OIL

[aspqrz02]

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa

Actually, the Soviets used mass attack with pretty much everything at the same time after hellish artillery prep. They overwhelmed with numbers, not pretty or tactically sophisticated. But the brute force usually got the job done. Ask Army Group Center circa 22 June '44. No standstill there.

A number of writers on the topic wouldn't agree with you, or not completely, including Glantz, amongst others.

The later war Soviet attacks could be pretty sophisticated in their own way.

Phil

[wulfgar]

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

Again, Wulfgar, read the cites and the works mentioned in the Bibliographies.

The information you seek is there, if only you weren't completely, totally and utterly unwilling to look for it.

I don't know how much plainer I can be [>:]

If you want confirmation, read the works cited.

The fact that a) you haven't bothered and/or b) haven't got the mental capacity to comprehend it if you have is sad [X(]

Indeed. I said Baku. You said, "No, you don't mean Baku" and the sources I cited "No, they don't mention Baku" when, in fact, on even the most cursory reading, they do.

But its become obvious that you aren't clewless (or not entirely), what you really are is a Troll. [8|]

Phil

From my perspective I can't look for what is not there. However if you see it as clear as a bell, then the onus is on you. To back up a very, very, very outstanding statement.

Let's look at your statement one more time.

The Soviets historically lost 90% of Baku Oil production anyway, destroying it when threatened by German advances. Did it make a difference?

No.

You claim that the Soviets destroyed 90% of Baku's oil production. Which furthers your claim that the oil production of Baku is a matter of indifference to the course of the war.

Two outstanding claims for the price of one.

Now if you can back that up with some real evidence, then do so! So quote it, but you don't because it is not there!

[barbarrossa]

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa

Actually, the Soviets used mass attack with pretty much everything at the same time after hellish artillery prep. They overwhelmed with numbers, not pretty or tactically sophisticated. But the brute force usually got the job done. Ask Army Group Center circa 22 June '44. No standstill there.

A number of writers on the topic wouldn't agree with you, or not completely, including Glantz, amongst others.

The later war Soviet attacks could be pretty sophisticated in their own way.

Phil

Whom?

A number of writers would, most works reside in my library. Let's examine one, shall we!

Page one[X(] (Soviet Blitzkrieg - The Battle for White Russia 1944, Walter S. Dunn Jr, 2000):

...When the heavy artillery and rockets finally quieted, the relentless air attacks intensified....Finally the rumbling of engines and the clatter of steel tracks signaled the approach of dreaded Soviet tanks...

A torrent of tanks and riflemen from four divisions of General N.I. Krylov's 5th Army stormed the German trenches along the 18 kilometer sector, about 36,000 men, or 3 men for every meter. With the shouting Red Army riflemen came two tank brigades and five assault gun regiments with over 120 tanks and 100 assault guns, double the strength of a panzer division.


Sounds kind of like what I described.

Sophisticated? In their own way? What does that even mean?

Zhukov's ill-advised use of anti-air searchlights to blind German defenders in his Oder bridgehead breakout? Pretty late-war and ultimately relied on brute force and overwhelming numbers to finally force his way to Seelow.

[aspqrz02]

ive pointed you at the information repeatedly ... and youve repeatedly failed to read and/or understand what is there ... and keep on doing so.

Read the works cited and stop whining [:-]

Phil

[aspqrz02]

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa

Actually, the Soviets used mass attack with pretty much everything at the same time after hellish artillery prep. They overwhelmed with numbers, not pretty or tactically sophisticated. But the brute force usually got the job done. Ask Army Group Center circa 22 June '44. No standstill there.

A number of writers on the topic wouldn't agree with you, or not completely, including Glantz, amongst others.

The later war Soviet attacks could be pretty sophisticated in their own way.

Whom?

Glantz for one.

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa

A number of writers would, most works reside in my library. Let's examine one, shall we!

Page one[X(] (Soviet Blitzkrieg - The Battle for White Russia 1944, Walter S. Dunn Jr, 2000):

...When the heavy artillery and rockets finally quieted, the relentless air attacks intensified....Finally the rumbling of engines and the clatter of steel tracks signaled the approach of dreaded Soviet tanks...

