ORIGINAL: mx1
Now, an invasion of Latvia? What for? Please don't say prestige, Putin has all the approval ratings he needs.
While I agree with most points you've made about lack of realism for most of the potential scenarios, the invasion and occupation of Baltic States is quite different. The reasons why Russia would do it are multiple:
a) to reestablish its presence in Baltic and restore territories it held since the end of XVIII century. The 'history politics' has a strong tradition not only in Russia.
b) 'to protect' ethnic Russians in these states - there is around million Russians living in the area - probably the number similar to the number of Russians living in the separatist republics in eastern Ukraine.
c) to reestablish land connection to its Kaliningrad exclave
d) the most important reason is that it is 'low hanging fruit'. While Baltic States are part of NATO, there is no way for NATO to prevent actual invasion, so in order to fullfil its obligations NATO would actually need to attack Russian forces to liberate these countries. So the attacker cost is low, while the defender cost is high. The hybrid war, like the one we see in Ukraine, combined with post-invasion referendum in which 99,8% of Baltic citizens would 'vote' for Russia, is unlikely to trigger fully blown military response from NATO. There will be no formal act of war, no official Russian involvement (Russia would just back up 'governments' created with the aid of 'green men') and referendum will soon prove that majority of citizens accept the new status quo. Would anyone risk the attack on the Russian owned republics to restore its rightful government?
There is really much to gain, with low costs involved. The most important strategic outcome would be the end of NATO as we know it, which in turn would be a great win for Russia. Even if the occupation would be temporary (couple of years) it would still show that diplomatic alliances are worthless against imperialism.
a) Russia lacks a substantial enough Baltic Fleet for a reoccupation of the prebaltika to be of much use, and while historically everyone and their mother have a claim to these lands (polandball can into Baltics!), I don't think they would be worth much after a war, as they aren't particularly rich in resources and industry. The trade ports would be nice, but it would take a huge investment to get them back up and turning a profit.
b) Maybe, but I believe the "protect our minority" was mostly maskirovka during the Ukraine affair. The situation of ethnic Russians in the Baltic countries does indeed lend itself to such ploys. After the dissolution of the USSR, the new governments passed laws making their local languages the only official ones, thus kicking lots of Russian-speakers (who were born and raised there, mind you) out of their jobs in the public sector. So the Russian Federation has, in the past, used that as a scare tactic against the Baltic countries, hinting at the fact they'd have plenty of disgruntled citizens making up a fifth column if push comes to shove. Plus, places like Estonia suffer from the same problem as the Lvov nationalists in the Ukraine: in their antagonism towards the USSR, they fought alongside the Nazi occupiers in 1944-45, thus making themselves an easy target for propaganda (the whole debate around whether that guilt by association is fairly placed or not I'll leave for another time).
It is a valid point you make, but I don't think it would be a main objective in and of itself.
c) Fair enough. But that would mean taking on two NATO member-states for easier logistics and the removal of some nearby NATO assets, so I don't see the cost-benefit calculation coming up positive. I don't recall off the top of my head what's stationed there, but it could actually weight against the decision to attack. If other NATO states lose too many assets in such an operation, they might be more willing, not less, to go to war over the Baltic states.
Now, if Belarus would one day rejoin the RF, then maybe that would make it worthwhile to poke at Lithuania. But I think that's not gonna happen either, not while Lukashenko is alive, and maybe not even afterwards. Consider not just the land, but the infrastructure in it. Without direct, well maintained roads and railroads, holding land is just a liability.
d) That's a very interesting point. If NATO's cohesion was to be questioned, the Baltic states would be a nice place to drive a wedge in an attempt to expose it's lack thereof.
I personally don't see it happening in the near future, not with a weak Europe that hopelessly depends on the US for arms and leadership. But in the next 10-20 years the situation might change.
Lastly, you speak of occupation. I don't think there is a way to make it short. None of those countries are like Crimea, and it would be a costly affair, in the economical and political sense. While many Russians could be easily persuaded to support the Crimean annexation, this was due to the longstanding affinity for the peninsula: it's the site of many historic clashes against foreign interference in Russia (British, French, Ottoman, German...), and a place that Russia spent a lot of time developing. The Baltic republics are seen as a more of a foreign place.
While the RF might have the capability to do it, it would be expensive; consider that even during the Ukraine affair Russia only used it's mechanized forces as a veiled threat against foreign intervention and did not commit them.
