Fleet

[paulderynck]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Not at all - I guessed that you posted for that reason and I merely used it as a springboard to further the argument against any result in naval warfare being solely down to luck (the more examples, the more it becomes obvious that the idea is without merit) - not to attack your comment because I thought you were also of the opposite school of thought (which I have no reason to believe was the case).

Ahh, then I misapprehended your reply.

I do think luck played a greater role in naval combat in the WWs compared with land or air (and land less than air). But some commanders put themselves in positions where they needed to have bad luck to not have done any better than the result they got. Others made bad decisions that were lucky for the other side (Kurita, Nagumo) in that a different decision could have had a worse outcome for the other side.

[Centuur]

ORIGINAL: paulderynck

ORIGINAL: warspite1

Not at all - I guessed that you posted for that reason and I merely used it as a springboard to further the argument against any result in naval warfare being solely down to luck (the more examples, the more it becomes obvious that the idea is without merit) - not to attack your comment because I thought you were also of the opposite school of thought (which I have no reason to believe was the case).

Ahh, then I misapprehended your reply.

I do think luck played a greater role in naval combat in the WWs compared with land or air (and land less than air). But some commanders put themselves in positions where they needed to have bad luck to not have done any better than the result they got. Others made bad decisions that were lucky for the other side (Kurita, Nagumo) in that a different decision could have had a worse outcome for the other side.

That's exactly what I mean. Luck is far more important on the sea than it is on land. And to answer the remarks which were made on the positions of the French in may 1940. Yes, Germany knew what kind of forces the French did position along the Meuse. Perhaps not in detail, but they knew that those weren't as strong as the ones at the Maginot line or along the French-Belgian border further west. Intelligence, you know...

[warspite1]

2016
The war at sea is a strange thing, IMHO. If you truly look at how things went, one often concludes that it is not the skill of the commanding officers which makes a difference, but pure and simple luck.

It was a lucky shot which killed of the Hood (sure, if the ship had been armoured better, this wouldn't have happened, but the granate could have missed)...
It was a lucky event, that the Bismarck was found and hit by the Swordfish planes...
It was pure luck, that at Midway, the Japanese were caught with their carriers full of planes...
It was lucky that the Japanese plane did spot the Repulse and the Prince of Wales

And on and on and on.

The war at sea depends on finding the enemy in the first place. Now, in the small North Sea, this is somewhat easy, but in the big ocean...

We keep looking for reasons why things happened at sea the way they did. Which to me, is complete BS. It all comes back to a simple thing: there are no good admirals or bad admirals. Only lucky and unlucky ones...

2018
All things mr. Warspite have said, have some degree of sense. Decisions made by admirals have effect on the circumstances why they might have lost or did win a battle. Good training of men and superior equipment also have effect on this. But those things are not the ultimate reason why the battle was won or lost.

No, that simply relied on whether or not you found the enemy ships at sea. And that wasn't something that one could take for granted at all, before the age of the satellite. Hitting the enemy was mostly a case of luck too. That is what I mean by saying that there are no good or bad admirals, only lucky or unlucky ones. Some writers do say that a decision made sure a battle was won or lost. I don't agree to that in most cases. There are too many circumstances which an admiral doesn't control...

Well I’m pleased I’ve got you to amend your position – at least slightly from the black and white – and overly simplistic - view from 2016 - but I still don’t understand where even the watered down comments come from or how they can be justified. The outcome of a battle “simply relied on whether or not you found the enemy ships at sea”. That comment is as simplistic as it is patently false. So once one’s ships found the enemy the battle was decided. Eh? Rather than that be the decider, that is just the start no?

Think of WWI, think of WWII and tell me how many potential battles were not fought because the fleets could not find each other? That too is a strange statement. The War in the Mediterranean was fought as it was because the British chose to try and keep Malta in the game, while the Axis tried to supply Rommel. You think the two sides didn’t know where to find the other?? The War in the Pacific was usually fought (especially in the early years) with two sides desperate to find the other – and they usually did. World War I, do you really think the skirmishes and the fleet action in the North Sea happened because one of the two fleets was trying to evade the other?

