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Its easier to hit a/c on a small airbase. Also, larger airbases have better spotting of incoming raids (assumed it has better radar and systems in place to spot/anticipate enemy raids.

Joel Billings wrote: Tue Sep 20, 2022 11:51 pm The good news is the problem with perfect info on where enemy air units have been moved has already been fixed, so it should be harder to know where to bomb.

Seems that .41 patch you can still see air transfers of the enemy still being there Here is the patch note related to air-transfer;




Here is a picture of the logistics phase of Beethoven(Soviet) & HardLuckYetAgain(German) game. We both upgraded to .41 patch. I am on Turn 7 Airphase and will be saving the game back to the Server if you like to take a look since I am going to bed and will pick up in the morning. I can see the Soviet Air Transfers done during the Soviets turn.




I can still see the transfers. I will also re-open the "Tech Ticket" if I can find it quickly tonight too.

I just ran an offline test and the enemy ground phase air transfers are not getting written into the log phase for either side, and those in the logistics phase are only showing up for the player that made the transfers. Are you sure your opponent upgraded before he made the transfer? His turn 6 logistics phase was run with .39. I see he resolved some combat with .41. You'll need to play another turn to know for sure. If he sees your move phase transfers in his log report, then we know there is a problem which might be unique for MP games. I'd be surprised if that's the case, but not shocked. Let me know.

Joel Billings wrote: Sat Sep 24, 2022 4:58 am I just ran an offline test and the enemy ground phase air transfers are not getting written into the log phase for either side, and those in the logistics phase are only showing up for the player that made the transfers. Are you sure your opponent upgraded before he made the transfer? His turn 6 logistics phase was run with .39. I see he resolved some combat with .41. You'll need to play another turn to know for sure. If he sees your move phase transfers in his log report, then we know there is a problem which might be unique for MP games. I'd be surprised if that's the case, but not shocked. Let me know.

Thank you Mr. Billings. I will do some air transfers and will ask Beethoven to report if he saw any to this thread. As always, "Thank You" for all the support.

I think it is good that some of you guys are pushing the envelop and exploring the full extent of possible air-base strike capabilities. This is something that is not normally possible in player vs AI games.

Regarding Loki's comments -

As an aside, we tested HLYA/Beethoven's claim that air base bombing is OP. Its not, if the German fighters are on well supplied airbases they will intercept (and mine are basically assigned to GS and auto-intercept) and wipe out any Soviet attempt.

If this is true, then I guess it would render this a topic a moot point. However, I suspect it is not completely true.

From my experience, Air-base attacks by the Luftwaffe after Turn 1 are exceedingly difficult. While never as devastating as the June 22 Airbase strikes, unfortunately, this is contrary to the historical record. The Luftwaffe conducted ongoing successful airbase strikes throughout the 1st several months of Barbarossa. This helped to keep the VVS AC numbers in check a good portion of the Summer and Fall of 1941.

Now, as far as successful Soviet Airbase attacks against the Luftwaffe in 1941? This can be subjective and a matter of debate.

It would have been nice to come across a list of Luftwaffe AC "destroyed on the ground" during this time period. That would have been very difficult to refute. But no such luck, I am afraid. In the alternative, I relied on a variety of studies, research papers and other historical documents.

According to "Soviet Air Force Operational Theory, 1918 -1941", Feb 2004 -There was an ongoing debate within the Soviet Union regarding the feasibility of airbase strikes.

see - https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/ ... 429305.pdf

... recognizing that strikes on enemy airbases were necessary, he also declared that the complexity and difficulty of the operation was such that, 'Most such strikes will not succeed.' D. T. Kozlov, who commanded a rifle corps in the Finnish War and was the Chief of the Main Directorate of Air Defence during the conference, argued briefly with Richagov over the efficiency of base strikes, insisting on the need to concentrate all available Frontal aviation on the first day of the operation against the enemy air force, bomb their airbases,and thereby prevent the enemy air force from interfering with ground operations. M. M. Popov, then the commander of the Ist Red Banner Army of G. M. Shtern's Far Eastern Front, and a veteran of the Russian Civil War (but not Spain, China, Mongolia, or Finland), argued that base strikes were only of use in the initial period of a war.
...
The other half of the doctrinal problem, however, comes from an incorrect assessment of the effectiveness of strikes on airbases. As discussed in the previous chapter, some of the top Soviet Air Force commanders did not believe that strikes on
airbases were especially effective.

another deficit pointed out (and often overlooked) ...

