers against a larger defending allied force of three CA’s, five CLs, and 3 DD’s. The Japanese had lost little of their skill at night fighting and the CA Quincy was mortally damaged in exchange for the CA Atago. But the advantage went to the allies when carrier aircraft put two torpedoes into the withdrawing CA Haguro the next morning.
The Japanese were back four nights later in another action is which they were outgunned and yet outfought the allies: the CA San Francisco was torpedoed in an action that resulted in damage to the CA Maya and DDs Shimakaze and Hatakaze. This time it was the Japanese who managed to maul a damaged survivor – the San Francisco was torpedoed and sunk by a submarine. And four days after this battle the Japanese were back with the CA Takao, CA Suzuya, CL Abukuma, and two destroyers against a surface group almost twice that size. The CA Canberra was torpedoed and hit nine times and survived only by a timely flooding of the magazine spaces. The Takao was also hit several times shell fire and was reported to be heavily damaged and engulfed in flame. The Abukuma and DD Huroshio were also hit but managed to escape detection by carrier aircraft the next day. But a strike by unescorted Betties slipped past the transport group and managed to hit the CVE Breton with a 500 lb bomb. None of these measures could stop the inevitable; Koepang was wrested from the Japanese the next day (9/1/43).
The Japanese carriers that had struck the sea lane between Oahu and the west coast in late July made an appearance again on 9/7/43, but it was not in opposition to the Timor landings. Instead the Kaga and Shokaku had slipped by a weak allied air search screen into the Indian Ocean and ambushed a Capetown convoy. Thirteen merchants were sent to the bottom and several others were forced to scatter for friendly ports. Their next target was Addu which was hammered by air strikes. The Enterprise and Saratoga had been operating in this general area providing cover for the Colombo and Madras convoys to Akyab, but the Enterprise was in the Colombo shipyard having I-boat torpedo damage repaired and no serious consideration was given to taking on the two Pearl Harbor veterans with just the Saratoga.
Just as the commitment of the Japanese carriers to convoy raiding had left the Timor theater free for aggressive allied action, the concentration of allied carriers near the Timor seemed to give the Japanese the green light for use of their still formidable surfaces forces against Rabaul. It was a disaster. The first victims were CLs Oi and Isuzu which were first damaged by SBDs and TBFs from Rabaul and then run down and demolished by an allied cruiser group. Then a Japanese surface group containing battleships was sighted north of New Britain. A dive bomber attack scored no hits but Avengers put two torpedoes into the Hiei. An afternoon strike added another torpedo hit to the Hiei’s woes. The enemy task force pressed on through the night and engaged a defending cruiser group in a confused night action pitting the BB Nagato, CA Mogami, CL Kiso and three destroyers against two CAs, four CLs, and 3 destroyers. The Kiso and Northampton took the brunt of the damage but the latter at least survived the action. The two battered forces took their worst losses the next day from other platforms; the CLAA Atlanta was torpedoed and sunk by a submarine and the still floating Hiei was found by Avengers again and was sunk by three torpedoes.
The Japanese had not yet run out of ships and on 9/11 an apparent second prong in the surface operation was bent back when SBDs based at the Shortlands damaged the CA Mikuma. This ship was still limping back to safety when a force of new aircraft carriers making its first transit from the West coast to Rabaul detected the Mikuma and her escort. Despite the air groups having a large number essentially green combat pilots, the Mikuma took (reportedly) eight bomb hits and the DD Kisaragi was hit once.
As the invasion of Koepang was wrapping up and final preparations were being made for the next action (landings at Maumere on the island of Flores) the Japanese carrier force finally made an appearance. The carriers supporting the landing of supplies and reinforcements at Koepang were attacked by a strike of 25 Zeros and 32 Jills flying from a previously undetected carrier group operating southeast of Celebes. 62 Hellcats and Wildcats providing air cover shot down seven of the escorts and 20 of the torpedo bombers and drove the remaining aircraft off before the strike got to within anti aircraft gunnery range of the allied forces. The carriers covering the landings could not pursue the Japanese without leaving the amphibious groups vulnerable to land based air attack, so the carriers that had just arrived at Rabaul were ordered to make a sweep around New Guinea to neutralize any other approaching Japanese warships and to hopefully catch and neutralize the Celebes carriers.
The resulting carrier battle, dubbed the “Battle Off Biak” in Morrison’s classic account, began as the US carriers steamed along the northeast coast of New Guinea. Japanese long range reconnaissance planes had been shadowing the task force since before it departed Rabaul and the Akagi, Kaga, and Shokaku were waiting within range of land based air support of Biak, Sorong, and Babeldaob. The initial setup was almost perfect for the Japanese: attacking from beyond counterstrike range of the heavier allied bombers, the Japanese carriers launched three waves of Zeros, Jills, and Vals before noon. The third strike even managed to coordinate with additional land based escorts. All three waves were shredded by the combat air patrol; only during the third strike did any of the attacking aircraft manage to make runs on their targets and these resulted in no hits.
The US carriers steamed toward their Japanese counterparts through the morning and were able to launch strikes at maximum range just after noon. As the US task force waiting for the results of this attack, more enemy strikes arrived. A total of 21 Zeros, 54 Vals, and 5 Jills attacked in three waves; none managed to penetrate the CAP. TBFs found the Akagi and put a torpedo into her, the Kaga was hit by three bombs and four torpedoes. The Shokaku was also present but managed to avoid being attacked. A late evening strike scored seven bomb hits on the Akagi and three on the Kaga and this time the Shokaku did not escape attention, taking four bomb and one torpedo hit. Air losses for the day were 19 F6Fs, 12 F4F’s, 22 TBDs and 4 SBDs in exchange for 71 Vals, 29 Zeros, 8 Kates, and 5 Jills.
The next day was a cleanup action. A single strike from the unblemished US carriers found the Akagi, already devastated by a reported torpedo and seven bomb hits, still afloat and remedied this with an additional two torpedo hits. The last large carrier battle of the war was over. The Japanese obtained some consolation when the CVL Bellau Wood and CV Essex were each hit twice by submarine launched torpedoes on 9/29 and 10/11 respectively, but both ships survived to reach repair facilities and were back in the war within a few months. But allied intelligence assessed the Akagi, Kaga, and Shokaku as sunk.
Maumere fell to the allies on 9/29/43. The way was cleared for the invasion of Java.
Bruce R Hugo
War Carrier of the Seal
[center]Part XII: Jinxed[/center]
The Seal completed a short turnaround in Rabaul and headed back to the now familiar waters between the southern top of the Korean peninsula and Okinawa. The transit was uneventful, with the ship’s air search radar providing amply time to dive to avoid patrol aircraft. But enemy shipping was scarce also and the sub spent many fruitless hours chasing down distant radar contacts as she passed the Philippines without managing to gain visual contact on a target. The hunting did not improve when the Seal reached her patrol area and frequent air patrols kept her submerged most of the time during the day. Adding to the crew’s frustration was a string of equipment failures ranging from minor nuisances to those threatening the ships effectiveness. Had the Seal been operating closer to home, CDR Hurd would have aborted the patrol; but with another potentially nonproductive transit the price for the repairs, he decided to tough it out on station.
The crew labored to keep the fault-plagued trim and drain system in full operation but when the last four inch transfer valve seized they had to resort to “trim parties” to maintain the desired bubble while the Chief of the Watch used a workaround to transfer water weight from one end of the sub to another. The Seal was small enough that her trim angle could be altered by enough sailors running from one end of the ship to the other. This technique, which had previously only been used to keep new Chiefs of the Watch busy managing trim tank inventories, now became the Seal’s supplemental trim control system.
CDR Hurd shifted the Seal in her patrol area every few days but there had apparently been a lull in enemy traffic and no contacts were generated beyond an occasional small fishing boat. With stores other than torpedoes and gun ammunition running low, the Seal ended this nonproductive patrol and began a slow transit at cruise speed back to Rabaul on 17Nov43. CDR Hurd hoped that this transit would generate attack opportunities but the Seal pulled into Rabaul on 30Nov43 with all of her ordnance still aboard [and 13% system damage].
The Seal completed a short turnaround in Rabaul and headed back to the now familiar waters between the southern top of the Korean peninsula and Okinawa. The transit was uneventful, with the ship’s air search radar providing amply time to dive to avoid patrol aircraft. But enemy shipping was scarce also and the sub spent many fruitless hours chasing down distant radar contacts as she passed the Philippines without managing to gain visual contact on a target. The hunting did not improve when the Seal reached her patrol area and frequent air patrols kept her submerged most of the time during the day. Adding to the crew’s frustration was a string of equipment failures ranging from minor nuisances to those threatening the ships effectiveness. Had the Seal been operating closer to home, CDR Hurd would have aborted the patrol; but with another potentially nonproductive transit the price for the repairs, he decided to tough it out on station.
The crew labored to keep the fault-plagued trim and drain system in full operation but when the last four inch transfer valve seized they had to resort to “trim parties” to maintain the desired bubble while the Chief of the Watch used a workaround to transfer water weight from one end of the sub to another. The Seal was small enough that her trim angle could be altered by enough sailors running from one end of the ship to the other. This technique, which had previously only been used to keep new Chiefs of the Watch busy managing trim tank inventories, now became the Seal’s supplemental trim control system.
CDR Hurd shifted the Seal in her patrol area every few days but there had apparently been a lull in enemy traffic and no contacts were generated beyond an occasional small fishing boat. With stores other than torpedoes and gun ammunition running low, the Seal ended this nonproductive patrol and began a slow transit at cruise speed back to Rabaul on 17Nov43. CDR Hurd hoped that this transit would generate attack opportunities but the Seal pulled into Rabaul on 30Nov43 with all of her ordnance still aboard [and 13% system damage].
Bruce R Hugo
RE: War Carrier of the Seal
brhugo,
thanks for the interesting detail in the AAR.
I've read a few accounts of US subs in the Pacific war but had never heard of "trim parties" before - I guess it shows the ingenuity of frontline troops.
was such an event common ?
thanks for the interesting detail in the AAR.
I've read a few accounts of US subs in the Pacific war but had never heard of "trim parties" before - I guess it shows the ingenuity of frontline troops.
was such an event common ?
RE: Trim party
I heard that this was done even on nuclear subamrines in my era. I was
stationed on the USS Michigan (18,000 tons - larger than the WWI battleship
of the same name) and it didn't work there because the ship was too big. I
think there is a scene in Das Boot where the crew rushes forward to help the
sub dive faster.
