Admirals Edition Naval Thread

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: resconq

Will 25 still be the cap for TF size on ASW missions?  It always seemed gamey in that 25 destroyers making contact with a sub will usually result in the demise of said sub.

In reality, the primary constraint on ASW was search rate. 25 destroyers in a hex was doubly inefficient. It was so detectable that the subs would avoid it, and it meant that the search segments for each DD overlapped.

[spence]

Practically the whole idea of ASW TFs is bogus. Having a bunch of DDs charging around the ocean (with or without a CV/CVE) had been tried and found to be ineffective long before there even was a war in the Pacific. The ocean is just too dang big and the surface ships are almost certainly going to be detected by the submarine before they detect it (and at such a range that it has plenty of time to manuever out of the surface ships' way).

With SIGINT support the USN had some success late in the war with ASW TFs that operated independently of convoys but the success of ASW TFs mostly came from rendering aid to convoys which had come under attack from a wolf pack. Players can actually employ this latter tactic effectively in WitP.

The same can be said of the aircraft ASW mission. General search of wide swaths of the ocean were for the most part about as effective as we see in WitP. Aircraft (particularly long range aircraft) which however, flew in direct support of a convoy were quite effective in both preventing attacks on the convoy and damaging or sinking submarines which were trying to intercept the convoy. An ASW mission which operated like the LRCAP mission (in WitP) would reflect what turned out to be the most effective employment of ASW aircraft. The only exception to the above IRL was the Bay of Biscay operations where ASW aircraft were able to search transit lanes (essentially very limited areas) to/from established and well known submarine bases or (once again) where SIGINT provided timely knowledge of a submarine's position.

[herwin]

Accurate and to the point. Gibraltar was also a choke point.

[witpqs]

I thought that a productive technique was when radar equipped ASW aircraft spotted a submarine ASW TF's could be vectored in.

In WITP sending ASW TF's around yields only chance encounters, but rushing toward an aerial search contact yields more ASW attacks. Seems to mirror what I've read. Note that I am not talking about any other aspects on ASW in game.

[Barb]

Convoy system in fact was not only defensive weapon, but also an offensive one. With enough escort  forces (naval and air) it poses enough strike force to kill enemy submarines forced to attack convoys because of lack of solo-targets.
Adm. King realized this too (but late )

[Don Bowen]

ORIGINAL: resconq

Will 25 still be the cap for TF size on ASW missions?  It always seemed gamey in that 25 destroyers making contact with a sub will usually result in the demise of said sub.

Nope

[witpqs]

IIRC there is a limit of maybe 99 aircraft on a carrier. In AE will the code be able to handle the 130 aircraft for the CV Midway?

[spence]

I thought that a productive technique was when radar equipped ASW aircraft spotted a submarine ASW TF's could be vectored in.

In WITP sending ASW TF's around yields only chance encounters, but rushing toward an aerial search contact yields more ASW attacks. Seems to mirror what I've read. Note that I am not talking about any other aspects on ASW in game.

The ocean is big. Really, really big. Getting the a/c somewhere near the submarine in the first place was the problem (hence the importance of SIGINT and chokepoints). When you're using convoys most of the ocean is empty nothingness and the submarines are forced to come to you . You know where the convoys are.

Tactically the submarines were also forced to transmit on the radio to tell other submarines that they'd found something. Once HFDF receivers were put onto the convoy escorts and a/c that meant they could follow the transmission's line of bearing and attack the sub before it was in position to attack the convoy. When the number of escorts was large or a support group was handy the escorts could literally sit on the contact until it had to come up for air.

The use of HFDF by the escorts was an important contribution to defeating the U-boats in the Atlantic. Were Japanese escort vessels equipped with a tactical HFDF (I know they had the same sort of shore stations as the Allies but those did not give tactically useful information to an escort's captain; only general information such as knowledge that the subs were in the area)?

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: spence
The ocean is big. Really, really big. Getting the a/c somewhere near the submarine in the first place was the problem (hence the importance of SIGINT and chokepoints). When you're using convoys most of the ocean is empty nothingness and the submarines are forced to come to you . You know where the convoys are.

Actually, thanks to code-breaking, we knew where most of them were most of the time. The Japs had their shipping (naval and civilian) reporting their "noontime positions" back to Tokyo every day. Only problems arose when the ship couldn't calculate it's own position accurately to report it.

[herwin]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: spence
The ocean is big. Really, really big. Getting the a/c somewhere near the submarine in the first place was the problem (hence the importance of SIGINT and chokepoints). When you're using convoys most of the ocean is empty nothingness and the submarines are forced to come to you . You know where the convoys are.

Actually, thanks to code-breaking, we knew where most of them were most of the time. The Japs had their shipping (naval and civilian) reporting their "noontime positions" back to Tokyo every day. Only problems arose when the ship couldn't calculate it's own position accurately to report it.

Or when they changed the code, but just for a few days.

[spence]

Actually, thanks to code-breaking, we knew where most of them were most of the time. The Japs had their shipping (naval and civilian) reporting their "noontime positions" back to Tokyo every day. Only problems arose when the ship couldn't calculate it's own position accurately to report it.

