A Japanese invasion of Hawaii

[warspite1]

Why would aircraft be non-operational on the first day of a war?

warspite1

Erm..... absolutely no reason at all. I suspect they had 541 aircraft of which 758 were fully operational. I believe they were serviced by pathfinders.....

Seriously Curtis Lemay that was yet another truly alarming question.

I'll ask again: Why would aircraft be non-operational on the first day of the war? Especially when the agressors know the war is just about to begin.

warspite1

....and I’ll say again:

Erm..... absolutely no reason at all. I suspect they had 541 aircraft of which 758 were fully operational. I believe they were serviced by pathfinders.....

Seriously Curtis Lemay that was yet another truly alarming question - and no less alarming the second time around.

[KingHart]

Only if you flunked math:

Historically, the Philipines operation had 541 aircraft assigned, including 156 Bettys and Nells and 107 Zeros.

156 - 48 = 108
107 - 32 = 75

warspite1

Ever heard of the difference between actual numbers and operational aircraft?

Why would aircraft be non-operational on the first day of a war?

Because aircraft are complex mechanical constructs, prone to having breakdowns at inopportune moments.
At least, that is how it is in the real world.
In your fantasy world - in which Betty bombers can fly 4000 miles fully loaded, completely destroy the tank farms at Pearl Harbor, and land on Maui without any losses at an airfield captured thanks to the guidance of imaginary "pathfinders" -there would, of course, be no non-operational aircraft on the first day of war.

[KingHart]

And you can also be wrong.
Which is what you are regarding the ranges of the Betty. Let me try again:
Max range (unloaded and unarmed): 3132 miles
Combat range: 1772 miles

See any contradition in those figures? 1772 x 2 = 3544 round trip. Half of that was with bombs!


Let me try to explain: 1772 miles is the maximum range the aircraft can fly armed and loaded. The plane cannot fly 1772 miles, have it's fuel tanks magically refilled and fly another 1772 miles. Do you understand?

Source - every online source using a simple google search. The link you provided included, if you had bothered to actually read the entire link.[/b]

Evidently I have to do everything over and over and over. Here are the links:

3749 miles transfer range unloaded:

http://www.aviation-history.com/mitsubishi/g4m.html

3132 miles transfer range loaded:

https://www.ww2-weapons.com/mitsubishi-g4m-betty/


And I can provide several links showing other numbers, which you will ignore because they don't fit your narrative. Here, however is a quote from your second link: "The new aircraft was to reach a speed of 250 mph (400 km/h) at 10000ft (3000 m), have a range of 3000 miles (4800 km) WITHOUT PAYLOAD and 2300 miles (3700 km) with a 1760-pound (800 kg) torpedo."

You really continue to believe that a convoy of 12 Japanese APDs can sail undetected, on a Saturday evening, land a force of 2400 soldiers and their supplies (again undetected), sail 300 miles to rendezvous with KB and the mystery "ground crew ships", somehow transfer aboard the ground crews and more supplies (including 800-kg bombs), and then sail back 300 miles to Maui and unload? In 8 hours? Meanwhile, your invasion force is somehow avoiding detection while maneuvering to attack positions to seize both port facilities and the airfield. Do I have that right?

Pretty garbled. I suppose if I added steath fighters to the operation you'd be howling about how they will give the whole raid up. Because that's how detectable those APDs will be at night, on a weekend, in peacetime. The APDs initially land only the combat units. They come back to deliver the supplies after the raid has begun and the facilities are captured. The ground crews aren't transferred to the APDs. They also sail on their own ships to Maui after the raid has begun. The APDs don't sail 300 miles to the fleet. They just sail about 100 miles from Maui - where they started from - which is over 200 miles from Oahu.

Sir, if my text seemed garbled to you, I apologize.
Perhaps, you could help.
All I need is the answers to the following questions:
What ships are the ground crews sailing on?
Why do the APDs sail to a random point 100 miles from the landing beaches,? Is that where the ground crew ships are located?
Did the ground crew ships sail in the same convoy as KB and the APDs? If so, how do you account for the added fuel for them?
What do the ground crew ships do after landing the ground crews?
Where do the ground crews land? On the same invasion beaches as the infantry? If so, how do they possibly get their supplies (including 800 kg bombs) ashore?
How far from KB is your random APD rally point?
How many "pathfinders" are on Maui? How did they get there? When did they get there? What happens if one is captured prior to the raid?
Where are the landing beaches?
What is the timeline for the landing and the capture of the airfield and port?
Thank you in advance for your prompt help.