The pace of these updates has slowed because my after action report has caught up with my game and I probably play less often than average. But the Seal tale will continue until either the end of the war (or the end of the sub - hopefully the former!).
stationed on the USS Michigan (18,000 tons - larger than the WWI battleship
of the same name) and it didn't work there because the ship was too big. I
think there is a scene in Das Boot where the crew rushes forward to help the
sub dive faster.
The pace of these updates has slowed because my after action report has caught up with my game and I probably play less often than average. But the Seal tale will continue until either the end of the war (or the end of the sub - hopefully the former!).
Bruce R Hugo
War Career of the Seal
[center]Part XIII: Philippines Cruise[/center]
It took four days of nearly around the clock work to repair all of the operational damage the Seal had accumulated during her nonproductive war patrol. Her underway appeared to be delayed until 3Dec43 while waiting for a critical part to arrive from Pearl Harbor – a solenoid-operated air valve that was not available at the tender in Rabaul. But en enterprising pair of Seal auxiliarymen found coveralls worn by primarily by tender personnel and managed to bluff their way onto the submarine tied up along the other side of the tender and with the Seal’s inoperative part in hand, conducted a midnight “repair” that enabled the Seal to get underway three days earlier than planned. No one above the rank of E6 was aware that the Seal’s good fortune had been due to this “cannibalization”.
The Seal was given a patrol area east of the Philippines where Intel had indications that Japanese shipping might be denser. All submarines were reporting fewer contacts as Japan’s war machine was slowing and the number of distance bases to be supplied was being whittled down. Allied submarine losses were still relatively light (15 since the war began) but the Japanese were clearly getting better at ASW.
Despite the patrol area change, the Sea had few contacts and almost none of these were in a position to be prosecuted. When the first opportunity did come on the last day of 1943, it did not go well. A single radar contact was picked up about an hour before sunset and was identified as a small merchant (the AKL Fukuyo Maru). The Seal remained on the surface and closed at maximum speed; both diesels were driving at rated rpm. Rather than expend a spread of torpedoes on the small target, CDR Hurd elected to employ the deck gun and with a few salvos, the first shell struck home. The Fukuyo Maru replied with her own gun but the shots were falling well clear of the pursuing submarine. Three more shells hit the merchant and it appeared she would join the growing list of Seal kills; but, a lucky shot from the Fukuyo Maru pierced the Seal amidships and killed three men in the compartment. With the ability of the Seal to dive in doubt, CDR Hurd broke off the attack and began heading for safety.
The nearest port with a shipyard was the Seal’s old refuge at Soerabaja, which had been recaptured on 3Dec43. The shipyard there had been quickly repaired and could easily accommodate the Seal. The Seal was directed there and arrived on 11Jan44 [with 8% system damage and 18% flotation damage] displacing the LSD Belle Grove. There weren’t a lot of extensive hull repairs involved, just one small patch, and with expedited repairs the Seal was able to pull out three days later and returned to her old familiar patrol area off the south coast of Korea.
It took four days of nearly around the clock work to repair all of the operational damage the Seal had accumulated during her nonproductive war patrol. Her underway appeared to be delayed until 3Dec43 while waiting for a critical part to arrive from Pearl Harbor – a solenoid-operated air valve that was not available at the tender in Rabaul. But en enterprising pair of Seal auxiliarymen found coveralls worn by primarily by tender personnel and managed to bluff their way onto the submarine tied up along the other side of the tender and with the Seal’s inoperative part in hand, conducted a midnight “repair” that enabled the Seal to get underway three days earlier than planned. No one above the rank of E6 was aware that the Seal’s good fortune had been due to this “cannibalization”.
The Seal was given a patrol area east of the Philippines where Intel had indications that Japanese shipping might be denser. All submarines were reporting fewer contacts as Japan’s war machine was slowing and the number of distance bases to be supplied was being whittled down. Allied submarine losses were still relatively light (15 since the war began) but the Japanese were clearly getting better at ASW.
Despite the patrol area change, the Sea had few contacts and almost none of these were in a position to be prosecuted. When the first opportunity did come on the last day of 1943, it did not go well. A single radar contact was picked up about an hour before sunset and was identified as a small merchant (the AKL Fukuyo Maru). The Seal remained on the surface and closed at maximum speed; both diesels were driving at rated rpm. Rather than expend a spread of torpedoes on the small target, CDR Hurd elected to employ the deck gun and with a few salvos, the first shell struck home. The Fukuyo Maru replied with her own gun but the shots were falling well clear of the pursuing submarine. Three more shells hit the merchant and it appeared she would join the growing list of Seal kills; but, a lucky shot from the Fukuyo Maru pierced the Seal amidships and killed three men in the compartment. With the ability of the Seal to dive in doubt, CDR Hurd broke off the attack and began heading for safety.
The nearest port with a shipyard was the Seal’s old refuge at Soerabaja, which had been recaptured on 3Dec43. The shipyard there had been quickly repaired and could easily accommodate the Seal. The Seal was directed there and arrived on 11Jan44 [with 8% system damage and 18% flotation damage] displacing the LSD Belle Grove. There weren’t a lot of extensive hull repairs involved, just one small patch, and with expedited repairs the Seal was able to pull out three days later and returned to her old familiar patrol area off the south coast of Korea.
Bruce R Hugo
RE: War Career of the Seal
[center]Part XIV: Nicking the Japanese[/center]
The Seal’s transit from Soerabaja to the waters off Korea was uneventful and offered the crew the opportunity to plan and train for the patrol. Only a few crew members had been changed out during the port visit mainly because the logistics of these transfers were still being worked out. Once in the patrol zone; however, the Seal was dogged by patrol aircraft and no suitable targets were identified during the periods she was able to surface and search for them.
On 29Jan44 the Seal detected a convoy off Nakadori-jima after she managed to elude air patrols for over two days. The convoy column included the SC CHa-36, xAK Nitiyo Maru, and xAKL Nissen Maru #2. CDR Hurd selected the largest of the three vessels for a four torpedo spread but these missed. The crew blamed the failed attack on faulty torpedoes, but the merchant had sighted the torpedoes in time to avoid them. Fortunately, the sub chaser was unable to locate the Seal after the merchant reported the torpedo wakes.
Two days later the Seal attacked another convoy and hit the xAK Kureha Maru #3 with a single torpedo (two other hits were duds) sending the freighter limping back to port. CDR Hurd had hoped to finish of the damaged ship but an ASW aircraft responding to the attack drove the Seal under and dropped a depth bomb close enough to make the crews’ ears ring. There was no surface escort to continue the attack but the aircraft circled the Kureha Maru to deter further attacks.
The final and most frustrating engagement of this patrol came on 6Feb44 when the Seal caught the lone merchant xAE Eiji Maru and attacked her on the surface. The crew began scoring hits with the deck gun almost immediately but the first torpedo salvo missed from close range when the captain of the plucky merchant threw the rudder over hard just in time to skirt the outer edge of the spread. The crew hit the Eiji Maru a few more times with 3” shells and more torpedoes were fired but the Japanese captain again managed to save his ship. With the merchant engulfed in fire amidships and appearing to lose maneuverability, CDR Hurd ordered another spread fired but the wounded Eiji Maru had apparently been keeping something in reserve because she again twisted away. A final torpedo salvo that left the Seal’s torpedo racks bare also failed to hit the lucky merchant. With torpedo ammo expended and gun ammo running low, CDR Hurd broke off the attack and headed back to port. Despite being heavily damaged and afire from 13 shell hits, the Eiji Maru reached the safety of port.
The Seal’s transit from Soerabaja to the waters off Korea was uneventful and offered the crew the opportunity to plan and train for the patrol. Only a few crew members had been changed out during the port visit mainly because the logistics of these transfers were still being worked out. Once in the patrol zone; however, the Seal was dogged by patrol aircraft and no suitable targets were identified during the periods she was able to surface and search for them.
On 29Jan44 the Seal detected a convoy off Nakadori-jima after she managed to elude air patrols for over two days. The convoy column included the SC CHa-36, xAK Nitiyo Maru, and xAKL Nissen Maru #2. CDR Hurd selected the largest of the three vessels for a four torpedo spread but these missed. The crew blamed the failed attack on faulty torpedoes, but the merchant had sighted the torpedoes in time to avoid them. Fortunately, the sub chaser was unable to locate the Seal after the merchant reported the torpedo wakes.
Two days later the Seal attacked another convoy and hit the xAK Kureha Maru #3 with a single torpedo (two other hits were duds) sending the freighter limping back to port. CDR Hurd had hoped to finish of the damaged ship but an ASW aircraft responding to the attack drove the Seal under and dropped a depth bomb close enough to make the crews’ ears ring. There was no surface escort to continue the attack but the aircraft circled the Kureha Maru to deter further attacks.
The final and most frustrating engagement of this patrol came on 6Feb44 when the Seal caught the lone merchant xAE Eiji Maru and attacked her on the surface. The crew began scoring hits with the deck gun almost immediately but the first torpedo salvo missed from close range when the captain of the plucky merchant threw the rudder over hard just in time to skirt the outer edge of the spread. The crew hit the Eiji Maru a few more times with 3” shells and more torpedoes were fired but the Japanese captain again managed to save his ship. With the merchant engulfed in fire amidships and appearing to lose maneuverability, CDR Hurd ordered another spread fired but the wounded Eiji Maru had apparently been keeping something in reserve because she again twisted away. A final torpedo salvo that left the Seal’s torpedo racks bare also failed to hit the lucky merchant. With torpedo ammo expended and gun ammo running low, CDR Hurd broke off the attack and headed back to port. Despite being heavily damaged and afire from 13 shell hits, the Eiji Maru reached the safety of port.
Bruce R Hugo
War Career of the Seal
[center]Part XV: The Tanker War[/center]
The close proximity to Borneo provided by the base at Soerabaja allowed COMSUBPAC to provide more on-station time for submarines athwart the seal lanes leading from this critical resource center to Japan. After reloading at Soerabaja on 18Feb44, the Seal departed for a patrol area in the Makassar Strait. Although shipping was sparse, the Seal did hit the AO Kokuyo Maru with one torpedo of a four torpedo spread. The Seal did not manage to witness the oiler actually sinking since an escort forced her to crash dive; it took months for Intel to confirm the target had sunk. This 10,000 ton ship was the largest Seal kill to date and brought her confirmed tonnage to nearly 55,000 tons.
