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keystone,
 
Interesting idea. Patton always had his eye on the biggest prize/effect. Cutting the Germans off with this approach would probably lead to a German pocket in Bastogne with the Allies having to reduce it. We could even then have a subsequent German drive to relieve them. Nice.[:)]

ORIGINAL: Arjuna

keystone,

Interesting idea. Patton always had his eye on the biggest prize/effect. Cutting the Germans off with this approach would probably lead to a German pocket in Bastogne with the Allies having to reduce it. We could even then have a subsequent German drive to relieve them. Nice.[:)]

Well with the historic OOB, there wasn't enough manpower to conduct any relief attempts. The defense lines at Aachen or in Huertgenwald (Huertgen Forest) area would have had to be thinned out (the Huertgen sector was extremely undermanned already) in order to collect troops for insertion at the east side of an imaginary pocket in Bastogne.

It might have been possible to send a relief force if Rundstedt had succeeded in deploying his original version of the offensive in the Ardennes (see my post above), where the width of the thrust westwards would have been smaller. Also, the remaining Panzer-units (SS Panzer Division, regular Armored Divisions etc.), which withdrew successfully after the failure of the offensive, were badly needed to relieve the troops in the besieged city of Budapest, Hungary.

2 questions:

1) Btw..... In various books and historiographies, there are circulating different numbers about the amount of German divisions/units participating in the Ardennes offensive (ranging from around 28 - 41 German divisions). While I favour the approaches where 28-31 are being outlined as final OOB, many authors mention up to 41 divisions (which seem to include the reserves [which were uncommitted???] of Army Group B).
Also, assuming there were around 28-31 Divisions, these numbers existed on the paper only, since many units were understrength units (some down to one-third of the required strength), or did not receive sufficient resupplies (armor/transportation/ammo). Some VGDs were newly formed units, consisting of green recruits, with only the COs/NCOs having combat experience. It's hard (if not impossible?) to research the exact numbers, since even Rundstedt/Model and Jodl (who outlined Hitlers goals roughly, and who altered Rundstedt's/Model's finished plan later on) were shuffling around abstract numbers, that partially did not display the actual strength of available units.
After the introductory German artillery bombardment (750-800 guns), quite a number of arty units were not allowed to fire more than 7 rounds a day in the Ardennes area, because the ammo had been rationed in their sectors.

What's BFTB's approach, regarding amount of German forces, and rationing of ressources?

2) Operation "Stösser" envisioned para drops (1300 troops, under Friedrich August von der Heydte.... the last german airborne operation in WW2) during the night of the 16th to 17th of December, 11 km north of Malmedy, to seize vital crossroads/road hubs used by the US troops. The paras then would have to be relieved by the spearheading SS armor units.

The troops got spread all over the Ardennes area, due to a heavy snow storm that night, so actually only one-fifth of the initially assigned amount of troops landed in the drop zone. Von der Heydte (crete veteran) had been captured during the operation.

What about a what-if scenario which would assume that all paras would have made it to the drop zone? The paras failed because they could not build up enough combat power.... several attempts to seize the area had been repelled by US units, which were then reinforced by a couple of armored "fire-brigade" units later on.

GoodGuy,
 
Good comments. Good questions. [:)]
 
re. amount of German units. Our approach is to cover most of the historical battles sector by sector and then to cover a number of hypotheticals. For the latter we can certainly introduce assumptions about the sommitment of strategic reserves. One other option also available to the Germans was to commit the forces earmarked to Op Nordwind. As to specific force allocations for the various scenarios, I'll leave that to the DDT boys to comment on.
 
re. rationing of supplies. This is an interesting area. At present the game engine includes rationing in the resupply system. However, its rather generic as we employ a generic ammo supply category at depots. Depots shuffle around kilos/litres of ammo, basics and fuel. When the supplies are delivered to units, they are converted to actual rounds of particular ammo types.
 
One thing we are going to do is to provide a means within the ScenMaker to edit the at-start stock level of units. This way certain units can start with low supplies or an abundance.
 
It would be nice if the player could set a supply priority for particular units/depots and we developed some AI that would know when to do so for the AI controlled side. However, I don't think we'll have time for that.

