Mifune is going to work up a Japanese turn so I can see things from an Allied point of view - and at the same time test the latest file data.
I think the Allies need to have different points of view rather than one player who just does what he pleases. So I want advisors to decide basic policy for various nations. The policy negotiations will be posted for all to see.
This game will be a demonstration project as well: we will both post events and send copies of the replays and reports to all who want to watch the Allies being run as I think they can be and should be. That is - if you want to see how a non Sir Robin player operates - trying to be really tough for the Japanese early on - this is your chance. In some circumstances we may also be able to tag team certain turns with respect to certain national units - to demonstrate how that might work (getting a different tactical flavor in different national commands at critical times).
This will be Test game 13A (both for first series 13 test and for Allied series 13 test).
Allied Team Advisors: NO MIFUNE
Moderators: wdolson, Don Bowen, mogami
RE: Allied Team Advisors: NO MIFUNE
What game (CHS, stock)?
I think if you play a historical game...Fighting can make sense.
That said, in an open game where the IJN can take on the deep pacific bases
in the first month (when the allies can not really do anything)....Then Sir Robin is pretty necessary.
I think if you play a historical game...Fighting can make sense.
That said, in an open game where the IJN can take on the deep pacific bases
in the first month (when the allies can not really do anything)....Then Sir Robin is pretty necessary.
To quote from Evans/Peattie`s {Kaigun}
"Mistakes in operations and tactics can be corrected, but
political and strategic mistakes live forever". The authors were refering to Japan but the same could be said of the US misadventure in Iraq
"Mistakes in operations and tactics can be corrected, but
political and strategic mistakes live forever". The authors were refering to Japan but the same could be said of the US misadventure in Iraq
-
el cid again
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- Joined: Mon Oct 10, 2005 4:40 pm
RE: Allied Team Advisors: NO MIFUNE
Well - of course an RHS scenario is involved - Mifune and I are at the heart of RHS development and it is RHS data we are testing here.
I am not sure which scenario he will use - but I assume it is EBO - which has the most stuff to test - and the greatest options for Japan.
That said - I almost completely disagree with your proposition (say 99 per cent) that Sir Robin is better than running - which is not to imply we don't run lots of places - but rather to say we contest - and contest hard - every vital point we can. I intend to demonstrate how to do that effectively - even in a scenario that is almost the most optimized for Japan (I would say Empires Ablaze probably is the one that goes farther in that direction - but that is Nemo's takeoff of RHS - and he and I disagree on giving Japan things it could not have had).
I like to play realistically - and there is a problem with one player being British, Aussie, American, Dutch, Russian, Chinese, etc.
I want to be limited by political considerations - and in spite of them STILL show how to hurt the Japanese.
To that end - I will repring the first part of the Allied Primer next (it has never been completed).
I am not sure which scenario he will use - but I assume it is EBO - which has the most stuff to test - and the greatest options for Japan.
That said - I almost completely disagree with your proposition (say 99 per cent) that Sir Robin is better than running - which is not to imply we don't run lots of places - but rather to say we contest - and contest hard - every vital point we can. I intend to demonstrate how to do that effectively - even in a scenario that is almost the most optimized for Japan (I would say Empires Ablaze probably is the one that goes farther in that direction - but that is Nemo's takeoff of RHS - and he and I disagree on giving Japan things it could not have had).
I like to play realistically - and there is a problem with one player being British, Aussie, American, Dutch, Russian, Chinese, etc.
I want to be limited by political considerations - and in spite of them STILL show how to hurt the Japanese.
To that end - I will repring the first part of the Allied Primer next (it has never been completed).
-
el cid again
- Posts: 16982
- Joined: Mon Oct 10, 2005 4:40 pm
RE: Allied Team Advisors: NO MIFUNE
Allied Primer – Chapter One: Overview
Concept: this is a primer for novice players of the Allies in WITP in general and RHS WITP in particular (the differences mainly being economic comments).
First Principle: Do not panic: you are going to win the war.
Amplification: The Allied position on the map is deep and wide – the Japanese have no hope to take it all – which is deliberate. This is more true in the RHS map system – which is bigger than the original WITP one. The Allies also get – relative to the Japanese - significant and growing rates of reinforcements and replacements – and vastly greater supplies (used generically to include fuel). The contest is more one of resource management and crisis management – from the Allied point of view – than a contest of survival (which is very different from the Japanese point of view). Washington DC is not at risk – Tokyo is at risk – in the long term.
