Rommel - A great general?

[coach3play4]

I'm playing the TOAW Africa senarios. One reason I like wargames is that you can learn things you didnt know about military history (thru the what if senarios etc). (Note: what I'm about to say i want to qualify - I feel that I'm reasonably well read on WWII - BUT I am by no means an expert - so dont jump on me here - I'm really asking for people that know more for their opinion!)

The question is - did Rommel rally do a great job in the Africa campaign - or is history simply biased because the big time British propaganda machine hype Rommel up (since they beat him) or did the German press hype him up - as a needed straight guy hero.

If you play out these excellent scenarios - You can see that Rommels two great drives took place against forces that had been really weakened by withdrawals to other fronts. Im a lousy wargamer - and even I can do what he did!
So the question is - do you put rommel up with the great generals of WWII? For example - if he was that great why didnt the Germans put him on the Russian front - instead of his assignment to Africa. Are we simply misled by old Brit propaganda here?

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: oleary111

The question is - did Rommel rally do a great job in the Africa campaign - or is history simply biased because the big time British propaganda machine hype Rommel up (since they beat him)

Rommel had a huge reputation amongst British soldiery going back well before Alamein. In fact this was something the Army was quite concerned about- that he was more respected than our own Generals. This was part of Montgomery's appeal- he was very charismatic and won the soldiers over.

Rommel was probably the best divisional commander of the war. However his passion for leading from the front caused problems which became progressively worse the larger his command. His subordinates would be frantically trying to get operational questions resolved while he was off leading some tank battalion at the front.

If you play out these excellent scenarios - You can see that Rommels two great drives took place against forces that had been really weakened by withdrawals to other fronts.

Yeah. You should take a look at his performance in command of a panzer division in 1940. That was him at his best.

Im a lousy wargamer - and even I can do what he did!

A lot of scenarios are designed to produce historical results rather than to replicate historical conditions. So this doesn't necessarily mean anything.

[Curtis Lemay]

With the exception of March and April of 1941, Rommel was under a material disadvantage of about 1.3:1 for most of his desert victories, based on some analyses I've seen. Only when the odds reached about 1.8:1 at El Alamein, where he was also at the end of a very long logistic tether, did the CW finally overcome him (toss in ULTRA, as well).

Achieving victory at any odds usually warrants garlands. When you consider the odds Rommel faced, he deserves to be as exhalted as he was.

I can only point out that I found it necessary to impose a net 8% shock advantage on the Axis vs. the CW/Allies in my scenarios, during Rommel's period, both in CFNA and in France 1944, as well. I can't name another WWII commander that requires the same. I have to go back to Lee, Jackson, or Napoleon to find any similar shock requirement.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

With the exception of March and April of 1941, Rommel was under a material disadvantage of about 1.3:1 for most of his desert victories, based on some analyses I've seen.

Throw in the rather dubious quality of many of the Italian units under his command and things become even more exciting.

I can only point out that I found it necessary to impose a net 8% shock advantage on the Axis vs. the CW/Allies in my scenarios, during Rommel's period, both in CFNA and in France 1944, as well.

For France 1944? I really don't think that's appropriate. I don't see Rommel's performance in that campaign as any more impressive than the norm for German commanders.

For CFNA, I know it's not really possible in TOAW without peculiar affects, but the ideal would be to allow the German player to give additional benefits to one stack or one small area each turn. This was what Rommel did.

Also, since the player is effectively replacing Rommel and his staff, it seems a bit weird to give the player an edge because he's supposed to be a better general than he is.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay
I can only point out that I found it necessary to impose a net 8% shock advantage on the Axis vs. the CW/Allies in my scenarios, during Rommel's period, both in CFNA and in France 1944, as well.

For France 1944? I really don't think that's appropriate. I don't see Rommel's performance in that campaign as any more impressive than the norm for German commanders.

Regardless, it was necessary - and it may not even be enough. Otherwise, the Allies break out far earlier than historically. Now, whether one can attribute it all (or even any of it) to Rommel is another issue, but he was in command while the Allies were stuck, and soon after he was wounded, they broke out. I suppose I could have attributed it to Montgomery instead. (The breakout occurred just after Bradley got out from under him.) But that would have bent some people's noses out of joint. Better to attribute it to Rommel.

For CFNA, I know it's not really possible in TOAW without peculiar affects, but the ideal would be to allow the German player to give additional benefits to one stack or one small area each turn. This was what Rommel did.

