Was Monty Right?

[MrBoats]

First, thanks very much to all who responded to my "grognards" post. I enjoyed the stories and learned a lot.

Now, a question for all of the WWII buffs: General Montgomery proposed a "narrow thrust" by all of the Allied armies, in which a huge force would have advanced along the Channel coast all the way into Holland, then across the North German Plain to Berlin. As we all know, Esienhower disapproved of Monty's plan, in favor of a broad-front approach. Was Monty right?

I think a narrow front approach would have worked much better. Three or four armies advancing shoulder-to-shoulder on, say, a 100 mile front would have been able to keep the Wermacht off-balance after the Normandy break-out. One army would have been able to cover the inland flank. Antwerp might have been put to use much sooner and the entire logistical system would have been much easier to maintain, given the shorter distances from the beaches and ports to the advancing armies.

For the record, I think that Patton ought to have had Bradley's job, in spite of the controversies. I'm certain that Patton and Montgomery would have worked very well together, and would have at least encircled the Ruhr by the end of '44. I believe that Bradley lacked the imagination necessary to fully take advantage of opportunity.

Of course, the narrow-front approach would have been political dynamite for Eisenhower. It may never have been feasible for that reason, but I think it was the soundest proposal of those Ike had to consider.

Thoughts? It may get a little hot in here, but I'd love to hear from anyone who has an opinion.

Thanks!

[Erik Rutins]

Well, the real answer is that they needed a better port - the focus should have been on capturing some of the large ports in a better state first. Either strategy could have worked, but without a better supply situation they almost had to focus on a narrow front at that time, which played to Germany's strength in the sense that it let up pressure elsewhere along the thin-stretched front and allowed their reserves to focus more on one area.

Ultimately though, I think the narrow front strategy could have worked, but I think the choice of front was the real problem - the terrain in Monty's sector was really pretty bad as we all now and played as much of a role in defeating Market-Garden as did the Germans. If you can envision an operation of similar scale happening on Patton's front with him maintaining logistical priority from Cobra through to Market-Garden time-wise I think the results would likely have been better. In all areas, the Germans had some better terrain to fall back to, but I think anywhere but Monty's sector would likely have worked out better.

[jchastain]

ORIGINAL: MrBoats
I'm certain that Patton and Montgomery would have worked very well together...

I'm a whole lot less certain than you are of that.

[2ndACR]

Monty and Patton literally hated it each other. Heck, even with priority on supplies, it still took Monty a long time to secure Antwerp.
 
I do not think Monty knew what he was talking about. I personally think he was an inept commander.

[Sarge]

The first step in the wrong direction came when Monty was unwilling to modify his planning even after Dutch resistance intel was reporting German movements and even identification of amour units, all shrugged off by Monty .

Armed with photos in hand of reconnaissance flights clearly showing Tanks deployed with in 10 miles of British drop zones Monty in his wisdom again shrugged off the intel and dismissed the Armor as broken down

But the planning of the operation was poor at best .

First day only dropped half of the British abn and zero Polish not to mention the 101st had to wait two days for its artillery ,82nd one day ,Glider infantry four.

Now remember that means all of the above need to split forces in order to secure the drops zones and simultaneously secure their objectives for days.

Next Monty’s Arnhem drop zones where suicidal, and only after RAF command refused would Monty modify. They setteled on a drop something like 10 miles away from the objective , but again British forces need to take their objective plus keep the DZ secure for 24 hours.


All under the knowledge that was the 9th and 10th SS down there in them broken down tanks.

[2ndACR]

I think Market Garden was one of the hugest disasters of WW2. Courtesy of Monty. Alot of good troops killed and captured because of his "brilliance".

[105mm Howitzer]

Frankly, I always thought that Monty was over-hyped, by far. El-Alamein was touch and go until nearly the end,when it became clear Rommel could not advance further or do more with what he had on hand. Arnhem essentially proved he had poor concept of Airborne utilization, and as for his competencies in armoured force usage, again questionable. Asking the XXX Corps to go up a narrow corridor, besieged on both sides by crack SS Panzer units in order to relieve Airborne troops, and not stop for anybody was, in my opinion, lousy planning. [:-]
What amazes me is the fact that he received no opposition from his own staff when he concocted this ops. Perhaps everyone was tired of the war at the time, and thought it best to gamble on this operation and end the war sooner.

[Raverdave]

Monty was an idiot.  The ONLY reason that he did so well at El-Alamein was that he had some Aussie divisions there to help him. [:'(]

[MrBoats]

I fully agree that Market-Garden was a giant mistake. The plan relied on the assumption that everything would go according to plan. We all know how realistic that is.

I think that Patton, as overall ground commander for the U.S., would have worked better with Montgomery than did Bradley. I think Patton respected Monty's professionalism and his military "imagination." I agree with Erik that a single thrust along 3rd Army's axis of attack might have succeeded in getting us over the Rhine by the fall. Patton hated the broad front approach as much as Monty did, if I recall correctly.