Second Principle: You are engaged in coalition warfare. Act like it.
Amplification: It often seems that the demands of coalition warfare weaken one’s military situation – but the reverse is the case. Japan should have engaged in coalition warfare – was politically incapable of it – and that dooms Japan to defeat. [In theory – beyond of the scope we can address in WITP – Japan could have united itself and many Asian allies – based on strong anti-colonial sentiments – established a viable autarky –
and enjoyed such vast manpower reserves it is not clear it would have been defeated. In practice – Japan only had a few idealists really committed to “Asia for the Asiatics” – and it behaved as a worse colonial power than the Europeans and Americans did – so it did not take long in most places to alienate even its genuine supporters.] The Allies – on the other hand – benefit from the need for common cause forced on all by the common threat of an aggressive Japanese Empire. It is not politic to act as if the various nations and territories are of no value - so both because they would be defended to some degree for political and legal reasons (you have no legal claim to a territory you don’t defend) –
and because you should make the enemy pay for what he takes – instead of getting it both free and undamaged – fight for every territory bigger than an islet – as if you care about it. This is both historical and effective – so never consider anything else. This means you ask “what constitutes a reasonable defense” - and remove only what is in excess of that.
Page 1-2
Third Principle: Create separate military and economic areas.
Amplification: Each area should have a key logistic center – which normally will have major air base and port potential (sometimes only an air base if inland) – and ideally also has significant local production. Each center needs to have a HQ, reserve forces which can react to enemies entering the area, and a turn by turn review of its supply state - and of the supplies and units which need to be sent there. Concentrate enough land units, air units and (if on the sea) naval units to be able to fight a credible battle at each such center. Then – when something happens in this area – you will have a force to react with. No area will ever be denuded of fighting forces. No area will ever be ignored so it lacks the supplies to be able to fight with the forces it has.
Fourth Principle: Network your key logistic centers.
Amplification: Use ships (and eventually long range air transports) to move supplies and units as required between adjacent points in the network. Always be feeding the ENTIRE network – not just one or two key operational areas of immediate concern. You need to think long term – not just about what is happening now – but what might happen about three months from now? Suppose the enemy comes into this area – what might they send and what should be here to deal with that? Suppose this area can be used to base the long range heavy bombers you are going to get? What should be done to get ready for that? [Build bases? Where? Build supply stocks? At which locations?]
Fifth Principle: Use real military doctrine
In general, it if makes sense IRL it makes sense in WITP. Do what you would do as a real commander – and let the game tell you how it worked out (in the context of what the enemy did and luck). This does not mean ignore the game technicalities – but it does mean don’t make them your primary focus. Instead – just do what makes sense to do in general military doctrine – if you can. A task force should have ASW and AAW escorts. If you don’t have any – that is one thing . But if you have some – always include one or two. If you have plenty – always include a sufficient number. But don’t ignore doing what real commanders would do if you can do it. Mostly it makes sense in game terms to do as they would do.
Chapter 2: Axis of Retreat and Advance
If we imagine the Japanese Home Islands as being in a gigantic hex, oriented the same way as the hexes on the map, there are six different Allied directions or axis along which forces can advance or retreat:
1) East: the United States/Hawaii/Central Pacific Axis: this is the logistic giant, with vast on map and off map sources of supplies and units – and it has the ability to repair rapidly even the most severe ship damage. It should be the primary focus of Allied player planning and, if threatened by enemy action, concern. It is not important to Japan per se – except insofar as it is a major threat axis. It permits direct attack on the Japanese position in the Mandated Islands – but only the skinny way – from the East.
2) Southeast: the South Pacific Axis: this area is almost entirely fed via Panama: although significant supplies can be sent from the US West Coast as well. The only significant resource centers are on New Caledonia and Nauru Island. It permits the Allies to attack the Japanese position in the Mandated Islands from their southern flank.
3) Southwest: this is really a twin route: Dutch East Indies and Australia Axis and the Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, Burma, India Axis: this area is significant in production of all kinds as well as fed from South Africa, although supplies can be sent from Aden as well. The Dutch East Indies, Indochina, Thailand and Malaya are vital objectives of the Japanese offensive – due to rich oil production. Burma is an objective because it prevents China being supplied via the Burma Road. These twin axes offer potential bases for a bomber offensive by bombers with medium ranges.
4) West: the China Axis. China is the subject of the Pacific War. If there was no dispute about Japanese conquest and control of China, there would be no war at all. China is substantially self supplied. However, it also gets 500 supply points per day if the Burma Road is open – and it can be supplied by air from India, Burma or Russia. China is a vital source of resources for Japan as well as itself and air bases in China can be used to attack Japan directly.