Nearly a month passed before the Seal was able to successfully attack another ship. On 12Mar44 she torpedoed the TK Eiwa Maru #4 and left it heavily damaged and afire, but the tanker made it back into port for temporary repairs. (The Eiwa Maru managed to provide a few months additional service to the emperor only to be sunk on 7Jun44 by the SS Tambor, a battle in which the Tambor was unfortunately lost.) A week later she hit the TK Kikusui Mary with a Mk-14 and was subjected to a several hour long depth-charging at the hands of SC CHa-62 which did not give up until all ASW ammunition was expended. The Seal received one hit from this attack and headed back to Soerabaja for a quick patch-up.
The Soerabaja shipyard made quick work of the Seal’s damage and she was soon operating of the southeast coast of Borneo again. After detecting several contacts on radar, the sub submerged and closed the track of a small outbound tanker convoy escorted by the E Aotaka. A spread of torpedoes ignited the TK Tempi Maru’s oil cargo which eventually proved fatal; the escort counterattacked with a few depth charges but lost contact and returned to the remaining ships in the convoy which began zigzagging furiously. The Seal attempted to reengage but could not again line-up on the now alerted ships.
The Seal had more success on 10Apr44 when she encountered a single tanker and escort. The two ships were in a poor position for an approach but with the day’s light fading, CDR Hurd gambled that the two ships would continue to make for the oil terminal at Balikpapan. The sub raced as full speed on the surface to get between the convoy and its assumed destination and then dove shortly before dawn. An hour later the tactic paid off – a spread of torpedoes found the TK Kyokuyo Maru and left her burning; her escort E W-21 searched for the Seal for over an hour but never made contact. The fate of the Kyokuyo Maru was not known for certain for several months. Initially Naval Intel assessed the attack as a kill, but then changed their minds a week later and concluded that the tanker had reached port. This reassessment was itself reassessed over a month later when the Seal was finally given credit for this 9,900 ton tanker.
The Seal pulled into Soerabaja for repairs and reloading on 14Apr44. Upon arrival in port CDR Hurd received some good news during an Intel debrief: the xAK Kureha Maru #3 which the Seal had torpedoed had not reached port as had been thought but had sunk nearly within sight of port. Including the (then) disputed result of the Tempi Maru engagement, the Seal’s tonnage had reached 68,000 [150 victory points].
The close proximity to Borneo provided by the base at Soerabaja allowed COMSUBPAC to provide more on-station time for submarines athwart the seal lanes leading from this critical resource center to Japan. After reloading at Soerabaja on 18Feb44, the Seal departed for a patrol area in the Makassar Strait. Although shipping was sparse, the Seal did hit the AO Kokuyo Maru with one torpedo of a four torpedo spread. The Seal did not manage to witness the oiler actually sinking since an escort forced her to crash dive; it took months for Intel to confirm the target had sunk. This 10,000 ton ship was the largest Seal kill to date and brought her confirmed tonnage to nearly 55,000 tons.
Nearly a month passed before the Seal was able to successfully attack another ship. On 12Mar44 she torpedoed the TK Eiwa Maru #4 and left it heavily damaged and afire, but the tanker made it back into port for temporary repairs. (The Eiwa Maru managed to provide a few months additional service to the emperor only to be sunk on 7Jun44 by the SS Tambor, a battle in which the Tambor was unfortunately lost.) A week later she hit the TK Kikusui Mary with a Mk-14 and was subjected to a several hour long depth-charging at the hands of SC CHa-62 which did not give up until all ASW ammunition was expended. The Seal received one hit from this attack and headed back to Soerabaja for a quick patch-up.
The Soerabaja shipyard made quick work of the Seal’s damage and she was soon operating of the southeast coast of Borneo again. After detecting several contacts on radar, the sub submerged and closed the track of a small outbound tanker convoy escorted by the E Aotaka. A spread of torpedoes ignited the TK Tempi Maru’s oil cargo which eventually proved fatal; the escort counterattacked with a few depth charges but lost contact and returned to the remaining ships in the convoy which began zigzagging furiously. The Seal attempted to reengage but could not again line-up on the now alerted ships.
The Seal had more success on 10Apr44 when she encountered a single tanker and escort. The two ships were in a poor position for an approach but with the day’s light fading, CDR Hurd gambled that the two ships would continue to make for the oil terminal at Balikpapan. The sub raced as full speed on the surface to get between the convoy and its assumed destination and then dove shortly before dawn. An hour later the tactic paid off – a spread of torpedoes found the TK Kyokuyo Maru and left her burning; her escort E W-21 searched for the Seal for over an hour but never made contact. The fate of the Kyokuyo Maru was not known for certain for several months. Initially Naval Intel assessed the attack as a kill, but then changed their minds a week later and concluded that the tanker had reached port. This reassessment was itself reassessed over a month later when the Seal was finally given credit for this 9,900 ton tanker.
The Seal pulled into Soerabaja for repairs and reloading on 14Apr44. Upon arrival in port CDR Hurd received some good news during an Intel debrief: the xAK Kureha Maru #3 which the Seal had torpedoed had not reached port as had been thought but had sunk nearly within sight of port. Including the (then) disputed result of the Tempi Maru engagement, the Seal’s tonnage had reached 68,000 [150 victory points].
Bruce R Hugo
War Career of the Seal
[center]Part XVI: The Invasion of Singapore[/center]
By the end of January 44 the allied drive through Java had forced all remaining Japanese troops into a pocket at the western tip of that island. British and Indian troops had pushed the Japanese as far as Moulmein. Months of heavy fighting at sea had resulted in a large number of damaged ships in the DEI theater; the small shipyard at Soerabaja could not repair the largest ships and had a large backlog of repairs due for smaller ships. Singapore had a large shipyard and with its airfields back in allied control, the Japanese would no longer be able to support their troops on Sumatra. The allies envisioned a reverse of the Japanese Malay peninsula drive with an eventual linkup of the US forces with their British and Indian allies. Carrier raids near Singapore in February and March appeared to have sunk or driven off any threats to an invasion; Intelligence reports suggested that the Japanese Navy would not be capable of interfering with the operation.
Troops began loading on 31Mar44 for the invasion of Singapore. The next day, carrier aircraft from task forces patrolling near the invasion site sighted and attacked a Japanese battleship but score no hits. Despite the appearance of this unexpected threat, the invasion timetable was maintained and a squadron of destroyer minesweepers followed by a bombardment task force maintained course for Singapore.
Contrary to earlier assessments, the Japanese Navy still had a lot of fight left and a task force consisting of the BB Kongo, CA Mogami, CL Abukuma and 3 DD’s ambushed the five US destroyer minesweepers. The DMS Boggs and Dewey were sunk and the Trevor and Perry set afire. The surviving ships made for the relative safety of Palembang while the bombardment group searched in vain for the Japanese dreadnaught before delivering a heavy bombardment to the Singapore airfields.
The bombardment group’s hunt for the Kongo had failed because the Japanese had unexpectedly continued pursing the surviving minesweepers; this chase became apparent when the DMS Perry was reengaged at long range but the only damage inflicted by the Japanese was on themselves when the Mogami collided with DD Namikaze. Carrier aircraft found the Kongo the next day but only managed to inflict superficial damage with two 1000 lb bomb hits. A second strike missed the Kongo entirely but still bore fruit when five AKL’s were hit inflicting over 4,000 casualties to the embarked troops. Four later sank.
Rapidly worsening area made hunting for the Kongo difficult but would provide cover for the Singapore attack. Carriers did manage to locate and sink additional merchants in the area but none of the Kongo group was detected again until 3Apr when The Abukuma and two destroyers, which had chased the minesweeper group all the way to Palembang, caught up with the DMS Lamberton and sank it. The Perry had become separated from the Lamberton in the bad weather but engaged the two destroyers later in the day and set the Hokaze on fire in exchange for one shell hit.
On the 4th, the Kongo was located in the Strait of Malaca the hard way – a carrier task force screened by BBs South Dakota and Massachusetts blundered into her. All five carriers were hit at least once; the worst damaged was the Intrepid but she was still able to handle aircraft. The two US battleships were very poorly handled and did not managed to score a single hit. The task forces separated and the Kongo sought refuge in Georgetown. Avengers found her there and hit her with three 500 lb bombs but again only superficial damage was inflicted.
Further to the south the allies had better luck. The Iowa and her eight destroyer screen engaged the Hokaze and the Nokaze which were withdrawing after having engaged the DMS Perry. Both destroyers took a 16” shell hit and were pounded into sinking wrecks by the combined 5”/38 fire of the destroyers and the Iowa’s secondary battery.
The chaos continued the next day: The Boise and three destroyers engaged merchants being covered by the Mogami and Namikaze. Two of the merchants were sunk and the Namikaze torpedoed but the “Mighty Mog” was unscathed. Battleships hunting the Kongo were recalled to bombard enemy positions in Singapore when the Japanese ground forces there began a counterattack.
The Kongo moved to Medan but carrier aircraft found her there and scored four hits with 1000 lb bombs but this was the last contact with this battleship for almost a week. Carriers scouring the area did continue to find and sink merchant and transport traffic. The last chance of the campaign to take out the Kongo and Mogami came on 11Apr. The Japanese had decided to move these two assets but the Mogami group was intercepted by the Iowa and six destroyers. The Iowas strayed into torpedo water and was hit my a Long Lance launched my the “Mighty Mog” and suffered only two minor hits. The Kongo was sighted and attacked by carrier aircraft but managed to evade torpedoes dropped by a wave of 29 Avengers, a second wave of 7 dive bombers and 13 Avengers, and then a third wave of 10 Avengers. Fortunately the Singapore ground campaign was going well with the allies slowly advancing against Japanese fortified positions.
The Kongo was not detected again until a submarine made un unsuccessful attack on her off of Luzon. Along with the Mighty Mog she had increased the cost of the Singapore campaign but had not changed the eventual outcome: the allies occupied the city and its military facilities on 19Apr10. The shipyard was intact and received its first patient the next day when the Massachusetts was hit by two torpedoes dropped by Betties.
