Game is not broken, History is!

[baghdadbob]

The strangest of all was when the USS Nimitz appeared out of nowhere near Hawaii just before the IJN attack on Pearl Harbor...[:D]

[rockmedic109]

ORIGINAL: baghdadbob

The strangest of all was when the USS Nimitz appeared out of nowhere near Hawaii just before the IJN attack on Pearl Harbor...[:D]

Makes me wonder if "Final Countdown" has been on the History Channel.....

[gladiatt]

ORIGINAL: Knavey

ORIGINAL: gladiatt

Unexpected results of battle in History ?
Well...

Alesia ?
Catalaunique fields?
Hattin ?
Teutoburg?
Crecy?
Malplaquet ?

Of course they were unexpected for the people of these time. Historians and Military analyst would analyses these and explain they could be "expected" but at the time they were fought, these was "unexpected" results [;)]

Alesia

Crap...thats a lot of looking stuff up for me! Never heard of ANY of these.

Ho sorry Knavey, i am a bit of history buff (did made a Master in History...). [:D]
Maybe you could give a look on the net ? [;)]

[Knavey]

I did look at every one of them. In wiki, but still got a good idea of the battles. Fascinating set of battles you have listed there. Its no wonder I haven't heard of any of them. A couple I recognize the results (probably from reading about that particular battle somewhere) but I could not associate the name with the results nor even the opponents.

The really sad part was that I translated Ceasars "Commentaries on the Gallic Wars" in Latin class and did not remember the Battle of Alesia...of course, that was 25 years ago and many turns of WitP/AE so please forgive me on that one.

Thanks for the history lesson though!

[Captain]

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace

ORIGINAL: Captain


forget about "the" search plane, the U.S. dive-bombers just have to get to their targets 5 minutes earlier or later than they did and the results are totally different.

Sorry, but I think this is a myth. The CAP was out of position, but the KB had been under near constant attack for an hour or more by then, and without a sophisticated and experienced central CAP control, radar, and reliable radios, five minutes was not going to change that situation. There was no strike spotted or even beginning to spot when the dive bombers hit (look at the gun camera photos of the IJN CVs). Even if the strike aircraft had completed rearming below decks, spotting a balanced strike (IJN doctrine) was more like 30-45 minutes away, not 5.

I was talking about the attack itself, the dive bombers just happen to arrive at the optimum attack spot just as the Torpedo bombers have finished their attack and the CAP is all at sea level. If they arrive 5 mins earlier or later, they would have to deal with part of the CAP which has gone back up and the ships are in a different position.

Of course, the japanese CVs air defenses left a lot to be desired, poor anti air formation, poor anti aircraft armament, lack of fighter control, poor CAP discipline, etc, but the US CVs suffered from the same problems in 42. There were 4 major CV v CV battle in 42: Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, Santa cruz. In all 4, the attacking ACs which found the opposing TF were able to penetrate the CAP screen and land hits on the opposing CVs. However in none of those battles, other than Midway, were all of the opposing CVs sunk. That is why I see Midway as a fluke event, much like the sinking of the Hood. Based on the other Pacific carrier battles, the results should have been more say, 1-2 IJN CVs sunk, 2-3 damaged.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Captain

I was talking about the attack itself, the dive bombers just happen to arrive at the optimum attack spot just as the Torpedo bombers have finished their attack and the CAP is all at sea level ...

Not too sure abt that either.

The intent was a co-ordinated attack w/SBDs and TBs, but that's easier planned than done.

Further, the Zero CAP was so successful that it was rapidly expending its heavy caliber ammo: Zero pilots soon discovered how difficult is was to take down the heavily-armored US AC w/only smaller cal. ammo.

Also, the Thatch weave innovation proved a distraction for many Zero pilots who became overly involved w/"Thatch's flying circus" (Shattered Sword) at the expense of its CAP mission.

[Wirraway_Ace]

[

ORIGINAL: Captain


...There were 4 major CV v CV battle in 42: Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, Santa cruz. In all 4, the attacking ACs which found the opposing TF were able to penetrate the CAP screen and land hits on the opposing CVs. However in none of those battles, other than Midway, were all of the opposing CVs sunk. That is why I see Midway as a fluke event, much like the sinking of the Hood. Based on the other Pacific carrier battles, the results should have been more say, 1-2 IJN CVs sunk, 2-3 damaged.