I remember hearing General Horrocks state that in late August and early September the 30th Corps could have pushed all the way into Germany with enough support. My hypothetical scenario envisions several corps abreast from the Channel to the German border, with the bulk of the force grinding everything ahead of it within 50-60 miles of the Channel. Horrocks may have been a bit boastful, but a larger force might just have pulled it off.

My opinions on this matter are based largely on Nigel Hamilton's 3 volume bio. of Monty, and on Carlo D' Este's biography of Patton. Also, The Supreme Commander by Stephen Ambrose and Eisenhower's Lieutenants by Russel Weigley.

[Hartford688]

There was quite a good series over at Armchair General on Montgomery.

For those who did not see it:

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Personally, I think he was a much better general than is sometimes made out. Not too many generals have not made mistakes - including costly ones. Not to say that Market Garden was not a mistake. I have also found out that courtesy of 20/20 hindsight and knowledge of the full facts, I am a brilliant general, far better than any of the commanders in WWII.

[MrBoats]

Hartford688,

Thanks! I just finished the first article and intend to read the others next.

It's funny: Monty was reviled for being a "commoner" in a military system full of aristocrats. Patton was despised for being an aristocrat (or as close to one as we get in the U.S.) in a military system full of commoners. The two generals were quite similar, and shared a total devotion to perfecting their skills.

Monty may have erred in pushing Market-Garden, but what was Bradley's excuse for the Hurtgen Forest? Or, for that matter, the failure to complete the encirclement in Normandy? i don't want to stray off-topic too far, but I think that Bradley was strictly a numbers man with very little imagination.

[JudgeDredd]

<nothing>

[Hartford688]

Actually, even with 20/20 hindsight, and no fog of war, I still suck as a general [:(]

[Yogi the Great]

Thoughts pretty much in line with some of the comments made.
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Narrow front may have worked if placed correctly and Patton in command.&nbsp;
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Monty would be the last that should be in command - his position and power had more to do with politics/popularity then with any actual military ability.

[jimi3]

For what is worth, I just finished reading War as I Knew it by George Patton. It is a compilation from his diaries as well as some very interesting personal comments at the end. He didn't have much use for monty. Great book for wargamers.

[HansBolter]

I'm likely to be lambasted by the Brits for this, but I, personally don't think Monty was ever right about much of anything.

As for the political minefield Eisenhower had to navigate, he was far, far too deferring to the Brits throughout the entire war effort.

Sure, we got our noses bloodied at Kasserine when we were still green, but we proved quickly that we could learn on the fly and soon surpassed the British army in our ability to defeat and drive through the German armies before us. Not to mention that a big part of the reason Rommel had the tactical flexibility to hit us at Kasserine was Monty's stodgy crawl across Africa in "pursuit".

Following the fiasco of Market Garden, Monty sat on his duff, planning his huge "set piece" battle for the Rhine crossing, while several American commanders crossed it "on the fly". Hell, even in the encirclement of the Ruhr, he only went one third of the way around it while Simpson went two thirds of the way. While we're at it let's not forget his failure to close the Falaise Gap and his failure clear the estuary at Antwerp.

Try reading Gavin's memoirs and see how he chafed at the bit being slowed in his advance against the Bulge because he had to adhere to Monty's "tidy phase lines" while Monty pursued the "small solution" (Runstedt's words) of pushing in the bulge rather than cutting it off. Read Ridgeway's memoirs and see how the 18th Airborne corps remained attached to Monty's army following the Rhine crossing in order to attempt to keep Monty moving at a reasonable pace.

The single biggest mistake Ike ever made was giving the resources to the stodgy, slow moving Monty while denying them to the hard charging Patton who had already proven he could blitzkrieg his way through the Germans.

As to the argument that the Brits had a better terrain route than Patton, don't believe for a minute that it wasn't Monty's plan all along when he planned Overlord. He knew fully well that the army on the eastern end of the invasion would be the one advancing through the coastal plain once the east/west line of the invading armies had reoriented into a north/south line for the drive on Germany. And the whole "we planned to pin the German armor down so the Americans could break out" was an after the fact rationalization of his failure to break out on his own. You bet yer sweet bippy he wanted the glory of breaking out of the bridgehead for himself.

It was his hatred of Patton, his chagrin over the huge publicity and popularity Patton was getting for his breakout drive across France, and his deep seated resentment at having been upstaged by Patton in Sicily that drove him to come up with the "daring venture" of Market Garden to get himself back in the limelight.

Well that ought to be enough Monty bashing to get me lynched by an irate British mob so I’ll climb down off my soap box now.

As to the original question, like others posting here, I believe it was a good idea. It just got the wrong commander.