GoodGuy,

I've been working on two scenarios which feature KGr Von der Heydte: one where he jumps into the Rocherath-Krinkelt area (as suggested by Model), and one where he secures the bridges at Huy for KGr Peiper. Both of course are "what if" scenarios.

As of the state of various German units at the start of the offensive: the West Front design team have pretty good information (mainly collected by "Final_Drive") on most units involved, often down to the number of machine guns available per company.

Pieter

ORIGINAL: KNac007

.........and if devs could add the rare SS mountain division (maybe it shares the TOE with Wehrmacht units) it could helo a bit more.

No, a Wehrmacht unit would not do it. Each of these SS mountain divisions had either a tank or a StuG company, also a full Flak-batallion and one logistics/supply batallion.

In general, SS combat units had more personnel than regular Wehrmacht units, and they featured a higher amount of heavy weapons, since they got all the shiny/new stuff.

Himmler established an independant SS weaponry department (which co-operated with the Wehrmacht weaponry department, but only in terms of observing the development and sharing of new technologies).
Equipment differed a lot, even to the point of exclusive developments for the SS ("Werfer"-units, mortars, special versions of tanks, AT equipment [guns] etc.). SS units were way more mobile, and had a bigger car/armor pool than Wehrmacht units.

These SS mountain units had more punch (if at full strength) and they had their own tank companies, unlike the regular Wehrmacht mountain divisions, which were still serving in an (elite) infantry role.

Goodguy,

I beg to differ on your "SS got all the shiny/new stuff"-theory. This is a bit of a simplification.

There were some organizational differences, but Wehrmacht and W-SS both used the same sets of KStN (Kriegsstärkenachweisung = +-T/O&E) as the basic organizational building blocks for their divisions.
True, in its Grundgliederung, the SS-Pz.Div. 44 for instance had two Pz.Gren.Btls more than its Army counterpart, but this was a left-over from the time when these divisions were Panzergrenadier-Divisions. To support the extra Pz.Grenadiers, each SS-Pz.Div. had an extra 10,5cm-battalion. If SS-units appear to have had some more support units within their divisional structures, this is mainly due to the fact that the SS had far less support units on the Corps and Army level than the Army had, which was sought to be compensated for. 
For one, fuel shortages didn't discriminate between Heer and W-SS units. In Autumn '44, each Pz.Div. was to make one of its Pz.Gren.Bn. 'Fahrradbeweglich' (bicycle-equipped), while SS-Pz.Divs. were ordered to do the same for two such Bns. (the order was only partially carried out though). So far the extra mobility...

Kind regards,

Andries

ORIGINAL: final_drive

I beg to differ on your "SS got all the shiny/new stuff"-theory. This is a bit of a simplification.

Oh well, I didn't mean to feature some of these myths like "oh they got the best equipment, better weapons than the Heer"-stuff.
I think Guderian's quote (from his book "Panzer Leader", the part about the period where he was Inspector of the Tank troops) is interesting, though: "But even during the war the preferential treatment received by the Waffen-SS in the quality and quantity of its replacements, as well as of arms and equipment, led to a certain amount of understandable ill-feeling on the part of the less-favoured army formations."

Well, while I use to be careful when judging these kinds of memoire statements, and while recent publications/researches and ppl online, like Niehorster and others, use to present numbers stating that they did not differentiate between Heer and W-SS (regarding delivery [+numbers] of let's say heavy weapons / tanks), i am convinced that the SS received resupplies/replacements faster than some of their Heer counterparts. SS units used to withdraw to resupply and replace lost/damaged equipment, while the Heer used to have to receive those replacements on the front lines.

I've also read veteran accounts about the tendency of SS units rather passing broken/damaged equipment to Wehrmacht repair shops or even back to factory, in order to receive brandnew equipment, and to redistribute the repaired vehicles to other units, or instances where working equipment was reported as lost/damaged, in order not to hand it over to other units. Things like these may have triggered statements like the ones Guderian published after the war.

That's where my statement was pointing at.

Although the Heeres-Waffenamt and the SS-Waffenamt shared the same distribution channels/factories, the SS-Waffenamt was quite inventive when it came to acquisition of equipment. While some of that equipment may have been even weaker (czech MGs, weak 2cm AA Wirbelwind, SS Pz Divisions filling up empty slots with Pz I - III in Russia '43[Kursk?]), quite some weapons had more punch (some special tank versions, extra arty, mortars, higher percentage of SMGs afaik), and/or could not be found in the Heer (Werfer units).

