What can we learn from the Houthis' successful ASBM attack?
Moderator: MOD_Command
What can we learn from the Houthis' successful ASBM attack?
Recently I have been paying close attention to the situation in the Red Sea. In addition to the non-stop kamikaze drone strikes, I noted at least three documented Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile strikes (at least one of which successfully hit the target).
The three poor bastards that were attacked were all within effective range of the ballistic missile defense naval vessels of the United States, Britain and France. But every time Western coalition ships have successfully detected an incoming ASBM, they have not conducted a single successful interception.
This is completely different in a CMO. I have found in my imagination and in separate tests that a guided-missile destroyer with an S1850M or BMD-capable SPY-1D/SPY-6 radar can quickly and accurately target an ASBM at a distance of 50 nautical miles. The SM-6/Aster-30 is used to accurately hit (deflect or destroy) the target with a 65% to 80% probability. If everything was as ideal as it is in the game, then we would at least have news of at least one successful intercept of ASBM targets using SAM together in the past while, but we haven't.
For a long time, I have noticed that the BMD-capable assets in the game are too powerful against ballistic missiles or hypersonic weapons targets (whether they are fragments or dedicated anti-missiles with KV warheads), and they are as easily protected against ballistic missiles as they are against ordinary cruise missiles or aircraft (after a series of numerical corrections, SAM has a lower success rate against some cruise missiles and aircraft than against ballistic missiles). At least I know that the accurate tracking and locking of high-speed targets requires the consumption of radar resources and the interception of relatively low speed targets is significantly different, so the efficiency of calculating and predicting the trajectory of ballistic missiles and intercepting information is also bound to be different, which leads to a further reduction in the success rate of interception (not to mention that all contemporary mainstream ballistic missiles have MaRV/HGV warheads capable of terminal maneuvering).
In summary, I think the BMD simulation for this game may need to make some changes.
https://apnews.com/article/red-sea-hout ... 8d3c48fbde
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/h ... in-red-sea
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/us ... es/3084044
The three poor bastards that were attacked were all within effective range of the ballistic missile defense naval vessels of the United States, Britain and France. But every time Western coalition ships have successfully detected an incoming ASBM, they have not conducted a single successful interception.
This is completely different in a CMO. I have found in my imagination and in separate tests that a guided-missile destroyer with an S1850M or BMD-capable SPY-1D/SPY-6 radar can quickly and accurately target an ASBM at a distance of 50 nautical miles. The SM-6/Aster-30 is used to accurately hit (deflect or destroy) the target with a 65% to 80% probability. If everything was as ideal as it is in the game, then we would at least have news of at least one successful intercept of ASBM targets using SAM together in the past while, but we haven't.
For a long time, I have noticed that the BMD-capable assets in the game are too powerful against ballistic missiles or hypersonic weapons targets (whether they are fragments or dedicated anti-missiles with KV warheads), and they are as easily protected against ballistic missiles as they are against ordinary cruise missiles or aircraft (after a series of numerical corrections, SAM has a lower success rate against some cruise missiles and aircraft than against ballistic missiles). At least I know that the accurate tracking and locking of high-speed targets requires the consumption of radar resources and the interception of relatively low speed targets is significantly different, so the efficiency of calculating and predicting the trajectory of ballistic missiles and intercepting information is also bound to be different, which leads to a further reduction in the success rate of interception (not to mention that all contemporary mainstream ballistic missiles have MaRV/HGV warheads capable of terminal maneuvering).
In summary, I think the BMD simulation for this game may need to make some changes.
https://apnews.com/article/red-sea-hout ... 8d3c48fbde
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/h ... in-red-sea
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/us ... es/3084044
Re: What can we learn from the Houthis' successful ASBM attack?
For one thing, my understanding is that it wasn't an ASBM that hit the ship. It was a standard BM. The Houthi's fired two at a huge commercial ship that had stopped. The only other actual strike I have seen is with a cruise missile. At best the BM was lucky hit. But I'm sure having spotters on the ground with GPS able to actually see the ship is a big factor. The only thing you can get from this technically is that the BMs are a little more accurate than most people think.
