China-Taiwan Wargame by Think Tank

[elxaime]

Article on CSIS wargame being run to simulate a conflict over Taiwan. I smiled when I saw the pictures, as they looked like any shot from a hotel at a wargame convention! One of the highlighted results is the US losing half its airpower, but they seem to believe Taiwan would survive in the end. They plan to publish the report in December. Should be interesting grist for wargame designers.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/th ... f76c1976fd

[Nikel]

Thanks for the link.

Kevinkins already posted a link, but there were no pics.

https://www.matrixgames.com/forums/view ... 6#p5025366


It looks similar to GMT's boardgame, Next War: Taiwan.

https://www.gmtgames.com/p-894-next-war ... ition.aspx


Some stuff of this game.

https://onedrive.live.com/?id=BAF113CFB ... CFB8DCD1CD

[blond_knight_new]

I just read that article this morning. The thing that really worries me about our chances of successfully defending Taiwan is supply. The Chinese will be fighting literally in their backyard, while we will be at the end of a very long supply chain.

And while appeasement never works and we've been headed toward a clash with China for years, lets remember Vietnam for a second and ask how many American lives are we willing to lose to defend the Taiwanese?

[thewood1]

I just read that article this morning. The thing that really worries me about our chances of successfully defending Taiwan is supply. The Chinese will be fighting literally in their backyard, while we will be at the end of a very long supply chain.

And while appeasement never works and we've been headed toward a clash with China for years, lets remember Vietnam for a second and ask how many American lives are we willing to lose to defend the Taiwanese?

Well, there's a massive difference between Vietnam and Taiwan from a US foreign policy standpoint. Taiwan is the global center for semicon manufacturing. Losing it to the PRC would be a massive short/medium-term blow to the world's digital economy. Not only that, but it would give China an even larger ability to choke off trade routes in the Pacific.

Vietnam was a non-player in any global strategy except as a symbol of resolve. Taiwan is a strategic partner that has been at the frontline of West vs Communism since 1949.

[Duck Doc]

I saw this as well and was struck by the interesting kriegspiel vibe to the gaming. Large board game driving the simulated conflict with what looks to be pages of rules on the table while there are laptops around.

[tiag]

I just read that article this morning. The thing that really worries me about our chances of successfully defending Taiwan is supply. The Chinese will be fighting literally in their backyard, while we will be at the end of a very long supply chain.

And while appeasement never works and we've been headed toward a clash with China for years, lets remember Vietnam for a second and ask how many American lives are we willing to lose to defend the Taiwanese?

Well, there's a massive difference between Vietnam and Taiwan from a US foreign policy standpoint. Taiwan is the global center for semicon manufacturing. Losing it to the PRC would be a massive short/medium-term blow to the world's digital economy. Not only that, but it would give China an even larger ability to choke off trade routes in the Pacific.

Vietnam was a non-player in any global strategy except as a symbol of resolve. Taiwan is a strategic partner that has been at the frontline of West vs Communism since 1949.

Cant follow the logic of your post. Why a country like China would be interested to cut the semiconductor industry from the rest of the world? Like any other country involved in international trade, they are also interested to sell/buy. It is Business as usual...almost actually, they would for sure put high prices for aggressors like USA and its allies, but they would continue producing and selling for sure. Remember, the GDP in the chinese communism also needs to grow, otherwise the 1Billion+ cannot eat, live,....."panem et circenses" will be always true.

There is though one important difference between South Vietnam and Taiwan: SV was a massively corrupted government, plagued by high inflation and mismanagement of its economy. It only survived due to the external policy of USA to assist corrupt (sometimes also dictatorships) governments in that era in order to force its version of capitalism/democracy. If people were deceived in the 60/70s to die in SV/NV, do you really think people got smarter?

[tiag]

Interesting reading on how the US may not have enough soldiers to fight in the beaches of Taiwan, if China takes too long to invade:

https://tomdispatch.com/a-military-rich ... in-people/

[thewood1]

"Cant follow the logic of your post. Why a country like China would be interested to cut the semiconductor industry from the rest of the world? "

Because they want to own the semicon industry. Look at their acquisitions and drive to develop a huge weak point in their weapons development. I thought that was universally known. I guess not.