But why do you treat the need to find another fleet as some sort of side show that may or may not be lucky. You don’t seem to grasp that searching is just one part of the challenge that admirals faced? It wasn’t some separate part of the game divorced from the ‘real action’. The need for a proper search capability (inc land and sea based air) was incredibly important – in fact potentially battle-winning or battle-losing (just ask Nagumo). The ability of ships to locate and then track their pray required great skill (as was the ability to shake off one’s pursuers) – just ask Tovey and Lutjens.

But you seem to think this feature (albeit in necessarily different form) was not a challenge a general faced? So Wellington’s clever use of the reverse slope at Waterloo to hide the true strength of his force wasn’t important? That Stalin was out-foxed by Hitler in thinking the 1942 campaign would be against Moscow and then Zhukov, husbanding his forces (feeding in to Stalingrad only sufficient to keep the city from falling) so that they could amass and encircle German forces in the south? Same for Napoleon and his clever trap at Austerlitz.

“There are too many circumstances which an admiral doesn't control”... Again a bland comment but no substance and certainly nothing to support your view that a general has more control over events once battle commences than an admiral. As the Germans said, take care of the fire-fights and the battles will take care of themselves. Those fire-fights are not in the control of the general are they? The general reacts to gains, losses, breakthroughs but he sure as hell doesn’t control the individual battles of his divisions, brigades, battalions and squads any more than an admiral is responsible for the gunnery control, the torpedoes or the aircraft of every ship in his squadron. And I notice you commented on some aspects of the French campaign but failed to explain the others. So the ultimate reason that the Germans won the campaign in France was because the German commander-in-chief had full control of events? Just think about that statement.

But you’ve floored me with the strangest of comments “Good training of men and superior equipment also have effect on this. But those things are not the ultimate reason why the battle was won or lost”. Which battle? All battles? How can you support such a general comment?

And the "Hitting the enemy was mostly a case of luck too". Yeah, and like Arnold Palmer, the more they practised, the luckier they got. But what? the problems with hitting the enemy didn't apply to generals and air marshals? If not then why the numerous blue on blue cases? Why were artillery barrages often ineffective? Why was air support not always guaranteed to succeed?

[Orm]

In my humble opinion, the Germans were not especially lucky in the French campaign. Neither in the Norwegian campaign as has been claimed. They won those campaigns without the "massive doses of luck".

[warspite1]

One of the many interesting aspects when analysing a battle/campaign is the luck factor. Specifically, was a lucky because b did or didn't do x? and then the praise and the brickbats get handed out according to one's own bias e.g. an historian could use the above example to say a was brilliant or b was incompetent.

What I have said many times before and will say again is that the German plan for Case Yellow was risky, daring, audacious and skilful. The individual contributions of Guderian and Rommel to name but two were key. Manstein deserves the praise that goes with the victory for the plan to thrust toward Sedan and the clever ruse to draw the Allies into Belgium.

That does not alter the fact that the Germans had just about every piece of good luck going their way. That is not a criticism and does not seek to totally down play the German victory, but it does recognise the simple facts and provide perspective for those that like to believe the German war machine was unstoppable and Blitzkrieg (how over used is that?) was this brilliant new concept that the entire German army was geared up toward and that had by-in from all the General Staff.

The two sides were so equal in numbers (perhaps aircraft being the only exception) that the Germans would need elements of good fortune for their plan not to be de-railed. Whether that good fortune was brought about by a) Allied incompetence – e.g. failure to man key crossing points on the Meuse and Arras showing just what would have been possible had the Allies mounted a serious counter even after the Germans were across the Meuse in numbers; there were ample opportunities to counter when the German breakthrough at Sedan was in its early stages but the response was slow, confused and irresolute – or by b) the ‘right’ German generals winning the arguments over how to proceed and the panzer generals actually ignoring orders that would have stopped the push to the coast, either way, the risky German plan could quite easily have failed.

The same applies to the Norwegian campaign. The plan – a true combined arms attack - was even bolder, even riskier and more audacious than Case Yellow! Again, whether one wishes to emphasise the luck of the Germans or the incompetence of the Allies is up to the individual.