A torrent of tanks and riflemen from four divisions of General N.I. Krylov's 5th Army stormed the German trenches along the 18 kilometer sector, about 36,000 men, or 3 men for every meter. With the shouting Red Army riflemen came two tank brigades and five assault gun regiments with over 120 tanks and 100 assault guns, double the strength of a panzer division.

Sounds kind of like what I described.

Sounds like a combined arms assault, actually, which is what Blitzkrieg morphed into during the war.

Of course, I presume your source has left out all of the preliminaries ...

"By 1944 the typical Soviet offensive was preceded by careful planning and deception measures, designed to concentrate forces at the designated bnreakthrough point. The attack began with a wave of reconaissance batallions that inflitrated the German defenses and seized key positions, thereby rendering the rest of the German positions untenable. This infiltration was accompanied or followed by massive, carefully orchestrated air and artillery offensives. When the whirlwinds of artillery fire shifted from the front lines to the German rear areas, infantry, heavy armour and engineers conducted the conventional assault to eliminate the centres of German resistance. As quickly as possible, senior Soviet commanders committed their mobile forces through the resulting gaps ..."

- "When Titans Clashed" David M Glantz and Johnathon House, UKansas Press, 1995, page #289

Combined Arms assault (modified Blitzkrieg) followed by motorised (armour and mechanised infantry, and some cavalry) forces. Like I said.

Glantz/House continue ... "Although the tank armies and separate mobile corps were large formations commanded by experienced general officers, much of their tactical success depended on the work of the young captains and majors who commanded the leading forward detachments. These highly mobile, combined arms groups of 800-2000 soldiers avoided pitched battles wherever possible, bypassing German defenders in order to establish large encirclements and seize bridgeheads for the next offensive. Follow on Rifle forces, supported by the increasingly powerful Red Air Force, then reduced the German encirclements, while the mobile forces continued their exploitation. Throughout their offensives, the Rear Services performed prodigious feats of improvisation to keep the spearheads supplied even 400 kilometers behind enemy lines. Just as in the German offensives of 1941-42, the later Soviet attacks were often halted by logistical overextension rather than by enemy action."

- same page

So, Glantz/House seem to be one of the sources that I suggested didn't agree with your statement.

Note: I didn't say every source did, merely that to make the statement that you did as if it was the only point of view held by eminent historians of the period and, therefore, the pure unvarnished undisputed truth (by implication), was not correct as, indeed as I have shown, and as I stated, not all historians would agree.

I think most people here understand that Glantz has a fairly good reputation as a Historian of the period and place.

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa
Sophisticated? In their own way? What does that even mean?

Well, as G/H notes elsewhere in WTC, they didn't copy the German model, they had their own ideas ... what they ultimately did was to use an amalgam of the Blitzkrieg and their own pre-war Deep Battle theories, and it worked well most of the time.

Most of the time.

Just like the German operations quite often, but not always, worked well.

Yes, they were prone to using brute force, to a significant degree, but not "brute force and ignorance", as the saying here in Oz goes.

And, of course, Stalin (like Hitler) could put his oar in and cause significant problems.

I would have thought that was reasonably clear, but I apologise if it wasn't.

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa
Zhukov's ill-advised use of anti-air searchlights to blind German defenders in his Oder bridgehead breakout? Pretty late-war and ultimately relied on brute force and overwhelming numbers to finally force his way to Seelow.

Indeed, and German plans didn't always work perfectly. And were occasionaly, with the benefit of 20:20 hindsight, harebrained too.

Which doesn't change the fact that not every historian agrees with the one you cited as if it was the definitive truth, which was (and remains) my point.

I hope that that clarifies things?

Phil

[wulfgar]

Well here's a book.

Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East, 1942-1943, by Joel S. A. Hayward

Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998. Pp. xxiii, 323. Illus., maps, notes, biblio., index. $39.95. ISBN:0-7006-0876-1.

Stopped at Stalingrad is really a campaign history of Luftflotte 4 and its part in the 1942 German summer campaign in Russia, which culminated so disastrously at Stalingrad. The major personality of the book is General (later Field Marshal) Wolfram von Richthofen, who started 1942 as the commander of Flieger Korps VIII, and from July 1942 on was the commander of Luftflotte 4; a man whose arrogance was matched only by his ability as the Luftwaffe's best field commander.