Furthermore, the Soviet decision to subordinate most of their air units to Armies meant that they had, in essence, given up the ability to concentrate air power. Since Fronts retained little in the way of assets, and the High Command retained control of heavy bomber aviation, the bulk of the power of the Soviet Air Force was incapable of shifting from Army to Army, let alone Front to Front.

and as far as severity and frequency of Soviet airbase attacks -

On 22 June 1941, the Soviet Air Force was ordered to bomb the Luftwaffe's airbases,debate on the value of such strikes notwithstanding. However, bombers units attempting this mission were, at best, poorly coordinated with fighter escorts, and often completely unescorted; and the sad fate of these large formations of bombers is well known. As a result, subsequent airbase attacks were generally not attempted in 1941. From 22 June to 30 September, the Soviet Western Front launched only 1,987 sorties on airbase attacks, just over 4% of the 50,000 or so sorties it launched in that time frame, while some 37% of all sorties by the Soviet Air Force up to 30 September were fighters on air superiority missions. The next major attempts to bomb German airbases did not occur until the fighting outside Moscow, when
major efforts were made on 11-18 October and 5-7 November.

The Soviet Air Force's next attempt to take the war to the enemy occurred in October. The Soviets thought they had discerned a Luftwaffe plan to concentrate between 1,000 and 1,500 aircraft intended to launch a major attack on a variety of Soviet strategic and operational targets near Moscow on 12-13 October. In response,the Soviets launched as much of their forces as they could at Luftwaffe bases from 11-18 October. The impact of these strikes is uncertain; the Soviets claimed, at the time, to have destroyed an unlikely total of 500 German aircraft, while German accounts suggest the damage was relatively minor. A repeat attack on 5-8 November is claimed to have produced another 200 German aircraft losses. In all Probability the damage was relatively slight, but the wider significance was not: the Soviet Air Force was beginning to return to the fray.

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On further review of other historical records, such as http://ww2.dk/Airfields%20-%20Russia%20 ... kraine.pdf, there was some mention of Axis AC lost "on the ground" in 1941 due to Soviet AC attacks.

7-9 Jul 41: Balti captured by 3 Romanian infantry divisions (5, 13 and 14) and now in Axis hands following heavy fighting. The airfields were said by them to be in terrible condition and situated on very marshy and wet terrain.
14 Jul 41: bombed by Soviet 45 SBAP and 146 IAP – claimed 12 Axis aircraft destroyed on the ground and violent fires started.
21 Jul 41: Balti/Ost attacked by fighters from 55 IAP and then by 8 x “DB-3s” – 11 x Ju 87s from St.G. 77 and 2 x Bf 109s from III./JG 77 damaged on the ground, plus 1 x Ju 52 assigned to JG 77 destroyed.
23 Jul 41: strafed again by 55 IAP – claimed 13 Axis planes left burning on the ground.

22 Jun 41: Biala Podlask bombed at 1220 hrs. by 6 (20?) Soviet bombers - 2 x Fw 58s from Verbindungsstaffel 52 destroyed and damaged on the ground.

21 Sep 41: Cherson II bombed by 8 SB-2s and 26 Pe-2s from 40 BAP/Black Sea Fleet – claimed 5 single-engine enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground.

