The Direct Approach

[Chiteng]

For people who remember:

I suggested that you could cut at least 18 months off the war by ignoring
the Soloman and Rabual (et al) and just head straight for Tokyo from Hawaii.

It would seem that we will never know, since WITP will NOT be giving us total control of our 30% of the US war economy. For the strategy to work, you need
that control.

Mogami and I had planned on testing this idea. Oh well.

[Nikademus]

what makes you say that?

[mdiehl]

It would seem that we will never know, since WITP will NOT be giving us total control of our 30% of the US war economy. For the strategy to work, you need that control.

Mogami and I had planned on testing this idea. Oh well.

Why am I not surprised? Before you were highly critical of the two-prongued approach, saying that it was an unnecessary waste of lives and berating the General Staff and SWPac command in particular for its lack of vision. Your claim was that all that would be required for the USN under Halsey and Nimitz to blitz the Pacific. Now you say you can't do it because you lack... something... not clear what.

Does this mean you no longer think the historically used 2-prong offensive was inapproriate, given that they like you can't conjure up the magic bullet that you think would make the deed doable?

Drat! I was so looking forward to reading the AAR where you as the USN player find yourself repeatedly busting your sword on Saipan into 1947 while Mogami laughs and eats your ships from under you. Oh well.

[mogami]

Hi, I still see a possible scenario for a direct approach beginning in late 1943.
The Allied player would still need another active front from mid 1942 to early 1943 just to suck in and grind up the Japanese stratigic reserve and front line units. So the South Pacific remains a valid place to make "first contact"
Then when the USN has built up it's CV numbers the Central Pacific operation can begin. I don't think it wise for the Allies to think they can simply wait and then head direct to Tokyo. They will always need bases. They will need to spread the Japanese out. Any landing on the Home Islands will require vast amounts of material. Not saying it can't be done but if the Japanese player knows it is coming and has months to prepare my money would be on the Japanese. You really need to shoot down several thousand Japanese AC sink at least half the IJN and destroy a good number of land combat units. (Getting the Japanese to deploy these assets in South Pacific/SRA is another means of taking them out of the battle.

[Chiteng]

Why am I not surprised? Before you were highly critical of the two-prongued approach, saying that it was an unnecessary waste of lives and berating the General Staff and SWPac command in particular for its lack of vision. Your claim was that all that would be required for the USN under Halsey and Nimitz to blitz the Pacific. Now you say you can't do it because you lack... something... not clear what.

Does this mean you no longer think the historically used 2-prong offensive was inapproriate, given that they like you can't conjure up the magic bullet that you think would make the deed doable?

Drat! I was so looking forward to reading the AAR where you as the USN player find yourself repeatedly busting your sword on Saipan into 1947 while Mogami laughs and eats your ships from under you. Oh well.

Not at all Mdiehl. We can crank out the Board Game WITP and using
ADC2 YOU can play Japan and I will be the USA and I will kick you easily.

Why? Because the board game DOES give you control of what gets built.
For the Strategy to work, you must have control.

I had hoped that the computer game (which did advertise US production)
would allow you to build your own units rather than accept what 2by3 thinks
is historical.

[mdiehl]

What, specifically, would you like to build that is unavailable to you (types? numbers?) in the historical order of battle that substantially alters the strategic feasibility of the Pacific Blitz, Chiteng?

[Chiteng]

What, specifically, would you like to build that is unavailable to you (types? numbers?) in the historical order of battle that substantially alters the strategic feasibility of the Pacific Blitz, Chiteng?

Those are YOUR words not mine.

Historical OOB...an interesting concept. When exactly does a CV become
an active unit in the game? Surley NOT simply when complete. There must be
some crew training.

Same goes with air units, and in fact all units.

BUT to answer your question, w/o expanded fleet support assets you will
find it very difficult to do more that take an island or two. You need more Amphs. Tankers would also help. Marines too.

As for what would NOT be built, that would be telling. It all depends on who your opponent is.

[mdiehl]

Soo... you're saying that you've got enough CVs and such, but you'd like more AKs, AOs, AVs and so forth, and perhaps some early delivery LSTs?

Does this mean that you think Mac and Nimitz had enough of these to pursue the 1-prong assault? If so, why can't you accomplish it with the same assets that they evaluated as being insufficient?

[Nikademus]

Hi, I still see a possible scenario for a direct approach beginning in late 1943.
The Allied player would still need another active front from mid 1942 to early 1943 just to suck in and grind up the Japanese stratigic reserve and front line units.