Right now, the Houthi's don't have ASBMs as far as anyone knows. As to lack of interception, I'm not sure what the ROEs are for any of the warships currently in the Red Sea. All NATO countries have taken a very weak stance on this and generally only fire for self or same-side preservation. I'm sure a big factor in BM interceptions is the inability of a BM to purposefully hit a moving target and the close in nature of the region and borders also play a role. There have been a couple BM interceptions during the current Gaza war and a number of Saudi interceptions. So the capability is somewhat validated. But the will and policy to use the capability for all sides in the region still isn't there.
Right now, the Houthi's don't have ASBMs as far as anyone knows. As to lack of interception, I'm not sure what the ROEs are for any of the warships currently in the Red Sea. All NATO countries have taken a very weak stance on this and generally only fire for self or same-side preservation. I'm sure a big factor in BM interceptions is the inability of a BM to purposefully hit a moving target and the close in nature of the region and borders also play a role. There have been a couple BM interceptions during the current Gaza war and a number of Saudi interceptions. So the capability is somewhat validated. But the will and policy to use the capability for all sides in the region still isn't there.
Re: What can we learn from the Houthis' successful ASBM attack?
Quote: Right now, the Houthi's don't have ASBMs as far as anyone knows.
The situation is maybe a little bit more complicated
Ansar Allah showed in Yemen at least 3 types Iranian anti-ship ballistic missile (AShBM).
Variant of Iranian Fajr-4CL or Fath-360 family missiles under local name Faleq
Variant of the Iranian Fateh-110 missile as Aasif AShBM
Variant of the Iranian Zoheir missile as Tankil
https://twitter.com/imp_navigator/statu ... 1784836182
Terminal guidance is an EO/IR seeker. A vid of this is at https://twitter.com/i/status/1736347273573896461
The situation is maybe a little bit more complicated
Ansar Allah showed in Yemen at least 3 types Iranian anti-ship ballistic missile (AShBM).
Variant of Iranian Fajr-4CL or Fath-360 family missiles under local name Faleq
Variant of the Iranian Fateh-110 missile as Aasif AShBM
Variant of the Iranian Zoheir missile as Tankil
https://twitter.com/imp_navigator/statu ... 1784836182
Terminal guidance is an EO/IR seeker. A vid of this is at https://twitter.com/i/status/1736347273573896461
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Re: What can we learn from the Houthis' successful ASBM attack?
The Houthis most definitely have ASBMs, supplied from Iran.
Re: What can we learn from the Houthis' successful ASBM attack?
About 12-16 months ago, half the Internet was urging us to nerf Russian hardware in the DB "because look at Ukraine!"Sanyr1310 wrote: Thu Dec 21, 2023 2:36 pm Recently I have been paying close attention to the situation in the Red Sea. In addition to the non-stop kamikaze drone strikes, I noted at least three documented Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile strikes (at least one of which successfully hit the target).
The three poor bastards that were attacked were all within effective range of the ballistic missile defense naval vessels of the United States, Britain and France. But every time Western coalition ships have successfully detected an incoming ASBM, they have not conducted a single successful interception.
This is completely different in a CMO. I have found in my imagination and in separate tests that a guided-missile destroyer with an S1850M or BMD-capable SPY-1D/SPY-6 radar can quickly and accurately target an ASBM at a distance of 50 nautical miles. The SM-6/Aster-30 is used to accurately hit (deflect or destroy) the target with a 65% to 80% probability. If everything was as ideal as it is in the game, then we would at least have news of at least one successful intercept of ASBM targets using SAM together in the past while, but we haven't.
For a long time, I have noticed that the BMD-capable assets in the game are too powerful against ballistic missiles or hypersonic weapons targets (whether they are fragments or dedicated anti-missiles with KV warheads), and they are as easily protected against ballistic missiles as they are against ordinary cruise missiles or aircraft (after a series of numerical corrections, SAM has a lower success rate against some cruise missiles and aircraft than against ballistic missiles). At least I know that the accurate tracking and locking of high-speed targets requires the consumption of radar resources and the interception of relatively low speed targets is significantly different, so the efficiency of calculating and predicting the trajectory of ballistic missiles and intercepting information is also bound to be different, which leads to a further reduction in the success rate of interception (not to mention that all contemporary mainstream ballistic missiles have MaRV/HGV warheads capable of terminal maneuvering).
