OT: In the begining..

[turtlefang]

And, as I stated, that's my opinion also.

But the point is that two different views do exist, and very much existed within the Admiralty at the time. The British had a very bad experience in Gallipoli regarding capital ships and narrow waters - which the Germans were trying to repeat on by bringing in heavy guns on the coast. And, in theory, mining the ends of the Channel. A very long debate was going on regarding this issue so its not as clear cut as it appears.

And the orders to the Rodney were cut while the RAF remain south to contest the invasion. Would these orders have changed if the RAF had withdrawn? I don't know that we have a definitive answer. (For that matter, I'm not convinced the RAF would have stayed NORTH if an invasion threat actually materialized.)

In any case, that's the issue I was raising - two points of view exist. And, at the time, a very convoluted command structured existed within the Home Waters which was never rationalized until literally IKE took over (and all the command structures were re-visited - I'm not implying that IKE revised them - it just happened at the same time). So there was a lot of unknowns at the time.

[aspqrz02]

Technically speaking, the RN didn't have a bad experience at Gallipoli, they had a bad experience trying to force the Hellespont on the other side of the Gallipoli peninsula.

And the two situations are not even vaguely similar.

But, indeed, two POVs did exist, though I don't take the reluctant commitment one at all seriously. At worst, all that would do would be to delay commitment of heavy forces until the Germans were committed ... remembering that it will take them 24-36 hours to cross the Channel and, once landed, two-three weeks for the second wave to be sent!

However, again, I suspect we're simply arguing around the margins rather than on key issues.

YMMV of course! [;)]

Phil

[turtlefang]

The official British Naval deployments to counter Sea Lion (British Naval Planning Resources, WW2, 1952 Review):

At the beginning of September the Admiralty had disposed sixty-seven destroyers (plus six cruisers) for immediate response to an invasion alarm. The first warning of the invasion’s sailing would come, it was hoped, from RAF reconnaissance over the assembly ports. But in case – as was likely – the Germans waited until after dark before commencing their 12-hour toil across to England, the Royal Navy had a pool of 700 armed patrol craft (requisitioned motor yachts and trawlers) of whom around 200 were on picket duty “off the north coast of France” every night. So, owing to either the air reconnaissance or the trip-wire patrols, there was a high likelihood that the German invasion armadas would have found British destroyers between them and their intended landing-beaches when they approached on the morning of D-Day. As well as torpedoes and guns, each destroyer carried 40 depth-charges filled with 600-800lbs of Amatol (depending on Mk) which could have demolished the tows of wallowing barges packed with soldiers and horses.

The second tranche of RN interventions would have been the thirty-four corvettes and sloops, and the MTBs, employed on East Coast and Channel convoy routes. Finally, up to thirty-five submarines based in home waters would have headed for the Channel to disrupt the shuttling back and forth of barges required by the German build-up for the next ten days.

On top of that standard force, the British established a “quick reaction” force at Rosyth for possible commitment. On Aug 11, the Battleship NELSON, battlecruiser HOOD, anti-aircraft cruisers NAIAD and BONAVENTURE, and destroyers KASHMIR, KIPLING, ZULU, SIKH, SOMALI , and ESKIMO Rosyth for anti invasion duties. Later that day, the destroyers MATABELE, ASHANTI, TARTAR, and PUNJAB arrived. These were joined a week later by the destroyers JACKAL and ELECTRA. On Aug 25, the battleship RODNEY, DD COSSACK and MAORI arrived. On the 15th, the DD DEDOUIN arrived as part of the defensive force.

The total Rosyth “invasion reaction force” consisted of 2 BB, 1 BC, 2 AA cruisers, and 15 fleet DDs.

This is just to close out the discussion with an British official forces in the area for the invasion.

The six cruisers, based on what I can tell, appear to the light cruisers not heavy, armed with six inch guns. I doubt the barges would actually care. The dept charges I wouldn't have considered an anti-shipping weapon, but if the freeboard on the barges is as low as you reported, setting those off near a barge could well swamp it.

[aspqrz02]

The wash from a Corvette sized or larger vessel doing a high speed run past at 30+ kts would swamp them.

Another thing the Kriegsmarine realised was that they simply didn't have enough trained seamen to put on the Barges to minimize the potential problems from the low freeboard ... they were, IIRC, thousands short from even having enough for 2-3 on most of the towed barges. This was a real worry.

As for the 12 hour crossing, yes, from the nearest ports, once fully formed up ... but the Germans didn't have enough coasters and powered vessels to form up in less than 12 hours, it was estimated (again, by the KM planners ... and the one real trial they had to see whether this could work, even on a small scale, was a disastrous failure) ... so the RN would have at least 24 hours warning, probably a lot more ... and that's for the nearest ports, in and around Brittany and Normandy which, IIRC, were the source of around 1/3 of the force.

The bulk were to come from Belgian and Dutch ports where the estimated form up + travel time, according to the Germans, was 36 hours (and, as noted, the German trial showed that the estimates were wildly optimistic!).

So, high speed passes. Depth Charges, and even moderately near misses, ditto with aerial bombs. The wake from high speed vessels passing. Cutting of tow ropes and inevitable collisions. Ramming. Most of which could have been done at night, which would mean the Luftwaffe couldn't even support the barge forces [X(]

Still, as we both seem to agree, not a good potential outcome for the Germans, regardless of how many/what type of RN forces are committed.

Phil

[kg_1007]

ORIGINAL: turtlefang

....

No one in the German High Command actually thought this would work.

IMO, Best case - and I mean best case - the British let the first wave land and then seal off the landing. Worst case, you could see the majority or all sunk at sea.

I just have a hard time seeing this operation as realistic even in the best of circumstances. And the Germans never achieved the best.

Actually v. Manstein, certainly must be regarded as one of the finest tactical minds of the war, and he devoted an entire chapter (ch 7) of his book to this topic, and implies that it was doable, while also fully explaining the risks. He ends by implying, though not outright stating, that he considered it a mistake not to attempt it.

[vinnie71]

Well one could also say this of many other operations that were planned but not executed by the Germans during the war. Suffice it to say that at least 3 come to mind - the invasion of Spain, and the planned assaults on Gibraltar and Malta. The first was 'doable' on paper, while the others were also relatively possible. But they were not done due to local circumstances or even because of changes in 'the big picture' so to say. The OKH and later OKW had pretty realistic appreciation of the strength of its armed forces and certainly planned accordingly at least in the first part of the war. They were more than willing to take risks, but that was part and parcel of the whole concept of blitzkrieg.

It should also be noted that concurrent with the planning of Sealion, plans were already being hatched in a completely different direction - ie the East. One issue that eludes the modern historian is the way Hitler was thinking at different stages. Although we know approximately when various plans were concocted of submitted to him, we don't know how he reacted to them in different stages. We do have the impression that his heart was not in Sealion (for many real or imagined reasons) but we do not know exactly when his eyes turned east. Given that various writers give various reasons for him turning east and abandoning Sealion its very difficult to really pin point when he did so.

Personnaly I ascribe to the school that his ultimate aim was to move east at the earliest possibility and that he saw no long term gain in subjugating the UK. Also at that point in time (1941), Britain was not that much of a problem for the Germans and so it was the right time to strike East to what was, in Hitler's mind, the real final goal of the whole war.