[warspite1]

All of that will be figured out by the pathfinders. They have months to prep. Again, Maui is a backwater of a nation at peace on a weekend at night.

warspite1

These miracle pathfinders that didn’t exist can do what they want - no one cares. You are putting foward a plan that you have absolutely no clue as to whether its even feasible. For all you know, had they existed, the pathfinders could have reported back:

- soz Yamamoto, there is no landing zone that meets your requirements anywhere near your airfield. Your timetable just wouldn’t work and there is little chance with this terrain of getting your magic 50 to the airfield. And as for the nearest port.....Best call it off.

There is as much chance of that being the feedback as anything else.

So what? If that truely were the case, the Maui part of the operation would be aborted. One more advantage of the pathfinders!! But if there is a way - and Maui is a huge island, so there is bound to be a way - it will go forward.

warspite1

This comment should logically bring the thread to a close.

Curtis Lemay has confirmed he is proposing this plan without any idea where the Japanese would land - and concedes it may not even be possible. But unwilling to let go, he adds that its bound to be possible because Maui is a large island.....

So what if the perfect landing spot is the opposite side of the island to the airfield? It doesn’t have to be the opposite side of course, just sufficiently far away to make any timetable for grabbing the airfield impossible.

What is perhaps most troubling is that Curtis Lemay talks of aborting the raid if that proves the case. But, by using the word aborted this suggests the Japanese wouldn’t necessarily know there is no practical landing ground when they set off on this ‘plan’. And only when the destroyer conversions are ready to make the run in to the island and the Bettys have long since taken off do they become aware and need to abort.

Why aborted? The ‘pathfinders’ would have scoped this potential issue out months before and it would be decided a landing was possible or not????

Strange.

But anyway, this confirms what we’ve suspected all along, there is no detailed plan because..... there can be no detailed plan.

I think when someone is reliant upon arguing over what is a data point, to try and deflect from the real issue, there is only one way this is headed.

Move along people, nothing to see.

[Buckrock]

Again, the only data point we have is the one in which the Enterprise sailed into Pearl with 2/3rds of it aircraft on board.

I think you mean the only data point you have.

No. It's the only data point anyone has.

Nope. Just you until you start giving us the requested KB strike details.

I don't care what the "SOP" was. What matters is how tightly they followed it.

They followed it "tightly" enough that it was considered standard procedure, hence the term. It will be the normal condition expected to be encountered if you attacked PH during peacetime while one or more CVs were moored there, hence it should be what any competent Japanese planners would have assumed. Even the historical Japanese treated it as SOP for US carriers at PH. And we know that because they supplied details for their plan.

Still only the one data point. Clearly they didn't follow the "SOP" on the 7th.

Because they were in the middle of a local emergency brought on by the hostile actions of a nearby enemy force. And I also think your amazing "data" point has been corrupted. As I have mentioned previously, USS Enterprise did not enter PH on the 7th. Give us your KB strike details and we can discuss what really happened.

Unfortunately your data point is during wartime, it has no bearing on peacetime SOP. Find me a data point in peacetime where the USN CVs weren't landing their CAGs before mooring their ship for a 24+ hour stay at PH and then we can talk compliance. And I'm using the 24+ hour stay as that is what your whole plan is built around.

Still waiting for a reason why it's OK for a carrier to enter a port with unusable aircraft in wartime but not in peacetime.

Then I hope you can show the same patience we've had to so far. Or you can quit stalling and give us your KB strike details. Then we can discuss it. I'll even give you the reference with the reasons for USS Enterprise's change of SOP.

Again, the Enterprise entered Pearl with 2/3rds of its aircraft unusable. Why would that be permisable in wartime but not in peacetime? What if something prevented Enterprise from leaving? This really sounds much worse in wartime than in peacetime.

Who said it wasn't permissible in peacetime? The SOP is the normal or expected behavior. It doesn't also mean there can never be exceptions in either peacetime or wartime but no competent Japanese planner is going to build part of their master strike plan around a hope that the day of their strike is the exact time both USN CVs happen to go against their previously demonstrated peacetime SOP.