Thats cheatin

The usual arguments around the two prong vs one prong strategy revolve around the pros and cons therein

One prong strategy:

Pro: Easier logistics, better availability of assets, concentrated blow, quicker ticket back to Philippines and to Japan(central Pacific pro)

Con: Japan can benefit from same thing, easier logistics, better avail of assets, concentration of forces, lack of attrition effect

Two prong strategy:

Pro: defender has to disperse force/logistics to defend multiple fronts, attrition factor doubled or more etc etc, key warships cant be in two places at once

Con: harder logistics for the attacker, less concentration of assets, might take longer, risk of concentrated blow against one prong (non game: command squabbles)

So to me, the ultimate test is a true Plan Orange....forget the South Pacific as long as Oz communication lines are secure......focus on central pacific. If you conduct a limited offensive or ops in two theaters it becomes more of an amalgamation of the two strategies.

Dont see why this scenerio cant be tested with the game. Some players may indeed not bother with the SoPac unless the Japan player, like in real life, creates cause for it. Neither side expected it to happen.

[Chiteng]

Soo... you're saying that you've got enough CVs and such, but you'd like more AKs, AOs, AVs and so forth, and perhaps some early delivery LSTs?

Does this mean that you think Mac and Nimitz had enough of these to pursue the 1-prong assault? If so, why can't you accomplish it with the same assets that they evaluated as being insufficient?

NO Mdiehl, I stated clearly what I wanted. Total control of the 30%.
I DONT want some suspect interpetation of what that would be.

[Chiteng]

Soo... you're saying that you've got enough CVs and such, but you'd like more AKs, AOs, AVs and so forth, and perhaps some early delivery LSTs?

Does this mean that you think Mac and Nimitz had enough of these to pursue the 1-prong assault? If so, why can't you accomplish it with the same assets that they evaluated as being insufficient?

Because KING was sitting on the assets and refused to release them. You know that as well as I do.

[mdiehl]

NO Mdiehl, I stated clearly what I wanted. Total control of the 30%.
I DONT want some suspect interpetation of what that would be.

That's a pretty meaningless answer. You've stated that you can't attempt that which you wish to attempt because the assets that you feel that you need to make the attempt are not available. They're not available because you don't get to control 30%. Got it.

So third time's the charm I hope:

What do you need that you don't have?

Seems to me that by refusing to state what you feel you need and instead simply dissing the whole state of affairs because you can't "control 30%" that all you accomplish is to dodge the question.

If I understand your dig against Admiral King, you are now stipulating that the 1-prong approach was not used because of King, rather than because of Mac and Nimitz. Of course, since King had to manage the Atlantic War as well, and since a big pile of the fleet support that you mentioned was tied up in the North African and Med campaigns, that your biggest complaint is either that the US rationalized its production to meet its strategic goals, or else that the ETO was not subordinated to PTO in receiving assets.

[Chiteng]

That's a pretty meaningless answer. You've stated that you can't attempt that which you wish to attempt because the assets that you feel that you need to make the attempt are not available. They're not available because you don't get to control 30%. Got it.

So third time's the charm I hope:

What do you need that you don't have?

Seems to me that by refusing to state what you feel you need and instead simply dissing the whole state of affairs because you can't "control 30%" that all you accomplish is to dodge the question.

If I understand your dig against Admiral King, you are now stipulating that the 1-prong approach was not used because of King, rather than because of Mac and Nimitz. Of course, since King had to manage the Atlantic War as well, and since a big pile of the fleet support that you mentioned was tied up in the North African and Med campaigns, that your biggest complaint is either that the US rationalized its production to meet its strategic goals, or else that the ETO was not subordinated to PTO in receiving assets.

No I am saying clearly that the historical builds paced the way they were would VERY likely be inadequete to a cross-ocean advance. Not because they could
not have been built or allocated. Especially CV aircraft replacements.
Why would the CV aircraft repl be low? Because we lost several CV. They
built what they needed.

Also you seem to not know that King ruled his assets with an iron hand and refused to release them from all quarters. INCLUDING demands from Europe.
They simply sat in storage.
Why he did that would be speculation.

As for Mac, there is no need to take back the Pi or fight in New Guinea
or the Soloman. Once sufficient HB become available these locations are moot in any case. But fleet support assets LIKE BaseForces are vital if you actually intend to USE and advance. If you dont have them, you wont be going anywhere. Also fleet oilers.