[gennyo]

As a Chinese, I think I feel more uncomfortable about recent Chinese stand than you guys.

China society as a whole is suffering from decline in export since 2014 or 2016 and it's much worsen in COVID years. Some highlights in the so call high technology exports didn't replace the lost of exporting ordinary goods, the original bread and butter.

They had to believe in the so call "1.4 billion market" more than before, although only 5% of all that population is living at a comparable standard of a mid-income nation. Keeping these people's confidence in chekc is their utmost priority now.

So we have the Zero COVID, even everybody in the health industry know it's impossible.

And from 2013 onwards, Chinese officials from all level are more focused on pleasing the upper echlon and not getting fired than economy. As long as they can get their own and pets' bellies fed (preferably with imported high quality goods), they don't care much about local economy like before.

As power concentrated and what I mentioned before, China as a whole is more consolidated than anytime since 1980. I do think it will become more like a Reich than anything like USSR, just like Russia nowadays. As long as the Reich's legality sustains, they are more leaning to a path like Russia or North Korea.

Taiwan to China nowadays is much more than a technological or strategic base, it's the key to the survival of the Reich in the situation of failing legality. "At least I accomplished something in the general line and saved myself for later escape" is the idea of upper echlon.

But as they are more worried about their own good for now, I don't think they could pull up anything like Ukraine in recent years. They don't want to burn the bridge. YET.

My post is a mess, I know. And my home is a mess too nowadays.

[thewood1]

China, economically, needs the west more than the west needs China. The PRC is not self-sufficient in food or energy. Any war that disrupts the global economy is bad for everyone. But its worse for China. But as noted above, Chinese leadership is built on a house of cards, economically. If that house starts to fall, they'll become desperate. And desperate leaders do desperate things. If they get the impression that they can grab Taiwan and as a bonus the TSMC, which is at the center of manufacturing for a large part of the global digital economy, they will try. Or if they get desperate enough.

[blond_knight_new]

I wonder if Taiwan has made plans to demo chip manufacturing sites in the even of invasion.

In reality I doubt it would be necessary. If the nation falls its likely the sites would already be damaged.

[SunlitZelkova]

As a Chinese, I think I feel more uncomfortable about recent Chinese stand than you guys.

China society as a whole is suffering from decline in export since 2014 or 2016 and it's much worsen in COVID years. Some highlights in the so call high technology exports didn't replace the lost of exporting ordinary goods, the original bread and butter.

They had to believe in the so call "1.4 billion market" more than before, although only 5% of all that population is living at a comparable standard of a mid-income nation. Keeping these people's confidence in chekc is their utmost priority now.

So we have the Zero COVID, even everybody in the health industry know it's impossible.

And from 2013 onwards, Chinese officials from all level are more focused on pleasing the upper echlon and not getting fired than economy. As long as they can get their own and pets' bellies fed (preferably with imported high quality goods), they don't care much about local economy like before.

As power concentrated and what I mentioned before, China as a whole is more consolidated than anytime since 1980. I do think it will become more like a Reich than anything like USSR, just like Russia nowadays. As long as the Reich's legality sustains, they are more leaning to a path like Russia or North Korea.

Taiwan to China nowadays is much more than a technological or strategic base, it's the key to the survival of the Reich in the situation of failing legality. "At least I accomplished something in the general line and saved myself for later escape" is the idea of upper echlon.

But as they are more worried about their own good for now, I don't think they could pull up anything like Ukraine in recent years. They don't want to burn the bridge. YET.

My post is a mess, I know. And my home is a mess too nowadays.

Thanks for this post. It seems most reporting either describes it as being super advanced having few problems apart from the lockdowns, and others are predicting collapse in two years. This seems more neutral and fact based. Stay safe!

[tiag]

"Cant follow the logic of your post. Why a country like China would be interested to cut the semiconductor industry from the rest of the world? "

Because they want to own the semicon industry. Look at their acquisitions and drive to develop a huge weak point in their weapons development. I thought that was universally known. I guess not.