Perhaps. But then the effect would have to be larger. So, a big, but localized effect, or a small, but theater-wide effect? It may be six-of-one/half-a-dozen-of-the-other.

Also, since the player is effectively replacing Rommel and his staff, it seems a bit weird to give the player an edge because he's supposed to be a better general than he is.

Common for Desert War games - and it wouldn't really model the Desert War without modeling Rommel and the CW command problems. Remember, the campaign covers several different commanders for each side. The Axis mustn't perform as well under Graziani as under Rommel. Same for the CW under Cunningham vs. under Monty.

[golden delicious]

Going to apologise in advance for the number of individual points I make here. Wasn't my intention when I approached the post but there were a number of things I wanted to say.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Regardless, it was necessary

Is it not possible that some other factors could be fiddled with? There are a lot of factors.

Now, whether one can attribute it all (or even any of it) to Rommel is another issue, but he was in command while the Allies were stuck, and soon after he was wounded, they broke out.

I think this is coincidence. What exactly would have Rommel done to prevent the Cobra breakout had he been in command- that he couldn't have already been doing before he was wounded?

I suppose I could have attributed it to Montgomery instead. (The breakout occurred just after Bradley got out from under him.)

Montgomery was overall ground commander until well after the breakout.

Perhaps. But then the effect would have to be larger. So, a big, but localized effect, or a small, but theater-wide effect? It may be six-of-one/half-a-dozen-of-the-other.

The former would be the impact Rommel tended to have, and the effect on gameplay (particularly 'interesting decisions') would be different. Of course as I've noted this isn't easy to do in TOAW.

Common for Desert War games

Just because something is usually done doesn't mean that it's right. Of course if your intent here is to interest the players then I can see where you're coming from- also of course you are trying to replicate a particular board game, which I imagine had a similar rule. Sometimes I get tunnel vision about simulation above all else.

The Axis mustn't perform as well under Graziani as under Rommel.

Because that would be ahistorical. Heaven knows what would happen if the players were allowed to vary from the historical course.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious
Is it not possible that some other factors could be fiddled with? There are a lot of factors.

Now, whether one can attribute it all (or even any of it) to Rommel is another issue, but he was in command while the Allies were stuck, and soon after he was wounded, they broke out.

I think this is coincidence. What exactly would have Rommel done to prevent the Cobra breakout had he been in command- that he couldn't have already been doing before he was wounded?

I suppose I could have attributed it to Montgomery instead. (The breakout occurred just after Bradley got out from under him.)

Montgomery was overall ground commander until well after the breakout.

Of course it could be attributed to any number of things. One factor that TOAW tends to model poorly is the need to build up stockpiles prior to a major push, and this may account for the way the Allies did it. But it is simply a fact that I needed a shock effect for this period, and it reasonably corresponds to the period when both Rommel and Monty were in command. (12th Army Group formed on 8/1/44).

Common for Desert War games

Just because something is usually done doesn't mean that it's right. Of course if your intent here is to interest the players then I can see where you're coming from- also of course you are trying to replicate a particular board game, which I imagine had a similar rule. Sometimes I get tunnel vision about simulation above all else.

Actually, it didn't. I don't think it was actually meant to be played (or even capable of such), just admired. Not true for my scenario of it. Of course, it may have had some other factor that debilitated the Italians. I never actually played it.

The Axis mustn't perform as well under Graziani as under Rommel.

Because that would be ahistorical. Heaven knows what would happen if the players were allowed to vary from the historical course.

No, it would be absurd. The characteristics of the commanders (plus their staffs, plus their force command-and-control, etc.) are part of the conditions of the Desert War - as much as the sand. This in no way prevents players from varying from the historical course.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

Of course it could be attributed to any number of things. One factor that TOAW tends to model poorly is the need to build up stockpiles prior to a major push, and this may account for the way the Allies did it. But it is simply a fact that I needed a shock effect for this period, and it reasonably corresponds to the period when both Rommel and Monty were in command. (12th Army Group formed on 8/1/44).

I think attrition has more to do with it. In another discussion, it was mentioned that at the time of Cobra, Panzer Lehr had something like 3,000 effectives- and this must have been the norm for the units facing the American forces. The Germans were able to keep on matching the increases in Allied strength for six weeks, but when their ability to do that ended, it was only a matter of time before they broke out.

