JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

[FatR]

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez
Given that the Philippines, Malaya and the southern SRA must be under Japanese player control before he can embark on any assault against Java or Sumatra,

Not really. Both Singapore and most of the Philippines can be easily bypassed and isolated. In my opinion, the key to Japanese success in the initial phase is speed and preventing the Allies from reinforcing or consolidating their defenses by securing key bases very early. You have only a few weeks of total Allied weakness in the air, so they need to be used to the fullest.

[USSAmerica]

ORIGINAL: FatR

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez
Given that the Philippines, Malaya and the southern SRA must be under Japanese player control before he can embark on any assault against Java or Sumatra,

Not really. Both Singapore and most of the Philippines can be easily bypassed and isolated. In my opinion, the key to Japanese success in the initial phase is speed and preventing the Allies from reinforcing or consolidating their defenses by securing key bases very early. You have only a few weeks of total Allied weakness in the air, so they need to be used to the fullest.

Do not forget the position that Chez is posting from. He is intentionally playing with a "Historical" flavor. In the game, Singers and the PI can easily be bypassed and cleaned up later, but historically this was impossible. Therefore, in Chez' game, it is impossible.

[vettim89]

ORIGINAL: USS America

ORIGINAL: FatR

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez
Given that the Philippines, Malaya and the southern SRA must be under Japanese player control before he can embark on any assault against Java or Sumatra,

Not really. Both Singapore and most of the Philippines can be easily bypassed and isolated. In my opinion, the key to Japanese success in the initial phase is speed and preventing the Allies from reinforcing or consolidating their defenses by securing key bases very early. You have only a few weeks of total Allied weakness in the air, so they need to be used to the fullest.

Do not forget the position that Chez is posting from. He is intentionally playing with a "Historical" flavor. In the game, Singers and the PI can easily be bypassed and cleaned up later, but historically this was impossible. Therefore, in Chez' game, it is impossible.

I have to call BS on this. Supposedly Chez is in this position because he plays a more historically based game style. Really? because historically the Japanese did ignore the western SRA while they set off to invade, oh say, Samoa. Chez hasn't played historically because if he had we wouldn't be having this conversation. He would have focused soley on the SRA until it was totally secured. In RL, the Japanese didn't consider expanding their perimeter before the beginning of May. Every action prior to that was soley focused on securing the SRA or Burma

[Bullwinkle58]

ORIGINAL: USS America
Do not forget the position that Chez is posting from. He is intentionally playing with a "Historical" flavor. In the game, Singers and the PI can easily be bypassed and cleaned up later, but historically this was impossible. Therefore, in Chez' game, it is impossible.

"You're at your 35-yard-line."

"Okay."

"My team will stand at our 35-yard-line wearing blindfolds."

"Okaaaaaay."

"You kick off to us, but stay at your 35 yard line."

"Huh?"

"Stay there until we find the ball by scrabbling around on all-fours."

"You must be joking . . ."

"Once we run across the 50-yard line we take off the blindfolds and speed up. You can move and try to tackle us, but you have to ride small ponies while doing so. The ponies, who respond only to French commands, can go where they please."

"#%&*!"

"Hey, it's a House Rule."

[JeffroK]

ORIGINAL: USS America

ORIGINAL: FatR

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez
Given that the Philippines, Malaya and the southern SRA must be under Japanese player control before he can embark on any assault against Java or Sumatra,

Not really. Both Singapore and most of the Philippines can be easily bypassed and isolated. In my opinion, the key to Japanese success in the initial phase is speed and preventing the Allies from reinforcing or consolidating their defenses by securing key bases very early. You have only a few weeks of total Allied weakness in the air, so they need to be used to the fullest.

Do not forget the position that Chez is posting from. He is intentionally playing with a "Historical" flavor. In the game, Singers and the PI can easily be bypassed and cleaned up later, but historically this was impossible. Therefore, in Chez' game, it is impossible.

No, In Chez's mind its impossible.

