A Japanese invasion of Hawaii

[Buckrock]

Goodnesss, this thread is actually getting me interested in the boring Pacific theatre Buckrock

Odd, it's having the opposite effect on me.

So moving away from the Hawaiian leg of the 'plan' for a second, I am keen to understand more about the impact that taking the IJNAF aircraft away from Luzon would have on operations in the Philippines - and of course the subsequent move in the NEI.

Of course the chances of the Maui invasion force not being detected is pretty much zero but, lets go with the scenario that either a) they are not detected, or b) they are detected sufficiently late in the day that MacArthur, Brereton and Sutherland in the PI take no action other than what they did in real life.

What would the likely effect be? With a) less aircraft, and b) less long range aircraft, what level of loss would the USAAF and USN likely suffered in those initial days? Perhaps moreover, would sufficent aircraft be available to interupt the Japanese landings in the southern PI? Obviously it's impossible to say with certainty, but presumably those in the know can hazard an educated guess? My (admittedly limited) understanding is that it was the IJNAF aircraft (as opposed to the shorter range IJAAF) that really hurt the US airforce, but that may be incorrect.

This aspect is of course vital to the 'plan' because of the need to secure the NEI.

Everything is too vague to contemplate. My head hurts.

I'm certainly not going to try to quantify the outcome but effectively it will mean that FEAF will probably have more operational aircraft remaining when the Bettys and Nells and Zeros head south 4 weeks into the war. Or it means FEAF has suffered its historic mauling but it took most of the 4 weeks to do it and the JNAF has suffered heavier casualties. Either way the JAAF wont be much help as under Curtis Lemay's current plan only their fighters and none of their bombers are being moved to within range of the main US airfields on Luzon and since we know the JAAF will refuse to participate in JNAF operations, they'll not have much to do other than defend their new base on Mindoro.

After that things should move roughly historically in the DEI until the Japanese begin their air efforts against Java. That's when the lower numbers of Bettys and Zeros may tell (or if FEAF was able to send some of its now larger force south to reinforce Java). And then there is the issue with this "flexible delay" to the start time of the war, guaranteeing more P-40s and B-17s that were already on their way to the Philippines as of Dec 7th will now be available earlier and in greater numbers for the defence of Java.

As I said, it's all currently too vague to properly analyze but regardless of whatever form Curtis Lemay's plan finally takes, the Japanese are now in for a harder fight to complete the last part of their DEI campaign.

[RangerJoe]

Secondly, but just as important, how is the unknown date for the Pearl Harbor attack (and thus the war starting between the Japanese and the Western Allies) going to be co-ordinated to ensure that all forces are advised and so don't act precipitously?

As part of the Malaya operation, the Japanese sent out a submarine screen and laid minefields to keep the RN away from the invasion convoys. As part of this plan the convoys left on 4 December to be in place for the attack on the 7th. But of course the attack has to be postponed because the required number of carriers are not at Pearl. So the invasion forces are all recalled, but how do all the subs of the submarine screen get told about the delay? What if the minefield is detected? Would the British not wonder why mines have been laid off southern Malaya?

When does the invasion fleet for Midway need to sail (by the way we still need to know what this fleet is made up of and also exactly what defences the US have on Midway). This is pretty important for obvious reasons, but doubly so when the invasion force appear to be relying upon carrier aircraft from the KB. But while approaching Midway the invasion fleet won't have air cover initially.

Has any check been made on whether the Japanese actually have enough destroyers for all these simultaneous additional operations. Yes, we've been told that the destroyers that would have taken part in the Luzon landings are now free, but we also know that more than 10% of the Japanese destroyer strength has been converted to allow the Maui attack to take place.

How many destroyers (and other ships) will be needed for:

- The Midway invasion?
- The escort of the tankers and ships that will be providing follow up supplies, fuel and ordnance to Midway and Maui?
- Just how many tankers have the Japanese had to add to those that were actually used for the Pearl attack to keep all these extra ships at sea (and remember, this for what is an indeterminate length of time)? Japanese weren't exacly flush with tankers - but more tankers means more destroyer escorts.
- I understand that the follow up supply vessels for Maui are no longer to be destroyers, but will be merchant ships. Presumably they are not going to sail to Maui with just a destroyer (more destroyers!! but how many?) escort. But they can't use cruisers from the KB as they were needed at Wake (although the Japanese won't have known that at the time). So does that mean the merchant ships have nothing larger than a destroyer force to escort them or does the attack on Wake get delayed even further?
- And remember, all the while these ships are not in Maui, the aircraft (assuming the airfield was in Japanese hands and they landed safely) are simply empty, impotent and pretty much defenceless chunks of metal.....