Hayward's book has two very interesting arguments. First, Hayward revives an old argument concerning the question of where the turning point of the war was. Since the late 1970's the now accepted conventional wisdom is that the German defeat at Moscow in December 1941 was really the turning point of the war. Hayward seems to challenge this, although he does it more by implication than by open argument. The second argument Hayward advances is that the Luftwaffe could have crippled Soviet oil production by launching large-scale bomber raids against Baku in the summer of 1942, when the German advance brought the major Soviet oil producing areas within bomber range. Here I think Hayward is on firmer ground. Richthofen did launch two large-scale raids on the oil refining facilities at Grozny with impressive results.

http://strategypage.com/bookreviews/94.asp

I'm left wondering what the speculation on the worth of bombing Baku would be for the Luftwaffe if the Soviets themselves had already destroyed 90% Baku's oil production?

1940

For the first time in the history of the oil industry, electrical drilling of wells were introduced (Kala oilfield). The first directional turbine drilling was used in Bail (2,000 meters depth). 1941 Drilling of the deepest oil well (3,200-3,400 meters) in USSR began in ITousani region. Azerbaijan achieved its highest level of oil extraction in its history-23.3 million tons. Azerbaijani high production accounted for 71.4 percent of the entire oil extraction in the Soviet Union that year, much of which was used in the war effort. 1941-1945 Azerbaijani production falls to 11.1 million tons or 63.2 percent of all oil produced in the USSR, Drilling was interrupted because of the war as manpower was concentrated on producing arms and weapons.

http://www.members.tripod.com/azmsa/oil.html

Here's another one that failed to notice that 90% of Baku's output was destroyed by the Soviets. He attributes the decline in production to the loss of manpower, nothing to do with sabotage.
Soviet planning would strip vital industries of vital manpower, give them a days rations, 5 rifle rounds and then Zhukov would slap them out in the snow around Rzhev.

[aspqrz02]

ORIGINAL: wulfgar

Well here's a book.

Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler's Defeat in the East, 1942-1943, by Joel S. A. Hayward

Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998. Pp. xxiii, 323. Illus., maps, notes, biblio., index. $39.95. ISBN:0-7006-0876-1.

Stopped at Stalingrad is really a campaign history of Luftflotte 4 and its part in the 1942 German summer campaign in Russia, which culminated so disastrously at Stalingrad. The major personality of the book is General (later Field Marshal) Wolfram von Richthofen, who started 1942 as the commander of Flieger Korps VIII, and from July 1942 on was the commander of Luftflotte 4; a man whose arrogance was matched only by his ability as the Luftwaffe's best field commander.

Hayward's book has two very interesting arguments. First, Hayward revives an old argument concerning the question of where the turning point of the war was. Since the late 1970's the now accepted conventional wisdom is that the German defeat at Moscow in December 1941 was really the turning point of the war. Hayward seems to challenge this, although he does it more by implication than by open argument. The second argument Hayward advances is that the Luftwaffe could have crippled Soviet oil production by launching large-scale bomber raids against Baku in the summer of 1942, when the German advance brought the major Soviet oil producing areas within bomber range. Here I think Hayward is on firmer ground. Richthofen did launch two large-scale raids on the oil refining facilities at Grozny with impressive results.

http://strategypage.com/bookreviews/94.asp

I'm left wondering what the speculation on the worth of bombing Baku would be for the Luftwaffe if the Soviets themselves had already destroyed 90% Baku's oil production?

I'm left wondering why you don't understand that the Germans didn't have 100% perfect intelligence of what was going on in Baku ... [8|]

Can you really be that ... clewless? [X(]

The obvious answer?

Yes, you can.

Phil

[PMCN]

ORIGINAL: johnnyvagas

(sniped for space saving)

The long and short being I agree with some of the earlier poster’s to this thread that have indicated that based upon their own game testing experiences that the WiTE oil and Fuel production is window dressing. Perhaps this is akin to the lack of importance of Soviet Heavy Industry in WITE which has also been suggested many times on this forum. While I have not play tested the effect the loss of Ploesti has upon the Axis, as I said above, the loss of Baku, Maikop and Grozny has no noticeable effects upon the Soviets.

One thing to consider is that at least in my game as the soviets under 1.05 I have more oil production then I can refine to fuel, plus I am not seeing my fuel use equal my fuel production. This means that I am accumulating fuel and oil in large quantities. If this is the case generally it is likely that the loss of the oil fields will take a fairly long amount of time to actually show up. I will have a look tonight at the relative values of each and my use of fuel. As the vile interlopers aren't really close to the fields it is not an issue for me.