The only turn a game is historical is 7 Dec 1941, from there on you have to have plans, be flexible and try to beat your opponent. Not to play against some history book.

I'm noy meaning to be rude to Chez but the basis of this thread is ridiculous.

What if CR complained that invading Pago Pago was ahistorical, would never happen in real life and "there should be a HR"

[Sardaukar]

ORIGINAL: FatR

My opinion on the Palembang problem.

1)Palembang is an absolutely indispensable for the Japanese war effort. Failure to take it means complete defeat by about early 1943 (not only you lose Palembang's oil, Allies will be within one step from cutting off the shipping from the rest of DEI). Failure to take it with minimal damage is also very crippling and can leave the Japanese unable to sustain both the economy and IJN operations in late 1942.

2)It is practically impossible to completely stop a determined attempt to reinforce it. Maybe one can prevent Fortress Sumatra, but not getting enough troops to Palembang to ensure heavy damgage on capture within a few weeks.

3)Therefore it is vital to capture Palembang within 10 days to, at most, two weeks from the opening of hostilities. A greater delay is basically asking your opponent to have mercy on you. In addition, there is no reason not to. A determined Japanese player can easily ensure naval and air superiority as soon as heavy units from Home Islands reach the theatre, even if Force Z is not destroyed on the first turn. The plan is not without risk, but playing Japan requires taking risks, and in this case you mostly just need to prevent Allied surface units from mauling the invasion convoy.

I'd not go as far as "failure" in 10 days. Failure to do it before end of IJ Amphibious bonus ending (31 March 42) is dire, though.

[Canoerebel]

There is a wide chasm between the thought processes of the "simulator" and the "gamer."  I don't think it's possible for the one to fully understand the thinking of the other.  As a gamer, though, I do know that the viewpoint of the simulators are ingrained in their psyches, as my viewpoint is ingrained in mine.  Those views are honest and sincerely held.
 
I hope I am not going too far in suggesting that I think top-notch veteran players like Chez, BradfordKay, and Cuttlefish seem to be simulators.  They are students of World War II and love nothing more than a contest that seems to emulate the war.  
 
On the flip side, you have players like Nemo, Q-Ball, rader, and John III, who are clearly gamers.  They are students of World War II and love nothing more than to figure out bold and exciting ways to hunt the most intensely exciting game possible - humans.
 
And, of course, there are plenty of players somewhere in the middle.
 
Defining what was historically possible is challenging and perhaps impossible.  It's a vaguely defined notion that will vary between every simulator.  But there are also outer limit boundaries that each simulator would recognize.
 
I know that Chez is sincere in his approach to the game.  I am sure he feels the same way about my approach.  Neither of us faults the other that we have fundamentally different philosophies - we entered the match in good faith and only gradually realized that our philosophies are quite dissimilar.  But we're enjoying the match and there's no acrimony whatsoever.  We're both looking forward to more fighting to come.
 
In the meantime, I hope we can all avoid getting into a protracted "gamer vs. simulator" debate.  That would be about as satisfying and helpful as the "AI vs. PBEM" debate has been.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

My question is this: What impact on his economy and movement of units will he be subjected to given his failure to secure this vital piece of real estate?

I am in this situation in my game against Canoerebel. He still holds southern Sumatra including Palembang, Padang, Benkolen and Oosthaven. The denial of the oil will hurt but at the moment Tarakan and Balikpapn coupled with numerous smaller oilfileds are meeting my needs. The part I am worried about is the severe restriction these forces have placed on my movements. I am that I am unable to disband any major surface units for repair in any port within 4e range of Oosthaven. I am severely restricted in what units I can operate near Sumatra. Anything larger than a DD generates unwanted attention. Muchof the SRA is denied to the Japanese player becasue of this.

Unfortunately I will never be able to take it because I simply do not have the land forces to overcome the 40+ land units at Palembang and Oosthave without stripping China, the SRA and Burma to the bone. I estimate that I would need upwards of 6000 AV and probably much more than that to dent the defense. Add to that the 400+ allied fighters and 200+ allied bombers that months of recon indicate are parked at Oosthaven and you end up with a fortress Sumatra that could never have existed in real life.