By the end of January 44 the allied drive through Java had forced all remaining Japanese troops into a pocket at the western tip of that island. British and Indian troops had pushed the Japanese as far as Moulmein. Months of heavy fighting at sea had resulted in a large number of damaged ships in the DEI theater; the small shipyard at Soerabaja could not repair the largest ships and had a large backlog of repairs due for smaller ships. Singapore had a large shipyard and with its airfields back in allied control, the Japanese would no longer be able to support their troops on Sumatra. The allies envisioned a reverse of the Japanese Malay peninsula drive with an eventual linkup of the US forces with their British and Indian allies. Carrier raids near Singapore in February and March appeared to have sunk or driven off any threats to an invasion; Intelligence reports suggested that the Japanese Navy would not be capable of interfering with the operation.
Troops began loading on 31Mar44 for the invasion of Singapore. The next day, carrier aircraft from task forces patrolling near the invasion site sighted and attacked a Japanese battleship but score no hits. Despite the appearance of this unexpected threat, the invasion timetable was maintained and a squadron of destroyer minesweepers followed by a bombardment task force maintained course for Singapore.
Contrary to earlier assessments, the Japanese Navy still had a lot of fight left and a task force consisting of the BB Kongo, CA Mogami, CL Abukuma and 3 DD’s ambushed the five US destroyer minesweepers. The DMS Boggs and Dewey were sunk and the Trevor and Perry set afire. The surviving ships made for the relative safety of Palembang while the bombardment group searched in vain for the Japanese dreadnaught before delivering a heavy bombardment to the Singapore airfields.
The bombardment group’s hunt for the Kongo had failed because the Japanese had unexpectedly continued pursing the surviving minesweepers; this chase became apparent when the DMS Perry was reengaged at long range but the only damage inflicted by the Japanese was on themselves when the Mogami collided with DD Namikaze. Carrier aircraft found the Kongo the next day but only managed to inflict superficial damage with two 1000 lb bomb hits. A second strike missed the Kongo entirely but still bore fruit when five AKL’s were hit inflicting over 4,000 casualties to the embarked troops. Four later sank.
Rapidly worsening area made hunting for the Kongo difficult but would provide cover for the Singapore attack. Carriers did manage to locate and sink additional merchants in the area but none of the Kongo group was detected again until 3Apr when The Abukuma and two destroyers, which had chased the minesweeper group all the way to Palembang, caught up with the DMS Lamberton and sank it. The Perry had become separated from the Lamberton in the bad weather but engaged the two destroyers later in the day and set the Hokaze on fire in exchange for one shell hit.
On the 4th, the Kongo was located in the Strait of Malaca the hard way – a carrier task force screened by BBs South Dakota and Massachusetts blundered into her. All five carriers were hit at least once; the worst damaged was the Intrepid but she was still able to handle aircraft. The two US battleships were very poorly handled and did not managed to score a single hit. The task forces separated and the Kongo sought refuge in Georgetown. Avengers found her there and hit her with three 500 lb bombs but again only superficial damage was inflicted.
Further to the south the allies had better luck. The Iowa and her eight destroyer screen engaged the Hokaze and the Nokaze which were withdrawing after having engaged the DMS Perry. Both destroyers took a 16” shell hit and were pounded into sinking wrecks by the combined 5”/38 fire of the destroyers and the Iowa’s secondary battery.
The chaos continued the next day: The Boise and three destroyers engaged merchants being covered by the Mogami and Namikaze. Two of the merchants were sunk and the Namikaze torpedoed but the “Mighty Mog” was unscathed. Battleships hunting the Kongo were recalled to bombard enemy positions in Singapore when the Japanese ground forces there began a counterattack.
The Kongo moved to Medan but carrier aircraft found her there and scored four hits with 1000 lb bombs but this was the last contact with this battleship for almost a week. Carriers scouring the area did continue to find and sink merchant and transport traffic. The last chance of the campaign to take out the Kongo and Mogami came on 11Apr. The Japanese had decided to move these two assets but the Mogami group was intercepted by the Iowa and six destroyers. The Iowas strayed into torpedo water and was hit my a Long Lance launched my the “Mighty Mog” and suffered only two minor hits. The Kongo was sighted and attacked by carrier aircraft but managed to evade torpedoes dropped by a wave of 29 Avengers, a second wave of 7 dive bombers and 13 Avengers, and then a third wave of 10 Avengers. Fortunately the Singapore ground campaign was going well with the allies slowly advancing against Japanese fortified positions.
The Kongo was not detected again until a submarine made un unsuccessful attack on her off of Luzon. Along with the Mighty Mog she had increased the cost of the Singapore campaign but had not changed the eventual outcome: the allies occupied the city and its military facilities on 19Apr10. The shipyard was intact and received its first patient the next day when the Massachusetts was hit by two torpedoes dropped by Betties.
Bruce R Hugo
RE: War Career of the Seal
Great to see the Seal back (and doing well) brhugo !
War Career of the Seal
[center]Part XVII: The Submarine War in the Pacific[/center]
With the improvement in the Mk-14 torpedo performance, the Seal and her sisters were taking a heavy toll on the Japanese merchant fleet. From roughly January 1943 through October 1943 American submariners enjoyed a “happy time” comparable to what their German counterparts had experienced in the Atlantic. Submarine losses had averaged only about one every two months and crews returning from war patrols reported that Japanese ASW attacks tended to be inaccurate and usually brief. But by November 1943 submarines were failing to return from patrol with a distressing frequency, and many of those that did were badly battered and were requiring lengthy drydock visits to make them battle-worthy again.
From 11/43 through 6/44 US submarine losses averaged almost four per month. Seven submarines were lost in June 1944 alone. In an effort to improve survival rates, COMSUBPAC’s Admiral Nimitz issued new regulations designating equipment and systems critical to submarine survivability. Any materiel deficiency associated with this critical equipment required an immediate return to port for repair. Although there was initially widespread noncompliance with this by the increasingly aggressive submarine force, Nimitz held firm and sent “Personal For” message to the skippers threatening to relieve anyone for case who disregarded this safety measure.
Allied submarine effectiveness against major warships had been disappointing for most of the war, in part due to the early problems with the Mk-14 torpedo. With one significant exception, even as late as July 1944 the largest Japanese warships sunk by submarine torpedoes were the heavy cruisers Atago and Haguro and the latter had been previously damaged. The exception was the battleship Nagato which had been hit and sunk by three submarine torpedoes while retreating with major damage from a surface action off Port Moresby in May of 1942. The remaining warship confirmed toll consisted of a CVE, two light cruisers, four destroyers, and three I-boats. But submarines damaged (or were thought to have damaged) the CV Ryujo and BB Ise during the critical first year of the war, and four destroyers and a heavy cruiser in the latter part of the conflict.
In contrast, Japanese submarines had sunk or damaged a disproportionate number of allied capitol ships. Their victims included a CVL, two CVEs, a heavy cruiser, 3 light cruisers, nine destroyer or destroyer escorts, two submarines, and many auxiliary vessels. Ships damaged by submarine attacks included the CV Lexington (in January 1942 and again in November 1943); CV Enterprise; CV Essex; battleships Idaho, Colorado, and Washington, five heavy cruisers, and three light cruisers. The Idaho and Colorado were hit in mid 1942 and again within days of each other in December 1943. Of all the damaged ships the Essex had the closest call – she was hit by two torpedoes on 8/22/43, spent 6 weeks undergoing temporary repairs at an advanced base, and then was hit again by two torpedoes during her transit to Sydney. By the time she reached the shipyard she had accumulated damage requiring six months in drydock to repair.
But allied submarines had been spectacularly effective against the Japanese supply lines, especially after the torpedo defects had been corrected. By July 1944, allied submarines had sunk 388 merchant ships and 93 tanker/oilers; only a badly thinned Japanese merchant fleet and a reduced need enemy resource and supply movement prevented the tonnage count from going even higher.
Although Japanese submarines operated off the US and Australian coasts, the amount of merchant traffic sunk was small enough to not seriously challenge the allied war effort. Nevertheless the public relations impact was disastrous, with occasional grainy photographs burning ships within sight of the west coast appearing on the front page of the New York Times and other newspapers.
When the Seal pulled out of Soerabaja harbor late in the afternoon on 15Apr44, the “happy times” were long over. Despite the crack by her new Navigator LT Wunder that “There are more airplanes on the bottom of the ocean than there are submarines in the sky!”, the little boat and her crew were returning to an environment that was proving to be almost as dangerous as that faced by allied bomber pilots over Germany.
With the improvement in the Mk-14 torpedo performance, the Seal and her sisters were taking a heavy toll on the Japanese merchant fleet. From roughly January 1943 through October 1943 American submariners enjoyed a “happy time” comparable to what their German counterparts had experienced in the Atlantic. Submarine losses had averaged only about one every two months and crews returning from war patrols reported that Japanese ASW attacks tended to be inaccurate and usually brief. But by November 1943 submarines were failing to return from patrol with a distressing frequency, and many of those that did were badly battered and were requiring lengthy drydock visits to make them battle-worthy again.
From 11/43 through 6/44 US submarine losses averaged almost four per month. Seven submarines were lost in June 1944 alone. In an effort to improve survival rates, COMSUBPAC’s Admiral Nimitz issued new regulations designating equipment and systems critical to submarine survivability. Any materiel deficiency associated with this critical equipment required an immediate return to port for repair. Although there was initially widespread noncompliance with this by the increasingly aggressive submarine force, Nimitz held firm and sent “Personal For” message to the skippers threatening to relieve anyone for case who disregarded this safety measure.
Allied submarine effectiveness against major warships had been disappointing for most of the war, in part due to the early problems with the Mk-14 torpedo. With one significant exception, even as late as July 1944 the largest Japanese warships sunk by submarine torpedoes were the heavy cruisers Atago and Haguro and the latter had been previously damaged. The exception was the battleship Nagato which had been hit and sunk by three submarine torpedoes while retreating with major damage from a surface action off Port Moresby in May of 1942. The remaining warship confirmed toll consisted of a CVE, two light cruisers, four destroyers, and three I-boats. But submarines damaged (or were thought to have damaged) the CV Ryujo and BB Ise during the critical first year of the war, and four destroyers and a heavy cruiser in the latter part of the conflict.