[PMCN]

ORIGINAL: LiquidSky

Much like when Gudarian suggested just using the captured T-34s (and copying the design) this was turned down immediately. So far as I am aware they never used them for anything and they had captured a lot of them.

They used them for training. There is an interesting story on the bridge being captured at Kalach (Stalingrad pocket) because the Germans thought the Russian tank company that was crossing was part of their training detachment, and waved them through.

Interestingly enough the Japanese scored a major victory in the Malaysian Campaign because the British mistook the Japanese tanks for a returning carier patrol. The tanks in question then caught the replacement infantry marching up the road and then blitzed through the rear areas. I'm still a bit miffed with the game WitPAE over the ground combat...I can't fathom how an unsupported tank battalion (and calling the japanese tanks of the period tanks is all but absurd) blew out a dug in infrantry regiment which had the divisional anti-tank gun regiment present with no apparent japanese tank losses. Get real. Or they arrived in Singapore with a unit that was tanks and artillery and counter-attacked with nearly a division of troops including artillery and tanks and got slaughtered. Get even more real. Unsupported "tanks" and artillery against a combined arms offensive??? The british troops of the time were not that bad...and these ones had been resting and preparing for the defense of singapore for months. But I think this got toned down somewhat in one or another patch but it still irks me.

Or for that matter the infantry was sent retreating because they heard japanese troops on bikes driving down the road (apparently they sounded like tanks). Not that I blame them really. I was in the Arnhem airborne museum and they have a diorama in the basement and when I was walking through it suddenly plays the sound of a tank behind you and I just about leaped out of my skin at that point.

[wulfgar]

An interesting section in a wiki article about the requirements of Germany's flight schools. To train 20,000 pilots of various kinds (3/4 fighter pilots) annually, would require 648,000 tonns - 876,000 tons of aero-fuel. Something that would require double that in crude since only 50% gasoline can be obtained from crude.
The output of Romania at its height was 1.8 million tons p.a.

So they only required all the gasoline output of Romania's crude for flight school!!! Of course they got nothing like that during the war. In 1944 they initially got 12,000 tonns per per month falling to half that later in the year. The total for 1944 being somewhere in the region of 120,000 tonns, or less than 20% of the minimum of what the schools required.
Here we can see the major reason for the defeat of the 3rd Reich, despite producing 40,000 aircraft of all types in 1944, they couldn't train the pilots to fly them. By mid 1944 new pilots were so poorly trained they were nothing but interesting practice targets for allied flyers. Germany simply could not defend its airspace.
So those who dismiss the need for oil best understand, that you don't get omelets without braking eggs.

German fighter pilot schools relied on fuel. They required 60,000–80,000 short tons (54,000–73,000 t) per month. With this achieved, they claimed to be able to train 1,200 fighter, 250 ground-attack, 40 bomber, 75 jet-bomber, 64 recce and 40 night fighter pilots a month.[152] The schools demands were never met. Just 13,500 short tons (12,200 t) were delivered in July 1944, 13,400 short tons (12,200 t) in August and 6,300 short tons (5,700 t) in September.[153] There were plenty of cadets joining, but the primary schools had to be shut down in favour of running the advanced flight schools.[153] The influx of bomber pilots helped keep output high but it was not to last. By the autumn, the Luftwaffe was seeking anyone who already had basic experience in flying, so they could bypass the primary stages of flight school.[153]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence_of_the_Reich

[barbarrossa]

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa

ORIGINAL: aspqrz



A number of writers on the topic wouldn't agree with you, or not completely, including Glantz, amongst others.

The later war Soviet attacks could be pretty sophisticated in their own way.

Whom?

Glantz for one.

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa

A number of writers would, most works reside in my library. Let's examine one, shall we!

Page one[X(] (Soviet Blitzkrieg - The Battle for White Russia 1944, Walter S. Dunn Jr, 2000):

...When the heavy artillery and rockets finally quieted, the relentless air attacks intensified....Finally the rumbling of engines and the clatter of steel tracks signaled the approach of dreaded Soviet tanks...