As an aside, you've been told why you're not being given the answers regarding the "data" point but at least it's within your control to change my own SOP on this. On the other hand I'm struggling to understand why you refuse to supply requested details. You have a plan to sell to the public but all you're presenting is a sales blurb written on the back of a napkin.

[Buckrock]

I've got a critical factor to be covered. What's going to stop the Bettys and Zeros being shot down by ship-board AA as they attempt to make their landing run on Puunene. There were multiple ships with 3" and 5" AA batteries off Maui when the PH strike began. More ships arrived there that morning. So when exactly are these Betty's first coming in to land at Ninja Field?

Again, the US is going to immediately tumble to every detail of the Jap plan like it was mid-war. The Japanese have strategic and tactical surprise on their side.

Every detail? Why exaggerate. The US only needs to tumble over the first one before the chance of discovery arises. Every tumble after that just ups the chance. From your vague descriptions of the Maui op so far, it looks like there will be plenty of chances for the US to compensate for both being initially surprised and not being up to your "mid-war" standards. Perhaps if you just put some proper detail on your Maui plan you can prove me wrong.

And the Airfield is about 3 miles from shore.

The whole training area of Maui represented one big radio net, second only to Oahu. Being a key training area for the Pacific Fleet's light forces and submarines, there would likely be USN ships already off Maui (as there were on Dec 7th) equipped with 3" and 5" AA guns and they would carry live ammo on board. Both these AA gun types could engage aircraft beyond 3 miles and would be even more effective if their targets were making a landing run without being able to evade. The center of the airfield is actually only about two miles from shore.

It should also be pointed out the best landing approach for an unfamiliar (to the Japanese) Maui airfield in December would be one into the NE trade wind, which would carry the Japanese aircraft right over the main USN training area in Lahaina Roads but when you finally release the full details of your Maui plan, you can include your "harm prevention" alternatives as part of it.

[Buckrock]

Does anyone know what is supposed to happen to KB's attack if the APDs have to abort their landing on Maui? Does KB still go ahead? We really need an index.

That would only happen if Maui was under alert. In that case, you could bet that Oahu was under alert. So, as I've stated before, that would be a benefit of the plan: The raid would be aborted by the pathfinders and not run into an alerted Pearl. Could never have happened under the historical plan.

So the abort condition is now an alerted PH or Maui? If PH and Maui is found to not be "alerted" but a division of US DDs and a squadron of PTs just happen to have arrived at the training area off Maui late in the afternoon in preparation for night tactical exercises, what happens?

You don't need details for this, just a standard answer will do.

[Buckrock]

Move along people, nothing to see.

About that time too I feel. Unless parts of the Japanese plan start getting detailed, I think maybe the wind-up should be finally wound-down.

[Curtis Lemay]

I think the Midway portion of this plan would have faced some serious obstacles. So many historical narratives focus on the what-ifs of the naval aspect of the 1942 Battle of Midway, that the flawed nature of the planned Japanese invasion of the atoll never gets much attention.

The two islands at Midway are surrounded by an exposed coral reef through which one inlet called the Brooks Channel had been blasted in the 1930s. That channel was covered by coast defense guns. There are gaps in the reef on the far western end, but the Japanese rejected using these as they lead to shallows of varying depths in the lagoon and would not have constituted a useful approach. The plan the Japanese Army conceived in 1942 was to use their daihatsu barges to land troops on the south facing reef closest to the islands instead of forcing the channel. The tidal range at Midway is quite small, with a mean range of only nine inches and a diurnal range of fifteen inches, which means that there was never a tide high enough to float the barges over the reef. After being "landed" the troops would have had to wade unto the exposed reef itself. From there the troops would have to slog through 200-300 yards of waters ranging from ankle to chest deep to reach the beach. To make matters worse, most of the Marine heavy and light machine guns were sited to cover this stretch of water.

I don’t have a source for how many landing barges were assigned to the IJN invasion fleet at Midway in 1942, but there were only a dozen transport ships and about 5000 men. So, you are going to be landed on a reef just inches above sea level and then step off into a lagoon with irregular depths from 3-15 ft deep. You’ve still got several hundred yards to the beach itself and you are wading that distance, not running. Pushing your way through waist deep water is slow and tiring. You are trying to keep your footing while gunfire is bursting around you. There is zero cover. And gods help you if you step into a hole 6 or 7 foot deep or trip and end up face down in the water carrying 70-100 lbs of equipment on your back. More troops might drown in the lagoon as opposed to being shot.