For one, fuel shortages didn't discriminate between Heer and W-SS units. In Autumn '44, each Pz.Div. was to make one of its Pz.Gren.Bn. 'Fahrradbeweglich' (bicycle-equipped), while SS-Pz.Divs. were ordered to do the same for two such Bns. (the order was only partially carried out though). So far the extra mobility...

Well, I've even read about a SS-Bn moving to the front lines on bicycles (was it Nordwind or Ardennes offensive? Can't remember), thus getting too late for a relieve-operation, so the other unit had to attempt a breakout on its own. Yeah, maybe vehicle shortages didn't differentiate between Heer and SS as well.
According to the accounts I've read so far, in general, let aside the shortages during '44/45, a SS-Inf unit had less features of a foot-unit than a corresponding Heer unit, though, and SS units had a somewhat higher amount of halftracks within their pool of transport units. EDIT: Oh and I'm well aware of the fact that there was a halftrack shortage in late '44, just for the record. :p

Some of the SS Pz. Division's companies being equipped with StuG throughout, instead of PzIV or better tanks, would be another difference, and another reason for me saying that they had more punch [:)], against enemy infantry units for sure [:D].

ORIGINAL: loyalcitizen

I'd love to see a scenario where a panzer division tries to capture an American supply point on the map, and in doing so raises their own petrol levels.

Me too like in the movie. I also want to be able to slaughter 1000's of americana prisioners like at Malmandy (sp?)

It's kinda funny Batle of the Bulge is the only other part of the war where I like playing the Germans. North Africa is the other. The rest of the time I want to play the US, but, not really allied forces like British or Canadians or the other puny ones.

Also, I will be buying this one because of the area/time frame (Bulge is one of my favorite battles of WW2), not because I like the way the game plays. Still hate rts, will always hate rts and I don't give a squats patutal about "pauseable continous time" bs, it's still real time that has to be paused and that suks. ANd that's my right and I'm stickin to it. pffft!

ORIGINAL: ravinhood

Also, I will be buying this one because of the area/time frame (Bulge is one of my favorite battles of WW2), not because I like the way the game plays. Still hate rts, will always hate rts and I don't give a squats patutal about "pauseable continous time" bs, it's still real time that has to be paused and that suks. ANd that's my right and I'm stickin to it. pffft!

lol, can't argue with that!

So long as you're buying it, ravinhood, that's what matters.. u can still be converted!

ORIGINAL: ravinhood

Me too like in the movie. I also want to be able to slaughter 1000's of americana prisioners like at Malmandy (sp?)

Is that some kind of morbid humour, or what?. You must be kidding.

ORIGINAL: GoodGuy

ORIGINAL: ravinhood

Me too like in the movie. I also want to be able to slaughter 1000's of americana prisioners like at Malmandy (sp?)

Is that some kind of morbid humour, or what?. You must be kidding.

probably just drunk...[;)]

Goodguy,

Oh well, I didn't mean to feature some of these myths like "oh they got the best equipment, better weapons than the Heer"-stuff.

Nice to read you’re not of that simplistic opinion. [:)]

I think Guderian's quote (from his book "Panzer Leader", the part about the period where he was Inspector of the Tank troops) is interesting, though: "But even during the war the preferential treatment received by the Waffen-SS in the quality and quantity of its replacements, as well as of arms and equipment, led to a certain amount of understandable ill-feeling on the part of the less-favoured army formations."

Well, while I use to be careful when judging these kinds of memoire statements, and while recent publications/researches and ppl online, like Niehorster and others, use to present numbers stating that the Waffenamt did not differentiate between Heer and W-SS (regarding delivery of let's say of heavy weapons/tanks), i am convinced that the SS received resupplies/replacements faster than some of their Heer counterparts. SS units used to withdraw to resupply and replace lost/damaged equipment, while the Heer used to receive those replacements on the front lines.

I've also read veteran accounts about the tendency of SS units rather passing broken/damaged equipment to Wehrmacht repair shops or even back to factory, in order to receive brandnew equipment, and to redistribute the repaired vehicles to Heer units, or instances where working equipment was reported as lost/damaged, in order not to hand it over to other units. Things like these may have triggered statements like the ones Guderian published after the war.