A torrent of tanks and riflemen from four divisions of General N.I. Krylov's 5th Army stormed the German trenches along the 18 kilometer sector, about 36,000 men, or 3 men for every meter. With the shouting Red Army riflemen came two tank brigades and five assault gun regiments with over 120 tanks and 100 assault guns, double the strength of a panzer division.

Sounds kind of like what I described.

Sounds like a combined arms assault, actually, which is what Blitzkrieg morphed into during the war.

Of course, I presume your source has left out all of the preliminaries ...

"By 1944 the typical Soviet offensive was preceded by careful planning and deception measures, designed to concentrate forces at the designated bnreakthrough point. The attack began with a wave of reconaissance batallions that inflitrated the German defenses and seized key positions, thereby rendering the rest of the German positions untenable. This infiltration was accompanied or followed by massive, carefully orchestrated air and artillery offensives. When the whirlwinds of artillery fire shifted from the front lines to the German rear areas, infantry, heavy armour and engineers conducted the conventional assault to eliminate the centres of German resistance. As quickly as possible, senior Soviet commanders committed their mobile forces through the resulting gaps ..."

- "When Titans Clashed" David M Glantz and Johnathon House, UKansas Press, 1995, page #289

Combined Arms assault (modified Blitzkrieg) followed by motorised (armour and mechanised infantry, and some cavalry) forces. Like I said.

Glantz/House continue ... "Although the tank armies and separate mobile corps were large formations commanded by experienced general officers, much of their tactical success depended on the work of the young captains and majors who commanded the leading forward detachments. These highly mobile, combined arms groups of 800-2000 soldiers avoided pitched battles wherever possible, bypassing German defenders in order to establish large encirclements and seize bridgeheads for the next offensive. Follow on Rifle forces, supported by the increasingly powerful Red Air Force, then reduced the German encirclements, while the mobile forces continued their exploitation. Throughout their offensives, the Rear Services performed prodigious feats of improvisation to keep the spearheads supplied even 400 kilometers behind enemy lines. Just as in the German offensives of 1941-42, the later Soviet attacks were often halted by logistical overextension rather than by enemy action."

- same page

So, Glantz/House seem to be one of the sources that I suggested didn't agree with your statement.

Note: I didn't say every source did, merely that to make the statement that you did as if it was the only point of view held by eminent historians of the period and, therefore, the pure unvarnished undisputed truth (by implication), was not correct as, indeed as I have shown, and as I stated, not all historians would agree.

I think most people here understand that Glantz has a fairly good reputation as a Historian of the period and place.

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa
Sophisticated? In their own way? What does that even mean?

Well, as G/H notes elsewhere in WTC, they didn't copy the German model, they had their own ideas ... what they ultimately did was to use an amalgam of the Blitzkrieg and their own pre-war Deep Battle theories, and it worked well most of the time.

Most of the time.

Just like the German operations quite often, but not always, worked well.

Yes, they were prone to using brute force, to a significant degree, but not "brute force and ignorance", as the saying here in Oz goes.

And, of course, Stalin (like Hitler) could put his oar in and cause significant problems.

I would have thought that was reasonably clear, but I apologise if it wasn't.

ORIGINAL: barbarrossa
Zhukov's ill-advised use of anti-air searchlights to blind German defenders in his Oder bridgehead breakout? Pretty late-war and ultimately relied on brute force and overwhelming numbers to finally force his way to Seelow.

Indeed, and German plans didn't always work perfectly. And were occasionaly, with the benefit of 20:20 hindsight, harebrained too.

Which doesn't change the fact that not every historian agrees with the one you cited as if it was the definitive truth, which was (and remains) my point.

I hope that that clarifies things?

Phil

Not really. Because it's pretty much the same thing. Did they learn? Yes. Did they have to fall back on sheer numbers attacks/defense most of the time? Yes.

So recon and signals deception is now considered some kind of high-speed (U.S. Army term) sophistication? C'mon. Shifting artillery from the front line of trenches sequentially to the rear? Concentrating forces at the point of attack? Point of attack at the junction point between different units?

That's not sophistication. That's basics. One need only look at the casualties and destroyed equipment the Soviets suffered while making these attacks, from the steppe grappling with Manstein to the fall of Berlin.

To say the Soviets were tactical masters and not mostly a steam roller is the outlier statement. Although, I would submit that their small unit tactics in the rubble-strewn streets of Stalingrad were superior to German street-fighting tactics.