No, it would be absurd. The characteristics of the commanders (plus their staffs, plus their force command-and-control, etc.) are part of the conditions of the Desert War - as much as the sand.

I thought the purpose of wargaming was to imagine what would have happened if the Generals were different.

[KarlXII]

I mainly agree of what has already been said about Rommels performance. He deserves his reputation. He was a brilliant tactician and good at an operational level but what he was not as brilliant in understanding logistics and the importance of good supply routes. I wouldn´t say he did not understand it but he did not give it the major importance it deserved. After all, it was the lack of supplies and equipment which led to his defeat in North Africa. The war in North Africa was decided in the mediterranian. It was of extreme importance that - mainly - italian supply ships could get through Malta to deliver their supply in Benghazi and El Agheila. The Air war and the italian navies operations (and lack of fuel) was important to succeed. Albert Kesselring was the man that did his utmost in trying to solve these issues.

[TOCarroll]

Can't resist a Rommel post! [:D]
 
Truth is I pretty much agree with what was said. Brilliant tactician, ability to insprie his men past the point of human endurance. I think it should be pointed out that in N Afrika, a significant number of Rommels men were ill. Dysentary, jundace, ect (e.g. whatever is carried by lice). This was caused by a totally inadequite diet, not lack of supplys (food). What Berlin sent was not appropriate for the climate/geography. One example: Sardines in oil! The German soidiers used the cans (fish & all) for lamps!
 
Rommel should be rightly critized for his inadequite grasp of grand strategy. BUT He was adept enough to realize that the German needed to evacuate Afrika after El Alimen. While he shares blame for the failure to take Malta, Hitler had already written off the Malta invasion before Tobruk fell. Rommel also was astute enough to have the correct plan for defeating the invasion (on the beaches), and was on of the few senior officers to understand the effect of Allied Air Superiority.
 
That said, his grasp of logistics was on a par with Hitler's. There was simply no was the German's could supply a drive to the Nile Delta, much less the Missle Eastern Oilfields. Probably the reason that Rommel had these gaps in his armor is that he did not receive General Staff Training. All of his knowledge came from the school of hard knocks.
 
Tom OC
 
 
 

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: TOCarroll

I think it should be pointed out that in N Afrika, a significant number of Rommels men were ill. Dysentary, jundace, ect (e.g. whatever is carried by lice).

Well, sickness affected all the armies that fought in the desert. My own grandfather was unable to join 8th Army because he was afflicted with jaundice and only went into action in French North Africa.

While he shares blame for the failure to take Malta,

I'm not so sure. Malta was not Crete- I'm fairly sure a direct assault would have been folly. The place could only have been taken if the aerial blockade had been consistently applied for a longer period of time, and this was really outside the scope of Rommel's command.

That said, his grasp of logistics was on a par with Hitler's.

Thing is, the same disregard for logistics took him to the Channel coast in 1940 and to Egypt in 1941. Both offensives were carried out despite the disbelief of his superiors.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: golden delicious
I think attrition has more to do with it. In another discussion, it was mentioned that at the time of Cobra, Panzer Lehr had something like 3,000 effectives- and this must have been the norm for the units facing the American forces. The Germans were able to keep on matching the increases in Allied strength for six weeks, but when their ability to do that ended, it was only a matter of time before they broke out.

That's like saying they broke out because they achieved a breakthrough. Why did it take them as long as they did to achieve enough attrition to break out? I repeat, my experimental evidence (playtests of France 1944) seems to show they should have reached it sooner. Shock is needed during the period Rommel was in command. No shock is needed when the game is started at Cobra.

I thought the purpose of wargaming was to imagine what would have happened if the Generals were different.

Or if those Generals made different decisions.

[Curtis Lemay]

ORIGINAL: TOCarroll
Rommel also was astute enough to have the correct plan for defeating the invasion (on the beaches), and was on of the few senior officers to understand the effect of Allied Air Superiority.

Good point.

That said, his grasp of logistics was on a par with Hitler's. There was simply no was the German's could supply a drive to the Nile Delta, much less the Missle Eastern Oilfields.

Certainly the drive to El Alamein put a logistical strain on the Axis. But, at the same time the impact of the US production was first being felt there. Mass quantities of Stuarts, Grants, and Shermans were poured into the CW lines post Tobruk. And the Tobruk losses were more than made up. The CW material superiority increased significantly. Same for aircraft. The CW first achieved Air Superiority over El Alamein. Had that not happened, it's debatable whether the CW could have held the El Alamein position. Once past that, Alexandria's capture would have solved the Axis logistical difficulties.