In contrast, Japanese submarines had sunk or damaged a disproportionate number of allied capitol ships. Their victims included a CVL, two CVEs, a heavy cruiser, 3 light cruisers, nine destroyer or destroyer escorts, two submarines, and many auxiliary vessels. Ships damaged by submarine attacks included the CV Lexington (in January 1942 and again in November 1943); CV Enterprise; CV Essex; battleships Idaho, Colorado, and Washington, five heavy cruisers, and three light cruisers. The Idaho and Colorado were hit in mid 1942 and again within days of each other in December 1943. Of all the damaged ships the Essex had the closest call – she was hit by two torpedoes on 8/22/43, spent 6 weeks undergoing temporary repairs at an advanced base, and then was hit again by two torpedoes during her transit to Sydney. By the time she reached the shipyard she had accumulated damage requiring six months in drydock to repair.
But allied submarines had been spectacularly effective against the Japanese supply lines, especially after the torpedo defects had been corrected. By July 1944, allied submarines had sunk 388 merchant ships and 93 tanker/oilers; only a badly thinned Japanese merchant fleet and a reduced need enemy resource and supply movement prevented the tonnage count from going even higher.
Although Japanese submarines operated off the US and Australian coasts, the amount of merchant traffic sunk was small enough to not seriously challenge the allied war effort. Nevertheless the public relations impact was disastrous, with occasional grainy photographs burning ships within sight of the west coast appearing on the front page of the New York Times and other newspapers.
When the Seal pulled out of Soerabaja harbor late in the afternoon on 15Apr44, the “happy times” were long over. Despite the crack by her new Navigator LT Wunder that “There are more airplanes on the bottom of the ocean than there are submarines in the sky!”, the little boat and her crew were returning to an environment that was proving to be almost as dangerous as that faced by allied bomber pilots over Germany.
Bruce R Hugo
War Career of the Seal
[center]Part XVIII: A Dolphin Tale[/center]
COMSUBPAC shifted the Seal’s patrol area to the seas off the west coast of the Philippines when a series of carrier sweeps found that the Java sea was devoid of tankers or any other significant enemy shipping. This patrol had an ominous start when the sub was sighted and shadowed by a Jake only two days after leaving port. Contact was eventually broken but this required remaining submerged for most of the day which slowed the Seal’s transit.
The Seal confirmed the earlier results of a lack of merchant shipping in the area when her transit of the Makassar Strait produced no contacts. But the Seal, possibly observed by an air patrol, was driven under by the E No. 14 off Tawau. Her engagement with the escort ended without any depth charges being dropped but there were a few tense moments when the escort appeared to be nearly on top of her.
Arriving in the patrol area without further incident, the crew settled into a dull routine that consisted in a fruitless search for contacts during the day at periscope depth followed by nightly surface runs across the Seal’s assigned waters in hopes of generating contacts the next morning. Intelligence suspected that the enemy had begun deploying radar receiving gear that could give away the location of a transmitter and thus CDR Hurd was unable to use this capability during the day.
With very little to do but wait for action, pranks became commonplace. One submarine tradition that was not universally popular was “Field Day” on Friday which entailed a three hour effort by the entire crew to clean the ship. The XO was fond of announcing this weekly routine with some novel announcement and on one morning in early May of 44 than announcement was:
“ Good ship,
Good crew,
Good Friday
Turn To!”
That evening the control room crew was amazed to see the XO come running in in his underwear with a wild glare in his eyes. He looked at the station selected on the sound powered phone and then proceeded aft, running. He returned in a few minutes and proceeded quietly to bet without saying a word. This was strange behavior even for the XO but within a few days the word had spread throughout the boat on what had really happened. Someone had rung the phone in the Executive Officer stateroom and had announced to him:
“Good ship,
Good Crew,
Get F!@#’ed
Guess who!”
The XO had run through the boat checking every phone selector switch only to find every one of them set for the Executive Officer stateroom!
Other pranks included a fake radio message announcing that one sailor’s wife had given birth to twins (despite more than 9 months of separation!), hidden mattresses (quite a feat on a ship as small as the Seal), and other less savory attempts to break up the monotonous routine.
Other submarines were also reporting slim pickings in the area and on 13May44 a carrier sweep through nearby waters confirmed that the Japanese had at least temporarily withdrawn their supply convoys even closer to the home islands. The Seal received orders to return to Soerabaja on 16May44 for replenishment and assignment to a patrol area closer to Japan.
COMSUBPAC shifted the Seal’s patrol area to the seas off the west coast of the Philippines when a series of carrier sweeps found that the Java sea was devoid of tankers or any other significant enemy shipping. This patrol had an ominous start when the sub was sighted and shadowed by a Jake only two days after leaving port. Contact was eventually broken but this required remaining submerged for most of the day which slowed the Seal’s transit.
The Seal confirmed the earlier results of a lack of merchant shipping in the area when her transit of the Makassar Strait produced no contacts. But the Seal, possibly observed by an air patrol, was driven under by the E No. 14 off Tawau. Her engagement with the escort ended without any depth charges being dropped but there were a few tense moments when the escort appeared to be nearly on top of her.
Arriving in the patrol area without further incident, the crew settled into a dull routine that consisted in a fruitless search for contacts during the day at periscope depth followed by nightly surface runs across the Seal’s assigned waters in hopes of generating contacts the next morning. Intelligence suspected that the enemy had begun deploying radar receiving gear that could give away the location of a transmitter and thus CDR Hurd was unable to use this capability during the day.
With very little to do but wait for action, pranks became commonplace. One submarine tradition that was not universally popular was “Field Day” on Friday which entailed a three hour effort by the entire crew to clean the ship. The XO was fond of announcing this weekly routine with some novel announcement and on one morning in early May of 44 than announcement was:
“ Good ship,
Good crew,
Good Friday
Turn To!”
That evening the control room crew was amazed to see the XO come running in in his underwear with a wild glare in his eyes. He looked at the station selected on the sound powered phone and then proceeded aft, running. He returned in a few minutes and proceeded quietly to bet without saying a word. This was strange behavior even for the XO but within a few days the word had spread throughout the boat on what had really happened. Someone had rung the phone in the Executive Officer stateroom and had announced to him:
“Good ship,
Good Crew,
Get F!@#’ed
Guess who!”
The XO had run through the boat checking every phone selector switch only to find every one of them set for the Executive Officer stateroom!
Other pranks included a fake radio message announcing that one sailor’s wife had given birth to twins (despite more than 9 months of separation!), hidden mattresses (quite a feat on a ship as small as the Seal), and other less savory attempts to break up the monotonous routine.
Other submarines were also reporting slim pickings in the area and on 13May44 a carrier sweep through nearby waters confirmed that the Japanese had at least temporarily withdrawn their supply convoys even closer to the home islands. The Seal received orders to return to Soerabaja on 16May44 for replenishment and assignment to a patrol area closer to Japan.
Bruce R Hugo
War Career of the Seal
[center]Part XIX: The East China Sea[/center]
The Seal received patrol orders to the East China Sea since other hunting grounds she had frequented seemed to have dried up. The shrunken Japanese merchant fleet had withdrawn to safer coastal routes that were heavy covered with air patrols, and the surviving ships were being protected by more escorts.
The Seal arrived in her patrol area off the northeast tip of Formosa on 28May44 to initially good hunting weather. Visibility at sea level was good and a thick low layer of clouds made search aircraft less effective. Lookouts had not even seen a patrol aircraft since the boat cleared the Philippine Islands area during the transit. But the good weather did not hold and a storm with heavy seas moved in over the next few days and made searching difficult. False returns from waves made the radar ineffective and visual detection was problematical due to rain and a heaving horizon.
Despite choosing a course to run with the waves, the little boat was rolled and tossed challenging the ability of even the most sea-hardened crew to move around or even stay in a bunk without getting knocked around. Sea-sickness struck the sailors like a medieval plague. Even after the storm passed the ocean seemed devoid of ships; CDR Hurd spent the next few weeks running along the boundary of the patrol area but this effort failed to generate any contacts.
Finally on 17Jun44 after weeks of frustration, radar contact was made with multiple slow targets whose tracks would close the Seal’s. The Seal dove and began closing on battery power. At 0941 CDR Hurd reported contact on a merchant (the xAK Ryochi Maru); it had an estimated range of 8000 yards with a port 20° angle on the bow. The convoy had apparently zigged toward the Seal after she dove. Successive observations through the scope revealed that the Ryochi Maru was followed by at least one other merchant and that a small escort vessel was behind her to starboard. The Seal closed to within firing range and launched a spread of 4 Mk-14’s at the convoy leader.
At the expected time, two distinct explosions were heard. The Seal’s course would have taken her across the convoy’s track, but it was unlikely that the Japanese would hold course after detecting the “flaming datum” of the Ryochi Maru which was now dead in the water. In fact, the lead ship had sighted the torpedo wakes and had veered to port in a failed effort to comb them. The remaining merchants turned away as the E Sanae turned to close the suspected firing point.
The Sanae had already passed over the Seal when her active sonar began receiving echoes. Reversing course, she laid down a pattern of depth charges that were shallow and astern of the twisting submarine. A second attack was closer to the mark – the Seal was hammered by two near-misses that shattered lights and gauge glasses, started minor leaks, and left ears ringing. CRD Hurd ordered the boat deeper and between the turbulence and bubbles remaining from the depth charges and the presence of a weak layer, the Sanae lost contact. Thinking that the enemy submarine had been sunk, the escort left to rejoin the remaining ships which were being herded back together by a second escort, APD T-3.
With the sounds of screws and active sonar receded, CDR Hurd brought the Seal shallow again; no contacts were visible through the scope except for a column of smoke on the horizon. The Seal surface and swept the area with radar receiving a return only from the same direction as the smoke. While batteries recharged and stale air was swept from the sub, the Seal closed the distant contact which grew on the horizon until it was confirmed to be the damaged Ryochi Maru, still afloat but making no headway. The Seal dove and continued to close to firing position. The only other ship within sight was the T-3 which appeared to be providing assistance to the crippled freighter. CDR Hurd waited until the APD was on the far side of the xAK and then fired a spread of four torpedoes. Four distinct explosions marked the end of the Ryochi’s service to the emperor and the Seal began clearing datum.
The T-3 attempted to regain contact on the Seal but gave up without making any attacks and returned to the sinking freighter to rescue survivors. The Ryochi Maru had been loaded with soldiers and the T-3 managed to save all but 111 that had been killed in one of the explosions or trapped in the sinking ship. For her part the Seal appeared to have gotten off with minimal damage – the crew was able to quickly replace broken lights and gauges and tighten leaking fittings. But one brazed seawater connection in a line that provided cooling water to the #1 diesel engine lube oil heat exchanger had cracked due to the shock of one of the close-aboard depth charge explosions. The leakage from this crack was just a trickle that was concealed by lagging but it was to have tragic consequences.