I have never encountered this tactic before and my hat is off to Canoerebel. It was a totally unexpected move. But it is one that I will develop a house rule for in future games. The house rule may either prohibit its use or simply remove any impediment to the Japanese player blitzing Sumatra before the fall of Singapore. This is not a gamey tactic as I do not consider it an exploit of the game mechanics. I do believe that it is so far removed from any historical possibility as to make it's real life WWII use a fantasy.

Chez

Unfortunately a Player One who tries a conventional approach towards conquoring the SRA against a good Player 2 will run into this type of issue every time in AE. The only recourse is to "rush" it as you described.

[vettim89]

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

My question is this: What impact on his economy and movement of units will he be subjected to given his failure to secure this vital piece of real estate?

I am in this situation in my game against Canoerebel. He still holds southern Sumatra including Palembang, Padang, Benkolen and Oosthaven. The denial of the oil will hurt but at the moment Tarakan and Balikpapn coupled with numerous smaller oilfileds are meeting my needs. The part I am worried about is the severe restriction these forces have placed on my movements. I am that I am unable to disband any major surface units for repair in any port within 4e range of Oosthaven. I am severely restricted in what units I can operate near Sumatra. Anything larger than a DD generates unwanted attention. Muchof the SRA is denied to the Japanese player becasue of this.

Unfortunately I will never be able to take it because I simply do not have the land forces to overcome the 40+ land units at Palembang and Oosthave without stripping China, the SRA and Burma to the bone. I estimate that I would need upwards of 6000 AV and probably much more than that to dent the defense. Add to that the 400+ allied fighters and 200+ allied bombers that months of recon indicate are parked at Oosthaven and you end up with a fortress Sumatra that could never have existed in real life.

I have never encountered this tactic before and my hat is off to Canoerebel. It was a totally unexpected move. But it is one that I will develop a house rule for in future games. The house rule may either prohibit its use or simply remove any impediment to the Japanese player blitzing Sumatra before the fall of Singapore. This is not a gamey tactic as I do not consider it an exploit of the game mechanics. I do believe that it is so far removed from any historical possibility as to make it's real life WWII use a fantasy.

Chez

Unfortunately a Player One who tries a conventional approach towards conquoring the SRA against a good Player 2 will run into this type of issue every time in AE. The only recourse is to "rush" it as you described.

I disagree. I do not want to break OpSec but I don't think it would be doing so in saying that CR's position is not based soley upon forces already present in the SRA, but on his ability to move "ahistorical" units into Sumatra. Any player can open the game as the other side and see what the other side has available. A Japan player should know that there are reinforcements on ships at game's start like the 18th UK and over a divsion's worth of Indian Army units. I think a bigger issue is the aforementioned free supply from refineries. I only play DBB so this has been removed from my games which to me is more than enough to slow the build-up in the DEI. Players not playing an economic mod need to consider the effect of free supply. As I said before, if you count on Sir Robin and your opponent does not go that route, a Japan player better realize what is happening quickly or pay a price.

[Nikademus]

ORIGINAL: vettim89

I disagree. I do not want to break OpSec but I don't think it would be doing so in saying that CR's position is not based soley upon forces already present in the SRA, but on his ability to move "ahistorical" units into Sumatra.

That is part of the reason why Player one has to "rush". AE allows Player two much more extensive control over not only the units you mention (sans Permanent (R)estricted command assigned units), but also the immediate dec41 reinforcements. Not sure what your disagreeing with. When i said "conventional" approach I mean the basic tennants by which Japan advanced prior to Coral Sea/Midway. Advancing under established air cover with adquate sea assets also available. By the time this slow careful approach is crafted, player two in the game can create these little "Festungs" as referred to in this thread. In my last PBEM experience, it was'nt Sumatra....but rather Timor and Java. Few actual additional units were brought in. In our case it was total concentration and optimization of the LCU's in mountain terrain hexes designed to do only one thing. Buy time.