The defenses at Midway had the 6th Marine Defense Battalion which included 5 inch (127 mm) CD guns and 3 inch AAA guns. They damaged the destroyer Ushio on the 8th of December, which is the reason why I mentioned that someone should look up that ship and Midway.

https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Midway

Of course, being US Naval Infantry, all US Marines can act as infantrymen.

"Organization

Unlike the mobile Marine forces involved in offensive actions, defense battalions were detached to key outposts, in the Pacific and one in Iceland,[1] and remained at the station they defended.[2] Most varied greatly in size and equipment. The battalions often had several coastal gun batteries, several anti-aircraft batteries, a detection battery (searchlights and radar), and machine gun units. While a few had composite infantry companies attached, most defense battalions were responsible for providing their own riflemen.

A 1939 table of organization and equipment (TOE) included:[3]

HQ Company
Service battery
Six platoons, each with a searchlight and aircraft sound locator
Coast Defense Group
Three batteries, each with two Mark 15 5"/51 caliber guns
Antiaircraft Group
Four AAA gun batteries, each with four mobile 3-inch M3 guns
Two AAA machine gun companies, each with 24 Browning M2 .50-caliber machine guns on AA mounts
Two beach protection machine gun companies, each with 24 Browning M1917A1 water-cooled .30-caliber machine guns

It is likely that the 5"/51 caliber guns were replaced by the 155 mm Long Tom and the 3-inch guns were replaced by the 90 mm Gun M1/M2/M3 by early 1943. "

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marine_defense_battalions

Something to read about these battalions:

https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publi ... 163218-440

This US Marine shot first:

https://www.pacificwar.org.au/Midway/Ed ... idway.html

[Curtis Lemay]

Just a reminder:

They ignored radar detection of the incoming planes.
Not true, a butterbar in training did not verify what the contact was nor did he ask his training officer for advise.
They ignored a sub caught sneaking into the harbor.
The USS Ward sank the sub, how is that ignoring it? The Captain of the Ward was new, he only took command on the Friday before so verification was requested.
They bungled detection of the Japanese ultimatum.
There was no bungling, it was not a declaration of war. It was essentially stating that further talks would not be productive at this time. President Rooseveldt had just asked for an in person meeting which could actually have prevented this war.
The AAA had no ammo.
That how were the Japanese planes shot down? Especially by a cook with no training?
They were STUNNED that Pearl had been attacked.
So? If you were there, wouldn't you be stunned? All of the other Japanese movements were detected, the Japanese aircraft carriers were thought to be in their home waters. Even with modern technology, ships and aircraft may not be found when in or over the ocean.

The US was oblivious. The APDs are arriving at night on a weekend. The risk is very low. The reward is huge.
The US was not oblivious to the possibility of war coming and the US was preparing. The risk is very high and the reward is questionable. For the number of aircraft that you have been mentioning, the carrier air groups of the USS Enterprise and the USS Lexington could have handled them. This would be while those two aircraft carriers would be steaming for the US West Coast where all available combat aircraft would be sent. Troops as well but they would probably come later. There would be no US troops or aircraft sent to Europe for awhile, unlike in real life where a US Division arrived in the United Kingdom in January 1942 . . .

Their actions scream obliviousness. The best alert possible - radar detection of the incoming air raid - was ignored! A sub sunk at the harbor entrance was ignored! An ultimatum - including a timeline and instructions to destroy secret documents was recognized as a war declaration - but its transmission to Pearl was bungled. No AAA ammo illustrates how oblivious they were. Those two carriers you mention are going to be at Pearl - first targets hit. They will be torched in a hurry.

And Oahu was the bulls-eye. Maui was a backwater. If Oahu was oblivious, multiply Maui's obliviousness by 10!

But you still did not suggest a better plan than attacking an island by invading a public beach on a weekend, moving overland, then attacking one or more military posts as a surprise attack - with alert military forces at that location.