Page 2-2
5) Northwest: The Russian Axis: this includes Sakhalin Island, Amur Province, Macnhukuo and Siberia. Half of Sakhalin Island and all of Manchukuo are Japanese territory – and important sources of resources and industrial production. Even if it is not an active theater of hostilities – large forces face each other in this area because of the potential for them. Air bases in this area can be used to attack Japan directly.
6) Northeast: the Kamchatka, Aleutians, Alaska, Canada Axis. This is the “poor” axis in terms of supplies – although Kodiak Island is a significant producer. Oil and resources and supplies from Canada feed the USA by rail. The resources of Alaska can do the same thing – but must be shipped out to become useful. Only Kodiak and Fairbanks generate significant supplies. However, air bases in this area can be used to attack Japan directly – and it is the major route by which aircraft sent to the USSR get there.
There are two general categories of strategy: direct and cumulative. A direct strategy – preferred by Japanese thinkers – is a strategy of battles and position – the winning of which directly contributes to winning the war. A cumulative strategy – preferred by American thinkers – is a strategy of attrition. No single action in itself is decisive, but the cumulative effect of many small victories can in theory win the war. In French this is called the “guerre de course.” Then there is “integrated strategy” – where you assume that attrition attacks weaken the enemy so he is more likely to succumb to direct attacks.
In the film adaption of Tom Clancy’s Hunt for Red October, a USN Rear Admiral says to Jack Ryan: “Russian boomer captains don’t take a dump without a plan. What is his plan?” Be like that boomer captain: for each and every axis of retreat or advance, have an operational plan. Decide if it is an area for an amphibious/naval/air offensive, a land/air offensive, a submarine offensive, or a bomber offensive (or more than one of these) in the long run? The submarine and bomber offensives are attrition warfare. Amphibious and land offensives are direct strategies. Once you do that, you have a context within which to assign forces to that axis, as they become available.
Page 2-3
Historically each separate Axis had a separate command (or even more than one command: in Alaska the Army and Navy operated separate commands – a poor choice).
The Allied commanders engaged in greater or lesser competition for units and supplies,
sometimes even bitter competition. But even if you act as a single integrated Allied commander for the theater, you should still feel torn by the need for things in more than one area. Generally it is best to send some of what is needed if you cannot send all that might be needed. You do not want to allow Japan to dominate any of these areas – and if it does – you want to limit the number of them it can dominate. That is best achieved when each area has adequate numbers of units and supplies for the current situation. If you feel like you are constantly making trade-off decisions, you are probably on the right track.
Concept: this is a primer for novice players of the Allies in WITP in general and RHS WITP in particular (the differences mainly being economic comments).
First Principle: Do not panic: you are going to win the war.
Amplification: The Allied position on the map is deep and wide – the Japanese have no hope to take it all – which is deliberate. This is more true in the RHS map system – which is bigger than the original WITP one. The Allies also get – relative to the Japanese - significant and growing rates of reinforcements and replacements – and vastly greater supplies (used generically to include fuel). The contest is more one of resource management and crisis management – from the Allied point of view – than a contest of survival (which is very different from the Japanese point of view). Washington DC is not at risk – Tokyo is at risk – in the long term.
Second Principle: You are engaged in coalition warfare. Act like it.
Amplification: It often seems that the demands of coalition warfare weaken one’s military situation – but the reverse is the case. Japan should have engaged in coalition warfare – was politically incapable of it – and that dooms Japan to defeat. [In theory – beyond of the scope we can address in WITP – Japan could have united itself and many Asian allies – based on strong anti-colonial sentiments – established a viable autarky –
and enjoyed such vast manpower reserves it is not clear it would have been defeated. In practice – Japan only had a few idealists really committed to “Asia for the Asiatics” – and it behaved as a worse colonial power than the Europeans and Americans did – so it did not take long in most places to alienate even its genuine supporters.] The Allies – on the other hand – benefit from the need for common cause forced on all by the common threat of an aggressive Japanese Empire. It is not politic to act as if the various nations and territories are of no value - so both because they would be defended to some degree for political and legal reasons (you have no legal claim to a territory you don’t defend) –
and because you should make the enemy pay for what he takes – instead of getting it both free and undamaged – fight for every territory bigger than an islet – as if you care about it. This is both historical and effective – so never consider anything else. This means you ask “what constitutes a reasonable defense” - and remove only what is in excess of that.