Hence....to counter these Festung movements you have to "rush" and nab pell mell. KB can only patrol on blockade duty so much and can't be everywhere. I actually did score a healthy bag of merchants (and even one carrier......though that was blind luck) but its like trying to hold grains of sands between your fingers. Had we "rushed" our opponents would never have had the opportunity to dig in so thoroughly. Have to admit too i get puzzled by comments such as "well arn't there other theaters?" Yes.....there are, but since everyone complains they want a "historical" game....naturally there's one theater that is vital to Player One.....as its supposed to be the entire reason why that side went to war in the first place!!! So yes....one has to get Palembang...one has to secure the other oil fields. Ignore it and go 'elsewhere' and you run out of steam....litterally.

Not rocket science. Its the result of ever greater detail control. Its no coincidence WitE is having the exact same issue.

[Mynok]

Indeed there are some surprising parallels in WitE developments. It's almost like the old UV days.

[USSAmerica]

What's the Cliff's Notes version of the parallel issue in WitE?

[ChezDaJez]

ORIGINAL: Canoerebel

After a sharp naval/air battle at Oosthaven following the 7/7/42 turn, Chez asked via email if I had all my carrier air on Sumatra.  Not wishing to provided classified info, I simply told him that I couldn't say specifically, but that I wouldn't have any problem doing so if I thought it was necessary.  See post # 1540 on page 52 of my AAR (written about two months ago both real time and game time for this discussion).

In actuality, the Allies had just transferred the aircraft from two carriers to Sumatra, because those two flattops were retiring to port to upgrade.

I wouldn't have any problem with employing all my carrier air from Sumatra, though.  The Allies took some really big chances in this game to heavily fortify a very forward base that was subject to isolation and destruction.  The Allies couldn't afford to lose a huge army, so they were naturally prepared to employ all available force to protect that position.  To my way of thinking, that is perfectly reasonable.  However, the Allies have never felt the need to employ that tactic.

And I don't have a problem with offloading carrier aircraft when that carrier is going to be out of action for a while either through damage or upgrade. I was satisifed with your answer. I would have a problem with it if it was being done to avoid risking allied carreirs in battle.

But as you indicated last night, we are two different type players who were both unprepared for the style of play the other uses. You put it quite succintly... I am a simulator and you are a gamer. Having said that I am having fun playing this game. Some turns are definitely more fun than others but it is still fun. It's quite out of the box for me.

Chez

[ChezDaJez]

I know that Chez is sincere in his approach to the game. I am sure he feels the same way about my approach. Neither of us faults the other that we have fundamentally different philosophies - we entered the match in good faith and only gradually realized that our philosophies are quite dissimilar. But we're enjoying the match and there's no acrimony whatsoever. We're both looking forward to more fighting to come.

Well said. Being either a gamer or being a simulator is neither good nor bad. There is room for both and I firmly believe one needs the other to ensure that the best wargames are produced. WitP is a classic example. It appeals to folks with all styles of play and more importantly accomodates them pretty well.

Chez

[oldman45]

After reading this thread, I am confused about where the mini KB was during the allied rush to fortify Sumatra? That and the land based air should have sunk a number of transports. Am I wrong about this?

[Lanconic]

I dont have any problem with Japan grabbing Palembang early. He isnt gonna be sending tankers down there any time soon.
What is the big deal?

[obvert]

The Japanese have almost an embarassing number of battle ready units prepped and in some cases loaded onto transports for assaults from day one. The Allied air forces in the DEI until at least Feb 42 are miserable. It is possible to go much faster in game than in the real war, but that is true for each player. The Allies can also move logistics and air support as well as land units into the DEI more quickly than they could have in the war. For one, when we start the game, we know the start date and the units involved on BOTH sides. We know what they can do. Neither side had even this luxury in December 41.