That’s not to say nobody would make it across, the Japanese weren’t known for being sensitive to losses. But I don’t see how more than 1000 of the 5000 Japanese assigned to the assault at the time make it as far as the beach, and then still have to get off that beach. I'm doubtful that there would have been enough men left to overcome the garrison.

I think at best it would have been a Japanese Tarawa. The lagoon would have flowed red with blood.


Fringing Reef.jpg

Here's a news flash: Tarawa was captured!!! About 1000 US dead total.

The Japs will be supported by the BBs and cruisers of the raid fleet. Why not assault directly at the port?

And I forgot to mention: Tarawa was defended by about 5 times the force Midway is at this time (3500 vs. 700). So...divide those Japanese Midway losses by 5 = about 200.

[Curtis Lemay]

What ships are the ground crews sailing on?

Whatever types of ships the Japanese used as standard AP. Probably modified cargo ships.

Why do the APDs sail to a random point 100 miles from the landing beaches,? Is that where the ground crew ships are located?

Maui is 115 miles from Oahu. So...100 miles north of Maui is going to be about 200 miles from Oahu The APDs get there at dusk the night before the raid. The ground crew ships get there at the time of the raid.

Did the ground crew ships sail in the same convoy as KB and the APDs? If so, how do you account for the added fuel for them?

Yes. The raid fleet was refueled in transit.

What do the ground crew ships do after landing the ground crews?

Depart.

Where do the ground crews land? On the same invasion beaches as the infantry? If so, how do they possibly get their supplies (including 800 kg bombs) ashore?

The port would be Japanese controlled by that time. Thousands of ground crew and troops available.

How far from KB is your random APD rally point?

The carriers are 200 miles north of Oahu during the raid. The APDs are between 0 and 100 miles north of Maui the night before and day of the raid.

How many "pathfinders" are on Maui? How did they get there? When did they get there? What happens if one is captured prior to the raid?

As many as necessary. Either injected or recruited. Months in advance. They would lawyer up - same as caught spies now. Of course, being Japanese, they could commit suicide.

Where are the landing beaches?

Determined by the pathfinders.

What is the timeline for the landing and the capture of the airfield and port?

Landing about midnight. Strike on the airfield and port (plus the barracks) as soon as the raid begins.

[Curtis Lemay]

I've got a critical factor to be covered. What's going to stop the Bettys and Zeros being shot down by ship-board AA as they attempt to make their landing run on Puunene. There were multiple ships with 3" and 5" AA batteries off Maui when the PH strike began. More ships arrived there that morning. So when exactly are these Betty's first coming in to land at Ninja Field?

Again, the US is going to immediately tumble to every detail of the Jap plan like it was mid-war. The Japanese have strategic and tactical surprise on their side.

Every detail? Why exaggerate. The US only needs to tumble over the first one before the chance of discovery arises. Every tumble after that just ups the chance. From your vague descriptions of the Maui op so far, it looks like there will be plenty of chances for the US to compensate for both being initially surprised and not being up to your "mid-war" standards. Perhaps if you just put some proper detail on your Maui plan you can prove me wrong.

Let's see...they tumbled over the radar dectection of the raid, the minisub caught sneeking into Pearl, and the ultimatum. Still got caught with planes bunched on the ground and no ammo for the AAA.

And the Airfield is about 3 miles from shore.

The whole training area of Maui represented one big radio net, second only to Oahu. Being a key training area for the Pacific Fleet's light forces and submarines, there would likely be USN ships already off Maui (as there were on Dec 7th) equipped with 3" and 5" AA guns and they would carry live ammo on board. Both these AA gun types could engage aircraft beyond 3 miles and would be even more effective if their targets were making a landing run without being able to evade. The center of the airfield is actually only about two miles from shore.

Not on the Lahaina side. That's much further. And the ships have to be far from the shore or they will be on the rocks.

Now it's time to recalculate the Betty flight options since we're now sending them from Roi Namur instead of Eniwetok. Roi Namur is about 275 miles closer to the islands than Eniwetok.