Remember it was Shokaku and Zuikaku at Coral Sea, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz as far as IJN CVs (you could include Junyo at Santa Cruz). The big twins showed time and time again that they could take a beating. If they had been two of the three targets during the first Midway strikes, they would probably have been simply damaged. At Midway, the IJN deployed its elite aircrews on its most fragile decks--sledge hammers mounted on tinderboxes.

[mdiehl]

If the Zeroes had been in position to intercept some of the SBDs they'd likely have lost more Japanese pilots. The Zekes had a difficult time with SBDs. Anyone can play "what if" games with the timing at Midway. What if Nautilus had actually torpedoed on of the Japanese CVs? What if an entire deckload of American dive and torpedo bombers had not missed the fight entirely? What if the Japanese Tf had not made a course change that put them farther from escorting American F4Fs?

The point is that the Japanese plan was fragile. It required PERFECT execution of the plan and it required the absence of American naval opposition. The results were predictable and expectable, not only because of the fragility of the Japanese operational plan, but also because in 1942 it was well recognized that putting a small number of CVs in strike range of an enemy land airbase with the potential for enemy strike CVs in the area was an extremely risky thing to do. Not only were the results predictable and expectable, but indeed Nimitz and Halsey predicted that such a thing could be the result (which is why the USN was there in the first place) and the IJN staff ALSO predicted that such a thing could be the result (in war games prior to the fight, which war game results they simply ignored).

[Wirraway_Ace]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

.... Not only were the results predictable and expectable, but indeed Nimitz and Halsey predicted that such a thing could be the result (which is why the USN was there in the first place) and the IJN staff ALSO predicted that such a thing could be the result (in war games prior to the fight, which war game results they simply ignored).

hard to distill it down much better than that.

[fbs]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

the IJN staff ALSO predicted that such a thing could be the result (in war games prior to the fight, which war game results they simply ignored)

Yup, they didn't have developers to complain to [:D]

Too bad the IJN didn't have a forum to complain about their misfortunes and try to change the rules. I can imagine Nagumo grumbling to Yamamoto: "It is not fair! This war was created by an AFB"


Cheers
fbs

[Captain]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

If the Zeroes had been in position to intercept some of the SBDs they'd likely have lost more Japanese pilots. The Zekes had a difficult time with SBDs. Anyone can play "what if" games with the timing at Midway. What if Nautilus had actually torpedoed on of the Japanese CVs? What if an entire deckload of American dive and torpedo bombers had not missed the fight entirely? What if the Japanese Tf had not made a course change that put them farther from escorting American F4Fs?

The point is that the Japanese plan was fragile. It required PERFECT execution of the plan and it required the absence of American naval opposition. The results were predictable and expectable, not only because of the fragility of the Japanese operational plan, but also because in 1942 it was well recognized that putting a small number of CVs in strike range of an enemy land airbase with the potential for enemy strike CVs in the area was an extremely risky thing to do. Not only were the results predictable and expectable, but indeed Nimitz and Halsey predicted that such a thing could be the result (which is why the USN was there in the first place) and the IJN staff ALSO predicted that such a thing could be the result (in war games prior to the fight, which war game results they simply ignored).

I dont disagree that the operational plan was flawed. Midway happened, so it is hard to argue that it is not a realisitc event. The point is more the probability of that event occurring. I am arguing that there is maybe a 1 in 10 or 1 in 20 chance of that event, (i.e. all carriers being lost ) occurring since you need, again, a bunch of lucky breaks for the americans, namely CAP at sea level, flight decks covered with bomb/torpedo laden ACs, CVs out of position, US dive-bombers at just the right position/altitude, no cloud cover over the CVs, etc, etc.

You seem to be arguing (not to put words in your mouth [:)]), that this is a normal, predictable event, i.e. a 1 in 2 or 2 in 3 chance of occurring, which seems too high to me. Nimitz himself was far from confident that the US gamble could work.

[John Lansford]

The Midway IJN CV's didn't have "flight decks covered with loaded planes".  The strike planes were still in the hangars awaiting the returning CAP fighters, while new CAP fighters were prepped to launch.
 
Throw in the lack of CAP coordination, few radios in the Zeros, and the eagerness of the pilots to "get the Americans", and I don't see how the Midway carriers could have survived even if the SBD's had showed up 15 minutes later.  IJN CAP management was atrocious and just getting the fighter squadrons reassembled so they'd have a cohesive defense prepared would have taken way too long to accomplish.
 