Page 1-2
Third Principle: Create separate military and economic areas.
Amplification: Each area should have a key logistic center – which normally will have major air base and port potential (sometimes only an air base if inland) – and ideally also has significant local production. Each center needs to have a HQ, reserve forces which can react to enemies entering the area, and a turn by turn review of its supply state - and of the supplies and units which need to be sent there. Concentrate enough land units, air units and (if on the sea) naval units to be able to fight a credible battle at each such center. Then – when something happens in this area – you will have a force to react with. No area will ever be denuded of fighting forces. No area will ever be ignored so it lacks the supplies to be able to fight with the forces it has.
Fourth Principle: Network your key logistic centers.
Amplification: Use ships (and eventually long range air transports) to move supplies and units as required between adjacent points in the network. Always be feeding the ENTIRE network – not just one or two key operational areas of immediate concern. You need to think long term – not just about what is happening now – but what might happen about three months from now? Suppose the enemy comes into this area – what might they send and what should be here to deal with that? Suppose this area can be used to base the long range heavy bombers you are going to get? What should be done to get ready for that? [Build bases? Where? Build supply stocks? At which locations?]
Fifth Principle: Use real military doctrine
In general, it if makes sense IRL it makes sense in WITP. Do what you would do as a real commander – and let the game tell you how it worked out (in the context of what the enemy did and luck). This does not mean ignore the game technicalities – but it does mean don’t make them your primary focus. Instead – just do what makes sense to do in general military doctrine – if you can. A task force should have ASW and AAW escorts. If you don’t have any – that is one thing . But if you have some – always include one or two. If you have plenty – always include a sufficient number. But don’t ignore doing what real commanders would do if you can do it. Mostly it makes sense in game terms to do as they would do.
Chapter 2: Axis of Retreat and Advance
If we imagine the Japanese Home Islands as being in a gigantic hex, oriented the same way as the hexes on the map, there are six different Allied directions or axis along which forces can advance or retreat:
1) East: the United States/Hawaii/Central Pacific Axis: this is the logistic giant, with vast on map and off map sources of supplies and units – and it has the ability to repair rapidly even the most severe ship damage. It should be the primary focus of Allied player planning and, if threatened by enemy action, concern. It is not important to Japan per se – except insofar as it is a major threat axis. It permits direct attack on the Japanese position in the Mandated Islands – but only the skinny way – from the East.
2) Southeast: the South Pacific Axis: this area is almost entirely fed via Panama: although significant supplies can be sent from the US West Coast as well. The only significant resource centers are on New Caledonia and Nauru Island. It permits the Allies to attack the Japanese position in the Mandated Islands from their southern flank.
3) Southwest: this is really a twin route: Dutch East Indies and Australia Axis and the Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, Burma, India Axis: this area is significant in production of all kinds as well as fed from South Africa, although supplies can be sent from Aden as well. The Dutch East Indies, Indochina, Thailand and Malaya are vital objectives of the Japanese offensive – due to rich oil production. Burma is an objective because it prevents China being supplied via the Burma Road. These twin axes offer potential bases for a bomber offensive by bombers with medium ranges.
4) West: the China Axis. China is the subject of the Pacific War. If there was no dispute about Japanese conquest and control of China, there would be no war at all. China is substantially self supplied. However, it also gets 500 supply points per day if the Burma Road is open – and it can be supplied by air from India, Burma or Russia. China is a vital source of resources for Japan as well as itself and air bases in China can be used to attack Japan directly.
Page 2-2
5) Northwest: The Russian Axis: this includes Sakhalin Island, Amur Province, Macnhukuo and Siberia. Half of Sakhalin Island and all of Manchukuo are Japanese territory – and important sources of resources and industrial production. Even if it is not an active theater of hostilities – large forces face each other in this area because of the potential for them. Air bases in this area can be used to attack Japan directly.
6) Northeast: the Kamchatka, Aleutians, Alaska, Canada Axis. This is the “poor” axis in terms of supplies – although Kodiak Island is a significant producer. Oil and resources and supplies from Canada feed the USA by rail. The resources of Alaska can do the same thing – but must be shipped out to become useful. Only Kodiak and Fairbanks generate significant supplies. However, air bases in this area can be used to attack Japan directly – and it is the major route by which aircraft sent to the USSR get there.