Now we have fully loaded range of 3132 miles, and the distance to Oahu is 2443 miles. That's 689 miles to spare. 115 miles from Oahu to Maui leaves 574 miles reserve. The flight time for 2443 miles at 196 mph is 12.46 hours. 574/12.46 = 46 mph average head wind that can be tolerated. So...the odds now become almost certain that the Bettys will be able to do the loaded bomb run over Oahu and Maui. They will not have to arrive unloaded on Maui. A fraction of the Bettys can fly direct to Maui to torpedo any US ships lurking there.

[Curtis Lemay]

Does anyone know what is supposed to happen to KB's attack if the APDs have to abort their landing on Maui? Does KB still go ahead? We really need an index.

That would only happen if Maui was under alert. In that case, you could bet that Oahu was under alert. So, as I've stated before, that would be a benefit of the plan: The raid would be aborted by the pathfinders and not run into an alerted Pearl. Could never have happened under the historical plan.

So the abort condition is now an alerted PH or Maui? If PH and Maui is found to not be "alerted" but a division of US DDs and a squadron of PTs just happen to have arrived at the training area off Maui late in the afternoon in preparation for night tactical exercises, what happens?

You don't need details for this, just a standard answer will do.

That would require some combat by both the Bettys and the APDs. I've never said this operation was without risk. Just that the risk was low and the reward huge. The US would have to hit the jackpot for the above to happen.

[Buckrock]

The whole training area of Maui represented one big radio net, second only to Oahu. Being a key training area for the Pacific Fleet's light forces and submarines, there would likely be USN ships already off Maui (as there were on Dec 7th) equipped with 3" and 5" AA guns and they would carry live ammo on board. Both these AA gun types could engage aircraft beyond 3 miles and would be even more effective if their targets were making a landing run without being able to evade. The center of the airfield is actually only about two miles from shore.

Not on the Lahaina side. That's much further. And the ships have to be far from the shore or they will be on the rocks.

FYI, Lahaina Roads was just the main anchorage, the training area stretched from Lahaina to Maalaea Bay. And you do realize ships are mobile?

Nor do ships have to be "far from shore", they just need to be in waters deep enough to operate safely. The waters in most of Maalaea Bay are deep enough that any DD can operate within half a mile of the shore and less than 3 miles from Puunene airfield. And the US DDs would be very familiar with the waters of one of their main training areas.

And to avoid the inevitable response, the 3" and 5" AA guns could engage targets at much greater ranges than 3 miles. Examples in combat records for both AA types can be found where they engaged aircraft beyond 5 miles during the first two months of the war (and when they were still using the same FC systems as on Dec 7th).

Now it's time to recalculate the Betty flight options since we're now sending them from Roi Namur instead of Eniwetok. Roi Namur is about 275 miles closer to the islands than Eniwetok.

Now we have fully loaded range of 3132 miles, and the distance to Oahu is 2443 miles. That's 689 miles to spare. 115 miles from Oahu to Maui leaves 574 miles reserve. The flight time for 2443 miles at 196 mph is 12.46 hours. 574/12.46 = 46 mph average head wind that can be tolerated. So...the odds now become almost certain that the Bettys will be able to do the loaded bomb run over Oahu and Maui. They will not have to arrive unloaded on Maui. A fraction of the Bettys can fly direct to Maui to torpedo any US ships lurking there.

Good luck with that in the real world.

[Buckrock]

That would only happen if Maui was under alert. In that case, you could bet that Oahu was under alert. So, as I've stated before, that would be a benefit of the plan: The raid would be aborted by the pathfinders and not run into an alerted Pearl. Could never have happened under the historical plan.

So the abort condition is now an alerted PH or Maui? If PH and Maui is found to not be "alerted" but a division of US DDs and a squadron of PTs just happen to have arrived at the training area off Maui late in the afternoon in preparation for night tactical exercises, what happens?

You don't need details for this, just a standard answer will do.

That would require some combat by both the Bettys and the APDs. I've never said this operation was without risk. Just that the risk was low and the reward huge. The US would have to hit the jackpot for the above to happen.

But you've never supplied the necessary details to show how the operation could be conducted with a "low risk" nor have you supplied the details to show exactly how the Japanese could have achieved their "huge reward". All we've been getting from you is a vaguely described plan and constant assumptions of success based on little more than "the US was surprised and clueless" while the Japanese always "had months to prepare".