Mention was made in an earlier post about “intelligence you know” to suggest that the Germans knew what to expect in the approach to, and in trying to cross the Meuse. Well intelligence is not always accurate, and often very wrong. The Germans proceeded with the attack on Narvik despite being told that coastal guns were in place in the approaches. Now, unfortunately the defences being in place (in the places they actually were) meant absolutely nothing if those defences weren’t manned, or weren’t utilised as was too often the case with the Norwegians. Intelligence? What did the Germans know of R4? That is a rhetorical question.

Did the Germans get lucky in Norway? As I say it depends on which angle one wants to come from. But to my mind an honest, dispassionate look at the campaign shows that, as bold and imaginative as the German plan was, if the British and Norwegians had acted as they should (and I’m not talking about some fantasy scenario where everything they did was perfect) then the losses to the German invading force could have been colossal. Perhaps the most extreme example was at Bergen, but not an isolated case. The “Fuhrer weather” too was a great aid to the German need to get the Marine Gruppen to Norway undetected but the invasion date was not set according to the weather forecasts so that can be considered a lucky break indeed.

And finally just for the avoidance of doubt. What I’m not suggesting, in saying that the Germans got all the good luck that was going in France and Norway, is that the ultimate outcome would necessarily have been different (although this is possible). But what is clear is that the losses to the Germans would have been substantially higher than was the case had some of those critical moments had a different outcome - whether that be the weather, Allied decisions or indeed German decisions.

[Orm]

No, the Germans didn't have "just about every piece of good luck going their way". They were good, and the Allied not as good. That about sums it up in my humble opinion.

When the luck favoured the Allies they either ignored it, or were to slow to react so that the opportunity passed. The Allied doctrine and training didn't make good use of opportunities. The Germans, on the other hand, were fairly good on acting when opportunities, or "good luck", appeared.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Orm

No, the Germans didn't have "just about every piece of good luck going their way". They were good, and the Allied not as good. That about sums it up in my humble opinion.

When the luck favoured the Allies they either ignored it, or were to slow to react so that the opportunity passed. The Allied doctrine and training didn't make good use of opportunities. The Germans, on the other hand, were fairly good on acting when opportunities, or "good luck", appeared.

warspite1

Well this leads on from what I said earlier. Is a brilliant or is a only brilliant because b is rubbish or whole manner of grey areas in between?

But there is no right or wrong answer - only judgement calls based on what we read.

[Admiral Delabroglio]

IIRC the French had some second rate troops guarding the Meuse crossings in 1940.
Most - or even all - of the bridges had been destroyed, but there were some locks that German pioneers crossed during the night.
In the morning, enough German soldiers had crossed to mount an attack, and it was a close call. The Germans started crossing with canoes while the ones that had already crossed under the cover of darkness provided covering fore. Then the Germans managed to build a pontoon bridge over the river.

As for counterattacking : there were somme (half hearted) attempts but they were doomed from the start with the German air superiority.

Most French commanders were irresolute because they would not order their troops to get into a fight that would result in a WW1 style bloodbath.

Churchill did not want to engage the RAF "en masse" in France. One of the reasons was the logistics constraints. True, but possible to overcome them in 7 months.
More important, he did not trust the French will to fight. In that, he was right. The French had lost 1.4 million soldiers in WW1 (1.4 million dead, many more crippled), and did not have the will to fight until may 1940. Now, we can only speculate whether the German attack would have been "lucky" or "unlucky" without the air superiority.
(Those foolish French and British should have known that non cooperating major powers are not efficient, and lacking cooperation, should have brought a second British HQ in France)
In any case, the Allied lack of cooperation, lack of resolve, was indeed lucky for the Germans.

The Germans taught a harsh lesson, and in June 1940, the pitiful remains of the French army (a third ? a quarter of the original one ?) inflicted roughly the same amount of casualties as the whole army in may. The remaining soldiers had learnt, but unlike the Russians, they could not move a thousand km back and keep fighting.

Best regards

[Elessar2]

Was going to start a new thread, but might as well ask this here since this thread got rezzed from the dead...

