ORIGINAL: mdiehl
The contexts are well known to anyone who'se read about the battles. What more information do you think you must have that you currently don't have?
The complete contexts are not included in the article.
ORIGINAL: Moi
You were asked....quite simply to quote where I stated, per you, that I flat out rejected the analysis.
ORIGINAL: Moi part du
the real irony in the days since has been how this study-post (preserved as an "article" for the warships1 board) has been taken out of context over the years and/or taken as gospel.
Hmm.....don't see anywhere where i stated I was rejecting it....and it has been taken out of context many times in the past and there have been posters who did at times try to paint it as unarguable from the viewpoint of their agendas [hence "gospel"]. Kind of like what you've been attempting to do for 1.5 pages now. Pointing out such tendancies does not constitute a complete rejection of the article. Otherwise i wouldn't have said "it can be viewed as supportive of the arguments already made in Peattie/Evans in regards to the DB and that I have no problem with it." Thx for proving my point on that score.
Dwelling on a straw man argument about the absence of complete data and the other straw man argument about the absence of an "actual battle" strikes me as a dismissal of the analysis.
Absence of complete data is hardly a straw man, and I'm not interested in the convoluted workings of your inner mind....I'm only interested in facts.....and the only fact present is that I did not write, as accused by you, that I was rejecting the article. Thx for helping me clear up Fabrication #1.
You've clearly stated that you don't think the real world battles represent operational realities as they might be encountered in, well, the real world. QED.
Fabrication #2
1. The data are thorough and very representative of typical circumstances in which battles of the kind in the Decisive Battle doctrine were fought.
I don't agree with that generalization. Joe included some battles which I and others [at the time of the posting of the original article on warships1] felt were not very representative of the conditions. The data that is present in Joe's article ultimately isn't under question however. How that data was interpreted and presented however was and can be called into question as can the missing elements of data. Certain aspects of some of the represented battles would have bore resemblences to the overall conditions expected in the DB. Their sum however does not, IMO, equate to a true and full representation of that battle and it's conditions. Some of the battles represented bore little context to the Japanese plan as laid out in "Kaigun."
One can add more data but they do not seem to improve Japanese successes.
I don't recall saying that the chances of Japanese success in the DB were high to begin with.
2. All of the battles included by Czarnecki were battles in which the conditions represented conditions that one could expect under the decisive battle doctrine.
All? Hardly.
The suggestion to the contrary makes no sense at all, since the DB doctrine envisioned a campaign consisting of a serious of attritioning battles in which presumed USN numerical superioirty would be whittled down to parity or inferiority prior to one last great decisive battle. The battles included by Czarnecki do a very good job representing what that serious of attritioning battles might look like, and they conclusively demonstrate that Japan was not going to get the desired attrition rate prior to that last great battle.
It makes alot of sense if one has read Kaigun.
The Japanese plan, as described in Kaigun was a different animal in many substantial ways, most notably in size and composition of the forces involved. As for Japan getting the desired attritional rate, it was considered unlikely they'd get it primarily due to the over-complexity of the Japanese plan coupled with the reliance on American aquiencence to Japanese predictions. In the end however one cannot rule out completely that they might have acheived an adequate hit rate. Some of the small scale battles documented show that they did indeed achieve the desired % rate the planners wanted.
You *seem to* be relying on a tautology here -- dismissing the relevance of these historical engagements because they're not outcomes favorable to the Japanese as required in the decisive battle doctrine.
If i'm guilty of any repetition, its only because i have to continually restate my points in the face of your continued attempts to misquote me. For example Fabrication #3 now involves me dismissing [in whole] the relevence of these historical engagements because they are not favorable to the Japanese. Wrong again. I have questioned the relevence of some of them and as i look at the data I can see some battles that actually support a more favorable outcome for the Japanese. (though ultimately their chances are still very unlikely primarily due to their plan's complexity) My final conclusion...stated again for what....the third time now is that Joe's article can be viewed as supportive of what Evans/Peattie had already concluded...that the DB scenario envisioned by the Japanese was overly optimistic and unlikely to occur as they envisioned it. As for the "conclusively demonstrates"...thats a matter of opinion as was demonstrated by the many discussions the article generated on Warships1 back in the early 2000's. You however *seem to* be guilty of trying to disquise your own repetition with the use of fancy english terms.
Finally, if you did not mean to reject the analysis as germane to proof testing WitP or UV, why would you accuse Big B of taking it "out of context" or as "gospel?"
Because I didn't accuse "Big B" of anything. Fabrication# 4
Clearly, the existence of Czarnecki's analysis violates some sort of gospel to which you are clinging.
Fabrication #5.....and the questioning of and discussing of any analysis and the interpretations derived from it are an integral part of any intelligent discourse.
No one other than yourself imagined that he attempted to apply those data to WitP or UV.
I didn't. You did however. Thx for proving my other point on how the article has been and continues to be taken out of context in regards to matters other than for which it was intended to address....that being the DB.
Assumes facts that are in fact not correct. I have played UV and rather extensively. Moreover, there are more than enough AARs available from WitP to make a conclusion. But you already knew both, and that makes you at best a kind of cartoon distortionist playing at discourse.
Yes, you've made that claim before....and it wasn't any more convincing the last time you stated it either. AAR readings do not subsitute for actual playing experience. BTW thx for yet another personal swipe. Didn't see that one coming. [8|]
1. The DB doctrine did not require specific statement of torpedo settings vis speed, depth, torpedo spread, or any of these things. Therefore, their exclusion from Joe's analysis does not obviate the applicability of his analysis to an examination of the likely outcome of the DB.
Joe himself felt it was required....otherwise he wouldn't have mentioned it in the article (as well as in the many discussions generated by his article.)
2. For it to obviate applicability to the evaluation of the DB doctrine on account of some imagined scenario in which substantially different settings would be use, one would have to presume that the torpedo speed, depth and spread settings in all of these battles consistently deviated from Japanese doctrine and training. There is no evidence to warrant such presumption.
That is a gross mis-assumption.