But if you want to go battle to battle. Source for source, I'm pretty sure I can come up with many, many, many more instances of victories due to Soviet steamroller that out number victories due to Soviet tactical genius --- by a magnitude.

I got a bookshelf full.

But see, that's not even what got this going:

You:In Blitzkrieg tactics, the German Infantry divisions punched a hole in the front and the Panzer divisions then exploited ... the Russian refinement of mobile war operated pretty much the same.

I said: Actually, the Soviets used mass attack with pretty much everything at the same time after hellish artillery prep. They overwhelmed with numbers, not pretty or tactically sophisticated. But the brute force usually got the job done. Ask Army Group Center circa 22 June '44. No standstill there.

Now you're saying: Combined Arms assault (modified Blitzkrieg) followed by motorised (armour and mechanised infantry, and some cavalry) forces. Like I said.

Which is it?[:)]

[darbycmcd]

Not to get in the middle of the terribly becoming pissing contest between barbarossa and aspqrz, but you guys realize that you are both right about what you are saying, right? the difference between you is in the characterization of of soviet deep battle operations, which is not an objective act. did it rely on mass more than German and more importantly for the debate NATO operations, yes. Does that make it brute force and simple, well if you think that is the definition of brute force than yes. Did those operations have complicated and well planned structure with phasing of objectives, synergistic force compositions, fire plans, etc. Yes. Does that make them sophisticated? yes, if that is your definition. So you might look at Bagration for instance, and one person could say it was brute force (true) and another could say there was a high degree of sophistication (also true). they are not mutually exclusive and depend entirely on subjective definition.

Really I think the underlying issue is in the historography of the study of Soviet operations. In the immediate post-war era until the end of the cold war, we relied overwelmingly on German sources for understanding the war. These sources of course have a certain perspective. This perspective shaped and then reinforced the predominate NATO attitude toward Soviet operational art, that they relied on brute force and lacked sophistication. Because that was seen as the major weakness of the Red Army, there was little incentive, institutionally, to challenge that view. And given that nearly all the books written in the cold war used the same, German, sources, it was taken as gospel.

But times have change, and authors such as Glantz and others are availing themselves more and more to Russian sources, and more Russian authors are available in the west. so now we are building a more complex understanding of the Soviet war experience from an operational perspective. A whole new vista is opening up in the historical understanding of the war. If you look at the bibliography in studies done before the late 90s, you will soon find that there is a very narrow selection of source materials. Up until about 15 years ago, we only got one side of the story, and that colored the way people learned to describe Soviet operations.

Otherwise, why are you guys so going at it in such a petty way, hahahha, you both have interesting things to say, but I promise promise you neither one will get voted 'the Winner'

[aspqrz02]

So, your personal opinion is that Glantz et al are wrong?

Fine.

Take it up in the academic press ... my point stands.

I stand by the statement I made, one which has been demonstrably proven, that not every historian agrees with your assessment.

Glantz et al certainly don't.

Phil

[aspqrz02]

Indeed, just as I was implying in my response to Barbarossa. He was describing combined arms operations, however conducted, and that is what the early war Blitz doctrine evolved into.

I could have gone into the historiography of it, as you have so ably, but I was merely making the point that not every historian would agree with Barbarossa's overly definitive statement ...

Which, of course, is what you have pointed out in more detail than I cared to.

As for being "winner" ... I cannot speak for Barbarossa, but all I was doing was pointing out that he was mistaken, or the work he cited was not representative of the "one true way" ... if he chooses to take issue with it, that's his issue, not mine. I really don't care one way or the other.

Phil

[barbarrossa]

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

Indeed, just as I was implying in my response to Barbarossa. He was describing combined arms operations, however conducted, and that is what the early war Blitz doctrine evolved into.

I could have gone into the historiography of it, as you have so ably, but I was merely making the point that not every historian would agree with Barbarossa's overly definitive statement ...

Which, of course, is what you have pointed out in more detail than I cared to.

As for being "winner" ... I cannot speak for Barbarossa, but all I was doing was pointing out that he was mistaken, or the work he cited was not representative of the "one true way" ... if he chooses to take issue with it, that's his issue, not mine. I really don't care one way or the other.

Phil

Where, anywhere have I said that I am the one true "knower of all" and that what I say is "definitive"?