The Seal received patrol orders to the East China Sea since other hunting grounds she had frequented seemed to have dried up. The shrunken Japanese merchant fleet had withdrawn to safer coastal routes that were heavy covered with air patrols, and the surviving ships were being protected by more escorts.
The Seal arrived in her patrol area off the northeast tip of Formosa on 28May44 to initially good hunting weather. Visibility at sea level was good and a thick low layer of clouds made search aircraft less effective. Lookouts had not even seen a patrol aircraft since the boat cleared the Philippine Islands area during the transit. But the good weather did not hold and a storm with heavy seas moved in over the next few days and made searching difficult. False returns from waves made the radar ineffective and visual detection was problematical due to rain and a heaving horizon.
Despite choosing a course to run with the waves, the little boat was rolled and tossed challenging the ability of even the most sea-hardened crew to move around or even stay in a bunk without getting knocked around. Sea-sickness struck the sailors like a medieval plague. Even after the storm passed the ocean seemed devoid of ships; CDR Hurd spent the next few weeks running along the boundary of the patrol area but this effort failed to generate any contacts.
Finally on 17Jun44 after weeks of frustration, radar contact was made with multiple slow targets whose tracks would close the Seal’s. The Seal dove and began closing on battery power. At 0941 CDR Hurd reported contact on a merchant (the xAK Ryochi Maru); it had an estimated range of 8000 yards with a port 20° angle on the bow. The convoy had apparently zigged toward the Seal after she dove. Successive observations through the scope revealed that the Ryochi Maru was followed by at least one other merchant and that a small escort vessel was behind her to starboard. The Seal closed to within firing range and launched a spread of 4 Mk-14’s at the convoy leader.
At the expected time, two distinct explosions were heard. The Seal’s course would have taken her across the convoy’s track, but it was unlikely that the Japanese would hold course after detecting the “flaming datum” of the Ryochi Maru which was now dead in the water. In fact, the lead ship had sighted the torpedo wakes and had veered to port in a failed effort to comb them. The remaining merchants turned away as the E Sanae turned to close the suspected firing point.
The Sanae had already passed over the Seal when her active sonar began receiving echoes. Reversing course, she laid down a pattern of depth charges that were shallow and astern of the twisting submarine. A second attack was closer to the mark – the Seal was hammered by two near-misses that shattered lights and gauge glasses, started minor leaks, and left ears ringing. CRD Hurd ordered the boat deeper and between the turbulence and bubbles remaining from the depth charges and the presence of a weak layer, the Sanae lost contact. Thinking that the enemy submarine had been sunk, the escort left to rejoin the remaining ships which were being herded back together by a second escort, APD T-3.
With the sounds of screws and active sonar receded, CDR Hurd brought the Seal shallow again; no contacts were visible through the scope except for a column of smoke on the horizon. The Seal surface and swept the area with radar receiving a return only from the same direction as the smoke. While batteries recharged and stale air was swept from the sub, the Seal closed the distant contact which grew on the horizon until it was confirmed to be the damaged Ryochi Maru, still afloat but making no headway. The Seal dove and continued to close to firing position. The only other ship within sight was the T-3 which appeared to be providing assistance to the crippled freighter. CDR Hurd waited until the APD was on the far side of the xAK and then fired a spread of four torpedoes. Four distinct explosions marked the end of the Ryochi’s service to the emperor and the Seal began clearing datum.
The T-3 attempted to regain contact on the Seal but gave up without making any attacks and returned to the sinking freighter to rescue survivors. The Ryochi Maru had been loaded with soldiers and the T-3 managed to save all but 111 that had been killed in one of the explosions or trapped in the sinking ship. For her part the Seal appeared to have gotten off with minimal damage – the crew was able to quickly replace broken lights and gauges and tighten leaking fittings. But one brazed seawater connection in a line that provided cooling water to the #1 diesel engine lube oil heat exchanger had cracked due to the shock of one of the close-aboard depth charge explosions. The leakage from this crack was just a trickle that was concealed by lagging but it was to have tragic consequences.
Bruce R Hugo
RE: War Career of the Seal
hey, you can't leave us with a cliff hanger like that !!! [X(]
War Career of the Seal
[center]Part XX: Terror at Four Hundred Feet[/center]
The next two days were uneventful for the Seal's crew. Although she continued to hunt Japanese shipping in the East China Sea, the crew was largely occupied with continuing temporary repairs to systems and components damaged during the depth charging attack. When a contact was finally made, it was with an escort vessel that had been directed to her location by a patrol aircraft that had not been detected either by lookouts or radar. Although the escort never made firm contact on the sub, it was her evasive maneuver that nearly ended he career on the spot.
CDR Hurd ordered the Seal to 400 feet, well below her official rated diving capability of 200 feet. The Seal and her sisters had routinely operated at this depth throughout the war; it virtually guaranteed concealment below the thermal layer (when one was present) and often resulted in depth charges that would have been direct hits exploding well above their intended target. But as the Seal passed through 360 feet the hydrostatic pressure on the weakened lube oil cooler piping caused the brazed connection to part completely.
The immediate effect of this high-pressure leak of icy water was to fill the engine room with mist and fog, hampering the watchstanders’ ability to find and isolate the leak. The Engineering Officer of the Watch reported the flooding to the Control Room and CDR Hurd ordered the sub to 120 feet to reduce the driving head on the leak. Normally this degree of flooding would call for emergency surfacing but with the escort vessel in the vicinity this could be just as fatal a choice. The OOD rang ordered full submerged speed, which the Seal could maintain only for two hours before draining the battery, and the diving officer order full rise on the planes.
The Seal made progress towards the ordered depth at first, but the rate of flooding greatly exceeded that of the after drain pump and the added weight of the additional sea water began to slow her descent. The Chief of the Watch began pumping the after trim tank overboard to help compensate for the leak, but that was also insufficient – the Seal reached 285 feet, then began sinking back into the depths.
The engine room crew managed to find the broken line and isolated both the suction and discharge hull valves but the seawater already taken in was causing problems beyond the initial buoyancy challenge. The highly conductive seawater wetted critical switchgear and caused several circuit breakers to trip, including the supply to the after drain pump. The trim pump was on a redundant electrical bus but even if the after trim tank were empty it would not compensate for the Seal’s added weight.
As the Seal passed through 350 feet CDR Hurd ordered the after main ballast tank blown and directed the crew to prepare to man battle stations gun for a potentially one-sided battle with the escort vessel waiting on the surface. The compressed air cylinders supplying the ballast tank blow valves were large, but had been sized for expected operation at 200 feet, not 350. Still, any expelled water would improve the Seal’s life expectancy since she still had the hydrodynamic effect of moving through the water with an “up angle” to help drive her towards shallower depths.
Personnel in the after torpedo room heard the hissing of air as the ballast tank blow valve opened. But after about ninety seconds the air noise stopped - moisture had entered the compressed air system due to a faulty air dryer on the discharge of one of the boats high pressure air compressors and turned to ice in the piping restrictions as the air expanded and cooled. The partial blow had bought the crew a few extra minutes but the boat was still negatively buoyant.
At 400 feet all of the Seal’s depth gauges were pegged. The hull creaked and popped as sea pressure, now over 180 pounds per square inch, compressed both the boat’s hull and the small pocket of air in the after ballast tank and reduced her buoyancy further. CDR Hurd ordered the forward ballast tank blown even though this risked increasing the boat’s angle to the point where forward motion and the resulting lift would be lost. The wet air made this decision moot. After 50 seconds this line also froze up. The diaphragm on the engine room depth gauge, which was sensing the highest pressure due to the Seal’s angle, burst but was quickly isolated by closing the root valve.
With nothing more that could be done in maneuvering to save the Seal, the Engineering Officer of the Watch, First Class Electrician’s Mate (EM1) Breffle, left his post and removed the cover plate for the breaker for the after drain pump. The supply breaker had features designed to prevent it from being held closed under an overcurrent condition and EM1 Breffle knew how to defeat them all. He held the breaker handle in the “closed” position and the drain pump restarted. The Chief of the Watch observed the pump running light come back on and reported this fact to the diving officer.
The crew could only estimate the maximum depth the Seal reached and did not even realize it when it happened due to the over-ranged depth gauges. But after a very long few minutes, the forward torpedo depth gauge came back on scale followed by the control room’s and finally the after torpedo room’s. The crew at this latter station had given up hope when water began spraying from the inner door seal on the #7 torpedo tube.
Had the Seal lost propulsion, broaching and destruction at the hands of the enemy on the surface would have been inevitable. But the diving officer managed to level the boat off at ordered depth and as the drain pump continued to dewater the engine room, the forward and then the aft ballast tanks were vented to maintain neutral buoyancy. CDR Hurd ordered speed reduced to two knots to conserve battery power, and an hour later a quick look at periscope depth revealed no contacts.
The Seal’s near sinking had resulted in two fatalities. One seaman apprentice which had been striking for machinist mate had been killed outright when the stream of high pressure water from the parted line struck him and knocked him into the #2 diesel engine, breaking his neck. A second man lost his footing on the wet deck and was knocked unconscious from the fall and then drowned in the icy water.
Despite the crew’s efforts to clean the switchgear and after drain pump motor it remained unreliable, usually running for only a few seconds before tripping its circuit breaker (EM1’s workaround having been undone after the emergency had passed). The faulty drain pump alone meant that the Seal was required to abort patrol by COMSUBPAC’s regulations. The Seal began the transit back to Soerabaja, pausing only to conduct a sea burial for her recent losses.
CDR Hurd regretted having to return to port with operable torpedoes on board. Nothing in Admiral Nimitz’s regulations specifically prohibited hunting on the return trip. These regulations also did not specify that the submarine make her best possible speed during the transit. The Seal’s track would take her close enough to the Philippines to provide one more opportunity to strike at the enemy. The navigator plotted a course that would take the boat through the desired waters, and into a meeting with the E Aguni.
The next two days were uneventful for the Seal's crew. Although she continued to hunt Japanese shipping in the East China Sea, the crew was largely occupied with continuing temporary repairs to systems and components damaged during the depth charging attack. When a contact was finally made, it was with an escort vessel that had been directed to her location by a patrol aircraft that had not been detected either by lookouts or radar. Although the escort never made firm contact on the sub, it was her evasive maneuver that nearly ended he career on the spot.