Researchers like Leo Niehorster, Richard Anderson, Jeff Dugdale, Timm Haasler, to name but a few, get their information from years of research in the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv and US National Archives. Thanks to the internet, they can nowadays share their findings with others which have an interest in this matter. While some of them focus on theoretical establishments, others do so on actual strength reports and still others check the equipment deliveries from the Waffenamt, thereby not just looking at either Heer or W-SS, but to both. Their findings all differentiate the exaggerated views on W-SS equipment deliveries, which have partly originated from the infighting between W-SS and Heer, and which are still being carried on today in part of popular history.
Most certainly, the W-SS didn’t always play according to the book and abused its political position to obtain equipment deliveries at times, but it did not happen on as large a scale as often presumed.
Like his fellow high-ranking Army officers, Guderian must have been frustrated by the chances and means the W-SS got. Understandably, a traditionalist institution as the Heer colided with a politically backed bunch of newcomers. Such infighting between overlapping authorities was typical for the Third Reich, not just between the branches of service, but also between government institutions.
By emphasising the argument that the W-SS took away many resources from the Heer, the former Army officers aimed to reinforce two points after the war: firstly, that the Army would have done better if they’d gotten acces to those resources, and secondly, that they weren’t as politically favoured and/or involved as the other branch. You pointed out yourself that one has to be careful when judging those memoirs. It’s only one side of the picture.

Although the Heeres-Waffenamt and the SS-Waffenamt shared the same distribution channels/factories, the SS-Waffenamt was quite inventive when it came to acquisition of equipment. While some of that equipment may have been even weaker (czech MGs, weak 2cm AA Wirbelwind, SS Pz Divisions filling up empty slots with Pz I - III in Russia '43), quite some weapons had more punch (some special tank versions, extra arty, mortars, higher percentage of SMGs afaik), and/or could not be found in the Heer (Werfer units).
According to the accounts I've read so far, in general, let aside the shortages during '44/45, a SS-Inf unit had less features of a foot-unit than a corresponding Heer unit, though, and SS units had a somewhat higher amount of halftracks within their pool of transport units. EDIT: Oh and I'm well aware of the fact that there was a halftrack shortage in late '44, just for the record.
Some of the SS Pz. Division's companies being equipped with StuG throughout, instead of PzIV or better tanks, would be another difference, and another reason for me saying that they had more punch , against enemy infantry units for sure

The 2cm Flakpanzer IV Wirbelwind, developed by OST-Bau on demand of In. 6, wasn’t exclusive to the W-SS Panzer Regiments, nor was the 3,7cm Flakpanzer Möbelwagen exclusive to their Army counterparts (I reckon you consider the latter as stronger?). A combination of four vehicles of each type within each regimental Flak platoon was aimed for, both in Heer and SS-Pz.Divs.
The reason for the extra artillery and Werfer units within the SS-Panzerdivision and/or Panzerkorps was already pointed out in my previous post.
I don’t know what you mean by “special tank versions” which would have had more punch.
Mortar and SMG establishment numbers would also have been prescribed by the KStN, and these, like stated, were identical for W-SS and Heer. If a 1944 W-SS Pz.Div. had considerably more of these than its counterpart, this was a consequence of the fact that it had two Pz.Gren.Btls more.
All late ’44 strength reports I’ve seen show the actual number for MP40s and the like well below the established figure, for both Heer and W-SS units.
Halftrack-figures per Kp.(gp.) (mechanised coy) also were established in the KStN, which, again, were valid for both branches. Actuals for the Ardennes were another story and varied on the availability of the different types during the refitting period. When compared to the total number of Pz.Grenadiere in each division type, you could even say an SS-Pz.Div. was worse off, since it had only one out of six Pz.Gren.Bns armoured, compared to one out of four for the Heer Panzer-Division.
The StuG which were sent to some of both Army and W-SS Panzer-companies to compensate for lacking medium tanks, all had the 7,5cm StuK40 L/48, which fired the same ammo as the Pz.IV’s KwK40 L/48. I don’t see how the StuG would have packed more punch against infantry.