All I asked was for your sources. You provided one, and I contend that the Soviet battlefield prep and breakthrough tactics are not anything special in your example. That's not mistaken.

All I know is what I've read in account and account and account, battle, after battle, after battle. Soviet commanders did not care about losses.

The Soviets even retained this doctrine of overwhelm with numbers in naval anti-ship missiles into the 1980's, I know this because it was my job as an Navy FC to shoot them down.

But I have a feeling we are not that far away from each other and that the nature of message boards can sometimes get a little contentious and we can agree to disagree. Cheers!

[aspqrz02]

Then we seem to be talking at cross purposes.

You made a statement, implying that it was definitive and inarguably correct.

Actually, the Soviets used mass attack with pretty much everything at the same time after hellish artillery prep. They overwhelmed with numbers, not pretty or tactically sophisticated. But the brute force usually got the job done. Ask Army Group Center circa 22 June '44. No standstill there.

My response was, well, no, there are historians that don't agree with your statement.

A number of writers on the topic wouldn't agree with you, or not completely, including Glantz, amongst others.

The later war Soviet attacks could be pretty sophisticated in their own way.

You responded by citing one historian who, indeed, could be seen to support your statement if one looked at it the right way

I responded by citing two historians who did not support your statement.

"Although the tank armies and separate mobile corps were large formations commanded by experienced general officers, much of their tactical success depended on the work of the young captains and majors who commanded the leading forward detachments. These highly mobile, combined arms groups of 800-2000 soldiers avoided pitched battles wherever possible, bypassing German defenders in order to establish large encirclements and seize bridgeheads for the next offensive. Follow on Rifle forces, supported by the increasingly powerful Red Air Force, then reduced the German encirclements, while the mobile forces continued their exploitation. Throughout their offensives, the Rear Services performed prodigious feats of improvisation to keep the spearheads supplied even 400 kilometers behind enemy lines. Just as in the German offensives of 1941-42, the later Soviet attacks were often halted by logistical overextension rather than by enemy action."

Now, we can quibble all you want about whether "avoiding pitched battles wherever possible, bypassing German defenders in order to establish large encirclements and seize bridgeheads for the next offensive" constitutes were tactically sophisticated or not, but Glantz/House seem pretty definite to me that they think it is ... YMMV. [:D]

If you have a cite from G/H that shows that they definitively agree that the Soviets were never, ever, tactically or operationally "sophisticated" (or equivalent) then, fine, I will accept that G/H agree with your conclusions.

But, as it stands, G/H do not agree with them.

You need to prove every single historian agrees with your interpretation.I just need one who doesn't ... Glantz/House. [8D]

(As a practising Historian I know enough to avoid making definitive statements such as yours ... generally speaking there is always a "revisionst" or dissenting opinion. Always. [;)] So I generally try and be quite careful of my wording when making such arguments ... and, as you note, apart from that we seem pretty damn close.

I would, personally, have gone with something like "The Soviets often used unsophisticated tactics, relying more on sheer numbers than finesse, but improved dramatically as the war went on.")

Phil

[barbarrossa]

ORIGINAL: aspqrz

Then we seem to be talking at cross purposes.

You made a statement, implying that it was definitive and inarguably correct.

Actually, the Soviets used mass attack with pretty much everything at the same time after hellish artillery prep. They overwhelmed with numbers, not pretty or tactically sophisticated. But the brute force usually got the job done. Ask Army Group Center circa 22 June '44. No standstill there.

My response was, well, no, there are historians that don't agree with your statement.

A number of writers on the topic wouldn't agree with you, or not completely, including Glantz, amongst others.

The later war Soviet attacks could be pretty sophisticated in their own way.

You responded by citing one historian who, indeed, could be seen to support your statement if one looked at it the right way

I responded by citing two historians who did not support your statement.

"Although the tank armies and separate mobile corps were large formations commanded by experienced general officers, much of their tactical success depended on the work of the young captains and majors who commanded the leading forward detachments. These highly mobile, combined arms groups of 800-2000 soldiers avoided pitched battles wherever possible, bypassing German defenders in order to establish large encirclements and seize bridgeheads for the next offensive. Follow on Rifle forces, supported by the increasingly powerful Red Air Force, then reduced the German encirclements, while the mobile forces continued their exploitation. Throughout their offensives, the Rear Services performed prodigious feats of improvisation to keep the spearheads supplied even 400 kilometers behind enemy lines. Just as in the German offensives of 1941-42, the later Soviet attacks were often halted by logistical overextension rather than by enemy action."