[mogami]

Hi, While the Allied player is waiting for the Essex class CV to arrive (WITP arrival dates reflect the training periods) and gathering the support ships et al he will have a vast number of units with nothing else to do but wait. He might as well find the nearest Japanese base and move air units in range and begin gaining experiance and killing Japanese. There is no shortage of surface ships that can battle the IJN. (supported by the first 6 USN non Essex class CV)
If the allied player does not find some means of fighting the Japanese will be free to do what ever they wish. (Dig in or make operations against isolated Allied areas) There are plently of places that in 1942 the allies can threaten and as a result kill Japanese. The more he kills in 1942 the fewer he will encounter during his march on Tokyo. Without the battles of 1942 the Japanese in 43 and 44 will be much stronger (and as a result require the allied build up to proceed longer) The historic allied builds are more then enough to defeat Japan but I would not depend on one massive battle to win the war.
The first requirement is the destruction of the IJN CV. The USN does not have to wait for 1943 to begin this. (and would be wise to have a major portion done by mid 1943)

[Chiteng]

I would argue that you could bring Japan to its knees with simply Gato production. If you built enough Gato.

You COULD do that, with minimal impact on the rest of the war.

There are many strategy.

[byron13]

Nope, sorry Chiteng. Mdiehl wins this round. Assuming you actually said that Mac and Nimitz were wrong to try a two-pronged approach, you're licked. The statement - if made - presumes you believed that they had the assets available to successfully execute a single-pronged advance and, therefore, should have done so. Now in WitP, having been allocated the same forces they were allocated, you say you cannot make a single-pronged approach cannot work. I don't see King coming into this equation at all. Either you can successfully execute a single-prong attack through the Central Pacific with the forces historically allocated or, if you can't, I think you've got to admit that the historical strategy is somewhat validated.

[mogami]

I would argue that you could bring Japan to its knees with simply Gato production. If you built enough Gato.

You COULD do that, with minimal impact on the rest of the war.

There are many strategy.

Hi, Nope. With just submarine production you don't shut down the Japanese. With no demand on the economy the Japanese could simply build air transports.
Use the rail net and move everything to ports (Shanghai amd Pusan) and then fly it to Japan. Convoys could be supported by massive ASW TF's and the Japanese Airforce could spend all it's time hunting subs.
I think all you'd do is doom thousands of bubble heads. The Japanese war machine needs to be stretched, over worked and destroyed not forced into specialized measures.

[Chiteng]

Nope, sorry Chiteng. Mdiehl wins this round. Assuming you actually said that Mac and Nimitz were wrong to try a two-pronged approach, you're licked. The statement - if made - presumes you believed that they had the assets available to successfully execute a single-pronged advance and, therefore, should have done so. Now in WitP, having been allocated the same forces they were allocated, you say you cannot make a single-pronged approach cannot work. I don't see King coming into this equation at all. Either you can successfully execute a single-prong attack through the Central Pacific with the forces historically allocated or, if you can't, I think you've got to admit that the historical strategy is somewhat validated.

In no case. All statements were postulated on the release of WITP which at that
time was billed as having USA production. Obviously it does not. It isnt even close.

[Chiteng]

Hi, Nope. With just submarine production you don't shut down the Japanese. With no demand on the economy the Japanese could simply build air transports.
Use the rail net and move everything to ports (Shanghai amd Pusan) and then fly it to Japan. Convoys could be supported by massive ASW TF's and the Japanese Airforce could spend all it's time hunting subs.
I think all you'd do is doom thousands of bubble heads. The Japanese war machine needs to be stretched, over worked and destroyed not forced into specialized measures.

You grossly overate the transport assets. We barely fed Berlin.
You seriously state you could feed 35+ million people with air transport?

[Chiteng]

Nope, sorry Chiteng. Mdiehl wins this round. Assuming you actually said that Mac and Nimitz were wrong to try a two-pronged approach, you're licked. The statement - if made - presumes you believed that they had the assets available to successfully execute a single-pronged advance and, therefore, should have done so. Now in WitP, having been allocated the same forces they were allocated, you say you cannot make a single-pronged approach cannot work. I don't see King coming into this equation at all. Either you can successfully execute a single-prong attack through the Central Pacific with the forces historically allocated or, if you can't, I think you've got to admit that the historical strategy is somewhat validated.

BTW I will never admit that feeding Macs ego is sound military strategy. NEVER.