Now, what can't be denied for the Ardennes, is the fact that 1., 2., 9. and 12. SS-Pz. fielded a bigger total of tanks (or replacing assault guns if any) and tank destroyers than the Army units involved in the offensive, except for 2. Pz. Div., which was on the same level (for a recent comprehensive overview of figures: Jeff Dugdale). As 6. Pz.Armee had been designated as the spearpoint for the offensive, its units were to be the strongest. But to achieve this, as you know, LAH was reinforced with s.Pz.Abt. 501, a I. SS-Pz.Korps unit, and HJ with s.Pz.Jäg.Abt. 560, an Army General HQ unit, to make up for missing tank battalions within these divisions. So you can't consider these as new equipment deliveries.
If you’d really want a fair comparison of equipment deliveries to each branch of service prior to the Ardennes Offensive, you’d have to take into account the following points:

• The last refitting prior to committal in France during Summer (when and to what extent?)
• The duration of commitment in Normandy and degree of destruction of the division in Normandy and the ensuing retreat from France
• The varying special reduced establishments for the Panzer Divisions in the West, Autumn ‘44
• The losses sustained during the commitments from September till December
• The length of the refitting period prior to the Offensive
• The presumed rôle in the Offensive

Kind regards,

Andries

Good post.
Like I said, I don't buy statements in memoires easily.
And I'm well aware of the inner-political conflicts.
I do take into account witness (vet) reports, though [:)].

ORIGINAL: final_drive

The 2cm Flakpanzer IV Wirbelwind, developed by OST-Bau on demand of In. 6, wasn’t exclusive to the W-SS Panzer Regiments, nor was the 3,7cm Flakpanzer Möbelwagen exclusive to their Army counterparts (I reckon you consider the latter as stronger?). A combination of four vehicles of each type within each regimental Flak platoon was aimed for, both in Heer and SS-Pz.Divs.

I know that the Wirbelwind wasn't exclusively used by one or another side... I typed so much, I forgot to point that out.[:D]
I've read veteran accounts which described the Wirbelwind as "unreliable" and "weak", whether they meant to say "harder to operate", or "inaccurate" or just plain "weak" (in terms of smaller calibre) is unknown to me, less useful at least. I for one haven't operated either of 'em. [;)] Have you? :p

All late ’44 strength reports I’ve seen show the actual number for MP40s and the like well below the established figure, for both Heer and W-SS units.

Halftrack-figures per Kp.(gp.) (mechanised coy) also were established in the KStN, which, again, were valid for both branches.

Hmmm..."way below".... "Valid".... were they equal or not?
And about what date KStN-wise are we talking about here? Just wondering, because, if I recall correctly, on at least one occasion a StN from 1938 had been used to build vehicle pools in COTA (sorry, but i can't be arsed to search for the thread in the COTA forum right now [:)] ), vehicles that were obsolete and possibly exchanged by 1941.

The StuG which were sent to some of both Army and W-SS Panzer-companies to compensate for lacking medium tanks, all had the 7,5cm StuK40 L/48, which fired the same ammo as the Pz.IV’s KwK40 L/48. I don’t see how the StuG would have packed more punch against infantry.

Correct me if i'm wrong, but as far as I know a SS PG-division did have an extra StuG-Abteilung while a corresponding Heer unit didn't.
Also, I had the Sd.Kfz. 142/2 with its 105 mm StuH 42 L/28 (36) (Feldhaubitze 18) gun in mind, a sub-type of the StuG 142/1, which was often just called StuG (officially) too, although it was designated Sturmhaubitze 42. I'd consider that one to have way more punch, since its prime role was combat against infantry, and, unlike the StuK, it could be used as artillery gun as well.

If you’d really want a fair comparison of equipment deliveries to each branch of service prior to the Ardennes Offensive, you’d have to take into account the following points:.....

You do you know that my suspicion, or let's say observation (according to the vet accounts i've read and seen on tv), isn't "who got what?" or "who got more", but "who got XY at what time and how fast?", do you?

Most certainly, the W-SS didn’t always play according to the book and abused its political position to obtain equipment deliveries at times, but it did not happen on as large a scale as often presumed.