Now, we can quibble all you want about whether "avoiding pitched battles wherever possible, bypassing German defenders in order to establish large encirclements and seize bridgeheads for the next offensive" constitutes were tactically sophisticated or not, but Glantz/House seem pretty definite to me that they think it is ... YMMV. [:D]

If you have a cite from G/H that shows that they definitively agree that the Soviets were never, ever, tactically or operationally "sophisticated" (or equivalent) then, fine, I will accept that G/H agree with your conclusions.

But, as it stands, G/H do not agree with them.

You need to prove every single historian agrees with your interpretation.I just need one who doesn't ... Glantz/House. [8D]

(As a practising Historian I know enough to avoid making definitive statements such as yours ... generally speaking there is always a "revisionst" or dissenting opinion. Always. [;)] So I generally try and be quite careful of my wording when making such arguments ... and, as you note, apart from that we seem pretty damn close.

I would, personally, have gone with something like "The Soviets often used unsophisticated tactics, relying more on sheer numbers than finesse, but improved dramatically as the war went on.")

Phil

Yadda yadda...Never intended the statement to be definitive. And you've know this all along.

You're erecting straw men.

You claimed:In Blitzkrieg tactics, the German Infantry divisions punched a hole in the front and the Panzer divisions then exploited ... the Russian refinement of mobile war operated pretty much the same. Italics are mine.

I said in response: Actually, the Soviets used mass attack with pretty much everything at the same time after hellish artillery prep.

You again: Combined Arms assault (modified Blitzkrieg) followed by motorised (armour and mechanised infantry, and some cavalry) forces. Like I said.

Which is it? Infantry or combined arms (ie. everything)

This is the original contention and you can't have it both ways no matter how many straw men you erect. You basically said here that Soviets used the same infantry breakthrough tactics as the Germans ---with Russian refinement?

Do you, by refinement, mean that the Soviets didn't use penal units to draw fire from concealed German positions to pinpoint their locations. I guess there's a certain sophistication there. That's thinking outside the box.

[wulfgar]

Maybe this off topic argument about battle tactics can be re-erected in its own thread. Because although interesting, it so far has nothing to do with strategic oil.

[aspqrz02]

Blitzkrieg was not Combined Arms, as you probably know.

Combined Arms was a refinement of Blitzkrieg.

Germany developed a version of Combined Arms by refining Blitzkrieg tactics.

Russia developed their version of Combined Arms by copying elements of German blitzkrieg and combined arms and combined it with their own theories and doctrines on deep battle.

Combined Arms is a development, a "refinement" (The improvement or clarification of something by the making of small changes) if you will, of Blitzkrieg, and, since Blitzkrieg and Combined Arms in context are referring to mobile war, well, Combined Arms is a Russian refinement of mobile war which operated pretty much the same as, indeed, the cited passage(s) from WTC indicate Glantz et al believe.

How they applied it, whether they used Penal units as part of it or not, or used strawman units or not, makes no different, it was, as G/H indicate in WTC a "refinement" by an accepted dictionary definition of the term/concept.

As I said, the problem with your statement was, is, and remains, that it implies that the only accepted understanding of Russian mobile operations in WW2, for the whole of the war, is basically, to paraphrase, brute force and ignorance ... whereas it is clear that, as I said, not all historians agree with such a position.

Which means, as I said, all I have to do is present one historian who disagrees ... which Glantz and House certainly do, despite your unique spin on their statements.

By all means, since you have an extensive library of books on the topic, feel free to peruse all those you have by Glantz and/or House and find where they specifically contradict what I pointed out ... in a work dated later than WTC, of course ... and then we will both be happy.

Until then, as I said, it would have been better if you understood that it is rare, if not unheard of, in historiography to find any issue on which there is no revisionist or dissenting point(s) of view ...

Your statement requires you prove every historian agrees with your claim, all I have to do ... and what I have done, despite your constant waffling on about supposed strawmen ... is to show that there is at least one historian who does not agree with your claim.

So far, G/H in WTC do not, which makes your claim invalid ... the rest is mere puffery ... [8|]

Phil

[aspqrz02]

oops ... copy ... deleted