Falklands 3 - Fleet Action 1/5/82

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fitzpatv
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Joined: Wed Mar 20, 2019 11:29 am

Falklands 3 - Fleet Action 1/5/82

Post by fitzpatv »

This scenario explores the big ‘what if’ of the Falklands campaign and assumes that the Argentine Navy made a serious attempt to stop the British task force in the early days of the conflict. While it would have been interesting to be able to play as either side, it can only be run from the British point-of-view.

As the game begins, the British TG 317.8 is some 150nm NE of the Falklands and comprises the carriers Invincible and Hermes, DDGs Coventry, Glasgow and Sheffield, FFGs Broadsword and Brilliant, FF Yarmouth and three support ships.

The DDG Glamorgan and FFs Alacrity and Arrow have been detached to bombard enemy positions around Port Stanley and are 80nm to the SSE.

Hermes and Invincible have 18 operational Sea Harriers with a mixture of A2A, strike (bombs) and reserve loadouts and there are plenty of choppers for ASW, recon and short-ranged strikes with Sea Skuas. A notable issue is a total lack of AEW aircraft.

Three SSNs are screening the task group, with the Spartan and Splendid some 180nm to the W and NW and the Conqueror a similar distance S of the Falklands.

The Argentine fleet is reported to be at sea, with the carrier Veinticinco de Mayo at the centre of one group and an SAG nearby, both to the NW. A third group, based around the cruiser General Belgrano, is believed to be S of the islands. The carrier is named for Argentina’s national day, the 25th May which, by a remarkable coincidence, also happens to be my birthday!. While the Belgrano is an old WW2 American light cruiser with 6” guns, most of the other Argentine destroyers and corvettes have four 23nm-ranged Exocets each. Their SAM and ASW capabilities are fairly poor.

The carrier is known to have bomb-armed Skyhawks and also some Super Etendards, which carry the 36nm-ranged air-launched version of the Exocet, which can just about be fired from a safe distance from the British SAM defences. Enemy land bases are ready to mount long-distance strikes with a variety of Mirages, Skyhawks and Canberras, while also providing MPA support with elderly but still capable Neptunes. On the Falklands (regardless of the outcome of the Superfuse scenario), there are some Pucara and Turbo Mentor light attack planes, which could pose a threat to the Glamorgan group or generally help to overload British defences.

At least one dangerous Salta-class diesel sub is believed to be in the vicinity, armed with Seeaal torpedoes, which outrange British ASW ordnance of the period.

A number of Soviet fishing vessels, with some intelligence-gathering ships mixed-in, are distributed between the two fleets, observing proceedings and, no doubt, passing information to the Argentines. However, their ability to do so, beyond ELINT, is limited.

1/5/82 15:30Z (11:30L): It was tempting to remove TG 317.8 from its pre-set patrol area and head E of the Falklands to increase the range for land-based Argentine aircraft. However, the task force was supposed to be screening the trailing amphibious group and could not realistically abandon its post in this manner. Closing the range to bring enemy ships within reach of our Harriers and Lynxes seemed foolish, so I left them where they were, with radars dark. All reserve aircraft were put on A2A and ASW loadouts, as appropriate and all ASW Doctrine settings were amended from Weapons Free to Weapons Tight.

I deemed that the Glamorgan group’s mission to Port Stanley was unlikely to achieve much and made the detachment vulnerable to attack from aircraft and land-based artillery. Besides, their SAMs would add weight to the main task force’s defences, so I recalled them. Not having any aircraft with long-ranged air search radar was a serious weakness, so I had Glamorgan (only) switch hers on and steered her group to the W of the carriers to act as an old-fashioned radar picket. It might make them a magnet for enemy aircraft, but better that than get the carriers bombed.

16:00Z: After a quiet start, a recon Sea King located groups of five, three and two probable Argentine warships between 200 and 300nm from the task force to the NW. A Wessex from Glamorgan made a sweep to the S but failed to locate the Belgrano group. HMS Conqueror was moved NE on a counter-clockwise route around the islands in case the cruiser and her escorts had slipped past her. Some enemy ASW and patrol aircraft were in evidence, so a Harrier was sent to intercept the latter.

17:00Z: The Harrier failed to pin-down several contacts in the foul, rainy weather and had to return. Thankfully, it had a quick turnround time. Our Sea King risked closing with the three enemy ships furthest to the NE but, even at 5k’ (below the cloud layer at 7k’) and 5nm range, couldn’t positively identify them.

20:00Z: At this point, the Argentines finally detected the task force (their MPA patrol zones are probably too far W). Six lumbering Canberras approached from the N and were easy prey for four Harriers and a few Sea Darts. The first one downed scored 10VP but there appears to be a bug which prevents scoring for any subsequent Argentine aircraft losses.

In the usual simultaneous fashion, the Argentine submarine San Luis was detected to the E of the task force. It rather foolishly tried a stern chase at Flank and was harried and eventually sunk by a posse of Sea Kings for 75VP. It probably reported the task force for the Canberra strike.

22:00Z: For whatever reason, the Argentines mounted no further air strikes, maybe losing contact with the sinking of the sub. Nightfall further hindered their scope for doing so. I once again sent a Harrier after the MPAs and, this time, succeeded in waylaying a Neptune.

23:00Z: The NE-most Argentine squadron proved to consist of three Exocet-armed Drummond-class corvettes. Using choppers to track them, I steered HMS Spartan into their baffles in a patient stalk, eventually closing with and sinking the nearest corvette, the Guerrico, for 30VP.

In another chronic piece of simultaneity, HMS Splendid closed with the five-ship task group at much the same time, giving me an awkward co-ordination problem. Arriving just after Spartan, she caught the Type 42 DDG Hercules napping, attacking at depth and sinking her with two torpedoes for 50VP. The other ships gave chase and, with aircraft zipping about, I dove as deep as possible and sought to escape at Flank. However, one of the pursuers turned-out not to be a destroyer, but a juicy oiler, the Punta Medanos. It was too good an opportunity to miss, so I turned and put her down for another 75VP, then slipped away at Cruise as the enemy lost the scent. The carrier must have been with the third Argentine task group, further W.

2/5/82 00:00Z: Helped by a relief chopper, Spartan repeated the treatment on the second corvette, the Drummond, which was sailing straight-on as if nothing had happened to her consort. The 30VP brought-up a message to say that I’d won, presumably exceeding the Victory Threshold for the Campaign version of the module. Albeit a little reluctantly, I accepted the win at this point and quit.

Overall, rather easier than I’d imagined. A score of +270, no British losses whatever and a DDG, two corvettes, a diesel sub, an oiler, 6 bombers, an MPA and a chopper (on the Hercules) destroyed, no doubt persuading the Argentine admiral that it would be wise to retire to his bases.

The next scenario covers the historical attack by HMS Conqueror on the Belgrano group.
Eboreg
Posts: 309
Joined: Wed Mar 13, 2019 10:35 pm

Re: Falklands 3 - Fleet Action 1/5/82

Post by Eboreg »

Fascinating... I imagine the loss of the Hercules would definitely rattle the captain of the Veinticinco de Mayo which would play a major role in his decision to withdraw. (Especially since the loss basically halved his carrier's air defenses) Add to that the loss of his picket sub, the constant snooping from your reconnaissance helicopters, and the repeated harassment of his reconnaissance assets and while his decision to withdraw may be excoriated on the homefront, it would be pretty well understood by naval historians in the decades to come.
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