A successful Case Blue

[warspite1]

Having wargamed this a few times, my idea is for a concentrated drive on Astrakhan, on the Caspian Sea at the mouth of the Volga. Its capture would prevent any river traffic up the Volga and cut off Russian troops in the Caucasus by land.

I am curious. Which wargame(s) did you use?

Thanks

Matrix World in Flames (with as close to a historical setup as possible)

warspite1

Well it can't be denied that World In Flames is the greatest wargame ever made. FACT However it is also a game purposely designed to allow either side to win and so some of the OOB and unit factors are designed with this in mind as opposed to being slaves to historical accuracy.

So I wouldn't take World In Flames - or frankly pretty much any wargame, as any indicator of what may or may not have been possible (although admittedly some may be more useful than others in this regard).

Bottom line is, in my opinion, unless the Germans seal off the Caspian Sea/Persia (impossible with the units they had available) then the Soviets are barely going to notice the difference in relative terms due to the loss of Astrakhan. I mean sure, its possible that things may have worked out slightly better for the Germans by going down this proposed route (although that is debatable) but I don't think it would have made any noticeable difference on the outcome of the war.

I think the effect of Hitler's meddling is probably over-played too. Because let's face it, if anyone sane was in charge, the Germans wouldn't have been where they were in 1942

[ncc1701e]

I think that the problem is, for gameplay reason, that the supply network is often too good in any wargame.

Some designers are convinced logistics is boring. So they abstract it. As such, yes it is often much too good.

[Neilster]

50% of U.S. Lend Lease arrived in East Asian ports of the Soviet Union sent from West Coast U.S. ports on Soviet ships. They could do that because Japan and the Soviets were not at war. No reason that amount couldn't be increased.

Could the Trans-Siberian railway transport more Lend-Lease west from the East Asian ports to the front than they already did?

That's potentially another factor. I believe it was mostly single track, meaning long stops in sidings for trains.

[RangerJoe]

50% of U.S. Lend Lease arrived in East Asian ports of the Soviet Union sent from West Coast U.S. ports on Soviet ships. They could do that because Japan and the Soviets were not at war. No reason that amount couldn't be increased.

Could the Trans-Siberian railway transport more Lend-Lease west from the East Asian ports to the front than they already did?

That's potentially another factor. I believe it was mostly single track, meaning long stops in sidings for trains.

More train engines and cars could be imported, rails themselves if needed to double track certain areas. A strict traffic rule allowing trains to proceed in one direction especially across a limiting one track bridge for a certain period of time, then the returning trains. The KGB could help with the enforcement of this . . .

Some of the supplies and equipment shipped to the 8th Army could have been diverted.

Some more ships could have been "lent" to the Soviets. Or Soviet ships in the Atlantic Ocean could have traversed the Panama canal to carry more cargo to Siberia. Some of the supplies could have been used for the Soviet Siberian forces to limit how many supplies came from other parts of the Soviet Union.

[Platoonist]

Some more ships could have been "lent" to the Soviets. Or Soviet ships in the Atlantic Ocean could have traversed the Panama canal to carry more cargo to Siberia. Some of the supplies could have been used for the Soviet Siberian forces to limit how many supplies came from other parts of the Soviet Union.

A number of US cargo ships on the West Coast were built or reflagged for Soviet use on the Pacific route. Often called the Belorussian or West Coast class. In some cases, laid-up merchantmen were also repaired and pressed nto service. I'm sure more could have been provided if the need arose.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belorus ... cargo_ship

[Orm]

Could the Trans-Siberian railway transport more Lend-Lease west from the East Asian ports to the front than they already did?

That's potentially another factor. I believe it was mostly single track, meaning long stops in sidings for trains.

More train engines and cars could be imported, rails themselves if needed to double track certain areas. A strict traffic rule allowing trains to proceed in one direction especially across a limiting one track bridge for a certain period of time, then the returning trains. The KGB could help with the enforcement of this . . .

Some of the supplies and equipment shipped to the 8th Army could have been diverted.

Some more ships could have been "lent" to the Soviets. Or Soviet ships in the Atlantic Ocean could have traversed the Panama canal to carry more cargo to Siberia. Some of the supplies could have been used for the Soviet Siberian forces to limit how many supplies came from other parts of the Soviet Union.