China is acting like any emerging power did in the past, isn´t?! Securing resources and confronting anyone trying to block their access. I thought you knew a little bit of history. I guess not.
USA by trying to block China will potentially suffer the consequences. But it is in the interest of everyone, China and USA, that both economies continue trading. From the chinese point of view, under chinese conditions; from the USA point of view, under USA conditions.

[tiag]

China, economically, needs the west more than the west needs China. The PRC is not self-sufficient in food or energy. Any war that disrupts the global economy is bad for everyone. But its worse for China. But as noted above, Chinese leadership is built on a house of cards, economically. If that house starts to fall, they'll become desperate. And desperate leaders do desperate things. If they get the impression that they can grab Taiwan and as a bonus the TSMC, which is at the center of manufacturing for a large part of the global digital economy, they will try. Or if they get desperate enough.

USA depends more on China than vice-versa.
https://www.industryweek.com/the-econom ... eds-the-us
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/11/us ... ump-biden/
https://asiatimes.com/2022/04/dependenc ... omy-in-q1/

[tiag]

...If they get the impression that they can grab Taiwan and as a bonus the TSMC, which is at the center of manufacturing for a large part of the global digital economy, they will try. ...

Sure, as any country with military power did in the past. When the war criminal Bush, the son, invaded Iraq in 2003, no one had the power to block USA/UK actions. They grabbed Irak. The interesting point is that in the unipolar world of 2003, no one had the political and military power to sanction the USA/UK. 2022 is different, this a world with two big economy powers. I am not so sure that the world in general would be looking for sanctions on China if an invasion of Taiwan takes place. UK, Australia, Germany, will surely follow the lead of USA, but the rest of world not necessarily due to strong economy dependence on China. An invasion of Taiwan depends on how it is triggered, in my opinion. If the chinese can sell well that such an invasion was "necessary" (a la Irak or Afghanistan), then the international backlash may not be so strong.

[thewood1]

I guess someone got triggered.

[tiag]

Geopolitics and history are fascinating topics indeed.

-----------------

I am not sure if this text is about the same wargaming.....sounds a different one:
"A recent strategic wargame that pitted the People’s Republic of China against a U.S. backed Taiwan, resulted in the trading of intercontinental ballistic missiles, a 25-percent drop in the global economy, 10s of thousands of Chinese, Taiwanese, and Americans dead…and a protracted guerilla conflict on the small island....."

"A Red Army of Private Ryans: What Wargaming Says about Chinese Willingness to Strike First and Stay Long"
By Major Jesse R. Humpal Ph.D.

https://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/ ... t-and-stay

[elxaime]

Back to the military side of this, I assume many wargames already model a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. I also assume most if not all predate the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. I assume the Think Tank report will address interesting questions as to whether the Russia-Ukraine war should change some commonly held assumptions about the nature of modern warfare, including naval and air weapons systems and munitions. Here are a few thoughts:

1. Shore-to-Ship Missiles: While Snake Island is no Taiwan, there has been some Black Sea skirmishing with significant results, such as the sinking of the Moskva. Shore-to-ship missiles seem to be gaining a lot of prominence, with what remains of the Russia Black Sea fleet staying far off Ukrainian shores. And the threat of these missiles seems to have largely negated the threat of a Russian amphibious invasion of the Ukrainian coasts. Given the PLAN is much more lethal and numerous than the Russian Black Sea Fleet and China has a lot of air and long-range missile power available, would Taiwan still be well-advised to more heavily invest in shore-to-ship missiles?

2. Losses from an opposed landing: the Russia-Ukraine war has developed into an almost static artillery slug fest due to the tremendous lethality of modern weapons on unprotected infantry, and even infantry in decent APCs. Not only has Russia decided not to even attempt an opposed amphibious landing in the Black Sea, but has taken heavy losses even trying to bridge significant rivers, has the calculus of losses from an opposed landing across a body of water reached the point where China will also shy away from even attempting it? The PRC calculations have to be worse than those faced by Eisenhower in 1944 at Normandy, where the Allies had complete and sustainable air and naval superiority and the English Channel was only a few dozen miles wide. Rommel didn't have the level of defenses in place he ideally wanted, while Taiwan has had seventy years to plan and prepare.