In summary, I think the BMD simulation for this game may need to make some changes.
https://apnews.com/article/red-sea-hout ... 8d3c48fbde
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/h ... in-red-sea
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/us ... es/3084044
We held to our method and explained our reasoning. Time passed, and we've been vindicated. Turns out most Russian kit (incl. hardware in Ukraine service) works well if used and maintained properly.
Don't rush headlong to become "Gen-2" of that mob. Wait. Let a more complete picture form. We are missing a lot of pieces right now from that theater.
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Re: What can we learn from the Houthis' successful ASBM attack?
Amen!Dimitris wrote: Thu Dec 21, 2023 9:57 pm
About 12-16 months ago, half the Internet was urging us to nerf Russian hardware in the DB "because look at Ukraine!"
We held to our method and explained our reasoning. Time passed, and we've been vindicated. Turns out most Russian kit (incl. hardware in Ukraine service) works well if used and maintained properly.
Don't rush headlong to become "Gen-2" of that mob. Wait. Let a more complete picture form. We are missing a lot of pieces right now from that theater.
The problem with active conflicts for us is that most of the time we won't get a decent enough picture until after the conflict is over. Take the sinking of the Moskva that was discussed in the "Nerf-the-Russians" article.
We don't have the full picture yet due to obvious classifications and the fact that the war is ongoing, and short of major culture/regime change, it's unlikely the Russians will be completely honest about what happened. That being said, there's enough that we can reasonably guess that, yes, the Moskva was operating far below proper combat conditions when it was hit.
For BMD engagements, it will be even more difficult to tell given that it's easier to keep details secret due to the fact that everything about the engagement is recorded on classified equipment, as opposed to, say surviving sailors on a ship.
It's also a largely un-practiced form of warfare that until recently has only had an occasional real combat encounter.
If I'm not mistaken, weren't the first real-world ABM engagments during the 1991 Gulf War? And after that, before 2022-23, perhaps there may have been a few during the first days of Iraqi Freedom in 2003? Beyond that, I don't think there have really been any real-world proper ABM engagements before 1-2 years ago.
ASBMs are a relatively new class of advanced weapons that (i'd like to think) a nation wouldn't just provide to non-state actors willy-nilly. They're expensive of course.thewood1 wrote: Thu Dec 21, 2023 3:05 pm For one thing, my understanding is that it wasn't an ASBM that hit the ship. It was a standard BM. The Houthi's fired two at a huge commercial ship that had stopped. The only other actual strike I have seen is with a cruise missile. At best the BM was lucky hit. But I'm sure having spotters on the ground with GPS able to actually see the ship is a big factor. The only thing you can get from this technically is that the BMs are a little more accurate than most people think.
Right now, the Houthi's don't have ASBMs as far as anyone knows. As to lack of interception, I'm not sure what the ROEs are for any of the warships currently in the Red Sea. All NATO countries have taken a very weak stance on this and generally only fire for self or same-side preservation. I'm sure a big factor in BM interceptions is the inability of a BM to purposefully hit a moving target and the close in nature of the region and borders also play a role. There have been a couple BM interceptions during the current Gaza war and a number of Saudi interceptions. So the capability is somewhat validated. But the will and policy to use the capability for all sides in the region still isn't there.
As for using non-guided BMs, well that would be a pretty expensive way to target a ship, even one at anchor, given that I doubt the Houthis have the fire-control equipment to ensure such a precise hit. It's a much more expensive version of attacking with straight-running torpedoes, I really don't see it being worth the effort.
When the threat is Ballistic missiles, ROE should be pretty straight forward, you detect an airborne target at an altitude and speed that matched ballistic missile? Shoot.
It's not like there's civilian aircraft with that flight profile. Any civilian rockets would obviously post notice in advance, and Yemen has no space program so....
Re: What can we learn from the Houthis' successful ASBM attack?
They don't have to be an actual threat. They just need to be enough of a threat to drive business and insurance risk decisions.
Re: What can we learn from the Houthis' successful ASBM attack?
As mentioned there are other factors that might change how or if ASBM's or BM's are engaged. Certainly things like range, geometry and time among others are factors. Also we should wonder if $13-$15M SM-3's are to be used in anything less than a direct threat to the warship (same argument for less expensive but still costly SM-6), if so how many are loaded (most of these ships would have put to sea prior to the Houthi actions). VLS cannot be reloaded at sea presently (working on it).