Rommel couldn't have known the CW was about to be massively reinforced, even if he had gone to General Staff training. He shouldn't be judged using 20:20 hindsight.

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

That's like saying they broke out because they achieved a breakthrough. Why did it take them as long as they did to achieve enough attrition to break out?

Attrition takes time. A lot of attrition was achieved in the six weeks or so of Rommel's command, and a little more in the following week. That the Germans broke after that last week doesn't mean that the fighting in that one single week was more important than in all of the previous six. It was just the straw that broke the camel's back.

I repeat, my experimental evidence (playtests of France 1944) seems to show they should have reached it sooner.

Perhaps historically the attrition divider wasn't so low.

Or if those Generals made different decisions.

.... how can you allow the Generals to make different decisions, and yet say that their ability- which produces an 8% increase in the fighting strength of all their units- remains exactly the same?

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay
Certainly the drive to El Alamein put a logistical strain on the Axis. But, at the same time the impact of the US production was first being felt there. Mass quantities of Stuarts, Grants, and Shermans were poured into the CW lines post Tobruk. And the Tobruk losses were more than made up. The CW material superiority increased significantly. Same for aircraft. The CW first achieved Air Superiority over El Alamein. Had that not happened, it's debatable whether the CW could have held the El Alamein position. Once past that, Alexandria's capture would have solved the Axis logistical difficulties.

Personally, I'm not hugely convinced that Rommel is responsible for his logistical problems at Alamein. It was just natural that so far from his ports he'd be weak whilst the British were very strong so close to theirs. The British material superiority was so tremendous at this point that it would take more than incremental changes either way to prevent the British from holding at Alamein.

What interests me is not so much the battle itself as the choice of ground. The British picked a narrow defensive position which minimised Rommel's strengths and maximised their own.

[TOCarroll]

Man, you guys keep dragging replys out of a guy. Rommel was certainly my favorite senior German General.....brilliant & not a suck-up (a sure-fire way fro promotion back then).
 
About Malta....The Axis needed to neutralize the island. The supply line from Italy to Tripoli to Alimen (or even Tobruk) was a hell of a lot longer that the distance from the German boarder to the channel coast. Also they had ROADS (plural). Supply in N Afrika, IMHO, was almost at bad as in Russia. The other option was to use Tunis and Bizerte as supply heads, but thats 2,000km worth of gas to get the jerrycans to the front. Lot less chance of getting sunk, though. (Shorter sea route).
 
Also Malta. Rommel's choice was wrong to push into Egypt--he forfitted either air superiority or supplys. BUT....it really was not his decision since Hitler canceled Hercules (a 'la Sea Lion---paper only) before Venezia (The Gazala Battle) even started. Hitler was on the record as saying he felt the Italian Navy would let him down. OKW kept a tight lid on the cancellation, but when Rommel reguested the go-ahead for Egypt, it allowed Hitler to say what had already been decided in May 1942-No Malta Invasion.
 
I'm greatful for the point about illness in the 8th Army. Every book I've read (German, Italian, or Allied) gives you the impression of a group of healthy, cheerful, beer-swilling, courageous and competant (up to the rank of General) young men, having a great time trying to kill those damned Jerries. And being really PO'd (until Monty) that the Jerrys had a better CO. (Actually it wasn't the CO, the British problem was middle-management). But I did not know about serious medical issues. I guess I thought only the Germans drank the water).
 
Please understand the last paragraph is tounge-in-cheek (although it does refelect my general impression....to Quote Sir John Hackett..."Quite a few of us LIKED being there"). However, in the main body, of the post, I stick to the facts as I know them or as I have the wrong, but read them (someone lied....not uncommon in memoirs).
 
Best wishes  [&o]

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: TOCarroll

The other option was to use Tunis and Bizerte as supply heads, but thats 2,000km worth of gas to get the jerrycans to the front.

Actually, a good deal of the distance between Tunis and Tripoli could be covered by rail, which helps a lot. In addition to running further from Malta (though I doubt the Maltese-based forces could have been avoided altogether) these were two excellent ports which had much more capacity than Tripoli.

I'm greatful for the point about illness in the 8th Army. Every book I've read (German, Italian, or Allied) gives you the impression of a group of healthy, cheerful, beer-swilling, courageous and competant (up to the rank of General) young men, having a great time trying to kill those damned Jerries. And being really PO'd (until Monty) that the Jerrys had a better CO. (Actually it wasn't the CO, the British problem was middle-management). But I did not know about serious medical issues. I guess I thought only the Germans drank the water).