A BoardGameGeek thread clued me in about something I had not realized [read it as I was perusing the rules-note I bought MWIF the other day during the recent sale, will check out on the weekend when I have more time and the cold I have has run its course]: you apparently CANNOT move from one seazone to the next, once you have already moved there during a previous impulse (or even during a previous turn!). The guy clarifying the rule even pointed out that the CE rules in question had even deleted mentioning that this kind of move was illegal since it was apparently very obvious from the core rules that one couldn't. [not to me]

What is the rationale for this rule? Avoiding micromanagement and thus fostering improved gameplay? Is there some underlying philosophical argument that escapes me?

If I have a task force in the The Solomons the the Three box, what, exactly, is stopping me from moving to the Marshalls to engage an enemy there-at the cost of having to drop one box down to Two (maybe down 2-3 depending on other rules)? An enormous tsunami at the seazone boundary stopping me? [&:] Has someone ever house-ruled to make it legal, and if so did it work, or not? I mean, it's a TWO MONTH turn for chrissakes.

[Courtenay]

This rule has always been fundamental to the WiF naval system. The point is that once you send a ship to sea, it is committed. It has to stay in that sea zone until it returns to port. This forces each side to either keep some of its fleet in reserve, or allow the enemy to go where they want (except where you sent your fleet) in response.

WiF would be a very different game without this rule. It is what creates the naval standoff in the Pacific in the middle of the game. Playing without it would, in my opinion, create too much naval activity

[Centuur]

ORIGINAL: Courtenay

This rule has always been fundamental to the WiF naval system. The point is that once you send a ship to sea, it is committed. It has to stay in that sea zone until it returns to port. This forces each side to either keep some of its fleet in reserve, or allow the enemy to go where they want (except where you sent your fleet) in response.

WiF would be a very different game without this rule. It is what creates the naval standoff in the Pacific in the middle of the game. Playing without it would, in my opinion, create too much naval activity

Apart from the game itself consider historical issues. Your admiral has sailed. He has orders to do a job. He will try to follow orders first. Also, his taskforce will not use radio's (especially long range ones), because if he does, the enemy knows his position and that's very dangerous.
This in itself means that it was very difficult for admirals on shore to suddenly change orders for ships at sea. They didn't know the exact positions of the forces at sea. They could inquire the taskforce at sea for their position, and ask if it has the necessary fuel and supplies to change course and start doing something completely different. But one of the most important orders an admiral had was to keep radio silence, so if he doesn't answer those questions, he's entitled to do so (and a lot of captains and admirals did, especially when on escort duty for convoys).
During the hunt of the Bismarck, there were capital ships who were ordered to do something and which didn't react because a captain or admiral at sea sees things different than one at the admiralty in London...
This is reflected in the game system by not allowing your ships to move from a sea area to another sea area to stay there.

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Elessar2

If I have a task force in the The Solomons the the Three box, what, exactly, is stopping me from moving to the Marshalls to engage an enemy there-at the cost of having to drop one box down to Two (maybe down 2-3 depending on other rules)? An enormous tsunami at the seazone boundary stopping me? [&:] Has someone ever house-ruled to make it legal, and if so did it work, or not? I mean, it's a TWO MONTH turn for chrissakes.

warspite1

What is stopping you? In a nut shell, logistics.

If you are in say Rabaul, as you know, there is nothing stopping you from travelling to the Marshalls via the Solomons. BUT, if you want to stop in the Solomons first then there you must stay. Why? Well from a realism point of view this makes perfect sense. By stopping in the Solomons - even for the minimum of two impulses (yours and your enemy's) - your fleet has burned up precious fuel (by definition your fleet is undertaking a mission(s) of some sort (patrolling, searching out an enemy, supporting a landing or perhaps convoy escort), and possibly used limited ammunition (shells, torpedoes, AA etc.) By moving to another sea area (without first having replenished in port) that fleet is then undertaking further operation(s), but fuel and ammunition stocks, wear and tear and crew fatigue aren't factored - that is not realistic.

One could argue that a fleet, in say the Solomons 4-box for two impulses, that takes part in no combats, should be allowed to move on (even though that fleet was not passing through and is performing a mission). But to incorporate a rule that allows movement from sea area to sea area (and remain remotely realistic) would mean a set of conditions being satisfied.