Limited numbers, economics, politics all may affect the ROE and if the ships aren't shooting then they are not going to shoot them down.... but then the question has to be why are they not shooting before you can say they are not as "effective". It may be a choice/ROE in some cases. Give it much more time I think, can revisit after we get more real data.
Limited numbers, economics, politics all may affect the ROE and if the ships aren't shooting then they are not going to shoot them down.... but then the question has to be why are they not shooting before you can say they are not as "effective". It may be a choice/ROE in some cases. Give it much more time I think, can revisit after we get more real data.
Re: What can we learn from the Houthis' successful ASBM attack?
Limited numbers, economics, politics all may affect the ROE and if the ships aren't shooting then they are not going to shoot them down
This is a very salient point. When we play/design scenarios we often load each platform to the max, and usually only use the best equipment. This is probably not how things really are in real life. I've seen some scenarios that load 100+ SM-3s (e-version) in a Task Group when that may be more missiles than actually exist in the whole USN.
My point, which echoes yours, is that the cost of war has some limits. I was talking to another gamer the other day and trying to convince him to build a unique scenario based not so much on destroying things (that obviously is a factor), but with a eye as to what ordinance is expended, and at what cost. I envisioned this to be a rise in Victory Points for things destroyed or Damaged, and a fall for the use of various ordinance. This type of scenario might well place much more emphasis on the actual limitations of war, while also revealing the economics and politics involved.
This is a very salient point. When we play/design scenarios we often load each platform to the max, and usually only use the best equipment. This is probably not how things really are in real life. I've seen some scenarios that load 100+ SM-3s (e-version) in a Task Group when that may be more missiles than actually exist in the whole USN.
My point, which echoes yours, is that the cost of war has some limits. I was talking to another gamer the other day and trying to convince him to build a unique scenario based not so much on destroying things (that obviously is a factor), but with a eye as to what ordinance is expended, and at what cost. I envisioned this to be a rise in Victory Points for things destroyed or Damaged, and a fall for the use of various ordinance. This type of scenario might well place much more emphasis on the actual limitations of war, while also revealing the economics and politics involved.
Re: What can we learn from the Houthis' successful ASBM attack?
I suspect most of the ABM SM-3 rounds are covering Taiwan/Korea/Japan area along with The Gulf, with a few thrown in Europe.
"SM-3 interceptors are high demand, low density assets. As of 2018, MDA had only acquired around 336 SM-3s of any type. The MDA and the Navy have expended 47 of these rounds in tests, and 24 are emplaced at the Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu, Romania. Most of the remaining 265 are assigned to the Navy’s BMD-capable ships, which are themselves spread around the globe across four U.S. combatant commands.
from - https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/sm-3/
https://mostlymissiledefense.com/2016/0 ... y-25-2016/
The plan was to acquire 100 a year or there-abouts, based on congressional funding. Last report I heard is the entire SM-3 project is at least a year behind. So the max number of SM-3s is around is 600-700. Which is lot for fighting off N. Korea of Houthis rebels. But not a lot for a full scale war.
And SM-6s might not be a factor here, with a lot of dependencies. The firing ship would have to be in relatively close proximity to the targeted ship to be effective at killing an RV in the atmosphere already. Now that might change as a new protection task force is assembled and all moved a lot closer to the target ships.
Total SM-6 inventory is around 500 as 2022 and 625 by end of 2024 with another 800 by end of 2028.
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals ... YP_1-4.pdf
https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/sm-6/
I look at the SM-3 as forward defense and the SM-6 as local defense. And the problem with USN VLS is the local DDG has to work with the loadout its given when it leaves port. They'll have to rotate DDGs back and move new ones forward to change out the loadout.
One other point is that Patriot and Arrow relative successes in intercepting BMs has to give countries like China, Iran, Russia, and any proxies about going all in on BMs. They are complex, vulnerable, and possibly becoming less effective.
"SM-3 interceptors are high demand, low density assets. As of 2018, MDA had only acquired around 336 SM-3s of any type. The MDA and the Navy have expended 47 of these rounds in tests, and 24 are emplaced at the Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu, Romania. Most of the remaining 265 are assigned to the Navy’s BMD-capable ships, which are themselves spread around the globe across four U.S. combatant commands.
from - https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/sm-3/
https://mostlymissiledefense.com/2016/0 ... y-25-2016/
The plan was to acquire 100 a year or there-abouts, based on congressional funding. Last report I heard is the entire SM-3 project is at least a year behind. So the max number of SM-3s is around is 600-700. Which is lot for fighting off N. Korea of Houthis rebels. But not a lot for a full scale war.