Effectively you've just been telling us to take your word for it because you've convinced yourself it will all work. But given how you've just made so much of an assumption about the USS Enterprise and yet got it completely wrong, there is no reason for anyone to accept any of the other assumptions that fill your plan will be correct either. And I can tell you several other assumptions already look clearly incorrect without having to even reach for a reference, such as....

Maui is 115 miles from Oahu. So...100 miles north of Maui is going to be about 200 miles from Oahu The APDs get there at dusk the night before the raid. The ground crew ships get there at the time of the raid.

100 miles north of Maui is "about" 100 miles north-east of Oahu (or more specifically, just a bit under 110 miles from the nearest Oahu coast). It's nothing like the 200 miles you claimed for your planning.

....but since you appear to not want to expose your "plan" to any real scrutiny, there is no reason to continue the discussion.

[RangerJoe]

100 miles north of Maui is "about" 100 miles north-east of Oahu (or more specifically, just a bit under 110 miles from the nearest Oahu coast). It's nothing like the 200 miles you claimed for your planning.

....but since you appear to not want to expose your "plan" to any real scrutiny, there is no reason to continue the discussion.

Apparently somebody does not know how to read a map. That individual could have looked at the links that I posted earlier, clicked on one of them, then gone to a larger map. That individual could also have looked elsewhere as well. Get an overview map, one colorized for ground cover (forests, the lack of forests, the ice cap, and so on) to get an idea of the situation on the ground. Then post a picture of the map with arrows and verbiage to describe where the landings would be, where the troops would be hiding out, and so on.

[Curtis Lemay]

The whole training area of Maui represented one big radio net, second only to Oahu. Being a key training area for the Pacific Fleet's light forces and submarines, there would likely be USN ships already off Maui (as there were on Dec 7th) equipped with 3" and 5" AA guns and they would carry live ammo on board. Both these AA gun types could engage aircraft beyond 3 miles and would be even more effective if their targets were making a landing run without being able to evade. The center of the airfield is actually only about two miles from shore.

Not on the Lahaina side. That's much further. And the ships have to be far from the shore or they will be on the rocks.

FYI, Lahaina Roads was just the main anchorage, the training area stretched from Lahaina to Maalaea Bay. And you do realize ships are mobile?

The point was that the Bettys would be approaching from the Lahaina Roads side! Since that side is much further from the shore, it would serve to protect that approach.

Nor do ships have to be "far from shore", they just need to be in waters deep enough to operate safely. The waters in most of Maalaea Bay are deep enough that any DD can operate within half a mile of the shore and less than 3 miles from Puunene airfield. And the US DDs would be very familiar with the waters of one of their main training areas.

So...add another half mile.

And to avoid the inevitable response, the 3" and 5" AA guns could engage targets at much greater ranges than 3 miles. Examples in combat records for both AA types can be found where they engaged aircraft beyond 5 miles during the first two months of the war (and when they were still using the same FC systems as on Dec 7th).

About the equivalent of engaging bombers at 3 miles altitude.

Now it's time to recalculate the Betty flight options since we're now sending them from Roi Namur instead of Eniwetok. Roi Namur is about 275 miles closer to the islands than Eniwetok.

Now we have fully loaded range of 3132 miles, and the distance to Oahu is 2443 miles. That's 689 miles to spare. 115 miles from Oahu to Maui leaves 574 miles reserve. The flight time for 2443 miles at 196 mph is 12.46 hours. 574/12.46 = 46 mph average head wind that can be tolerated. So...the odds now become almost certain that the Bettys will be able to do the loaded bomb run over Oahu and Maui. They will not have to arrive unloaded on Maui. A fraction of the Bettys can fly direct to Maui to torpedo any US ships lurking there.

Good luck with that in the real world.

Math is math.

[Curtis Lemay]

Effectively you've just been telling us to take your word for it because you've convinced yourself it will all work. But given how you've just made so much of an assumption about the USS Enterprise and yet got it completely wrong, there is no reason for anyone to accept any of the other assumptions that fill your plan will be correct either. And I can tell you several other assumptions already look clearly incorrect without having to even reach for a reference, such as....