[oi_you_nutter]

being a brit, while still trying to avoid the them and us arguements:

1) no commander is prefect, Monty was too cautious because he had to be, Patton was more agressive because he could afford to be.
2) Patton was a great army commander, Monty was an ok army group commander. Monty was too rigid and slow against the Germans who were still masters at mobile defensive warfare.
3) XXX corps should have been more aggressive, thats the fault of the order & commanders, not the tankers and PBI. you do not win a war using one corps, sent a bloomin Army and then some more.
4) a Market Garden style operation, in an area where they werent just advancing up one narrow road and with enough resources could have worked: Patton and his 3rd Army should have been the troops to attack and exploit the operation.
5) planned operations go wrong and hastily planned operations can be disasters, thats a fact of war.
6) other Allied commanders made big c*ck ups, it just that Market Garden is the best known.

[HansBolter]

ORIGINAL: oi_you_nutter

being a brit, while still trying to avoid the them and us arguements:

1) no commander is prefect, Monty was too cautious because he had to be, Patton was more agressive because he could afford to be.

While I am extremely harsh in my criticism of Monty, I am at least willing to be fair on this point.

It is absolutely true that the strain on British manpower after so many years at war was a significant factor contributing to the slow and cautious nature of the British army at that time.

This well known fact is something Ike should have taken into consideration in his evaluation of the possibility for the success of Monty's big gamble.

I blame Ike for giving in to Monty as much as I blame Monty for his hubris.

[pad152]

I think WWII would have been ended sooner if Patton had the supplies. Monty had a bad habit of never getting or reaching an objective on time, he let the Germans escape in Africa and again France. Eisenhower almost canned Monty after his inaction in France, how he ever thought Monty could/would pull off Market-Garden I still don't understand. Hell Market-Garden might have even worked if it was Patton leading the charge.

[Hartford688]

While acknowledging your points that post Kasserine the US forces did everything, and everything the British did was poor, some of your points seem to contrast with Carlos D'Este's article (not that it is necessarily the gospel truth).

He suggested that Montgomery did NOT have a hatred of Patton; plus a rather different view in Sicily; Montgomery supported Patton to take Messina.

D'Este:

When the three Allied ground commanders met for the first time in the campaign on July 25, Montgomery proposed that Seventh Army rather than his Eighth Army capture Messina. The myth that there was a race to Messina between Patton and Montgomery existed only in Patton’s mind – and was unfortunately embellished in the film “Patton” in which a smirking Monty meets Patton in the city centre as two competing bands drown one another out. The truth was that Montgomery not only never went to Messina nor had any desire to do so but also once he recognized Seventh Army was better positioned to carry out this task, actually advocated that Patton do it!

and:

One digression before concluding this installment: when Patton got into serious trouble after slapping two soldiers for what he believed was malingering in U.S. field hospitals, an unfavorable remark about Patton appeared in the Eighth Army newspaper. Montgomery’s policy was to give his editor complete freedom from command interference, however, after the story about Patton appeared, Monty summoned the editor for a chat with his very displeased commanding general. As Montgomery’s official biographer has written: “Monty had been genuinely impressed by Seventh Army’s mobility, speed . . . rugged determination and professionalism – and he would have nothing derogatory printed in Eighth Army newspapers [about Patton].”

Also, just goes to show different views apparently from the same person - James Gavin. Again, per D'Este's articles:

The First Army staff, already resentful of the change of command, is alleged to have been less than pleased to be under British command. Such resentments, and many seem to be of postwar creation, were not evident to James Gavin, the 82d Airborne commander, when he dined with Hodges and his staff several days later. "The staff spoke of Montgomery with amusement and respect. They obviously liked him and respected his professionalism." For his part, Gavin was impressed with Montgomery as a soldier. "I took a liking to him that has not diminished with the years."

Note that this is the same James Gavin post Market Garden.

For all his other faults, he at least was generally right up with his troops:

With the exception of Patton, Montgomery was the only senior commander to regularly visit his troops at the Ardennes front. Montgomery’s presence and his decisions to reassign responsibilities and realign units of both First and Ninth Armies was precisely the fitting remedy. For American commanders, to cede ground was considered sinful, however, after visiting St. Vith and determining that if the 7th Armored remained it would be annihilated, Montgomery decreed that further defense of the town was futile and, with Hodges’s concurrence, ordered what was left of the division to withdraw to new positions on December 22. The 7th Armored’s brilliantly orchestrated defense of St. Vith against near-impossible odds had stemmed the advance of Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army until December 23, when the last elements evacuated the shattered town. The defense of St. Vith was a key factor in the German failure in the Ardennes. The official U.S Army historian wrote that Montgomery’s decision reflected his "ability to honor the fighting man which had endeared him to the hearts of the Desert Rats [of the British 7th Armored Division] in North Africa: ‘They can come back with all honor. They come back to the more secure positions. They put up a wonderful show.’" 7 The defenders of St. Vith were unambiguous about their feelings toward the field marshal. "Montgomery saved the 7th Armored Division," said Robert Hasbrouck

Sorry for the long post. But apparently not all Americans (and among them people with much real experience) had such contempt for Montgomery.

I am, of course, an irate Brit![:'(] And no, I do not think Montgomery was the best general in the world, but a darn sight better than most make out.