Let me see if I got this right.

Train cars, and engines, should be refitted to a different track gauge, then loaded onto ships, shipped to a already overburdened port, unloaded there, be put into immediate use, and not case traffic jam on a more than 5700 mile train journey, on a notoriously difficult journey. Time tables should be modified, and personal educated for speedier traffic. The line was double tracked so that would have been helpful, but that was obviously already calculated into the already stretched train schedule. At the same time, not all of the line was electrified as far as I understand it.

All of this planned, and executed, in a few months? When do you think the Soviet leaders would have realized the need for this, and when do you think USA would see the need for this? How much planning would be needed to execute the plan? Would it then be enough time to actually do it before it would be to late?

It is my understanding that the Trans-Siberian railway was already working at capacity at this point of the war.

Also, no war material allowed this route...

Lastly, KGB would have to be created to enforce this.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans-siberian_railway

1024px-Trans_Sibir.jpg (225.92 KiB) Viewed 337 times

[Lobster]

50% of U.S. Lend Lease arrived in East Asian ports of the Soviet Union sent from West Coast U.S. ports on Soviet ships. They could do that because Japan and the Soviets were not at war. No reason that amount couldn't be increased.

In mid 1942 the U.S. had only been at war for seven months and had multiple theatres competing for arms and resources from a war economy that was still in the process of ramping up. In March 1942, Roosevelt made the Soviet Union the top priority for Lend Lease, so I'd say they were giving about all they could spare. Lend Lease to the Soviet Far East could only be carried on Soviet ships, which is a limiting factor to any big increase, and anyway could not include arms. Spam and telephone cable were handy but won't stop a German offensive.

For the above reasons, I don't think much increased aid to the Soviet Far East is possible.

The Strait of Tartary was safe from Japanese intervention. Open from June to October.

[RangerJoe]

That's potentially another factor. I believe it was mostly single track, meaning long stops in sidings for trains.

More train engines and cars could be imported, rails themselves if needed to double track certain areas. A strict traffic rule allowing trains to proceed in one direction especially across a limiting one track bridge for a certain period of time, then the returning trains. The KGB could help with the enforcement of this . . .

Some of the supplies and equipment shipped to the 8th Army could have been diverted.

Some more ships could have been "lent" to the Soviets. Or Soviet ships in the Atlantic Ocean could have traversed the Panama canal to carry more cargo to Siberia. Some of the supplies could have been used for the Soviet Siberian forces to limit how many supplies came from other parts of the Soviet Union.

Let me see if I got this right.

Train cars, and engines, should be refitted to a different track gauge, then loaded onto ships, shipped to a already overburdened port, unloaded there, be put into immediate use, and not case traffic jam on a more than 5700 mile train journey, on a notoriously difficult journey. Time tables should be modified, and personal educated for speedier traffic. The line was double tracked so that would have been helpful, but that was obviously already calculated into the already stretched train schedule. At the same time, not all of the line was electrified as far as I understand it.

All of this planned, and executed, in a few months? When do you think the Soviet leaders would have realized the need for this, and when do you think USA would see the need for this? How much planning would be needed to execute the plan? Would it then be enough time to actually do it before it would be to late?

It is my understanding that the Trans-Siberian railway was already working at capacity at this point of the war.

Also, no war material allowed this route...

Lastly, KGB would have to be created to enforce this.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans-siberian_railway
1024px-Trans_Sibir.jpg

I don't think that they had electric trains then, most were coal powered but could burn wood. There are lots of trees in Siberia . . .

Refitting or making the engines and railroad cars would not be that difficult. Then they could be loaded onto a Roll On Roll Off (RORO) ship and sent to the USSR. They could also have been sent to Iran and then to the USSR as well. The rules could have changed about the war material or the units in the Siberian area could have been given American equipment and have their Soviet equipment sent to fight the Germans. I mean, they moved entire units on the railroads so the war material could have been sent that way as well.