Palembang is a relatively small issue if the Japanese realize its importance. Who knows what the Japanese in the RW would have done if the Allies had begun to reinforce in this manner. They surely would have known it was happening and made some counter. You can't assume conditions to be in any way historical after Dec 7 because each side in reality would have reacted differently in other conditions. Most Allied players don't defend Rangoon or Port Moresby. Most Japanese players isolate areas and move fast in the DEI because they know they can.

If you want to play through the history you would have to have pages of HRs restricting moves until certain dates and certain political conditions and certain kinds of units in certain places. This is fine. But make it known. Work it out beforehand. It would be interesting to try and I'd love to read those AARs.

[Chickenboy]

ORIGINAL: obvert

The Japanese have almost an embarassing number of battle ready units prepped and in some cases loaded onto transports for assaults from day one. The Allied air forces in the DEI until at least Feb 42 are miserable. It is possible to go much faster in game than in the real war, but that is true for each player. The Allies can also move logistics and air support as well as land units into the DEI more quickly than they could have in the war. For one, when we start the game, we know the start date and the units involved on BOTH sides. We know what they can do. Neither side had even this luxury in December 41.

Palembang is a relatively small issue if the Japanese realize its importance. Who knows what the Japanese in the RW would have done if the Allies had begun to reinforce in this manner. They surely would have known it was happening and made some counter. You can't assume conditions to be in any way historical after Dec 7 because each side in reality would have reacted differently in other conditions. Most Allied players don't defend Rangoon or Port Moresby. Most Japanese players isolate areas and move fast in the DEI because they know they can.

If you want to play through the history you would have to have pages of HRs restricting moves until certain dates and certain political conditions and certain kinds of units in certain places. This is fine. But make it known. Work it out beforehand. It would be interesting to try and I'd love to read those AARs.

I agree.

The Allied Palembang aggressive defense is a gambit / gimmick in my mind. Doable? Yes. Advisable against an opponent that knows about these gambits? Harder question-it's certainly not without risk to the Allies. Allied troops can be cut off and liquidated in S. Sumatra as easily as they can anywhere else. Japanese players would be well advised to consider this and the opportunities for early war Allied destruction that this gambit-gone-wrong would entail.

[House Stark]

If the Japanese player chooses to let the Allies build up Palembang in order to cut it off later and destroy more troops, wouldn't that risk Palembang being heavily damaged?

[GreyJoy]

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

ORIGINAL: obvert

The Japanese have almost an embarassing number of battle ready units prepped and in some cases loaded onto transports for assaults from day one. The Allied air forces in the DEI until at least Feb 42 are miserable. It is possible to go much faster in game than in the real war, but that is true for each player. The Allies can also move logistics and air support as well as land units into the DEI more quickly than they could have in the war. For one, when we start the game, we know the start date and the units involved on BOTH sides. We know what they can do. Neither side had even this luxury in December 41.

Palembang is a relatively small issue if the Japanese realize its importance. Who knows what the Japanese in the RW would have done if the Allies had begun to reinforce in this manner. They surely would have known it was happening and made some counter. You can't assume conditions to be in any way historical after Dec 7 because each side in reality would have reacted differently in other conditions. Most Allied players don't defend Rangoon or Port Moresby. Most Japanese players isolate areas and move fast in the DEI because they know they can.

If you want to play through the history you would have to have pages of HRs restricting moves until certain dates and certain political conditions and certain kinds of units in certain places. This is fine. But make it known. Work it out beforehand. It would be interesting to try and I'd love to read those AARs.

I agree.

The Allied Palembang aggressive defense is a gambit / gimmick in my mind. Doable? Yes. Advisable against an opponent that knows about these gambits? Harder question-it's certainly not without risk to the Allies. Allied troops can be cut off and liquidated in S. Sumatra as easily as they can anywhere else. Japanese players would be well advised to consider this and the opportunities for early war Allied destruction that this gambit-gone-wrong would entail.

Keep in mind that i scenario 2 Japan can mass into a single spot a HUGE amount of troops.
in my game against rader he, in summer 1942, managed to invade India with nearly 14,000 AVs...