Game Set Match: End of Realism, Supply and Run Discussion

[TulliusDetritus]

And anyways -I don't want to hijack this after all [:D]- "inefficient", really? Let's see the big picture (the one Roosevelt had in mind when he decided the Chinese would get a "limited" help). IF it helped China to survive a little bit then some consequences follow. The [now free] Japanese army in China would not be launched elsewhere: let's say Siberia or Australia or the Pacific. Or India and the Middle East...

[Flaviusx]

I'm doubting that the Japanese could have won in China before we beat them in Japan proper regardless of the airlift. Japan had bit off way more than it could chew. Mostly, I tend to see the airlift and much of Roosevelt's activities in China in general as being less driven by strategic thinking and more by the usual China lobby stuff which never made much sense to me on objective grounds. It was all political rather than strategic. Our whole China policy was a mess, frankly.

Anyways, why bother with this very dubious Chinese example when you've got the much more persuasive case of Slim? That was the real deal.

[SigUp]

Well, that's way offtopic here, but nevertheless: 70% of the Lend-lease aid went to Chennault and the airforce. Though American airpower achieved air superiority by 1944 it was not a decider in terms of keeping China in the war. The aid for the ground forces mostly went to the forces in Ramgarh India, as well as to a smaller degree the forces in Yunnan. These forces were used in Burma, even as Ichigo was romping through China, so they also didn't contribute in a big way of stemming the Japanese tide in China proper. As Flav said, the US China policy was not very well thought out. First, it was more a political decision to show American support and give China a morale boost. Second, the protagonists Chennault and Stilwell also worked heavily in influencing Washington's policy concerning aid. They, however, massively misrepresented the chances and difficulties. While Stilwell believed that he could drive the Japanese out of China with a little US help in rearming a Nationalist army of 30-60 divisions, Chennault argued that with adaquate resources airpower could smash Japan from China. Both were unfeasible and the visions of those two hampered aid, that really could have helped Nationalist war effort.

But as Flav said, even without aid it is doubtful whether the Japanese could have beaten China. China was a logistical nightmare. Similar to the Peninsula Campaign in the Napoleonic Wars, the China theatre became a quagmire holding up the Japanese forces. After the Wuhan-Yichang campaigns of 1939/40 the war stalemated - even before the outbreak of the Pacific War (I'd like to see a game concerning the Sino-Japanese War, though the audience for such a game would be overwhelmingly small [:D]). During the next three to four years Japanese offensives were conducted in the fasion of strike and retreat, as they lacked the forces to permanently occupy new territory. Of course one can point to the tremendous operational success of Ichigo. But the price the Japanese had to pay for Ichigo was high and wasn't quite visible when Japan surrendered. Namely that for scraping together the forces needed for the offensive they massively weakened their garrisons in North China. And still, the IJA was a good distance away from Chongqing that lies in very favourable defensive terrain.

[Flaviusx]

Me, I've always wondered if we backed the wrong horse in China. Although ironically modern China looks a lot more like the KMT version than Mao's...

[SigUp]

I don't think there was a choice as to whom to back, but rather whether to back the Nationalists or not. The Communists, despite all their talk, were never seriously contemplating fighting the Japanese. Their main aim was to use the upheavel created by the Japanese invasion to rebuild their forces and then expand their power base. As for the Nationalists, despite all the troubles and infighting in the Nanjing Decade, they actually managed to get on a track to modernizing the country and the institutions. Tragedy is, before they could reap the results of their reforms, the Japanese invasion shattered the framework they were creating. And the main factors contributing to the Nationalist defeat (aside from the Communists), namely hyperinflation, massive corruption and loss of popular support only started to explode after 1941. That's when the Nationalist economy began to to crash.

[Walloc]

ORIGINAL: SigUp

The Hump was quite inefficient and can't be taken as a successful example of sustained aerial supply. In the whole year 1942 only 1.571 tons arrived in China and in 1943-44 194.072 tons, which amounts to some 8.000 per month. The 15th June 1944 air raid against the Yawata ironworks consumed so much of the accumulated stockpiles, that subsequent operations had to be downscaled and by the end of the year 20th Air Force was transferred to the Marianas.

ORIGINAL: TulliusDetritus

I know it was inefficient. But is was "large scale air supply" [8D]

ORIGINAL: Marquo
What is the historical truth about using bombers for fuel transport? I have found some references to using He 111's, but they could transport only 1 1/2 tons of supply per day/

"900th Special Purposes Bomber Wings, equipped with Ju 52s, and the Fifth Special Purposes Bomber Wing, equipped with He 111. These transport groups had performed well since Operation Blue, the German summer offensive of 1942, began back in June. Between August and October alone, for example, they had transported 20,173 tons of aviation fuel, 9,492 tons of ammunition, 3,731 tons of equipment, and 2,764
tons of supplies to Luftwaffe airfields at the front. They also provided the army with good support, carrying forward 27,044 troops, 4,614 tons of fuel, 1,787 tons of ammunition, and 73 tons of supplies, as well as evacuating 51,619 wounded soldiers."

Its proberbly not as known but just to give a perpesctive on the scale of what is needed. The Allies actually did deliver supply via air to its armies in france during the race across france and in september 44. From 19 to 25 aug the averege per day is 600 tons and reaches in the periode of 2 sep to 16 sep an average of over 1000 tons per day. The allied troops/armies wasnt exactly those that needed/used the least supplies and it was far from all fuel. Non the less that along with the Redball Express only got them so far. The daily need for he 37 Allied divs on the continent at the end of aug was 22200 tons per day. Or 9'ish day is what the total delivered over the hump in 3 years would have sustained those divs. Not that it wasnt large scale compared to what was the capabilties of the time.

Rasmus

[Klydon]

I can't remember the exact source, but I think it was Liddle-Hart's book "The German Generals Talk". He was talking to V Kleist and the 42 offensive. In it, V Kleist mentioned many of his issues were logistical in nature and precious time was wasted while panzer formations sat waiting for fuel when there was no real opposition. He said air lift helped, but was still too inadequate to provide for an advance. V Kleist also mentioned the diversion of 4th panzer army actually made things worse for him because it clogged up the roads he was trying to use and he didn't need their help. He needed gas, not more troops, etc.

I think the logistics system and the German bombers as fuel tankers are just two examples as to why WITE is in the state it is. Does any German really bomb with anything other than Stuka's these days except at really important places? (Like the reduction of Leningrad). My guess would be no. They are all on flying gas duty unless the players have a house rule in place.

[SigUp]

Indeed, the Blau offensive was severely hampered by logistical difficulties. 6th Army at one point for example was pretty much immobile for 10 days, allowing the Soviets to strengthen their defenses near and in Stalingrad. This just doesn't happen in WITE. Just let your bombers fly supplies and fuel.