At night, on a weekend, in peacetime, guided by pathfinders. Maui has about a 150 mile coastline. The pathfinders will find a spot to land undetected. The APDs will be about as detectable as stealth fighters. All that's being risked is two battalions. The reward is a TWO YEAR delay in US response.

[warspite1]

The defenses at Midway had the 6th Marine Defense Battalion which included 5 inch (127 mm) CD guns and 3 inch AAA guns. They damaged the destroyer Ushio on the 8th of December, which is the reason why I mentioned that someone should look up that ship and Midway.

https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Midway

warspite1

But what did they have in December 1941? I suspect there were less aircraft, but I'm afraid I don't know...... and for any 'Plan' to be so confidently announced, knowing the opposition to be faced is really important.....

[Curtis Lemay]

Thank-you for this Buckrock. It is nice to have some detail at last. The Lahaina Roads, and the position of this anchorage, would clearly stop the Japanese from even considering any such operation ahead of the successful conquest of the NEI and capture of the oil.

Maui is huge and has a coastline about 150 miles long. The landings wouldn't be anywhere near Lahaina Roads.

Imho the limitations of the plan (previously set out) no longer even need considering because Japan simply couldn’t consider this (and even that assumed plan was only ‘possible’ if the Japanese were given foresight they never had, and a relaxed attitude to the rather important matter of oil that no leaders of an industrialised country could surely have.

They approved the Pearl Harbor raid. If alerted to the gigantic benefits of ensuring carriers were in port and the oil stocks being torched, they could approve the revisions to it.

[Curtis Lemay]

Puunene was probably the one Hawaiian airfield outside of Oahu the Japanese couldn't attempt to occupy without rapidly tripping a clear alarm back at Kimmel's HQ. And last time I checked, Curtis Lemay was going to attempt this in broad daylight.

The whole area was a giant radio net, connected back to PH (and the area was communicating with PH during the raid, it's in the CINCPAC logs). The airfield control station had radios. The aircraft being readied around the airfield had radios. The aircraft flying over the nearby waters had radios, as did the ships and the Maalaea shore base and likely any parties dropped off elsewhere to monitor the training exercises. If such a key comms center for the training goes offline, it wont take long before someone drives the less than two miles back from Maalaea to the airfield or one of the utility aircraft comes back to land or flies overhead to blinker the airfield.

And this was supposed to go unrecognized for days.

The pathfinders will know where radios are and telephone controls are. This is an attack against a force at peace, surprised, and from the rear. They're probably hung over too. The Pearl raid will trigger mass confusion, with Japanese sightings even on the West Coast.

[Curtis Lemay]

Of course the chances of the Maui invasion force not being detected is pretty much zero...

Chances of detection are about the same as a steath fighter.

but, lets go with the scenario that either a) they are not detected, or b) they are detected sufficiently late in the day that MacArthur, Brereton and Sutherland in the PI take no action other than what they did in real life.

Their attacks on Maui don't begin till the raid starts.

What would the likely effect be? With a) less aircraft, and b) less long range aircraft, what level of loss would the USAAF and USN likely suffered in those initial days? Perhaps moreover, would sufficent aircraft be available to interupt the Japanese landings in the southern PI? Obviously it's impossible to say with certainty, but presumably those in the know can hazard an educated guess? My (admittedly limited) understanding is that it was the IJNAF aircraft (as opposed to the shorter range IJAAF) that really hurt the US airforce, but that may be incorrect.

This aspect is of course vital to the 'plan' because of the need to secure the NEI.

15% less aircraft. But lots of ground and sea forces released for use elsewhere. The net effect on the NEI operation is probably positive.

[Curtis Lemay]

Secondly, but just as important, how is the unknown date for the Pearl Harbor attack (and thus the war starting between the Japanese and the Western Allies) going to be co-ordinated to ensure that all forces are advised and so don't act precipitously?

As part of the Malaya operation, the Japanese sent out a submarine screen and laid minefields to keep the RN away from the invasion convoys. As part of this plan the convoys left on 4 December to be in place for the attack on the 7th. But of course the attack has to be postponed because the required number of carriers are not at Pearl. So the invasion forces are all recalled, but how do all the subs of the submarine screen get told about the delay? What if the minefield is detected? Would the British not wonder why mines have been laid off southern Malaya?

The invasion force was detected long in advance. It made no difference. The Allies are oblivous.