For example; a fleet can move on if no more than x impulses in the turn have been expended and no combat has taken place in the current sea box and if no enemy ships/aircraft are (or have been) in the current sea-box. The sea box currently in, and the movement points expended, need to be taken into account when moving to the new sea area and sea-box (in order to stop massive over allowance on range). In practice, this last point alone would make such a rule pointless in many cases through being unusable - or at least severely limiting.

One could argue that the latter should not be necessary (and the ships can keep all or some of their movement allowance) as the ships in practice would move to a port first, but then if this is assumed then this too would create numerous difficulties. 'Virtual' moving to port between operations takes up time and fuel - and how much will depend on where the nearest usable port is to refuel and re-supply. How is this modelled? What ports are acceptable? What if only minor ports are in the sea area and the fleet would have to split up and then re-group? It all gets too messy.

One could also argue there is an historical precedent. USS Yorktown was in the South Pacific at the beginning of May, fighting the Battle of the Coral Sea, and then fought in the Battle of Midway a month later, despite damage in the earlier battle that had to be patched up. However had she not been able to get to the main naval base at Pearl, and had Midway not been so close, then this would not have been possible. I'm sure there are other examples too. But I think in the name of keeping things manageable, playable and at the same time sufficiently realistic, then the rules are fine as they are.

In summary then, I just don't see the need for this. But that is just my 2 cents.

[Centuur]

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Elessar2

If I have a task force in the The Solomons the the Three box, what, exactly, is stopping me from moving to the Marshalls to engage an enemy there-at the cost of having to drop one box down to Two (maybe down 2-3 depending on other rules)? An enormous tsunami at the seazone boundary stopping me? [&:] Has someone ever house-ruled to make it legal, and if so did it work, or not? I mean, it's a TWO MONTH turn for chrissakes.

warspite1

What is stopping you? In a nut shell, logistics.

If you are in say Rabaul, as you know, there is nothing stopping you from travelling to the Marshalls via the Solomons. BUT, if you want to stop in the Solomons first then there you must stay. Why? Well from a realism point of view this makes perfect sense. By stopping in the Solomons - even for the minimum of two impulses (yours and your enemy's) - your fleet has burned up precious fuel (by definition your fleet is undertaking a mission(s) of some sort (patrolling, searching out an enemy, supporting a landing or perhaps convoy escort), and possibly used limited ammunition (shells, torpedoes, AA etc.) By moving to another sea area (without first having replenished in port) that fleet is then undertaking further operation(s), but fuel and ammunition stocks, wear and tear and crew fatigue aren't factored - that is not realistic.

One could argue that a fleet, in say the Solomons 4-box for two impulses, that takes part in no combats, should be allowed to move on (even though that fleet was not passing through and is performing a mission). But to incorporate a rule that allows movement from sea area to sea area (and remain remotely realistic) would mean a set of conditions being satisfied.

For example; a fleet can move on if no more than x impulses in the turn have been expended and no combat has taken place in the current sea box and if no enemy ships/aircraft are (or have been) in the current sea-box. The sea box currently in, and the movement points expended, need to be taken into account when moving to the new sea area and sea-box (in order to stop massive over allowance on range). In practice, this last point alone would make such a rule pointless in many cases through being unusable - or at least severely limiting.

One could argue that the latter should not be necessary (and the ships can keep all or some of their movement allowance) as the ships in practice would move to a port first, but then if this is assumed then this too would create numerous difficulties. 'Virtual' moving to port between operations takes up time and fuel - and how much will depend on where the nearest usable port is to refuel and re-supply. How is this modelled? What ports are acceptable? What if only minor ports are in the sea area and the fleet would have to split up and then re-group? It all gets too messy.

One could also argue there is an historical precedent. USS Yorktown was in the South Pacific at the beginning of May, fighting the Battle of the Coral Sea, and then fought in the Battle of Midway a month later, despite damage in the earlier battle that had to be patched up. However had she not been able to get to the main naval base at Pearl, and had Midway not been so close, then this would not have been possible. I'm sure there are other examples too. But I think in the name of keeping things manageable, playable and at the same time sufficiently realistic, then the rules are fine as they are.

In summary then, I just don't see the need for this. But that is just my 2 cents.