CDR Hurd ordered the Seal to 400 feet, well below her official rated diving capability of 200 feet. The Seal and her sisters had routinely operated at this depth throughout the war; it virtually guaranteed concealment below the thermal layer (when one was present) and often resulted in depth charges that would have been direct hits exploding well above their intended target. But as the Seal passed through 360 feet the hydrostatic pressure on the weakened lube oil cooler piping caused the brazed connection to part completely.
The immediate effect of this high-pressure leak of icy water was to fill the engine room with mist and fog, hampering the watchstanders’ ability to find and isolate the leak. The Engineering Officer of the Watch reported the flooding to the Control Room and CDR Hurd ordered the sub to 120 feet to reduce the driving head on the leak. Normally this degree of flooding would call for emergency surfacing but with the escort vessel in the vicinity this could be just as fatal a choice. The OOD rang ordered full submerged speed, which the Seal could maintain only for two hours before draining the battery, and the diving officer order full rise on the planes.
The Seal made progress towards the ordered depth at first, but the rate of flooding greatly exceeded that of the after drain pump and the added weight of the additional sea water began to slow her descent. The Chief of the Watch began pumping the after trim tank overboard to help compensate for the leak, but that was also insufficient – the Seal reached 285 feet, then began sinking back into the depths.
The engine room crew managed to find the broken line and isolated both the suction and discharge hull valves but the seawater already taken in was causing problems beyond the initial buoyancy challenge. The highly conductive seawater wetted critical switchgear and caused several circuit breakers to trip, including the supply to the after drain pump. The trim pump was on a redundant electrical bus but even if the after trim tank were empty it would not compensate for the Seal’s added weight.
As the Seal passed through 350 feet CDR Hurd ordered the after main ballast tank blown and directed the crew to prepare to man battle stations gun for a potentially one-sided battle with the escort vessel waiting on the surface. The compressed air cylinders supplying the ballast tank blow valves were large, but had been sized for expected operation at 200 feet, not 350. Still, any expelled water would improve the Seal’s life expectancy since she still had the hydrodynamic effect of moving through the water with an “up angle” to help drive her towards shallower depths.
Personnel in the after torpedo room heard the hissing of air as the ballast tank blow valve opened. But after about ninety seconds the air noise stopped - moisture had entered the compressed air system due to a faulty air dryer on the discharge of one of the boats high pressure air compressors and turned to ice in the piping restrictions as the air expanded and cooled. The partial blow had bought the crew a few extra minutes but the boat was still negatively buoyant.
At 400 feet all of the Seal’s depth gauges were pegged. The hull creaked and popped as sea pressure, now over 180 pounds per square inch, compressed both the boat’s hull and the small pocket of air in the after ballast tank and reduced her buoyancy further. CDR Hurd ordered the forward ballast tank blown even though this risked increasing the boat’s angle to the point where forward motion and the resulting lift would be lost. The wet air made this decision moot. After 50 seconds this line also froze up. The diaphragm on the engine room depth gauge, which was sensing the highest pressure due to the Seal’s angle, burst but was quickly isolated by closing the root valve.
With nothing more that could be done in maneuvering to save the Seal, the Engineering Officer of the Watch, First Class Electrician’s Mate (EM1) Breffle, left his post and removed the cover plate for the breaker for the after drain pump. The supply breaker had features designed to prevent it from being held closed under an overcurrent condition and EM1 Breffle knew how to defeat them all. He held the breaker handle in the “closed” position and the drain pump restarted. The Chief of the Watch observed the pump running light come back on and reported this fact to the diving officer.
The crew could only estimate the maximum depth the Seal reached and did not even realize it when it happened due to the over-ranged depth gauges. But after a very long few minutes, the forward torpedo depth gauge came back on scale followed by the control room’s and finally the after torpedo room’s. The crew at this latter station had given up hope when water began spraying from the inner door seal on the #7 torpedo tube.
Had the Seal lost propulsion, broaching and destruction at the hands of the enemy on the surface would have been inevitable. But the diving officer managed to level the boat off at ordered depth and as the drain pump continued to dewater the engine room, the forward and then the aft ballast tanks were vented to maintain neutral buoyancy. CDR Hurd ordered speed reduced to two knots to conserve battery power, and an hour later a quick look at periscope depth revealed no contacts.
The Seal’s near sinking had resulted in two fatalities. One seaman apprentice which had been striking for machinist mate had been killed outright when the stream of high pressure water from the parted line struck him and knocked him into the #2 diesel engine, breaking his neck. A second man lost his footing on the wet deck and was knocked unconscious from the fall and then drowned in the icy water.
Despite the crew’s efforts to clean the switchgear and after drain pump motor it remained unreliable, usually running for only a few seconds before tripping its circuit breaker (EM1’s workaround having been undone after the emergency had passed). The faulty drain pump alone meant that the Seal was required to abort patrol by COMSUBPAC’s regulations. The Seal began the transit back to Soerabaja, pausing only to conduct a sea burial for her recent losses.
CDR Hurd regretted having to return to port with operable torpedoes on board. Nothing in Admiral Nimitz’s regulations specifically prohibited hunting on the return trip. These regulations also did not specify that the submarine make her best possible speed during the transit. The Seal’s track would take her close enough to the Philippines to provide one more opportunity to strike at the enemy. The navigator plotted a course that would take the boat through the desired waters, and into a meeting with the E Aguni.
Bruce R Hugo
RE: War Career of the Seal
I agree! But the Seal's game life has been a series of cliff-hangers for me!
Bruce R Hugo
RE: War Career of the Seal
[:)]
And yet another cliff hanger ending !!
And yet another cliff hanger ending !!
RE: War Career of the Seal
[center]Part XXI: E Aguni[/center]
Temporary repairs were completed and the Seal began her deliberately slow return transit to home port. Although the drain pump motor was unreliable, by cross connecting the trim and drain systems the trim pump could be used for dewatering bilges although the boats ability to rapidly deballast had been severely restricted.
The war was going relatively well for the allies in the Pacific in stark contrast to the stalemate in Europe. After the disastrous Pas-de-Calais landings of early June 44, the allies were not inclined to attempt another direct assault on Hitler’s Fortress Europa and so the entire war in Europe hinged on a slow but steady advance through Italy. Stalin and the Russian winter had stopped the Wehrmacht’s advance for the time being but even with Lend-lease convoys no one believed the Soviets could hold the Germans off forever.
Roosevelt’s trump card was supposed to have been a promising new weapon that exploited nuclear fission and would turn the tables on Hitler but Fermi’s criticality experiment in Chicago had fizzled badly and that line of research toward development of a super nuclear bomb (the fabled “N-bomb”) had been temporarily abandoned. Good progress was being made in Oak Ridge with isotopic separation of uranium metal but there would be at best enough material for a single bomb by mid to late 1945. By the time the problem with the Chicago test pile had been discovered (boron impurities in the graphite moderator blocks) the US had wasted precious time and resources on developing a heavy water moderated reactor that had no chance of producing enough plutonium for a weapon until late 1946.
The best chances of turning stalemate into victory was to defeat Japan and allow the allied Pacific forces to be used against Italy and Germany. For CDR Hurd and his crew though each blow landed on the enemy brought the end of the war and eventually reunion with their families closer. To that end, the Seal sailed into Philippine waters and into harm’s way.
On 23Jun44 the surfaced Seal detected multiple radar contacts off the east coast of Mindanao and submerged to close their projected tracks. Despite the crew’s excitement, the approach was carried out methodically with well-practiced technique. The Seal’s periscope shot up every few minutes for quick masthead height and angle-on-the-bow observations and was just as quickly retracted to avoid detection of the characteristic feather and wake. Then when the analog fire control computer showed that the target was within Mk-14 range, CDR Hurd fired a spread of 4 torpedoes at the lead merchant and altered course to a lag leg to put angular separation between his boat and the torpedo wakes.
The Seal’s aim was true and xAKL Toten Maru was hit by one of the four torpedoes. Following the explosion, CDR Hurd observed through the scope that the target was listing and afire but also noted that an escort vessel was bearing down on him at high speed. The Seal crash dove and altered course but was quickly fighting for her life as a salvo of well-placed depth chargers rocked her.
CDR Hurd and his crew were also well practiced in breaking contact and this effort began in earnest. The Seal dove to 300 feet, well below the last measured depth of the thermal layer and altered course. But the thermocline had changed since the Seal’s last sound speed measurements and the acoustic layer had become shallow and weak and no longer provided concealment from the escort’s active sonar. Another barrage of depth charges exploded close aboard and most of the Seal went dark as light bulbs shattered from the shock.
Not suspecting that he might have met his match, CDR Hurd ordered another course change and took his ship deeper suspecting that she was still above the layer. This tactic seemed to have been effective as no immediate follow up attack was made with depth charges. Most previous ASW counterattacks had been a nearly continuous barrage with many of the weapons exploding fair outside their effective range; as the Seal drove away from the datum the only evidence of their adversary’s presence was the rhythmic pinging of the escort’s active sonar.
The control room crew had just started to relax when Sonar reported multiple splashes close aboard followed by a deafening explosion as one depth charge in a well-placed pattern exploded close aboard and shook the Seal severely. Damage reports came in from several compartments but none of them seemed particularly serious. CDR Hurd focused on escaping further damage and left the mitigation of that already received to the boats Damage Control Assistant (DCA). There was another course and depth change, another unusually long wait, and then another close spread of depth charges that broke more lights and sprang more leaks.
When further zig-zagging proved to be ineffective, CDR Hurd changed tactics. To this point the Seal’s general course had been away from the attack point; CDR Hurd ordered a 180° course change hoping that the escort’s skipper would discount the possibility of the submarine returning to the “scene of the crime”. This provided a short respite which the crew used productively to tighten fittings, strap on patching and band-its, and hammer id damage control (DC) plugs. But eventually, the escort regained contact with the Seal and the hammering resumed.