When does the invasion fleet for Midway need to sail (by the way we still need to know what this fleet is made up of and also exactly what defences the US have on Midway). This is pretty important for obvious reasons, but doubly so when the invasion force appear to be relying upon carrier aircraft from the KB. But while approaching Midway the invasion fleet won't have air cover initially.

You seriously think the Japanese can't coordinate two fleets?

Has any check been made on whether the Japanese actually have enough destroyers for all these simultaneous additional operations. Yes, we've been told that the destroyers that would have taken part in the Luzon landings are now free, but we also know that more than 10% of the Japanese destroyer strength has been converted to allow the Maui attack to take place.

Luzon is postponed. Lot of naval stuff released for use elsewhere.

How many destroyers (and other ships) will be needed for:

- The Midway invasion?
- The escort of the tankers and ships that will be providing follow up supplies, fuel and ordnance to Midway and Maui?

Less than would be required at Luzon.

- Just how many tankers have the Japanese had to add to those that were actually used for the Pearl attack to keep all these extra ships at sea (and remember, this for what is an indeterminate length of time)? Japanese weren't exacly flush with tankers - but more tankers means more destroyer escorts.

Merchant cargo ships can carry fuel in drums. No escorts. (Did the Japanese even escort supply convoys ever?) How could they be intercepted in the vastness of the North Pacific, anyway?

- I understand that the follow up supply vessels for Maui are no longer to be destroyers, but will be merchant ships. Presumably they are not going to sail to Maui with just a destroyer (more destroyers!! but how many?) escort. But they can't use cruisers from the KB as they were needed at Wake (although the Japanese won't have known that at the time). So does that mean the merchant ships have nothing larger than a destroyer force to escort them or does the attack on Wake get delayed even further?
- And remember, all the while these ships are not in Maui, the aircraft (assuming the airfield was in Japanese hands and they landed safely) are simply empty, impotent and pretty much defenceless chunks of metal.....

The initial destroyer and merchant ship force delivers about 5000 tons of supplies. That's enough for a long time.

[RangerJoe]

The defenses at Midway had the 6th Marine Defense Battalion which included 5 inch (127 mm) CD guns and 3 inch AAA guns. They damaged the destroyer Ushio on the 8th of December, which is the reason why I mentioned that someone should look up that ship and Midway.

https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Midway

warspite1

But what did they have in December 1941? I suspect there were less aircraft, but I'm afraid I don't know...... and for any 'Plan' to be so confidently announced, knowing the opposition to be faced is really important.....

The defenses at Midway included 5 inch CD guns and 3 inch AAA guns which damaged the Ushio and drove off the two destroyers that bombarded Midway on the 8th of December 1941. That would be enough to drive off any impromtu invasion from Japanese destroyers. If you read about Midway, there wasn't a lot of things for men to do. But there is always guard duty to keep them busy and out of mischief.

[RangerJoe]

Since someone is "oblivious" to what other people post, does not understand US nor Japanese Naval Operations at the time, nor apparently even reads links to what other people post, and continuously insults the US and Allied military, I will quit responding to that individual. While individuals at higher levels would perform their jobs by performing PYP (aka, CYA) this would not apply to the individuals on the ground - especially the NCOs.

[Buckrock]

The defenses at Midway had the 6th Marine Defense Battalion which included 5 inch (127 mm) CD guns and 3 inch AAA guns. They damaged the destroyer Ushio on the 8th of December, which is the reason why I mentioned that someone should look up that ship and Midway.

https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Midway

warspite1

But what did they have in December 1941? I suspect there were less aircraft, but I'm afraid I don't know...... and for any 'Plan' to be so confidently announced, knowing the opposition to be faced is really important.....

On top of what RangerJoe mentioned, Midway had roughly twice the Marine personnel as Wake (about 800 to 400) but the number of 5" CD and 3" DP guns on Dec 7th were about the same as on Wake. Both Midway and Wake were due for further troop and AA/CD reinforcements but whether that would have happened in the timeframe of Curtis Lemay's delayed start is unknown.

A squadron of PBYs (VP-21) was also operating operating from Midway atoll and had the PH Raid not happened on cue then 18 SB2U dive-bombers from VMSB-231 would have been delivered by the Lexington within days.

