Biggest German East front mistake

[freeboy]

again we come back to "Hitler" as a leader was terrible.. maybe the biggest mistake

[Real and Simulated Wars]

ORIGINAL: freeboy
again we come back to "Hitler" as a leader was terrible.. maybe the biggest mistake

Good point. LOL. That's the guy who fired Manstein, demoted Guderian and forced Rommel to commit suicide (!?).
Based on that grounds, I would like to put the guilt onto another person:
During the 1920 decade, a young bohemian Austrian applies to a prestigious arts academy in Viena and gets rejected. The Austrian gets so pissed off that he decides to go to Germany. I blame the director of the arts academy for virtually triggering WWII!
Joke aside, why Hitler was such a fool to don't listen to his Generals? Why his obsession with planning the details of certain operations?

[a19999577]

Hitler didn't make Rommel kill himself due to alleged 'incompetence'... it was due to disloyalty, for aiding the July 1944 conspirators. When you take a look at Rommel's fate, you'd have to say they 'let him off easy' and even gave him an honorable way out. Hitler was quite 'considerate' towards Rommel, actually.

Look at it this way: do you think any American president would let an Al-Qaida sympathizing general who participated in an assassination attempt against him commit an 'honorable' suicide with the following cover up [Rommel was said to have 'died of his battle wounds']? I'd say they'd probably lock 'im up in Guantanamo, rough him up a bit, execute him a few years later and put his portrait next to Benedict Arnold's.

[freeboy]

Pleasee, Rommels suicide was a face saver for these idiots... a trial would have shown then for what they truly where , petty tyrants ruling by fear.

Getting back to Hitler, lots of mistakes...
Put yourself in the mindset of the Geermans after France fell, they thought Russia would cave too, thus no long term planning for winter etc...

[Real and Simulated Wars]

ORIGINAL: a19999577
Hitler didn't make Rommel kill himself due to alleged 'incompetence'... it was due to disloyalty, for aiding the July 1944 conspirators. When you take a look at Rommel's fate, you'd have to say they 'let him off easy' and even gave him an honorable way out. Hitler was quite 'considerate' towards Rommel, actually.

You are right, Rommel was "elegantly (?!)" dismissed not because of military incompetence, which is the topic of the thread. My bad.
However, if one of your brightest generals commits suicide or conspires to kill you, isn't that a clear indication that you may be something is a bit wrong with your leadership? That was actually my point.

Look at it this way: do you think any American president would let an Al-Qaida sympathizing general who participated in an assassination attempt against him commit an 'honorable' suicide with the following cover up [Rommel was said to have 'died of his battle wounds']? I'd say they'd probably lock 'im up in Guantanamo, rough him up a bit, execute him a few years later and put his portrait next to Benedict Arnold's.

Case 1: dead general without official justice; Case 2: dead general without official justice. What's your point?

[a19999577]

ORIGINAL: Chelco

Case 1: dead general without official justice; Case 2: dead general without official justice. What's your point?

My point is, that it doesn't matter if you're a 'lunatic' or 'sane', 'tyrranical' or 'democratic', a conspiring general will probably be executed all the same. To count this as one of Hitler's nazi-inspired follies is fairly obtuse.

[freeboy]

not really where we where headed.. but that s ok, I often go in a tangential manner.. no worries.... feel the love ?

[EricGuitarJames]

ORIGINAL: Chelco

Why Hitler was such a fool to don't listen to his Generals? Why his obsession with planning the details of certain operations?

Hitler had little respect for his generals as a whole. They had opposed his 'gambles' in the '30s (Rhineland, Anschluss, Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia) and been proved wrong, their war plans had been unimaginative and timid (the original plan for the invasion of France was little more than a re-run of the WW1 Schlieffen Plan!). Unfortunately this gave Hitler an over-inflated opinion of his own abilities, something fueled by the lackeys like Jodl and Keitel whom he surrounded himself with. The upshot of this was that Hitler attributed the early successes to his own abilities and when things went wrong he blamed his generals for not following his orders - hence his obsession for greater operational control being vested in his own hands.