The HQ in Pearl Harbor reorganised the Yorktown to sail again (in MWIF terminology). So that's covered in MWIF too... [:D]

[warspite1]

ORIGINAL: Centuur

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Elessar2

If I have a task force in the The Solomons the the Three box, what, exactly, is stopping me from moving to the Marshalls to engage an enemy there-at the cost of having to drop one box down to Two (maybe down 2-3 depending on other rules)? An enormous tsunami at the seazone boundary stopping me? [&:] Has someone ever house-ruled to make it legal, and if so did it work, or not? I mean, it's a TWO MONTH turn for chrissakes.

warspite1

What is stopping you? In a nut shell, logistics.

If you are in say Rabaul, as you know, there is nothing stopping you from travelling to the Marshalls via the Solomons. BUT, if you want to stop in the Solomons first then there you must stay. Why? Well from a realism point of view this makes perfect sense. By stopping in the Solomons - even for the minimum of two impulses (yours and your enemy's) - your fleet has burned up precious fuel (by definition your fleet is undertaking a mission(s) of some sort (patrolling, searching out an enemy, supporting a landing or perhaps convoy escort), and possibly used limited ammunition (shells, torpedoes, AA etc.) By moving to another sea area (without first having replenished in port) that fleet is then undertaking further operation(s), but fuel and ammunition stocks, wear and tear and crew fatigue aren't factored - that is not realistic.

One could argue that a fleet, in say the Solomons 4-box for two impulses, that takes part in no combats, should be allowed to move on (even though that fleet was not passing through and is performing a mission). But to incorporate a rule that allows movement from sea area to sea area (and remain remotely realistic) would mean a set of conditions being satisfied.

For example; a fleet can move on if no more than x impulses in the turn have been expended and no combat has taken place in the current sea box and if no enemy ships/aircraft are (or have been) in the current sea-box. The sea box currently in, and the movement points expended, need to be taken into account when moving to the new sea area and sea-box (in order to stop massive over allowance on range). In practice, this last point alone would make such a rule pointless in many cases through being unusable - or at least severely limiting.

One could argue that the latter should not be necessary (and the ships can keep all or some of their movement allowance) as the ships in practice would move to a port first, but then if this is assumed then this too would create numerous difficulties. 'Virtual' moving to port between operations takes up time and fuel - and how much will depend on where the nearest usable port is to refuel and re-supply. How is this modelled? What ports are acceptable? What if only minor ports are in the sea area and the fleet would have to split up and then re-group? It all gets too messy.

One could also argue there is an historical precedent. USS Yorktown was in the South Pacific at the beginning of May, fighting the Battle of the Coral Sea, and then fought in the Battle of Midway a month later, despite damage in the earlier battle that had to be patched up. However had she not been able to get to the main naval base at Pearl, and had Midway not been so close, then this would not have been possible. I'm sure there are other examples too. But I think in the name of keeping things manageable, playable and at the same time sufficiently realistic, then the rules are fine as they are.

In summary then, I just don't see the need for this. But that is just my 2 cents.

The HQ in Pearl Harbor reorganised the Yorktown to sail again (in MWIF terminology). So that's covered in MWIF too... [:D]

warspite1

Exactly. So it can be done - but the units need to sail for port, be reorganised and then sail out again.

[WIFKillzone]

I think in the main its not luck.

It's skill to create the conditions based on probability that an action will turn out in your favor. Probability, through statistical analysis, experience, or just plain smarts, does account for bad things to happen but at lower amount of acceptable risk.

It's like sailing your fleet and landing them in the 1 box (taking perhaps an unacceptable risk to achieve another goal), the enemy sorties into the 4 box leveraging their higher probability that he will spank you badly (i.e using surprise modifiers).

Was it lucky that that he created the conditions to be more successful, no. Was it unlucky that he surprised you, no, he used probability.

On the other hand, is it reasonable to say 25 out of 35 times I would surprise him, but I was unlucky. Technically no, It's just easier to say I was unlucky, than probability was in my favor but its normal I was not successful this time, maybe next time I will be, lol.

It's the decisions (skill) leading up to the event, or during the event that matter, and that's skill.