OTOH, Akagi apparently was sunk by one bomb hitting in a critical location.  The near miss that damaged the propellor shafts (shades of Bismarck) was bad but would not have sunk the ship by itself.  The hangar hit, though, created a fire that couldn't be stopped, and also blocked repair efforts to the engine room location.

[Mike Scholl]

ORIGINAL: Captain

I dont disagree that the operational plan was flawed. Midway happened, so it is hard to argue that it is not a realisitc event. The point is more the probability of that event occurring. I am arguing that there is maybe a 1 in 10 or 1 in 20 chance of that event, (i.e. all carriers being lost ) occurring since you need, again, a bunch of lucky breaks for the americans, namely CAP at sea level, flight decks covered with bomb/torpedo laden ACs, CVs out of position, US dive-bombers at just the right position/altitude, no cloud cover over the CVs, etc, etc.

You seem to be arguing (not to put words in your mouth [:)]), that this is a normal, predictable event, i.e. a 1 in 2 or 2 in 3 chance of occurring, which seems too high to me. Nimitz himself was far from confident that the US gamble could work.

I think mdiehl's point is that given the inflexibility of Japanese planning and doctrine, and their skimpy search habits, a "Midway-like" disaster was almost inevitable. Too much depended on everything going just the way the Japanese planners forecast it.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

I think mdiehl's point is that given the inflexibility of Japanese planning and doctrine, and their skimpy search habits, a "Midway-like" disaster was almost inevitable ...

Cdr. C. Masatake said the defeat at Midway was practically planned for: if it had not happened at Midway, the IJN would eventually meet the same fate elsewhere in the Pacific ... it was "something preordained".

"Why? Because it was visited on the Japanese Navy to penalize its absurd self-conceit".

Re Brit FM Will Slim, IJ officers were afraid to recast their plans as they would have to admit error and lose face. Instead, they would pass the same orders down to their subordinates despite knowing that w/the available resources, the demands of these orders were impossible.

"... They scored highly by determination; they paid heavily for lack of flexibility".

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

... in 1942 it was well recognized that putting a small number of CVs in strike range of an enemy land airbase with the potential for enemy strike CVs in the area was an extremely risky thing to do. Not only were the results predictable and expectable, but indeed Nimitz and Halsey predicted that such a thing could be the result (which is why the USN was there in the first place) and the IJN staff ALSO predicted that such a thing could be the result (in war games prior to the fight, which war game results they simply ignored).

Wargaming of Op MI on the Yamato was umpired by Yamamoto's chief of staff who personally intervened and reversed the damage done to 3 IJN CVs when the OPFOR player's CVs showed-up sooner than expected.

[tblersch]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

If the Zeroes had been in position to intercept some of the SBDs they'd likely have lost more Japanese pilots. The Zekes had a difficult time with SBDs. Anyone can play "what if" games with the timing at Midway. What if Nautilus had actually torpedoed on of the Japanese CVs? What if an entire deckload of American dive and torpedo bombers had not missed the fight entirely? What if the Japanese Tf had not made a course change that put them farther from escorting American F4Fs?

The point is that the Japanese plan was fragile. It required PERFECT execution of the plan and it required the absence of American naval opposition. The results were predictable and expectable, not only because of the fragility of the Japanese operational plan, but also because in 1942 it was well recognized that putting a small number of CVs in strike range of an enemy land airbase with the potential for enemy strike CVs in the area was an extremely risky thing to do. Not only were the results predictable and expectable, but indeed Nimitz and Halsey predicted that such a thing could be the result (which is why the USN was there in the first place) and the IJN staff ALSO predicted that such a thing could be the result (in war games prior to the fight, which war game results they simply ignored).

Nonetheless, there's more to the Japanese loss than that. The Japanese had a flawed plan, and flawed damage control, but for the time some pretty solid operational and tactical doctrine, and experienced leadership. And chance plays a factor in any battle; no battle is preordained.

And while the ultimate reason for the Japanese loss was the incapability of command and control to react fast enough to events, and the gradual narrowing of their options as a result, some of the "chance" at Midway was quite eyebrow-raising. Never mind VT-8 drawing all the CAP onto a single threat axis, or the uncoordinated attacks keeping the Kido Butai from deck-spotting a strike...but Kaga draws two squadrons of SBDs, leaving a single three-plane vic to plant a single bomb hit on Akagi, wiping out the ships entire fire-fighting capacity in one blow? Three hits on Soryu spaced almost perfectly to turn both hangar decks into infernos inside of fifteen minutes?