[Real and Simulated Wars]

ORIGINAL: a19999577
My point is, that it doesn't matter if you're a 'lunatic' or 'sane', 'tyrranical' or 'democratic', a conspiring general will probably be executed all the same. To count this as one of Hitler's nazi-inspired follies is fairly obtuse.

Hi a19999577,
You bring very good points to the discussion. I appreciate them.
Despite I disagree, I understand your point. If Rommel's would have been court-martialed he would have been found guilty and executed. Not very honorable end in a nazi-inspired country.
But again, if one of your best generals, who BTW served your country for two wars, conspired to kill you because is tired of your ruling... is very likely that the general's suicide will be told as one of your dictatorship-inspired follies. Hitler, as the nazi party's #1 lunatic and tyrant, is to blame for Rommel's death. Germany lost a terrific general and a real patriot because of Hitler.
Cheers,

[Real and Simulated Wars]

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames
Hitler had little respect for his generals as a whole. They had opposed his 'gambles' in the '30s (Rhineland, Anschluss, Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia) and been proved wrong, their war plans had been unimaginative and timid (the original plan for the invasion of France was little more than a re-run of the WW1 Schlieffen Plan!). Unfortunately this gave Hitler an over-inflated opinion of his own abilities, something fueled by the lackeys like Jodl and Keitel whom he surrounded himself with. The upshot of this was that Hitler attributed the early successes to his own abilities and when things went wrong he blamed his generals for not following his orders - hence his obsession for greater operational control being vested in his own hands.

Hi Eric,
VonMellentin in his "Panzer Battles" is always complaining about Hitler's obsession about details (he claims that sometimes Hitler gave detailed orders about batallions dispositions for an upcoming operation!).
Your statement about the plan to invade France (unimaginative and timid) really got me thinking. How many of Hitler's generals were really brilliant or at least had innovative thinking?
Cheers,

[Error in 0]

ORIGINAL: Chelco

ORIGINAL: EricGuitarJames
Hitler had little respect for his generals as a whole. They had opposed his 'gambles' in the '30s (Rhineland, Anschluss, Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia) and been proved wrong, their war plans had been unimaginative and timid (the original plan for the invasion of France was little more than a re-run of the WW1 Schlieffen Plan!). Unfortunately this gave Hitler an over-inflated opinion of his own abilities, something fueled by the lackeys like Jodl and Keitel whom he surrounded himself with. The upshot of this was that Hitler attributed the early successes to his own abilities and when things went wrong he blamed his generals for not following his orders - hence his obsession for greater operational control being vested in his own hands.

Hi Eric,
VonMellentin in his "Panzer Battles" is always complaining about Hitler's obsession about details (he claims that sometimes Hitler gave detailed orders about batallions dispositions for an upcoming operation!).
Your statement about the plan to invade France (unimaginative and timid) really got me thinking. How many of Hitler's generals were really brilliant or at least had innovative thinking?
Cheers,

During the battle for Stalingrad, Hitler gave orders on what buildings were to be attacked; from Berlin! But do not understand his interest in details for being sounded on good military logic, as they certainly was not! Hitler despised military theory.

My impression as to what happened prior to the invasion of Poland and France is as follows:
The high command was basically officers from WW1, and somewhat rigid in their opinions. Younger officers were coming up, with truly imaginitive and innovative ideas (Manstein et al), but they had to convince some major authoroties of their brilliance, which anyone can understand is difficult. Enter Hitler: a guy that believes that will and commitment is superior to theory, and because of that finds Mansteins plan right down his ally. Not because he understood the plan better, but because he understood the oportunistic side of it.

The war itself is a testimony that german field commanders were brilliant and innovative, or else they would not have had the successes they had.