13 Dec 41: Kiln bombed – 1 x Bf 109 F-2 from 6./JG 52 destroyed on the ground and 6 more from II./JG 52 damaged.

16 Jul 41: Roshkopolje bombed – 2 x Bf 109 F-2s from II./JG 53 destroyed on the ground.

12 Oct 41: Krasnogwardeis bombed – 1 x Go 145 from Kurierstaffel I. Fliegerkorps damaged on the ground.

8 Sep 41: Ljuban/Süd low-level attack by Russian SB-2 bombers - no damage reported by airfield and nearby town Flak claimed 5 of the raiders shot down.
10 Sep 41: Ljuban/Süd bombed – 1 x Bf 109 F-4 from 5./JG 53 destroyed on the ground.
26 Sep 41: the Ljuban/Süd airfield was the terminus for a large airlift operation involving c. 200 Ju 52 transports that brought in elements of the 1. Fallschirmjäger-Div. (1st Parachute or Airborne Division) from Germany and concluded on 3 Oct 41. The Division was to be employed on the front around Schlüsselburg (Schlisselburg, Petrokrepost) 66.5 km N of Lyuban. At the time, the airfield was described as “small and poorly arranged.”
4 Oct 41: Ljuban/Süd attacked by 15 or 16 MiG-1s and Pe-2s with high explosive and fragmentation bombs - no damage reported.

14 Oct 41: Mariupol/Wes air attacks – 1 x Bf 109 E-7 from I./LG 2 destroyed on the ground and 1 x Ju 52 from Transportstaffel IV. Fliegerkorps moderately damaged.

(note - I admittedly stopped here, as anything remaining for 1941 was similar to those previously listed - and nothing extraordinary.)

---

In 1941, one of the biggest shortcomings of the VVS was its inability to mass and apply concentrated force when necessary.

see - Strategy and the Use of Air Power on the Eastern Front, found here: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1019214.pdf

---

In conclusion, the idea of the VVS being able to conduct and coordinate a series of wave-after-wave air strikes, against a select number of German airbases, resulting in the losses of 400+ AC in a 1 week period at the onset of Barbarossa is troubling and concerning.

If it was so easy to accomplish, then why wasn't it done?

In fact, the point here is not the ability to concentrate forces, but the fact that the reconnaissance aviation of the USSR was terrible. It was in a terrible command structure, the technical staff did not receive sufficient training, the technology for producing reconnaissance images was antediluvian, and reconnaissance aircraft were also affected by the attacks of the German troops, which greatly undermined their reconnaissance work in the rear.

The question arises, how can you concentrate forces against targets about which you know nothing?

It is obvious that in such conditions it is impossible to concentrate forces simply on the basis of the fact that you cannot know at what airfields the enemy is and how he is prepared to repel an attack.

Technically, the aviation of the USSR could well concentrate its efforts, at least from a purely technical point of view. Concentrate planes, dig airfields, bring in fuel and ammunition, but provide intelligence, a clear idea of ​​where, why and how they could not.

This is the essence of the problem.

The in-game fog of war is not the same fog of war as in real life. The player has a very good idea of ​​what is really going on. You know about all the airfields that are being built by the enemy. About how many percent it is loaded and at what point. You do not know the types of aircraft, but this is not important, the main thing is to understand the very fact of the presence of aircraft at the airfield.

I would reconsider the intelligence game system in the future, because this is currently the biggest problem, it is either not needed at all, or does nothing, or does a lot but already when the plans are made, it opens the goals of which you could not see and you no longer in a position to correct anything without restarting the course.

I'm still waiting for some saves from someone that covers these issues. I know it's hard to come up with, but without it, Pavel will be guessing about what's going on.

Joel Billings wrote: Mon Sep 26, 2022 5:10 pm I'm still waiting for some saves from someone that covers these issues. I know it's hard to come up with, but without it, Pavel will be guessing about what's going on.

I will get you some saves. But I will need a few days with my hectic work schedule I have at the moment. I should have something like Thursday/Friday.