3. Resupply: Given the rate of munitions expenditure in an intense conventional conflict, the lessons from the Ukraine war seem to be that Russia decided to limit its advances to where they had nearby rail lines. The PRC of course doesn't have a rail line across the straits and would need to lift everything across what is likely to be heavily contested sea lanes. Any post-landing conflict that extends past a few days would seem likely to leave PLA landing forces low on supply and very vulnerable.

I wonder if these results play out in current wargame simulations? And how the assumptions have changed because of the Ukraine War?

[SunlitZelkova]

1. Shore-to-Ship Missiles: While Snake Island is no Taiwan, there has been some Black Sea skirmishing with significant results, such as the sinking of the Moskva. Shore-to-ship missiles seem to be gaining a lot of prominence, with what remains of the Russia Black Sea fleet staying far off Ukrainian shores. And the threat of these missiles seems to have largely negated the threat of a Russian amphibious invasion of the Ukrainian coasts. Given the PLAN is much more lethal and numerous than the Russian Black Sea Fleet and China has a lot of air and long-range missile power available, would Taiwan still be well-advised to more heavily invest in shore-to-ship missiles?

Yes. You don't stop investing and trying just because it looks hopeless.

2. Losses from an opposed landing: the Russia-Ukraine war has developed into an almost static artillery slug fest due to the tremendous lethality of modern weapons on unprotected infantry, and even infantry in decent APCs. Not only has Russia decided not to even attempt an opposed amphibious landing in the Black Sea, but has taken heavy losses even trying to bridge significant rivers, has the calculus of losses from an opposed landing across a body of water reached the point where China will also shy away from even attempting it? The PRC calculations have to be worse than those faced by Eisenhower in 1944 at Normandy, where the Allies had complete and sustainable air and naval superiority and the English Channel was only a few dozen miles wide. Rommel didn't have the level of defenses in place he ideally wanted, while Taiwan has had seventy years to plan and prepare.

No. China does not share the same mentality surrounding casualties that the West does. Martyrdom and dying for the country are frequent messages in propaganda nowadays, with a special focus on the Korean War where China suffered huge casualties but still achieved one of their objectives in keeping North Korea intact. The CPC is making a big effort to gear up the population for this kind of loss.

Keep in mind China may not even feel it needs to do an amphibious assault right from the beginning. A blockade and large air campaign will precede any landing attempt.

And a WWII style amphibious assault in the 2020s would not necessarily look like D-Day. On-call CAS and gunfire support are two things that exist now that could make such a scenario very different, helping to avoid an Omaha Beach-like calamity.

3. Resupply: Given the rate of munitions expenditure in an intense conventional conflict, the lessons from the Ukraine war seem to be that Russia decided to limit its advances to where they had nearby rail lines. The PRC of course doesn't have a rail line across the straits and would need to lift everything across what is likely to be heavily contested sea lanes. Any post-landing conflict that extends past a few days would seem likely to leave PLA landing forces low on supply and very vulnerable.

China has the second largest merchant marine in the world, and assuming the beachheads are properly secured, should not have an issue with resupply, or at least any remarkable issue beyond the usual ways things don't work out for one during war.

Now this could be different depending on the scope of the conflict. I don't think the Taiwanese surface fleet could realistically pose a threat past a few weeks at best. You just can't hide guided missile boats in the same way you can artillery pieces and ATGM positions.

But if the US intervenes they would face many more (both in a quantitative and qualitative sense) undersea threats. Still, the area that China needs to defend is pretty small, and they are building huge numbers of Type 056 ASW corvettes and Type 054 frigates, while their MPA and ASW helicopter fleet will expand in the coming years.

Just based on CMO experience the strait seems like it would be pretty difficult to penetrate if the PLAN really concentrates their efforts on protecting it.

I wonder if these results play out in current wargame simulations? And how the assumptions have changed because of the Ukraine War?

I am skeptical of how much can really be learned from the Ukraine war. Politically, the Taiwan and Ukraine situations seem similar, but as far as the military aspect goes they are completely different.

Ask yourself- how much did the Eastern Front of WWII influence the battles (air, sea, and land) in the Pacific against Japan?