The XO offered that either the Seal had a large air or oil leak that was giving her away or “… the can’s (destroyer’s) skipper is a submariner”. The crew isolated non-critical air systems (nothing could be done while submerged about a leaking fuel oil tank) but the XO was closer to the truth with the latter suggestion. The E Aguni was no destroyer but was instead a smaller but no less capable ASW platform. And although her CO had never served in submarines, he was being advised by LCDR Fujiyoshi whose I-boat had been sunk at the pier by a bombing raid on Rangoon. Desperate to reduce the losses allied submarines were inflicting on critical shipping, the Japanese had begun a pilot program of assigning officers with submarine experience to ASW platforms. This effort had been effective but the Japanese had been unable to see this; reports of submarine kills had been grossly exaggerated before the program started and the submarine liaisons had helped reduce the number of false kill reports. Despite an actual increase in the number of allied submarines sunk or sent limping back to port for lengthy repairs, ASW effectiveness appeared to have actually decreased slightly. LCDR Fujiyoshi was scheduled to rotate back to a submarine command after about another month on E Aguni and there were no plans to replace him.
The cumulative effects of the hits and near-misses were taking their toll and the Seal’s situation was becoming grave. When the Chief of the Watch (COOW) was having trouble pumping seawater inleakage out of the bilges using the trim pump, the engineer ordered the drain pump’s breaker closed in only to have it immediately trip open when the COOW tried to start it. EM1 Breffle attempted to work his magic again but when a second start attempt was made the feeder breaker to the associated bus tripped dropping plunging the engine room into near darkness and dumping several critical loads. The presence of the acrid odor of burnt insulation deterred another attempt and the electric bus was reenergized with the drain pump breaker open. The Seal would have to be taken shallow to reduce the driving force of the many leaks or she would be overcome slowly by flooding.
In desperation the crew attempted to break contact by randomizing their evasive maneuvers. The compass was divided into six 60° sectors and a die was rolled after each close aboard attack; the submarine was steered to the sector “selected” by the die even if this meant remaining on roughly the same course. After several more attacks and maneuvers this appeared to have worked. Although the pinging continued unabated, the depth charge attacks stopped and after over an hour of relative calm, CDR Hurd ordered the Seal onto a course that would take her back to Soerabaja.
The Seal had actually been saved from destruction that day by the Aguni’s limited ASW loadout. She had conducted a successful attack against another submarine a few days earlier and had not had the opportunity to replenish. With LCDR Fujiyoshi’s assistance, the Aguni had maintained contact on the Seal while radioing frantically for assistance in finishing off the enemy from either aircraft or another escort craft or both, but none had been available. E Aguni finally lost contact on the Seal when the submarines track took her into an area with a stronger thermal layer. It was not until dusk several hours later when a seaplane loaded with depth charges finally arrived to help. The Aguni’s skipper sent it back to its airfield in disgust. The Aguni also had to report that one of her charges (xAKL Toten Maru), a converted troop carrier, had lost her fight with fires and flooding from the torpedo hit and would not be delivering her load of troops.
Although no compartments had been completely flooded, the overall damage to the Seal was worse than that sustained by the earlier mine explosion off Pusan harbor. But she was also much closer to help.
[The Seal took seven hits in this engagement and accumulated 48 system, 62 flotation, and 5 engine damage points.]
Temporary repairs were completed and the Seal began her deliberately slow return transit to home port. Although the drain pump motor was unreliable, by cross connecting the trim and drain systems the trim pump could be used for dewatering bilges although the boats ability to rapidly deballast had been severely restricted.
The war was going relatively well for the allies in the Pacific in stark contrast to the stalemate in Europe. After the disastrous Pas-de-Calais landings of early June 44, the allies were not inclined to attempt another direct assault on Hitler’s Fortress Europa and so the entire war in Europe hinged on a slow but steady advance through Italy. Stalin and the Russian winter had stopped the Wehrmacht’s advance for the time being but even with Lend-lease convoys no one believed the Soviets could hold the Germans off forever.
Roosevelt’s trump card was supposed to have been a promising new weapon that exploited nuclear fission and would turn the tables on Hitler but Fermi’s criticality experiment in Chicago had fizzled badly and that line of research toward development of a super nuclear bomb (the fabled “N-bomb”) had been temporarily abandoned. Good progress was being made in Oak Ridge with isotopic separation of uranium metal but there would be at best enough material for a single bomb by mid to late 1945. By the time the problem with the Chicago test pile had been discovered (boron impurities in the graphite moderator blocks) the US had wasted precious time and resources on developing a heavy water moderated reactor that had no chance of producing enough plutonium for a weapon until late 1946.
The best chances of turning stalemate into victory was to defeat Japan and allow the allied Pacific forces to be used against Italy and Germany. For CDR Hurd and his crew though each blow landed on the enemy brought the end of the war and eventually reunion with their families closer. To that end, the Seal sailed into Philippine waters and into harm’s way.
On 23Jun44 the surfaced Seal detected multiple radar contacts off the east coast of Mindanao and submerged to close their projected tracks. Despite the crew’s excitement, the approach was carried out methodically with well-practiced technique. The Seal’s periscope shot up every few minutes for quick masthead height and angle-on-the-bow observations and was just as quickly retracted to avoid detection of the characteristic feather and wake. Then when the analog fire control computer showed that the target was within Mk-14 range, CDR Hurd fired a spread of 4 torpedoes at the lead merchant and altered course to a lag leg to put angular separation between his boat and the torpedo wakes.
The Seal’s aim was true and xAKL Toten Maru was hit by one of the four torpedoes. Following the explosion, CDR Hurd observed through the scope that the target was listing and afire but also noted that an escort vessel was bearing down on him at high speed. The Seal crash dove and altered course but was quickly fighting for her life as a salvo of well-placed depth chargers rocked her.
CDR Hurd and his crew were also well practiced in breaking contact and this effort began in earnest. The Seal dove to 300 feet, well below the last measured depth of the thermal layer and altered course. But the thermocline had changed since the Seal’s last sound speed measurements and the acoustic layer had become shallow and weak and no longer provided concealment from the escort’s active sonar. Another barrage of depth charges exploded close aboard and most of the Seal went dark as light bulbs shattered from the shock.
Not suspecting that he might have met his match, CDR Hurd ordered another course change and took his ship deeper suspecting that she was still above the layer. This tactic seemed to have been effective as no immediate follow up attack was made with depth charges. Most previous ASW counterattacks had been a nearly continuous barrage with many of the weapons exploding fair outside their effective range; as the Seal drove away from the datum the only evidence of their adversary’s presence was the rhythmic pinging of the escort’s active sonar.
The control room crew had just started to relax when Sonar reported multiple splashes close aboard followed by a deafening explosion as one depth charge in a well-placed pattern exploded close aboard and shook the Seal severely. Damage reports came in from several compartments but none of them seemed particularly serious. CDR Hurd focused on escaping further damage and left the mitigation of that already received to the boats Damage Control Assistant (DCA). There was another course and depth change, another unusually long wait, and then another close spread of depth charges that broke more lights and sprang more leaks.
When further zig-zagging proved to be ineffective, CDR Hurd changed tactics. To this point the Seal’s general course had been away from the attack point; CDR Hurd ordered a 180° course change hoping that the escort’s skipper would discount the possibility of the submarine returning to the “scene of the crime”. This provided a short respite which the crew used productively to tighten fittings, strap on patching and band-its, and hammer id damage control (DC) plugs. But eventually, the escort regained contact with the Seal and the hammering resumed.
The XO offered that either the Seal had a large air or oil leak that was giving her away or “… the can’s (destroyer’s) skipper is a submariner”. The crew isolated non-critical air systems (nothing could be done while submerged about a leaking fuel oil tank) but the XO was closer to the truth with the latter suggestion. The E Aguni was no destroyer but was instead a smaller but no less capable ASW platform. And although her CO had never served in submarines, he was being advised by LCDR Fujiyoshi whose I-boat had been sunk at the pier by a bombing raid on Rangoon. Desperate to reduce the losses allied submarines were inflicting on critical shipping, the Japanese had begun a pilot program of assigning officers with submarine experience to ASW platforms. This effort had been effective but the Japanese had been unable to see this; reports of submarine kills had been grossly exaggerated before the program started and the submarine liaisons had helped reduce the number of false kill reports. Despite an actual increase in the number of allied submarines sunk or sent limping back to port for lengthy repairs, ASW effectiveness appeared to have actually decreased slightly. LCDR Fujiyoshi was scheduled to rotate back to a submarine command after about another month on E Aguni and there were no plans to replace him.
The cumulative effects of the hits and near-misses were taking their toll and the Seal’s situation was becoming grave. When the Chief of the Watch (COOW) was having trouble pumping seawater inleakage out of the bilges using the trim pump, the engineer ordered the drain pump’s breaker closed in only to have it immediately trip open when the COOW tried to start it. EM1 Breffle attempted to work his magic again but when a second start attempt was made the feeder breaker to the associated bus tripped dropping plunging the engine room into near darkness and dumping several critical loads. The presence of the acrid odor of burnt insulation deterred another attempt and the electric bus was reenergized with the drain pump breaker open. The Seal would have to be taken shallow to reduce the driving force of the many leaks or she would be overcome slowly by flooding.
In desperation the crew attempted to break contact by randomizing their evasive maneuvers. The compass was divided into six 60° sectors and a die was rolled after each close aboard attack; the submarine was steered to the sector “selected” by the die even if this meant remaining on roughly the same course. After several more attacks and maneuvers this appeared to have worked. Although the pinging continued unabated, the depth charge attacks stopped and after over an hour of relative calm, CDR Hurd ordered the Seal onto a course that would take her back to Soerabaja.
The Seal had actually been saved from destruction that day by the Aguni’s limited ASW loadout. She had conducted a successful attack against another submarine a few days earlier and had not had the opportunity to replenish. With LCDR Fujiyoshi’s assistance, the Aguni had maintained contact on the Seal while radioing frantically for assistance in finishing off the enemy from either aircraft or another escort craft or both, but none had been available. E Aguni finally lost contact on the Seal when the submarines track took her into an area with a stronger thermal layer. It was not until dusk several hours later when a seaplane loaded with depth charges finally arrived to help. The Aguni’s skipper sent it back to its airfield in disgust. The Aguni also had to report that one of her charges (xAKL Toten Maru), a converted troop carrier, had lost her fight with fires and flooding from the torpedo hit and would not be delivering her load of troops.
Although no compartments had been completely flooded, the overall damage to the Seal was worse than that sustained by the earlier mine explosion off Pusan harbor. But she was also much closer to help.
[The Seal took seven hits in this engagement and accumulated 48 system, 62 flotation, and 5 engine damage points.]
Bruce R Hugo