"622,100 tons of railroad rails were delivered to the USSR, which is equal to 36% of the total number of rails supplied and produced in the USSR. During the war, 1900 steam locomotives were delivered, while in the USSR in 1941-1945, 800 steam locomotives were produced, of which in 1941 - 708. If we take the number of steam locomotives produced from June to the end of 1941 as a quarter of the total production, then the number of steam locomotives produced during the war will be approximately 300. That is, the share of Lend-Lease steam locomotives in the total volume of steam locomotives produced and supplied in the USSR is approximately 72%. In addition, 11,075 cars were delivered to the USSR. For comparison, in 1942-1945, 1,092 railway cars were produced in the USSR. During the war years, 318 thousand tons of explosives were supplied under Lend-Lease (of which the USA - 295.6 thousand tons), which is 36.6% of the total production and supplies of explosives to the USSR."

https://military-review.com/12497832-le ... ity#menu-1

[pzgndr]

I still think that the Soviets would not have been crippled by a successful Case Blue taking Astrakhan. See the historical situation map. The Trans-Caucasus Front in the south is not that critical. If the Germans did not go to Stalingrad and get counter-attacked by the Southwest Front from the north and the Stalingrad Front from the east, then they would simply have been counter-attacked by the Southwest, Don, and Stalingrad Fronts from the north. German Army Groups A and Don would have been over-extended at Astrakhan and unable to hold for long. Those Soviet winter counter-offensives in late 1942 and early 1943 were overwhelming and, assuming a pseudo-historical situation with comparable OOBs but with Germans taking Astrakhan rather than Stalingrad, the Soviets would likely have still pushed the Germans back to the Kursk-Kharkov-Rostov-Krasnodar line by February 1943. And that's regardless of supply being cutoff to the Trans-Caucasus Front. The open-ended question is what if the Germans had reached and destroyed the Grozny oil fields and what impact that would have had in 1943.
.

WWIIEurope24.jpg (4.22 MiB) Viewed 303 times

[Orm]

More train engines and cars could be imported, rails themselves if needed to double track certain areas. A strict traffic rule allowing trains to proceed in one direction especially across a limiting one track bridge for a certain period of time, then the returning trains. The KGB could help with the enforcement of this . . .

Some of the supplies and equipment shipped to the 8th Army could have been diverted.

Some more ships could have been "lent" to the Soviets. Or Soviet ships in the Atlantic Ocean could have traversed the Panama canal to carry more cargo to Siberia. Some of the supplies could have been used for the Soviet Siberian forces to limit how many supplies came from other parts of the Soviet Union.

Let me see if I got this right.

Train cars, and engines, should be refitted to a different track gauge, then loaded onto ships, shipped to a already overburdened port, unloaded there, be put into immediate use, and not case traffic jam on a more than 5700 mile train journey, on a notoriously difficult journey. Time tables should be modified, and personal educated for speedier traffic. The line was double tracked so that would have been helpful, but that was obviously already calculated into the already stretched train schedule. At the same time, not all of the line was electrified as far as I understand it.

All of this planned, and executed, in a few months? When do you think the Soviet leaders would have realized the need for this, and when do you think USA would see the need for this? How much planning would be needed to execute the plan? Would it then be enough time to actually do it before it would be to late?

It is my understanding that the Trans-Siberian railway was already working at capacity at this point of the war.

Also, no war material allowed this route...

Lastly, KGB would have to be created to enforce this.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans-siberian_railway
1024px-Trans_Sibir.jpg

I don't think that they had electric trains then, most were coal powered but could burn wood. There are lots of trees in Siberia . . .

Refitting or making the engines and railroad cars would not be that difficult. Then they could be loaded onto a Roll On Roll Off (RORO) ship and sent to the USSR. They could also have been sent to Iran and then to the USSR as well. The rules could have changed about the war material or the units in the Siberian area could have been given American equipment and have their Soviet equipment sent to fight the Germans. I mean, they moved entire units on the railroads so the war material could have been sent that way as well.