This says the Enterprise entered Pearl on the 8th:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Enter ... arl_Harbor

Maui is 115 miles from Oahu. So...100 miles north of Maui is going to be about 200 miles from Oahu The APDs get there at dusk the night before the raid. The ground crew ships get there at the time of the raid.

100 miles north of Maui is "about" 100 miles north-east of Oahu (or more specifically, just a bit under 110 miles from the nearest Oahu coast). It's nothing like the 200 miles you claimed for your planning.

I didn't mean due north. Just to the north. I'm not going to post a map, but there is a point to the north of Maui that would be at least 200 miles from Oahu.

[Curtis Lemay]

My final post on this matter. Just a few more facts:

About the 15% of the Philipines airforce I'm withdrawing: Historically, at least some of that airforce would have been needed for support of the invasion. That is no longer required, since the invasion is postponed. The portion of the airforce that was targeted for air superiority is probably close to unchanged - as shown in the figures for the Clark Field raid I posted - only 9 Zeros would have been unavailable for that raid out of 192 planes. We can be sure that the US air on Luzon is going to be neutralized at about the same rate as historically.

And, canceling that invasion facilitates the NEI invasion by releasing ground and sea assets sooner than historically. The supposed threats to Japanese plans outside the HI are false.

As to the forces being used on Maui: 2400 troops and maybe a couple of thousand ground crew. The Japanese lost 2.1 to 2.3 million military in the war. The men on Maui would be 0.2% of that. In addition, there are 80 aircraft committed to Maui. I would contend that if things go wrong, most of those could escape just by base transfer. But even if lost, the Japanese lost 35,000 to 50,000 aircraft in WWII. Those 80 would be 0.2% of that. Any claims that loss of the assets on Maui would shorten the war by any measurable amount is nonsense.

[Buckrock]

Effectively you've just been telling us to take your word for it because you've convinced yourself it will all work. But given how you've just made so much of an assumption about the USS Enterprise and yet got it completely wrong, there is no reason for anyone to accept any of the other assumptions that fill your plan will be correct either. And I can tell you several other assumptions already look clearly incorrect without having to even reach for a reference, such as....

This says the Enterprise entered Pearl on the 8th:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Enter ... arl_Harbor

Yep but you kept saying the Enterprise entered PH on the 7th and moored with most of her CAG still on board, as in...

But she didn't follow SOP. She still have 2/3rds of her planes onboard.

and

Again, the one data point we have is the Enterprise on 12/7. She didn't follow SOP.

In reality, from Lundstrom's "First Team" page 23, here's what Enterprise was actually doing on the night of the 7th....
"Nightfall on 7 December found the Pacific Fleet reeling from the stunning surprise air strike on Pearl, but at least its carriers were unharmed. Vice Admiral Halsey’s Task Force 8 with the Enterprise operated southwest of Oahu...."

And on the 8th, covering both for Enterprise and her CAG, first the return of the SBD and F4F survivors of the previous days events......
"Before dawn on 8 December, Lt. Cdr. Young assembled his operational Enterprise SBDs and F4Fs on Ford Island and made ready to fly back out to the ship."

And then what followed after the survivors returned....
"Halsey started in for Pearl late that morning. All the searches proved negative, so it seemed safe to bring the Enterprise into port overnight for fuel. She despatched her air group for dispersal among several fields on Oahu."

And the records from CINCPAC for the 8th Dec confirm the arrival of Enterprise into PH and the landings of all her flyable F4Fs, SBDs and TBDs at three different airfields. And the change in SOP I had been referring to previously related to the fact that F4Fs were now being sent to Wheeler air force base rather than a naval airfield as under the emergency wartime situation the USAAC now commanded all land based fighter units.

I offered several times to explain these facts to you previously and all you had to do was make an effort to put some detail into your KB strike plan.

Anyway, the discussion is over now as far as I'm concerned.

[warspite1]

My final comment on this subject.

Curtis Lemay has dismissed many of my comments as crap and nonsense.

But how does one truly define crappy nonsense?

Well three words/groups of words liberally bandied about in this thread as the answer to all problems fit the bill perfectly:

Kamikaze/Code of Bushido
Pathfinders
Data Point.

Losing an argument? No clue? Don’t worry, simply insert any one of the above into your argument and all problems are solved.