And SM-6s might not be a factor here, with a lot of dependencies. The firing ship would have to be in relatively close proximity to the targeted ship to be effective at killing an RV in the atmosphere already. Now that might change as a new protection task force is assembled and all moved a lot closer to the target ships.
Total SM-6 inventory is around 500 as 2022 and 625 by end of 2024 with another 800 by end of 2028.
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals ... YP_1-4.pdf
https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/sm-6/
I look at the SM-3 as forward defense and the SM-6 as local defense. And the problem with USN VLS is the local DDG has to work with the loadout its given when it leaves port. They'll have to rotate DDGs back and move new ones forward to change out the loadout.
One other point is that Patriot and Arrow relative successes in intercepting BMs has to give countries like China, Iran, Russia, and any proxies about going all in on BMs. They are complex, vulnerable, and possibly becoming less effective.
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Re: What can we learn from the Houthis' successful ASBM attack?
Was super surprised to see a post that said ABM in CMA was TOO GOOD! Usually, even recently, it's about how ABM doesn't work.
Re: What can we learn from the Houthis' successful ASBM attack?
Yes, the moskva incident was a one-off, so of course there was no reason to minimize it, but it provided at least three usable samples. Perhaps we should expect the Houthis to attack Western surface ship assets directly?Dimitris wrote: Thu Dec 21, 2023 9:57 pmAbout 12-16 months ago, half the Internet was urging us to nerf Russian hardware in the DB "because look at Ukraine!"Sanyr1310 wrote: Thu Dec 21, 2023 2:36 pm Recently I have been paying close attention to the situation in the Red Sea. In addition to the non-stop kamikaze drone strikes, I noted at least three documented Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile strikes (at least one of which successfully hit the target).
The three poor bastards that were attacked were all within effective range of the ballistic missile defense naval vessels of the United States, Britain and France. But every time Western coalition ships have successfully detected an incoming ASBM, they have not conducted a single successful interception.
This is completely different in a CMO. I have found in my imagination and in separate tests that a guided-missile destroyer with an S1850M or BMD-capable SPY-1D/SPY-6 radar can quickly and accurately target an ASBM at a distance of 50 nautical miles. The SM-6/Aster-30 is used to accurately hit (deflect or destroy) the target with a 65% to 80% probability. If everything was as ideal as it is in the game, then we would at least have news of at least one successful intercept of ASBM targets using SAM together in the past while, but we haven't.
For a long time, I have noticed that the BMD-capable assets in the game are too powerful against ballistic missiles or hypersonic weapons targets (whether they are fragments or dedicated anti-missiles with KV warheads), and they are as easily protected against ballistic missiles as they are against ordinary cruise missiles or aircraft (after a series of numerical corrections, SAM has a lower success rate against some cruise missiles and aircraft than against ballistic missiles). At least I know that the accurate tracking and locking of high-speed targets requires the consumption of radar resources and the interception of relatively low speed targets is significantly different, so the efficiency of calculating and predicting the trajectory of ballistic missiles and intercepting information is also bound to be different, which leads to a further reduction in the success rate of interception (not to mention that all contemporary mainstream ballistic missiles have MaRV/HGV warheads capable of terminal maneuvering).
In summary, I think the BMD simulation for this game may need to make some changes.
https://apnews.com/article/red-sea-hout ... 8d3c48fbde
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/h ... in-red-sea
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/us ... es/3084044
We held to our method and explained our reasoning. Time passed, and we've been vindicated. Turns out most Russian kit (incl. hardware in Ukraine service) works well if used and maintained properly.
Don't rush headlong to become "Gen-2" of that mob. Wait. Let a more complete picture form. We are missing a lot of pieces right now from that theater.
Re: What can we learn from the Houthis' successful ASBM attack?
You hit the nail on the head.tylerblakebrandon wrote: Fri Dec 22, 2023 2:06 am Was super surprised to see a post that said ABM in CMA was TOO GOOD! Usually, even recently, it's about how ABM doesn't work.
Re: What can we learn from the Houthis' successful ASBM attack?
