ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn
Motorization should take a turn or more to achieve.
When I sim... I am Hitler... I am Stalin.
I am inclined to feel the same. (I mean, it takes a full turn to de-motorized...)
Someone else posted a reply regarding being used in a non-combat role, simply for behind the front-lines transport. More of an ad-hoc rail-transport-like feature. That may be worth exploring.
Outside of the US, was large-scale adhoc motorization ever actually employed in WWII? Troubles me that I cannot find any historical references to it.
But the way it is implemented now, it seems like allows German to create 4-6 fully motorized combat infantry divisions, on-the-fly. (and who knows how many Soviet Rifle Corps, once their industry and lend-lease get really cranking!)
This is a bit over-the-top. If Germany really had the ability to do that at the onset of Barbarossa, they would have.
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And for those that are concerned about 'Sir Robin', I assert that is a different matter. Personally, I would look at what, historically, kept the Soviet Army from not running away? (outside the NKVD troops strategically placed behind the front-lines.
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1. Soviet Army could not immediately run away.
Up until the end of 1941, the Soviet logistical and transport networks were in complete disarray (not to mention tactical leadership). Soviet unit-level supply system was, in some case, even worse off than the Germans.
Full movement points for Soviet units should not be immediately fully restored, but incremented over time.
Nearly sixteen million Soviet civilians and over 1,500 large factories were moved to areas in the middle or eastern part of the country by the end of 1941.
This is not really modeled well in the game. It was not magic or teleportation, but came at a tremendous burden on the Soviet transportation and logistical networks. There is noway this occurred without the hindrance of military movement as well. For example, consider the following regarding the 1942 evacuations, which was minor in comparison to 1941 -
Even with this authority, the GKO could not entirely avoid disruptions that hindered military operations. An Evacuation in the Trans-Caucasus region during 1942 clogged the rail lines and “deprived [the Soviets] of the ability to maneuver troops and restricted the arrival of supplies.”
Given the massive evacuation of civilians and industry...
One natural facilitator of the evacuation with regard to the military was the general movement of troops from the east to the west. Railcars full of soldiers dropped off their cargo at the front and loaded the empty cars with freight and passengers heading east
A mass exodus of a "run away" Soviet ground force (from West to East) as well would have been impossible.
2. Preservation of the Soviet industry.
The mass evacuation of the Soviet industrial production was not a foregone conclusion or auto-magic. for example -
As monumental as this effort proved, it still fell short of all available industry. In the Donets Basin, for example, 64 steel facilities came under threat in 1941, but the Soviets only managed to salvage 17 of them. It was not only facilities that were lost; huge stockpiles of raw materials or refined materials were also abandoned, and areas that produced strategic resources were taken by the enemy. The year 1942 saw the production of steel and coal at rates roughly half of what they had been in 1941
It came at a cost to the Soviet ground forces as well...
The Soviets, driven by the existential threat to their existence west of the Urals, endured the massive sacrifice of Soviet troops, civilians, and war equipment, enabling the evacuation of industry, material, and manpower east of the Urals.
In essence, it was not the preservation of the Soviet Army that led to their victory, but the preservation of their industrial capacity!
Until this is appropriately modeled by WiTE2, thus giving ample reason for Soviets to stand their ground, the "Sir Robin" strategy will prevail.