Useful information certainly. Due to the volume of signal traffic thus sent probably way too much information requiring the code breakers to concentrate mostly on certain important call signs (like those of ships in the KB) rather than worrying about the noon position of the Obscure Maru #31 every day. Keeping track of IJN subs probably did fall within the category of important call signs though.

As far as effective ASW operations are concerned I was speaking about Allied efforts to counter the U-boats in the Atlantic. Lacking SIGINT or a geographical chokepoint roving groups of destroyers and even destroyers with carriers were pretty ineffective except when they operated near convoys. The convoy was bait for the U-boats...you didn't have to go look for them. The hard part of the whole operation (getting your weapons systems within range of the enemy) was, of necessity, completed by the enemy. Once sufficient forces were finally (1943) committed to the battle, the submarines died.

[Don Bowen]

ORIGINAL: witpqs

IIRC there is a limit of maybe 99 aircraft on a carrier. In AE will the code be able to handle the 130 aircraft for the CV Midway?

Limit was raised in 1.8.something.

[mdiehl]

Defeating submarines was a science that the UK and US (by dint initially of UK training) were uniquely good at. Contributing technologies included shipboard HFDF (something the Japanese attempted during the late war), ahead-thrown contact exploding weapons that did not mess up sonar unless they hit something (mousetrap/hedgehog), centimetric radar that could detect a conning tower or any other object down to about the size of a late German uboat snorkel head, and active asdic that was flatly superior to anything mounted by the Axis (although the Germans had very good passive acoustic listening systems).

On top of these add aircraft with look-down radar and acoustic torpedoes and you get a pretty good gee-whiz factor that was not remotely matched by the Axis powers.

However, the allies also led organizationally. Thus by late 1942 pretty much every American convoy (thanks to RN instruction) had not only a convoy commander but also a separate ASW asset commander with a dedicated command center just for plotting sub contacts, controlling ASW assets, and hunting subs. AFAIK the Japanese never developed that sort of command and control center for each merchie convoy. They also never developed anything remotely like a dedicated hunter-killer TG of the sort that the US built around CVEs.

[mdiehl]

@Tankerace -

Would the revised OOB include USS Terror (CML) or the other WAGCs that were left out of WitP?

[Terminus]

[8|]

[witpqs]

Don - thanks, guess I missed that one.

mdiehl - one point, I believe that the Germans first deployed the acoustic homing torpedo.

[mdiehl]

mdiehl - one point, I believe that the Germans first deployed the acoustic homing torpedo.

The German Falke (G7E/T4) and the US FIDO (Mark 24) both entered general service (deployed) in the same month (March 1943) as a consequence of parallel arms development initiatives in both nations.

Their applications were quite different. Falke was sub-launched and designed as a ship-killer. FIDO was air-dropped and designed as an ASW torpedo.

[Tankerace]

That's a roger. Along with a host of other little goodies. WAGCs, Fairmiles, Dutch Gouvernmentsmarine Schiffs, etc. PLus other fun stuff that was left out of WitP with the bigger ships. Gearings, Gearing Radar Pickets, Tench class subs, "Gunboat" submarines with 2 5in/25s, the ability to choose the final AA fit on some ships (for example the New Mexicos. Players can choose the New Mexico's fit of retaining 5in/25s and 5in/51s, Mississippi's ad hoc all 5in/25s, or send the ships for overhaul and have Idaho's 10 single 5in/38s).

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

@Tankerace -

Would the revised OOB include USS Terror (CML) or the other WAGCs that were left out of WitP?

[JWE]

HOT ZOOTS and OUT-FREAKIN-STANDING !!

Few months ago I asked MBS, LLC (Tim Colton) if they could do specific queries from their database, told them what I wanted and why.

Just got a reply from Gus Moutzalias with everything my little heart could have desired, and much, much, more (except the redhead). He sent me a database of every US Maritime Commission ship built from Jan. '41 to July '46, by name, shipyard, commission date, and including disposition, if known. This is every C1 (subdivided by variant: C1-A, C1-B, C1-S, C1-M), C2 (with variants) C3 (with variants), and has C4s, P1s, P2s, and if you know ships, you will know all the others I don't want to bother mentioning. He key coded every ship that commissioned into the USN, so they can be excluded from a strictly merchie list. He also key coded ships taken by USAT as troopers, so those can be separately listed.

Yeow !!! Woof !!! AE is gonna be sweet !! Lobscouse got a mess o' greens, some ship braid, and a snapper turkle big as yo hat, yow !!

[Ron Saueracker]

ORIGINAL: Tankerace

That's a roger. Along with a host of other little goodies. WAGCs, Fairmiles, Dutch Gouvernmentsmarine Schiffs, etc. PLus other fun stuff that was left out of WitP with the bigger ships. Gearings, Gearing Radar Pickets, Tench class subs, "Gunboat" submarines with 2 5in/25s, the ability to choose the final AA fit on some ships (for example the New Mexicos. Players can choose the New Mexico's fit of retaining 5in/25s and 5in/51s, Mississippi's ad hoc all 5in/25s, or send the ships for overhaul and have Idaho's 10 single 5in/38s).

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

@Tankerace -

Would the revised OOB include USS Terror (CML) or the other WAGCs that were left out of WitP?

Wow, sounds like what we started with CHS years back!!! Can't wait for this Justin.