Comments from someone who knows "a few things" on the subject:
* Just like traditional BMD, AShBMD is highly dependant on deployment geometry. The two main objectives of the US sea-based BMD effort are carrier protection and boost-phase intercept (I'm excluding mid-course SM-3 interceptions from the conversation, that doesn't apply to short or even medium ranged TBM/AShBM defense). Carrier defense implies that your BMD ship is sailing along the main defended asset, making it part of the defended footprint (you'd even pick the best spot in the CSG formation for that). Boost-phase intercept requires you to be close(-ish) to the launch sites, which might not be possible in case if deep, in-land sites or of mobile platforms are used. It also increases the risks to your destroyer, so it's always a tradeoff. In the case we're talking about, the vast majority of attacks have been made with loitering ammunitions or conventional cruise missiles rather than ballistic missiles, so the cost/benefit ratio wouldn't be favorable to forward-basing. If the threat was a north Korean ICBM potentially taking out San Francisco, you'd forward base your Burke. In the case of relatively low intensity attacks, I don't think that would be worth it.
* Since the IAF 655 incident, the USN has been using conservative firing policies for its Aegis cruisers. Each ship has a threat/response card written into the computers before it leaves port. That threat/response database has all the allowed automatic or semi-automatic behaviors the ship is allowed to use during the mission. If TBM/AShBM attacks weren't part of the expected threat list, it's unlikely that the ship is configured for ballistic missile detection, classification and engagement.
* Similarly, if the expected threat are low-to-medium subsonic, low-altitude vectors, why waste radar resources searching at super high elevations for very high velocity objects ?
* I doubt (and most analysts as well, I think) that Iran supplied the Houthis with AShBMs. That would annoy people they wouldn't want annoyed, and create opportunities for Western powers to study how they behave in flight and develop countermeasures. The success rate in those ballistic attacks is also very low for dedicated anti-ship weapons. The missiles fired were probably conventional ballistic systems. I read somewhere (and agree with) that the MOA at play here probably was to threaten large ships and get them to stop moving, then fire conventional TBMs at them (perhaps your local flavor of the Zolfaghar/Dezful/Fateh or Qiam families).
* Finally, I think that CMO's BMD in general still over-performs a bit, because of the lack of radar resource modelling (e.g radar time and BM search volumes limitations) and has implicit perfect datalinks (a key element of the BMD mission, and usually the limiting factor). People expect BMD to work because of a very limited set of tightly-controlled experiments and the precedent of the 1991, which isn't as clear cut as people make it to be. BMD still is by far the most difficult air defense mission (even more than ASAT, I'd say).
Re: What can we learn from the Houthis' successful ASBM attack?
Not a defense analyst my self, but its exactly what I thought. These reports come from reading headlines and not looking any deeper.
"* I doubt (and most analysts as well, I think) that Iran supplied the Houthis with AShBMs. That would annoy people they wouldn't want annoyed, and create opportunities for Western powers to study how they behave in flight and develop countermeasures. The success rate in those ballistic attacks is also very low for dedicated anti-ship weapons. The missiles fired were probably conventional ballistic systems. I read somewhere (and agree with) that the MOA at play here probably was to threaten large ships and get them to stop moving, then fire conventional TBMs at them (perhaps your local flavor of the Zolfaghar/Dezful/Fateh or Qiam families)."
"* I doubt (and most analysts as well, I think) that Iran supplied the Houthis with AShBMs. That would annoy people they wouldn't want annoyed, and create opportunities for Western powers to study how they behave in flight and develop countermeasures. The success rate in those ballistic attacks is also very low for dedicated anti-ship weapons. The missiles fired were probably conventional ballistic systems. I read somewhere (and agree with) that the MOA at play here probably was to threaten large ships and get them to stop moving, then fire conventional TBMs at them (perhaps your local flavor of the Zolfaghar/Dezful/Fateh or Qiam families)."
Re: What can we learn from the Houthis' successful ASBM attack?
So what are youre thoughts? If the Houtis do not have AShBMs? Are these mockups?Blast33 wrote: Thu Dec 21, 2023 4:37 pm Quote: Right now, the Houthi's don't have ASBMs as far as anyone knows.
The situation is maybe a little bit more complicated
Ansar Allah showed in Yemen at least 3 types Iranian anti-ship ballistic missile (AShBM).