JT

[EricGuitarJames]

Hitler loved radical ideas, as well as the men who came up with them. This was the key to gaining his favour and why German scientific achievement during the war was so stunning, even with the loss of so many Jewish top scientists. It also often lead to a diversification of effort as teams competed for resources - look at the development of the jet fighter for just one very good example. Generals like Rommel, Guderian, Manstein et al all flourished under Hitler because of their belief in, and the implementation of, 'new' ideas.

[IronDuke_slith]

My impression as to what happened prior to the invasion of Poland and France is as follows:
The high command was basically officers from WW1, and somewhat rigid in their opinions. Younger officers were coming up, with truly imaginitive and innovative ideas (Manstein et al), but they had to convince some major authoroties of their brilliance, which anyone can understand is difficult.

I'm not sure it's so clear cut. Manstein, Rommel and Guderian all served in the first world war, albeit at lower and middle Officer ranks. Rommel wrote a book on infantry tactics, but never commanded armour until 1940. Manstein was a Staff Officer, Guderian was a proponent but not the originator of German armoured theory. I think you might find some conservatism within the upper ranks but all Guderian did was fit the tank into existing German doctrine, which was shared by most if not all German Officers. It was therefore a tactical achievement as much as a strategic one, although he certainly fits the bill as much as anyone as the younger and more imaginitive Officer you point to.

Enter Hitler: a guy that believes that will and commitment is superior to theory, and because of that finds Mansteins plan right down his ally. Not because he understood the plan better, but because he understood the oportunistic side of it.

The initial assault into Belgium (ala Schliefen as EricGuitarJames pointed out) was accepted by Hitler, and he pushed his Gernals hard to actually launch it. It only got changed when it was compromised in the winter of 39-40. I think Hitler did like the gamble, and did see the operational possibilities of Manstein's plan when it was put to him. Perhaps the fact he did not have the formal military training of the rest of the High Command helped him accept it and appreciate it here, although Manstein was a product of that Officer training, so I've always preferred to see it as a brilliant, daring plan, dreamed up by a fine operational and strategic mind. Tanks made what would have been a battle winning plan (in the first world war) into a war winning plan in the second.

My own take on Hitler was that his successes and inner will drove him into thinking he was cleverer than anyone else. I think major psychological flaws that saw him blame everyone but himself for the problems that beset Germany drove him to take more and more on himself.

It came to a head in 1941/42. I think there was one crucial event, and that was the Soviet Counterattack in Winter 1941. The infamous assault of the Siberians that drove the Wehrmacht back from the gates of the Moscow. The Wehrmacht were saved by two things. Stalin tried to do too much with the forces he had (and ended up doing little as a result), and German tactical dominance saw them survive the assaults.
However, amidst all this, Hitler did his level best to prevent any retreats. This (for once and only once in the war) helped, because any retreat could have become a rout with the pressure the Germans were under.

Perceiving himself vindicated, Hitler sees Brauchtisch go, Hitler becomes head of the Wehrmacht, Rundstedt, Guderian and Leeb are sacked/retired and Hitler is on his way. Everything else after that is best described by a Psychiatrist/Psychologist.

Regards,
IronDuke

[terje439]

Several mistakes were done prior to the attack on Russia, and added up they spelled sure defeat for the germans.
-poor intelligence, not realizing the ammount of men that the red army could draw upon, and not
realizing that Russian roads were not the same as European roads, and not giving enough thought
on the fact that Russian and European railroads had different tracksize, so that german trains could
not drive from Europe and deep into Russia.
-not accepting the fact that the war might last until wintertime
-not taking Moscow, as that was a major transportcentre
-not beeing able to deny Russia lend-lease help from the commonwealth and the US
-basing their panzerarmy on quality over quantity, and not making lots of welltried tanks
-the thinking of russians as untermensch, not taking their fightingabilities seriously enough
-not realising just HOW big the Russian steppes are
-not beeing able to replace their losses soon enough
-the altering of divisional strength to maintain lots of divisions instead of filling the already excisting
divisions.
-the treatment of the Russian population
-fighting a twosided war, after all in Norway alone there were 350.000 German soldiers as Hitler
thought of this as a Schweerpunkt (decisive area of the war)