Sure, I've even seen a vet on tv (SS) who was laughing when asked if his unit got better equipment .... he was like "we wished we would have had better stuff", and another vet (Heer) said that they got brandnew equipment prior to the Ardennes offensive, new stuff they hadn't received for months, if not a year.
Still, I've seen/read quite a number of accounts giving reports that it happened on a larger scale, especially after the 20th of July. And these weren't solely stated by high ranked officers.

I do take into account witness (vet) reports, though

Nowhere did I state that veteran accounts should be discarded. However, you will agree with me that veteran accounts which offer lots of details on OOBs, TO&E's and equipment deliveries are rather rare. Usually and understandably, veterans keep recollections about experiences which are more intense than the exact make-up of their company, battalion, etc.

Hmmm..."way below".... "Valid".... were they equal or not?

Yes, the KStN-establishments at company level were equal for both branches.
No, the actuals were not equal. They differed, not from one branch to another, but from one unit to another, with sometimes one SS-Pz-Division having far more of one equipment item than another SS-Division, while at other times an Army Pz-Division had more of an equipment item than an SS-Pz-Division. Differences weren't just there between divisions, but also within similar unit types within divisions. I hope you get the idea now.

And about what date KStN-wise are we talking about here? Just wondering, because, if I recall correctly, on at least one occasion a StN from 1938 had been used to build vehicle pools in COTA (sorry, but i can't be arsed to search for the thread in the COTA forum right now ), vehicles that were obsolete and possibly exchanged by 1941.

Well, this is the 'Battles from the Bulge' forum, so we're talking about (late) 1944 establishments. I've been in the BftB data team for over a year now, and wasn't involved in CotA-development, but I'm sure Steve 'Golf33' did his very best.
I hope you realize that for the data team members this is a hobby project and we're trying to combinate this group effort as best as we can with our daily jobs and social lives. Meticulously drawing the maps, collecting all the Estab data, researching the OOB's and developing the scenarios, is a big job, considering the depth of detail AA offers. And it is this depth which is one of the major features which render AA popular. Rest assured: in the data teams, we're as picky to eachother, as you are to us.

Correct me if i'm wrong, but as far as I know a SS PG-division did have an extra StuG-Abteilung while a corresponding Heer unit didn't.

No, just like an Army 1944 Panzergrenadier-Div. had one StuG-Abteilung and one Pz.Jäg.Abt., the SS-Pz.Gren.Div. had just one StuG-Abteilung and one Panzerjäger-Abt. Mind you, in your previous post, you mentioned the StuG in the context of the (SS-)Panzer-Division, not in the context of the Panzergrenadier-Division:

Some of the SS Pz. Division's companies being equipped with StuG throughout, instead of PzIV or better tanks

Also, I had the Sd.Kfz. 142/2 with its 105 mm StuH 42 L/28 (36) (Feldhaubitze 18) gun in mind, a sub-type of the StuG 142/1, which was often just called StuG (officially) too, although it was designated Sturmhaubitze 42.

The StuG which were used by the Panzerwaffe in (SS)-Pz.Coys as a substitute for lacking medium tanks were never of the StuH42 type, for its 105mm gun's anti-armour capacities were too small, but always of the StuK40 type. The same holds true for StuG in the StuG-Abteilungen of (SS)-Panzergrenadier-Divisions. StuH42 were only fielded within independant StuG-Brigaden and Sturm-Art.Brigaden, which were Army General HQ-units, depending from the Artillery arm.

after the 20th of July

After the failed bomp plot, Himmler was appointed "Commander of the Replacement Army and Head of Army Equipment", a position formerly held by Generaloberst Fromm. This shift further enlarged his grip on the German armed forces. However, shortly before, he had already been given extraordinary political and jurisdictional powers over the then-forming Army infantry divisions of the 29th Wave and following 32nd Wave. These divisions, which would ultimately become known as Volks-Grenadier-Divisions, were merged with the remains of destroyed infantry divisions and received new hardwear (including big amounts of MP44, far more than any Pz. or SS-Pz.Div. ever did). At roughly the same time, in August 1944 the new independent Army Panzer-Brigaden were created, and these received full deliveries of Panthers, Pz. IV/70(V), mSPW, etc. to the disadvantage of both Pz. and SS-Pz.Divs. This as just another illustration of the not so clear lines between Army and W-SS and their hardware deliveries.

kind regards,

Andries