There are two general categories of strategy: direct and cumulative. A direct strategy – preferred by Japanese thinkers – is a strategy of battles and position – the winning of which directly contributes to winning the war. A cumulative strategy – preferred by American thinkers – is a strategy of attrition. No single action in itself is decisive, but the cumulative effect of many small victories can in theory win the war. In French this is called the “guerre de course.” Then there is “integrated strategy” – where you assume that attrition attacks weaken the enemy so he is more likely to succumb to direct attacks.
In the film adaption of Tom Clancy’s Hunt for Red October, a USN Rear Admiral says to Jack Ryan: “Russian boomer captains don’t take a dump without a plan. What is his plan?” Be like that boomer captain: for each and every axis of retreat or advance, have an operational plan. Decide if it is an area for an amphibious/naval/air offensive, a land/air offensive, a submarine offensive, or a bomber offensive (or more than one of these) in the long run? The submarine and bomber offensives are attrition warfare. Amphibious and land offensives are direct strategies. Once you do that, you have a context within which to assign forces to that axis, as they become available.
Page 2-3
Historically each separate Axis had a separate command (or even more than one command: in Alaska the Army and Navy operated separate commands – a poor choice).
The Allied commanders engaged in greater or lesser competition for units and supplies,
sometimes even bitter competition. But even if you act as a single integrated Allied commander for the theater, you should still feel torn by the need for things in more than one area. Generally it is best to send some of what is needed if you cannot send all that might be needed. You do not want to allow Japan to dominate any of these areas – and if it does – you want to limit the number of them it can dominate. That is best achieved when each area has adequate numbers of units and supplies for the current situation. If you feel like you are constantly making trade-off decisions, you are probably on the right track.
-
el cid again
- Posts: 16982
- Joined: Mon Oct 10, 2005 4:40 pm
RE: Allied Team Advisors: NO MIFUNE
What the Japanese need is to establish - then defend - an autarky- a strategic economic area with adequate resources, oil, industry and other supply production. The reason for the attack on PH (historically and in RHS CVO and BBO families) is merely to neutralize the United States Fleet - so it cannot interfere with the Strike South plan. All that changes in EEO family scenarios is the size of the PH strike - in this version they come in foce - to stay. But the purpose remains the same - to neutralize the United States Fleet - and also to lengthen the SLOC feeding forces in the areas more vital to Japan.
Hard as it is - I say adopt a modern NATO like strategy. While I won't abandon Hawaii (or any other valuable place) - don't die defending it - or trying to retake it. Instead - put your main mobile assets into opposing Japan getting what it needs to have: the SRA. If possible - get the Dutch to fight forward (they did IRL) - and the Aussies - even North of the NEI - and fall back - fighting hard all the way. The KB isn't here - nor most of the battlefleet. But LOTS of bases are here - bases of use to the enemy if captured but of use to us UNTIL they are captured. These bases meand planes of shorter ranges are more viable. Similarly - the area produces supplies - unlike the broad Pacific - which is a supply desert. The less we have to haul in - the more supplies and fuel we feed our units to make them effective. In this area we can combien short and long range - and land and sea based - airpower - and we have a better chance together - than trying to fight KB with just USN.
China is also an opportunity. If we send good air units and supplies there - China offers a nightmare situation for Japan. Chinese units regenerate in only 30 days too. Engage japanese forces heavily in China - fighting for LOC - and they will either give up inland positions - or die because they stayed there. The goal is to divert units TO China - so they cannot be used to expand the SRA.
Hard as it is - I say adopt a modern NATO like strategy. While I won't abandon Hawaii (or any other valuable place) - don't die defending it - or trying to retake it. Instead - put your main mobile assets into opposing Japan getting what it needs to have: the SRA. If possible - get the Dutch to fight forward (they did IRL) - and the Aussies - even North of the NEI - and fall back - fighting hard all the way. The KB isn't here - nor most of the battlefleet. But LOTS of bases are here - bases of use to the enemy if captured but of use to us UNTIL they are captured. These bases meand planes of shorter ranges are more viable. Similarly - the area produces supplies - unlike the broad Pacific - which is a supply desert. The less we have to haul in - the more supplies and fuel we feed our units to make them effective. In this area we can combien short and long range - and land and sea based - airpower - and we have a better chance together - than trying to fight KB with just USN.
China is also an opportunity. If we send good air units and supplies there - China offers a nightmare situation for Japan. Chinese units regenerate in only 30 days too. Engage japanese forces heavily in China - fighting for LOC - and they will either give up inland positions - or die because they stayed there. The goal is to divert units TO China - so they cannot be used to expand the SRA.