Battle of Savo Island

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: spence

So after the London blitz from '40-41, the only thing left that ever really frightened Churchill were fully operational U-boats.

Actually I don't think the London Blitz frightened Churchill much because it was pretty much an expression of Hitlerian bluster....

Or another of Goering's failed "Dunkirk" operations. But if he were allowed to continue striking the British airfields instead of blitzing London, it would have been another historical "What if," as in what if Nagumo went after the fuel tanks at Pearl, what if Mikawa also sank the supply transports at Savo, etc.

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: Fishbed
There were near to no subs operating from PH in December. Submarines use diesel in relatively small quantities that is easily replaced. Unreliable torpedoes are the main cause explaining the US subs lack of efficiency in the first half of 1942, which means that the few patrols that *might* not have taken place in case of a highly hypothetical complete shortage of Diesel fuel aboard ships at PH and ashore wouldn't have impacted the conflict in any meaningful way.

If based on the figures of the Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee (JANAC) and making the assumption that the historical subs can't operate from PH for 6 months (Dec '41 - May '42) and instead move back to the West Coast and take no effective part in Pacific operations until PH is again ready for submarines, then this hypothetical impact on the overall wartime submarine effort against Japanese shipping can be quantified with a bit of quick and dirty analysis.

a) Total Japanese sinkings by US submarines 1941-45:- naval vessels sunk = 540,192 tons, merchant vessels sunk = 4,779,902 tons.

b) Total Japanese sinkings by US submarines based out of PH for 6 month period Dec '41 - May '42:- naval vessels sunk = 15,597 tons, merchant vessels sunk = 113,487 tons.

c) % of historical wartime Japanese sinkings by US submarines forgone by this 6 month scenario:- naval vessels = 2.9%, merchant vessels = 2.4%

[Barb]

Destroying fuel tanks at Pearl would not affect PacFleet Submarine operations much.
Single oiler of the Patoka class (e.g. USS Ramapo AO-12) had a capacity of 70,000 barrels, Cimarron class fleet oiler (e.g. USS Neosho AO-23) had 146,000 barrels.

Typical Fleet submarine available in 1942 (Tambor, Sargo, Seadragon, Salmon, Perch, Shark, Porpoise classes) had total bunkerage of about 90,000-109,000 galons. Averaged, rounded up it is some 2400 barrels of diesel oil. Later classes like Gato, Balao and Tench had up to 116,000 galons bunkerage so up to 2800 barrels of diesel oil.

Doing some math here, a single Patoka class oiler would be able to support 25-29 submarines topped up, while Cimarron class ship would support 52-60 submarines topped up.

Of course Fleet oilers would be used elsewhere, but commercial tankers were available. Just one tanker doing WC-PH route once a month would be able to bring enough fuel to support number of submarines operating out of Pearl. Couple of Submarine tenders (AS) would be able to keep subs in operation in case a submarine repair facilities were hit badly. Of course they would have to be taken out from somewhere else, but I presume this would not cause such degradation of submarine patrols in number on efficiency as to make a big difference in the end.

[Fishbed]

@Buckrock
Thank you for the extra research, much appreciated and very interesting.

@Barb
There again, nice data, big thanks! Although such knowledge regarding US submarines might be expected from someone who decided to call himself Barb. I suppose it wasn't because of the fish [;)]

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

If based on the figures of the Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee (JANAC) and making the assumption that the historical subs can't operate from PH for 6 months....

Why would you make that assumption as neither the subs or their fuel received any significant damage during the IJN attack?

[BBfanboy]

If the Japanese really wanted to hurt the USN, all they had to do was bomb out the bars on Oahu. USN morale would plummet and half the sailors would be down with DTs!

[Fishbed]

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

If the Japanese really wanted to hurt the USN, all they had to do was bomb out the bars on Oahu. USN morale would plummet and half the sailors would be down with DTs!

You, Sir, know all too well how history is born [&o]

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

If based on the figures of the Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee (JANAC) and making the assumption that the historical subs can't operate from PH for 6 months....

Why would you make that assumption as neither the subs or their fuel received any significant damage during the IJN attack?

Just in case someone brings up the possible impact of such a worst-case scenario within the context of a hypothetical Japanese 3rd strike. Such topics have been known to occur on the AE forum.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

If based on the figures of the Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee (JANAC) and making the assumption that the historical subs can't operate from PH for 6 months....

Why would you make that assumption as neither the subs or their fuel received any significant damage during the IJN attack?

Just in case someone brings up the possible impact of such a worst-case scenario within the context of a hypothetical Japanese 3rd strike. Such topics have been known to occur on the AE forum.

So all your calculations were based on a hypothetical that didn't occur.
Thank you for that clarification.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

If the Japanese really wanted to hurt the USN, all they had to do was bomb out the bars on Oahu. USN morale would plummet and half the sailors would be down with DTs!

1+

[Fishbed]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: Buckrock

ORIGINAL: Joe D.



Why would you make that assumption as neither the subs or their fuel received any significant damage during the IJN attack?

Just in case someone brings up the possible impact of such a worst-case scenario within the context of a hypothetical Japanese 3rd strike. Such topics have been known to occur on the AE forum.

So all your calculations were based on a hypothetical that didn't occur.
Thank you for that clarification.

I beg you to forgive my silly colleague here for having the weakness to work his ar*e needlessly over a whole lot of data, for the sake of some fantasy born from the mind of a troubled man.

Oh, wait...

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.
So all your calculations were based on a hypothetical that didn't occur.
Thank you for that clarification.

The totals and % are all historical, the hypothetical conditions of the scenario are not.