[Buckrock]

Puunene was probably the one Hawaiian airfield outside of Oahu the Japanese couldn't attempt to occupy without rapidly tripping a clear alarm back at Kimmel's HQ. And last time I checked, Curtis Lemay was going to attempt this in broad daylight.

The whole area was a giant radio net, connected back to PH (and the area was communicating with PH during the raid, it's in the CINCPAC logs). The airfield control station had radios. The aircraft being readied around the airfield had radios. The aircraft flying over the nearby waters had radios, as did the ships and the Maalaea shore base and likely any parties dropped off elsewhere to monitor the training exercises. If such a key comms center for the training goes offline, it wont take long before someone drives the less than two miles back from Maalaea to the airfield or one of the utility aircraft comes back to land or flies overhead to blinker the airfield.

And this was supposed to go unrecognized for days.

The pathfinders will know where radios are and telephone controls are. This is an attack against a force at peace, surprised, and from the rear. They're probably hung over too. The Pearl raid will trigger mass confusion, with Japanese sightings even on the West Coast.

Sorry but you're just spitballing again. It's effectively meaningless unless you start supplying some specifics for your plan like the ones I identified earlier. That way we'll at least have something to compare against relevant historical accounts.

[warspite1]

The defenses at Midway had the 6th Marine Defense Battalion which included 5 inch (127 mm) CD guns and 3 inch AAA guns. They damaged the destroyer Ushio on the 8th of December, which is the reason why I mentioned that someone should look up that ship and Midway.

https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Midway

warspite1

But what did they have in December 1941? I suspect there were less aircraft, but I'm afraid I don't know...... and for any 'Plan' to be so confidently announced, knowing the opposition to be faced is really important.....

On top of what RangerJoe mentioned, Midway had roughly twice the Marine personnel as Wake (about 800 to 400) but the number of 5" CD and 3" DP guns on Dec 7th were about the same as on Wake. Both Midway and Wake were due for further troop and AA/CD reinforcements but whether that would have happened in the timeframe of Curtis Lemay's delayed start is unknown.

A squadron of PBYs (VP-21) was also operating operating from Midway atoll and had the PH Raid not happened on cue then 18 SB2U dive-bombers from VMSB-231 would have been delivered by the Lexington within days

warspite1

So yet another example of the Japanese being disadvantaged thanks to the ‘plan’......

[Buckrock]

warspite1

But what did they have in December 1941? I suspect there were less aircraft, but I'm afraid I don't know...... and for any 'Plan' to be so confidently announced, knowing the opposition to be faced is really important.....

On top of what RangerJoe mentioned, Midway had roughly twice the Marine personnel as Wake (about 800 to 400) but the number of 5" CD and 3" DP guns on Dec 7th were about the same as on Wake. Both Midway and Wake were due for further troop and AA/CD reinforcements but whether that would have happened in the timeframe of Curtis Lemay's delayed start is unknown.

A squadron of PBYs (VP-21) was also operating operating from Midway atoll and had the PH Raid not happened on cue then 18 SB2U dive-bombers from VMSB-231 would have been delivered by the Lexington within days

warspite1

So yet another example of the Japanese being disadvantaged thanks to the ‘plan’......

Please don't try to build a list of disadvantages one example at a time. The thread is already over 30 pages long as is.

[RangerJoe]

On top of what RangerJoe mentioned, Midway had roughly twice the Marine personnel as Wake (about 800 to 400) but the number of 5" CD and 3" DP guns on Dec 7th were about the same as on Wake. Both Midway and Wake were due for further troop and AA/CD reinforcements but whether that would have happened in the timeframe of Curtis Lemay's delayed start is unknown.

A squadron of PBYs (VP-21) was also operating operating from Midway atoll and had the PH Raid not happened on cue then 18 SB2U dive-bombers from VMSB-231 would have been delivered by the Lexington within days

warspite1

So yet another example of the Japanese being disadvantaged thanks to the ‘plan’......

Please don't try to build a list of disadvantages one example at a time. The thread is already over 30 pages long as is.

Except that there is no "plan" so to speak since there is nothing definite other than an invasion that is supposed to take place before the raid on Pearl Harbor or during or after. That is correct, not even a timeline for those seasick gravel agitators to try and make it ashore during whatever weather there happens to be there.