HardLuckYetAgain wrote: Sat Sep 24, 2022 11:14 am

Joel Billings wrote: Sat Sep 24, 2022 4:58 am I just ran an offline test and the enemy ground phase air transfers are not getting written into the log phase for either side, and those in the logistics phase are only showing up for the player that made the transfers. Are you sure your opponent upgraded before he made the transfer? His turn 6 logistics phase was run with .39. I see he resolved some combat with .41. You'll need to play another turn to know for sure. If he sees your move phase transfers in his log report, then we know there is a problem which might be unique for MP games. I'd be surprised if that's the case, but not shocked. Let me know.

Thank you Mr. Billings. I will do some air transfers and will ask Beethoven to report if he saw any to this thread. As always, "Thank You" for all the support.

Good Morning Mr. Billings. Seems this is still taking place in our game game Sir. Beethoven started a tech ticket and I am linking here too. As always thank you for reading.

https://www.matrixgames.com/forums/view ... 6#p5038456

HardLuckYetAgain wrote: Tue Sep 27, 2022 12:19 am

Joel Billings wrote: Mon Sep 26, 2022 5:10 pm I'm still waiting for some saves from someone that covers these issues. I know it's hard to come up with, but without it, Pavel will be guessing about what's going on.

I will get you some saves. But I will need a few days with my hectic work schedule I have at the moment. I should have something like Thursday/Friday.

Mr. Billings

What year specifically would you like to see covered first? 41, 42, or 43? I would not think that 1944 needs to be covered since by that time Soviets could be overwhelming in numbers as is. You do have the save from Beethoven & HLYA game that was done for Pavel for 1941? Or do you require another.

As always thank you in advance for you reply.

I think the bigger issue seems to be in 1941 with how much the Soviets can do in terms of sorties and bombing effect, and where interception is poor. I don't have a save for 1941 where the air directives are set up and I can just run the attacks. I need to see how players actually set up their units and air directives. Something in 1944 would also be good to have if either the airbase bombing is way too effective or intercepts are not happening or are too hard.

Joel Billings wrote: Wed Sep 28, 2022 6:26 pm I think the bigger issue seems to be in 1941 with how much the Soviets can do in terms of sorties and bombing effect, and where interception is poor. I don't have a save for 1941 where the air directives are set up and I can just run the attacks. I need to see how players actually set up their units and air directives. Something in 1944 would also be good to have if either the airbase bombing is way too effective or intercepts are not happening or are too hard.

Ok, I will work on both prioritizing 41 first. I have a save in 44 that I will work on 2nd from a PBEM game. Thank you much!

Update:

Joel I am still working on this & have not forgotten. I will have some others look at the bombing and German interception before posting but new forecast is sometime next week for the 1941 test.

Thank you as always.

No worries. Having saves will give Pavel something to work with. We're trying to wrap up Steel Inferno and the last changes needed for that, so no rush as it probably won't get looked at until SI is done. Thanks.

GS is the pinnacle of air warfare. Before the GS you must clear the airspace using other available options. Deprive enemy aviation of airfields and supplies by destroying it in the air or on the ground. Then proceed to such a difficult process, including in terms of losses, as ground support. In the most extreme case, you must have a serious superiority to perform the GS, and the enemy aircraft must not be able to actively engage in counteraction. And even then, any unfinished organized group of aircraft can bring such chaos and inflict losses that will be at least unpleasant for you. Speaking of a group in this case, it could be 40-80 aircraft. In the regiments of the full complement.

This is the old argument that that "mass" - in this case numbers of planes - are the deciding factor.

So numerous are the cases that Germans until 1942 were FAR better at:

Being at the right place at the right time.
Were often FASTER
Could co-ordinate via the above

Due to damage caused the Germans could "shoot and scoot". There are hardly any cases previous to 1942 that the Russians managed anything but tactical success. The bombing missions in 1941 on Panzer spearheads (especially center) did slow the advance (and sometimes even managed to blow a bridge). The result on the bombers was so bad that by October the Russians had to reorganize the whole air force.

It was the equivalent to the losses of Russian armor in 1941.