"Stuff" happens in war. Most of that "stuff" is normal chance. Sometimes that "stuff" appears awfully coincidental and non-random. But very rarely is it so fortuitious and unlikely as disabling an aircraft carrier's damage control with a single bomb planted on the aft port corner of a midships elevator.

[decaro]

ORIGINAL: tblersch
... But very rarely is it so fortuitious and unlikely as disabling an aircraft carrier's damage control with a single bomb planted on the aft port corner of a midships elevator.

Rare only because by the time of the Battle of Midway, almost every USN seaman was trained in fire and damage control and USN CVs had redundant fire extinguishing appartti, but their IJN counterparts lacked this training and equipment; IJN damage control was relegated to a relatively small cadre, probably in keeping w/their philosophy that the only defense is a good offense.

To save metal, IJN CV furniture and other domestic items were made of wood, which helped turn them into floating tinder boxes when hit: that's what happened to the Akagi.

[Captain]

US damage control in 42 was better than in the IJN, but still in its infancy compared to 44-45. Lexington and Yorktown would probably not have been sunk if they had suffered the same damage in 44-45.

This thread actually made me dust off some of my old history books on Midway. Part of the reason why the attacks were so devastating was because the Kaga, Akagi and Soryu had planes on their decks and hangar being rearmed.

Soryu had its second strike on the flight deck armed and fueled and was turning into the wind to launch when it was jumped by US SBDs. Again, 5-10 minutes more and most of those planes are on their way to strike the US CVs.

rereading on the battle of Midway again shows me what a near run thing it was, it does not take much of a change in the variables to get a different result: Whatif the search report came in 15 mins earlier and Nagumo had launched the 93 planes he had armed and fueled on his flight decks? Whatif the BigEs SBDs which were lost had changed course 5 mins earlier and not spotted that IJN DD making a bee line back to the CVs?

[bradfordkay]

Captain, you need to read Shattered Sword. In that detailed study of the IJN at Midway the authors point out that the Japanese strike aircraft were not on the decks armed, fueled and ready to go. They were actually in the hangars rearming. It would have taken something to the tune of 45 minutes to spot and launch their attack. 

[mdiehl]

Mike Scholl got my point correct. A Midway like disaster was almost inevitable and also, in my view, in precisely the circumstances that were in effect at Midway.

And in a way you COULD say that the Japanese complained to the game design team in their pre-operational wargames. They lost three CVs to the unanticipated early arrival of two American CVs in their wargame. Then they complained to the umpire, who changed the results of their simulation.

If it weren't for bad luck at Midway, the USN would have had no luck at all. The sudden northward turn putting the Japanese CVs miles off their reported course. The errant diversion of one squadron each of TBFs, SBDs, and F4Fs that put them out of the fight entirely during the critical phase of the battle. The lucky break that the Japanese received in having Tone #4 plane delayed long enough for it to discover Yorktown, which it otherwise would not have done.

If the American plan had gone as WELL as circumstances might have permitted, the Japanese could have lost many more ships than 4 CVs and one CA at Midway, and the USN might have easily have walked away from it with no ship losses at all.

The point is more the probability of that event occurring. I am arguing that there is maybe a 1 in 10 or 1 in 20 chance of that event, (i.e. all carriers being lost ) occurring since you need, again, a bunch of lucky breaks for the americans, namely CAP at sea level, flight decks covered with bomb/torpedo laden ACs, CVs out of position, US dive-bombers at just the right position/altitude, no cloud cover over the CVs, etc, etc.

I disagree. I think that having poorly positioned CAP was likely for the IJN in any CV engagement, especially after fighting off waves of land based air from Midway. There was a reason why, in 1942, operational planners in both the IJN and USN tried to avoid going toe to toe with land bases when they lacked complete surprise. The Japanese simply did not bring enough carriers to the battle to handle both Midway Island and also any American CVs that might intervene.

You seem to be arguing (not to put words in your mouth ), that this is a normal, predictable event, i.e. a 1 in 2 or 2 in 3 chance of occurring, which seems too high to me. Nimitz himself was far from confident that the US gamble could work.

No problem. I think it was a normal, predictable event, with a 60% chance or better of coming out exactly how it did, and a 30% chance or better of coming out much worse for the Japanese than they did, and a slim chance of the Japanese doing a little better (say, losing only 2 or 3 CVs, sinking one American CV, and retiring from the engagement without taking Midway).