"622,100 tons of railroad rails were delivered to the USSR, which is equal to 36% of the total number of rails supplied and produced in the USSR. During the war, 1900 steam locomotives were delivered, while in the USSR in 1941-1945, 800 steam locomotives were produced, of which in 1941 - 708. If we take the number of steam locomotives produced from June to the end of 1941 as a quarter of the total production, then the number of steam locomotives produced during the war will be approximately 300. That is, the share of Lend-Lease steam locomotives in the total volume of steam locomotives produced and supplied in the USSR is approximately 72%. In addition, 11,075 cars were delivered to the USSR. For comparison, in 1942-1945, 1,092 railway cars were produced in the USSR. During the war years, 318 thousand tons of explosives were supplied under Lend-Lease (of which the USA - 295.6 thousand tons), which is 36.6% of the total production and supplies of explosives to the USSR."

https://military-review.com/12497832-le ... ity#menu-1

I started to make a long post of why I think it would have been practically impossible to increase the shipping through the Trans-Siberian railway before it would no longer be relevant. The campaign, I suspect, would have been settled one way or the other long before any such plan could have been implemented. But then I decided against it. The supply shipping from Siberia is not really relevant to the main question on this thread.

xxxx

Cutting down trees to fuel steam locomotives to increase transportation efficiency?

[pzgndr]

The open-ended question is what if the Germans had reached and destroyed the Grozny oil fields and what impact that would have had in 1943...

My curiosity compelled me to research this some more. I found an article https://www.europeanproceedings.com/art ... .03.02.276 "Petroleum Industry In Grozny In Days Of Great Patriotic War." A couple of points are interesting:

Thus, the petroleum industry workers of Chechen-Ingushetia had to stop the production of raw materials, namely oil, which was extremely necessary for the front. In total, 2.181 out of 2.459 producing wells were liquidated, as well as 131 out of 149 exploration wells... On 13 September 1942, the USSR Grozny Defense Committee adopted the resolution No. 2298 SS On dismantling of Grozny oil refineries. In total, 4.020 cars of equipment were taken to eastern regions of the country...

As of 1 January 1943, only 12 wells of Grozneftekombinat enterprises were in operation, and in 4 months and 25 days the enterprises put into operation 170 more wells, thus exceeded a five-month plan of placing wells on production...

Clearly, the Soviets were well aware of the importance of their Grozny oil fields and aggressively began shutting them down and relocating equipment to the east. I would assume that wells were not just capped but also covered over and hidden as well as possible so that advancing German forces would not be able to easily find and destroy them. Thus, the Soviets were able to recover their wells and resume operations fairly quickly in 1943 when the Germans retreated. If the Germans had managed to occupy the oil fields only briefly, I doubt that those lead panzer units would have caused too much permanent damage. If the Germans had managed to hold the area for a few months and bring in some expertise to locate and destroy thousands of wells, then that would have complicated Soviet recovery operations whenever the Germans did retreat and the Soviets re-occupied the oil fields.

Not sure if this answers the "open-ended" question or not, but it certainly provides some food for thought. In grand strategy games that include economics and production and such, capture/loss of oil fields should be considered and usually is. In my Advanced Third Reich mod for Strategic Command, Axis capturing the oil fields at Maikop, Grozny, and Baku is generally key to crippling the Soviets, but like all games the question remains regarding how realistic and historically accurate any of those game results may be, or might have been. But, hey, that's why we play wargames, eh?

[sPzAbt653]

Baku produced 71.5% of total Soviet oil output, other Caucasian oilfields produced 15%. In 1941, of the total Soviet oil output of 38,000,000 tons, the Soviet military consumed 4,500,000 tons. Based on these numbers, the loss of Maikop and/or Grozny wouldn't seem to have greatly bothered the Soviet military, if at all. While it might appear that the loss of Baku would have a greater effect, the development of alternative oil sources were being hastily developed in areas of the Upper Volga and Kama, in the Urals, near Ukta, and east of the Caspian across the entire southern USSR. The greater the threat to Baku, we can assume the greater these efforts would be, while in reality once the threat to Baku subsided these efforts slowed.

Similarly, the flow of Lend-Lease to the Soviets could be redirected depending on Axis interference [Murmansk route is interdicted, move more thru the Pacific. Japan enters the war, move more thru Persia]. Additionally, the Persian route not only went thru Baku and Astrakhan, but also went to the south and east of the Caspian, which would make it necessary for the Axis to occupy all of Persia including its' ports in order to close that route. However, if this did indeed occur, it is safe to assume that other routes would be improved/developed.

I'm in the camp that while the Caucasus was a nice area for the Soviets to have, it's loss would not be crippling to its' war effort. I think that the vast importance of the area to the Axis is sometimes mistaken to have the same weight of value to the Soviets, which it did not.