Variant of Iranian Fajr-4CL or Fath-360 family missiles under local name Faleq
Variant of the Iranian Fateh-110 missile as Aasif AShBM
Variant of the Iranian Zoheir missile as Tankil
https://twitter.com/imp_navigator/statu ... 1784836182
Terminal guidance is an EO/IR seeker. A vid of this is at https://twitter.com/i/status/1736347273573896461
GBe39y-XwAAgcIk.jpgGBe39KSXQAAWhEB.jpgGBe3-vhWcAADMc5.jpg
Re: What can we learn from the Houthis' successful ASBM attack?
That would be my guess. I'm not even sure the Iranians have them. Its not like the Iranians don't have a significant history of faking weapon development.
https://apnews.com/article/red-sea-hout ... 8d3c48fbde
Go back and read this in detail and you'll see there was one confirmed BM launch. But only one possible BM strike. The reporting is conflating damage to ships with a single BM launch. Looking at the minor damage classification to at least two of the ships, I suspect drone attacks on the last two. A 700-1500 lb warhead hitting a commercial ship is going to cause more than minor damage.
https://apnews.com/article/red-sea-hout ... 8d3c48fbde
Go back and read this in detail and you'll see there was one confirmed BM launch. But only one possible BM strike. The reporting is conflating damage to ships with a single BM launch. Looking at the minor damage classification to at least two of the ships, I suspect drone attacks on the last two. A 700-1500 lb warhead hitting a commercial ship is going to cause more than minor damage.
Re: What can we learn from the Houthis' successful ASBM attack?
I thought you knewthewood1 wrote: Mon Dec 25, 2023 11:41 am That would be my guess. I'm not even sure the Iranians have them. Its not like the Iranians don't have a significant history of faking weapon development.
https://apnews.com/article/red-sea-hout ... 8d3c48fbde
Go back and read this in detail and you'll see there was one confirmed BM launch. But only one possible BM strike. The reporting is conflating damage to ships with a single BM launch. Looking at the minor damage classification to at least two of the ships, I suspect drone attacks on the last two. A 700-1500 lb warhead hitting a commercial ship is going to cause more than minor damage.
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Re: What can we learn from the Houthis' successful ASBM attack?
There's AShBM and AShBM. For instance, the DF-26 is though to have high maneuverability in endgame to correct for evasive actions undertaken by the target. On the other hand, a (barely) modified Fateh 110 probably can probably be fired at, and detect with organic sensor(s) a ship in some situations, but has limited maneuverability since it was intended as a conventional (if accurate) surface-to-surface weapon. Heck, a modified Pershing II could be used as an improvised AShBM if you really wanted to and fed it with the needed custom TERCOM map.Blast33 wrote: Mon Dec 25, 2023 7:50 amSo what are youre thoughts? If the Houtis do not have AShBMs? Are these mockups?Blast33 wrote: Thu Dec 21, 2023 4:37 pm Quote: Right now, the Houthi's don't have ASBMs as far as anyone knows.
The situation is maybe a little bit more complicated
Ansar Allah showed in Yemen at least 3 types Iranian anti-ship ballistic missile (AShBM).
Variant of Iranian Fajr-4CL or Fath-360 family missiles under local name Faleq
Variant of the Iranian Fateh-110 missile as Aasif AShBM
Variant of the Iranian Zoheir missile as Tankil
https://twitter.com/imp_navigator/statu ... 1784836182
Terminal guidance is an EO/IR seeker. A vid of this is at https://twitter.com/i/status/1736347273573896461
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The Fateh 360 family uses INS and GLONASS nav systems, both of which are unsuitable for anti-ship missions, unless said ship is very large and standing still (which might be the MOA at play here).
The Zoheir, on the other hand, is an alleged AShBM modification of the Raad-500, but we have yet to see a demonstration of its anti-ship potential.
Regardless of the exact weapons used, the lack of ABM engagements by frigates and destroyers in the vicinity is hardly surprising, because of the reasons given above. That being said, a 30% (or 50%, depending on the source) hit rate is really bad if they're indeed using true, dedicated AShBMs. It would however be consistent with repurposed conventional ballistic missiles equipped with decent EO/IR/EM sensors.
Re: What can we learn from the Houthis' successful ASBM attack?
My point is this is a typical uninformed narrative about some new and transformational change in combat dynamics. And it turns out to be mostly hype from a broader perspective.