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: terje439

Several mistakes were done prior to the attack on Russia, and added up they spelled sure defeat for the germans.
-poor intelligence, not realizing the ammount of men that the red army could draw upon, and not
realizing that Russian roads were not the same as European roads, and not giving enough thought
on the fact that Russian and European railroads had different tracksize, so that german trains could
not drive from Europe and deep into Russia.
-not accepting the fact that the war might last until wintertime
-not taking Moscow, as that was a major transportcentre
-not beeing able to deny Russia lend-lease help from the commonwealth and the US
-basing their panzerarmy on quality over quantity, and not making lots of welltried tanks
-the thinking of russians as untermensch, not taking their fightingabilities seriously enough
-not realising just HOW big the Russian steppes are
-not beeing able to replace their losses soon enough
-the altering of divisional strength to maintain lots of divisions instead of filling the already excisting
divisions.
-the treatment of the Russian population
-fighting a twosided war, after all in Norway alone there were 350.000 German soldiers as Hitler
thought of this as a Schweerpunkt (decisive area of the war)

An excellent summary. I think the key one is:

poor intelligence, not realizing the ammount of men that the red army could draw upon

Barbarossa was designed to smash the Russian Field Army in Poland and the Russian border areas. That task was largely completed at Kiev when the Southern Armies were annihilated. The German error was that they didn't anticipate that the Russians would be able to replace the smashed armies so quickly. The few weeks after Kiev was the only time (despite inflicting millions of casualties) that the Germans held numerical superiority.

Had the Germans realised this, I think Barbarossa might have looked a little different, although it's hard to see what else they could have done. Moscow wasn't on whilst 600 000 Russians sat in Kiev, so maybe (and someone has already mentioned this) the key error was in the Balkans, delaying Barbarossa by a month or more. If you had to fight encirclement battles at Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev and Briansk, an extra month of useful weather might have given you a better chance at the ultimate prize of Moscow. That said, this plan would come with no guarantees, and the Siberians would have still turned up against gravely weakened German forces either way.

I just think the Germans attempted it with fewer resources than it required. If they couldn't find another 20-30 divisions to use, then it was a mistake to launch it.

Regards,
IronDuke

[Error in 0]

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

I just think the Germans attempted it with fewer resources than it required. If they couldn't find another 20-30 divisions to use, then it was a mistake to launch it.

Yes, its an interesting 'what if' if Germany had gone to war economy from the beginning. When they finally decided to use their industries, the production rate was rocketing. Change all those PzII and III's with Tigers, and later Panthers, add new divisions, air squadrons etc etc, and Barbarossa would have been a success. And then what?


JT

[fjbn]

I think that simply Hitler was out of reality, and destroyed any rest of controversy in OKW. Some people have said that there were a lack of logistic. Well, German campaigns in the West were very short, not more than three months, and after that time all the vehicles were fully repaired. This was not possible in Russia, distances were much bigger.

Barbarroja were simply not a good plan. You have to design an axis of advance according to your strenght, and this was not the case. Whermacht advanced in three axis but without leaving any priority to no one. With that estrategy you can get all or, more probably, get nothing, but this was a line of thinking impossible with Hitler.

This was the mistake in Case Blue too. Hitler introduced so many changes in the operations that tha aim of the offensive, a fast advance to the Caucasus and Volga, was converted and a slow one because of the lack of strenght, and the consecuence was that the forces in Caucasus couldn't break the front and take the oil camps, and this was the real objective of Case Blue.

When you are out of reality, victory is impossible. It's curious that the biggest victories in the East Front (Jarkov counterattack in 1942 and 1943) were against Hitler's opinion.