I wouldn't be surprised if the German medical problem was worse- the British after all had a great deal more experience of fighting in the Sahara desert than did the Germans- but in this kind of climate one can only go so far. Sickness will always be a factor.

to Quote Sir John Hackett..."Quite a few of us LIKED being there").

Indeed. A fact that's often overlooked today is that the right sort of war can be rollicking good fun for those who are inclined.

[Terminus]

Heh... I remember hearing a British veteran telling a story about how he and his armoured car crew had taken their vehicle down to the Med for a swim. On the way they'd passed a German armoured car going the other way. Both parties had just nodded to the other and gone on their way. As the veteran said, "they'd been for a swim too!"

[Dabbs]

What seems to me the single largest contributing (not the only) factor to Rommel's defeat in North Africa was the lack of oil to power the Italian navy on a consistent and extended basis.  That would have been helpful for the escorting of merchant marine supplies to Libya and likely could have extended to starving Malta of supplies.  As it was, I think the Axis came close to bringing Malta to a real emergency; but pressure relented as it was starting to take effect. 
 
It is almost inconceivable how much drinking water is needed to keep a brigade-sized unit healthy in the desert, in static conditions with nominal combat.  Adding combat and wide-ranging mobile operations is a logistics nightmare that even the best logistics specialists would hesitate to consider!  Rommel can't be faulted entirely for not understanding the full scope of logistical elements, the people on his supply side were responsible for making "supples" happen - which aside from requisition of equipment (like a hundred tanks)...well - problem is that with distance + communication time + process + shipping & delivery, that a tank destroyed today might take 3 - 6 months to replace.  It would be very different if there were local equipment stockpiles and/or a regular and periodic refreshment, but I don't think the Axis ever achieved this except in relation to artillery. 
 
Compounding this further was the lack of rail lines from Libya to Egypt, and basically the same issues applied in Russia, the further away you are from your supply sources = the closer the enemy is to his.  Not as large an issue in Egypt where equipment was coming from around the world - but it was coming in a steady stream and had the benefit of rail so that when it got in theater it was more accessible to the troops and in a better condition, generally. 
 
Would consider Rommel "good", but Guderian probably best in class and a class above Rommel...IMO.  That's one thing about the German Army though, they had a lot of good generals from division-level up to army; whereas it's difficult to come up with any comparable list of generals by country. 
 
 
 

[golden delicious]

ORIGINAL: Dabbs

What seems to me the single largest contributing (not the only) factor to Rommel's defeat in North Africa was the lack of oil to power the Italian navy on a consistent and extended basis.  That would have been helpful for the escorting of merchant marine supplies to Libya and likely could have extended to starving Malta of supplies.  As it was, I think the Axis came close to bringing Malta to a real emergency; but pressure relented as it was starting to take effect.

I suspect the Italian navy used lack of oil as an excuse not to act, rather than it being a real reason.

Anyway, the work of blockading Malta was done by the Luftwaffe- but there were long periods in which virtually no pressure was being put on Malta from the air at all. Had the significance of Malta been realised in 1941, the island could probably have been reduced in a year. Of course the Luftwaffe saw Russia as a rather higher priority.

Would consider Rommel "good", but Guderian probably best in class and a class above Rommel...IMO.  That's one thing about the German Army though, they had a lot of good generals from division-level up to army; whereas it's difficult to come up with any comparable list of generals by country.

Mm. Nazi Germany had all the right characteristics for producing fine generals. First, the country had an excellent military tradition in the first place, and had come up with a pretty good system come 1918. Second, they had lost the First World War. This made them take a long, hard look at the way war is fought and come up with radical solutions to its problems- something the Allies did not do to the same extent. Third, the National-Socialist movement was so revolutionary in nature that it was natural for it to encourage revolutionary forms of warfare and the newest types of equipment- at the same time avoiding the destructive purges which broke the back of the Red Army. Fourth, the army's tiny size between 1919 and 1934 meant that only the very best military men could be in uniform at all (some of the generals of the Second World War were not even comissioned officers prior to 1934), and the expansion to the Wehrmacht was done so rapidly that these men were promoted to high command much faster than in other circumstances, preventing the domination of army thought by conservatism which occurs in most armies.