[Curtis Lemay]

The defenses at Midway had the 6th Marine Defense Battalion which included 5 inch (127 mm) CD guns and 3 inch AAA guns. They damaged the destroyer Ushio on the 8th of December, which is the reason why I mentioned that someone should look up that ship and Midway.

https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Midway

warspite1

But what did they have in December 1941? I suspect there were less aircraft, but I'm afraid I don't know...... and for any 'Plan' to be so confidently announced, knowing the opposition to be faced is really important.....

On top of what RangerJoe mentioned, Midway had roughly twice the Marine personnel as Wake (about 800 to 400) but the number of 5" CD and 3" DP guns on Dec 7th were about the same as on Wake. Both Midway and Wake were due for further troop and AA/CD reinforcements but whether that would have happened in the timeframe of Curtis Lemay's delayed start is unknown.

A squadron of PBYs (VP-21) was also operating operating from Midway atoll and had the PH Raid not happened on cue then 18 SB2U dive-bombers from VMSB-231 would have been delivered by the Lexington within days.

The invasion force will be four regular infantry battalions - 4400 men. They will be supported by the fleet from the raid: six carriers, two BBs, 2 CAs, 1 CL, and 11 DD, plus the 12 APDs.

More than enough to smash any resistance.

[Curtis Lemay]

warspite1

But what did they have in December 1941? I suspect there were less aircraft, but I'm afraid I don't know...... and for any 'Plan' to be so confidently announced, knowing the opposition to be faced is really important.....

On top of what RangerJoe mentioned, Midway had roughly twice the Marine personnel as Wake (about 800 to 400) but the number of 5" CD and 3" DP guns on Dec 7th were about the same as on Wake. Both Midway and Wake were due for further troop and AA/CD reinforcements but whether that would have happened in the timeframe of Curtis Lemay's delayed start is unknown.

A squadron of PBYs (VP-21) was also operating operating from Midway atoll and had the PH Raid not happened on cue then 18 SB2U dive-bombers from VMSB-231 would have been delivered by the Lexington within days

warspite1

So yet another example of the Japanese being disadvantaged thanks to the ‘plan’......

If you don't count sinking two carriers and delaying the US response by two years!

[Curtis Lemay]

Sorry but you're just spitballing again. It's effectively meaningless unless you start supplying some specifics for your plan like the ones I identified earlier. That way we'll at least have something to compare against relevant historical accounts.

Whatever you're talking about is too trivial to respond to. The APDs have to be 100 miles from Maui 12 hours ahead of the fleet arriving at the launch point. Trivial.

[Buckrock]

Sorry but you're just spitballing again. It's effectively meaningless unless you start supplying some specifics for your plan like the ones I identified earlier. That way we'll at least have something to compare against relevant historical accounts.

Whatever you're talking about is too trivial to respond to. The APDs have to be 100 miles from Maui 12 hours ahead of the fleet arriving at the launch point. Trivial.

Wasn't what I was asking for in that particular post but OK, then walk through the starting distances of KB and the APDs from Maui at the time the "2 CVs" go order is received and then show how the APDs end up both 100 miles from Maui and 12 hours ahead of KB.

[warspite1]

On top of what RangerJoe mentioned, Midway had roughly twice the Marine personnel as Wake (about 800 to 400) but the number of 5" CD and 3" DP guns on Dec 7th were about the same as on Wake. Both Midway and Wake were due for further troop and AA/CD reinforcements but whether that would have happened in the timeframe of Curtis Lemay's delayed start is unknown.

A squadron of PBYs (VP-21) was also operating operating from Midway atoll and had the PH Raid not happened on cue then 18 SB2U dive-bombers and from VMSB-231 would have been delivered by the Lexington within days

warspite1

So yet another example of the Japanese being disadvantaged thanks to the ‘plan’......

Please don't try to build a list of disadvantages one example at a time. The thread is already over 30 pages long as is.

warspite1

My mistake, there appears to be no disadvantages Buckrock. I must confess I didn’t realise the Japanese fleet train had the ability to keep the 1st Air Fleet (and accompanying fleet of warships and troop carrying destroyer conversions) at sea on sustained combat operations for as long as they wanted. Very, very impressive. Remember, when the KB depart Japan, they have no idea how long they will be at sea for, or whether they will encounter opposition off the HI. They don’t know how strongly Midway is defended and how long it will take to conquer. But quite simply none of it matters - the Japanese fleet train carries an inexhaustible supply of everything needed to win the war by Christmas. Cool.