[Buckrock]

ORIGINAL: Fishbed
I beg you to forgive my silly colleague here for having the weakness to work his ar*e needlessly over a whole lot of data...

Thankfully no ar*e was overworked during the making of that data, just about 30 minutes revisiting some old JANAC notes I made a few years ago. After they'd originally failed as conversation starters at parties, I'd lost hope of ever finding a use for them....till now.[:)]

[spence]

quote:

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

If the Japanese really wanted to hurt the USN, all they had to do was bomb out the bars on Oahu. USN morale would plummet and half the sailors would be down with DTs!

Oh come now, the Kido Butai definitely did not have enough ordnance for that.[:D]

[fcooke]

Not the IJN should have known, but the US didn't have many Mark 14s (made even more severe by the loss of a couple hundred at Cavite). So bomb the torpedo storage facility. As it was many boats went on patrol with partial torp loads, often augmented by mines - which crews really did not like laying. In addition captains were urged to use small spreads, which led to many ships being missed altogether, before you even get to the issues with running deep, magnetic exploders, and firing pin jamming (the firing pin problem was a special insult as perfect shots often jammed the pins, but more oblique shots would more often explode).

Regards,Frank

[anarchyintheuk]

ORIGINAL: spence

The Germans "did it" to save their torpedoes, most of which worked

Actually the Germans had severe problems with their torpedoes at first related to their magnetic exploder. IIRC the closer they got to magnetic North the worse their problems became...in the Norwegian Campaign it became so severe that their equivalent of BuOrd actually paid attention and corrected the problem.

Found a link on the web that describes the problems pretty well. Interesting that there were a lot of the same problems with the same systems on US torpedoes.

http://www.uboataces.com/articles-woode ... does.shtml

Love the quote by Donitz: “I do not believe that ever in the history of war, men have been sent against the enemy with such a useless weapon”.

[GetAssista]

ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk

ORIGINAL: spence

The Germans "did it" to save their torpedoes, most of which worked

Actually the Germans had severe problems with their torpedoes at first related to their magnetic exploder. IIRC the closer they got to magnetic North the worse their problems became...in the Norwegian Campaign it became so severe that their equivalent of BuOrd actually paid attention and corrected the problem.

Found a link on the web that describes the problems pretty well. Interesting that there were a lot of the same problems with the same systems on US torpedoes.

http://www.uboataces.com/articles-woode ... does.shtml

Love the quote by Donitz: “I do not believe that ever in the history of war, men have been sent against the enemy with such a useless weapon”.

From the linked article
"As 1939 drew to a close, at least 25 percent of all shots fired had been torpedo failures."
Ahhaha, 25% failure rate and Donitz is complaining... You knew nothing, Karl Donitz! Try mk14 80%

[anarchyintheuk]

ORIGINAL: GetAssista

ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk

ORIGINAL: spence

Actually the Germans had severe problems with their torpedoes at first related to their magnetic exploder. IIRC the closer they got to magnetic North the worse their problems became...in the Norwegian Campaign it became so severe that their equivalent of BuOrd actually paid attention and corrected the problem.

Found a link on the web that describes the problems pretty well. Interesting that there were a lot of the same problems with the same systems on US torpedoes.

http://www.uboataces.com/articles-woode ... does.shtml

Love the quote by Donitz: “I do not believe that ever in the history of war, men have been sent against the enemy with such a useless weapon”.

From the linked article
"As 1939 drew to a close, at least 25 percent of all shots fired had been torpedo failures."
Ahhaha, 25% failure rate and Donitz is complaining... Try mk14 80%

What a wuss [;)]

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk

ORIGINAL: spence

The Germans "did it" to save their torpedoes, most of which worked

Actually the Germans had severe problems with their torpedoes at first related to their magnetic exploder. IIRC the closer they got to magnetic North the worse their problems became...in the Norwegian Campaign it became so severe that their equivalent of BuOrd actually paid attention and corrected the problem.

Found a link on the web that describes the problems pretty well. Interesting that there were a lot of the same problems with the same systems on US torpedoes.

http://www.uboataces.com/articles-woode ... does.shtml

Love the quote by Donitz: “I do not believe that ever in the history of war, men have been sent against the enemy with such a useless weapon”.

That weapon didn't stay useless for long.

"During the war the U-boats sank about 2,779 ships for a total of 14.1 million tons GRT. This figure is roughly 70% of all allied shipping losses in all theatres of the war and to all hostile action. The most successful year was 1942 when over 6 million tons of shipping were sunk in the Atlantic."

https://uboat.net/special/faq.htm?question=4

[anarchyintheuk]

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: anarchyintheuk

ORIGINAL: spence



Actually the Germans had severe problems with their torpedoes at first related to their magnetic exploder. IIRC the closer they got to magnetic North the worse their problems became...in the Norwegian Campaign it became so severe that their equivalent of BuOrd actually paid attention and corrected the problem.

Found a link on the web that describes the problems pretty well. Interesting that there were a lot of the same problems with the same systems on US torpedoes.

http://www.uboataces.com/articles-woode ... does.shtml

Love the quote by Donitz: “I do not believe that ever in the history of war, men have been sent against the enemy with such a useless weapon”.

That weapon didn't stay useless for long.

"During the war the U-boats sank about 2,779 ships for a total of 14.1 million tons GRT. This figure is roughly 70% of all allied shipping losses in all theatres of the war and to all hostile action. The most successful year was 1942 when over 6 million tons of shipping were sunk in the Atlantic."

https://uboat.net/special/faq.htm?question=4

My dad was born in Stratford, my mom was born in Fairfield. I always liked the Stratford Point lighthouse. Hope it's still around.