[fjbn]

About production. Germany were bigger than England, but England produced in 1940 (Battle of England ) more military material than Germany. Germany was not really doing a war effort until 1943, just when the war was yet on the allies side. If Germany had produced enough PzIV or fighters in 1941 and 1942 as he did in 1943-1944, when there were still many veterans crews, maybe the result have been different.

[IronDuke_slith]

ORIGINAL: JallaTryne

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

I just think the Germans attempted it with fewer resources than it required. If they couldn't find another 20-30 divisions to use, then it was a mistake to launch it.

Yes, its an interesting 'what if' if Germany had gone to war economy from the beginning. When they finally decided to use their industries, the production rate was rocketing. Change all those PzII and III's with Tigers, and later Panthers, add new divisions, air squadrons etc etc, and Barbarossa would have been a success. And then what?


JT

JallaTryne,
I don't think the Germans would have got the Tiger and Panther much earlier than they did (42 and 43) respectively. The Panther, in particular, was built after a study of the T-34, so was not even on the drawing board as Barbarossa started. The Tiger had a rather more complicated development history, which also made it a non-starter for Barbaross, although it was entering service by August 1942.

Operational needs can often drive Tank design and development, and the Germans weren't doing too badly with what they had in France etc. However, the T-34 and KV series came as a shock, and I think accelerated things, although in addition to these weapons, they also upgunned the MK III and MK IV.

The bit about the war economy is interesting. I think it might have made some difference. However, extra weapons require extra soldiers, and recruiting extra soldiers, means taking the skilled craftsmen and labourers who build the weapons, so it's a tricky circle. The Germans got around it with masses of slave labour, but this is not a perfect solution.

It might have helped them survive longer, but I don't know if it would have necessarily changed the result.

Regards,
IronDuke

[IronDuke_slith]

fjbn
Barbarroja were simply not a good plan. You have to design an axis of advance according to your strenght, and this was not the case. Whermacht advanced in three axis but without leaving any priority to no one. With that estrategy you can get all or, more probably, get nothing, but this was a line of thinking impossible with Hitler.

Although I think you make a good point about Blue, I don't think the point is as valid for Barbarossa.

The German plan wasn't really about the Axes of advance, but about the destruction of the Russian Field Army in Eastern Poland and Western Russia. This they largely achieved with encirclements at Minsk, Smolensk, Kiev etc. To concentrate on only one or two Axes of advance would have left a very vulnerable flank somewhere. For example, had the Germans just shielded Russian forces in the Ukraine and used the Southern Panzer Group in Army Group Centre instead, once they cleared the Pripiat Marshes at Smolensk, they were suddenly advancing towards with Moscow with a very long and exposed right, southern flank. As I pointed out in another thread, air power doesn't protect flanks, troops have to do it, and this was never more the case than in the vastness of Russia. With 600 000 Russians at Kiev, for example, it would have been operationally suspect to pile forward for Moscow with such a force sat on an open flank. Had you withdrawn forces from Army Group South to reinforce the centre for the initial attack, Rundstedt would never have cleared the Ukraine alone, or certainly not quickly enough to prevent this open flank as Army Group Centre advanced more quickly.

Ultimately, the German logistical support was not good enough, and German troops levels were too low to defeat the Soviet union.

fjbn
This was the mistake in Case Blue too. Hitler introduced so many changes in the operations that tha aim of the offensive, a fast advance to the Caucasus and Volga, was converted and a slow one because of the lack of strenght, and the consecuence was that the forces in Caucasus couldn't break the front and take the oil camps, and this was the real objective of Case Blue.

I agree here. Any chance of success with Blau was destroyed with the constant changing of objectives etc. However, the Russians were far cleverer at this stage of the war, and yielded ground more readily to prevent encirclement. The German armoured pincers of Blau usually created huge pockets of empty territory, certainly compared to the victories of '41. Blau was also launched with too few men. It did represent Germany's last chance, particularly since the defeats of Mars and Kharkov 42 had cost the Russians heavily, and meant there were fewer potential defenders than there might have been.

Regards,
IronDuke