A Forum member has suggested a scenario: I want to know if there is any interest in this.
The scenario would be a variation of RHSCVO - that is a "strictly historical" order of battle rather than one based on different Japanese planning pre war - and thus the Japanese side would be unchanged in any respect.
The scenario would assume proponants of a "Japan First" strategy beat out the "Germany First" advocates. A game attack prompted the suggestion: in these conditions it was felt that the attack was so nasty advocates of a "Japan First" response might win the day.
I can think of one other variation: suppose Adolf Hitler had not declared war on the USA? [See Hitler's Mistakes] I do not see how an attack by Japan justifies a US declaration of war on Germany - and I doubt Congress would approve it even if requested. I suppose one might say Germany and Japan were allies - but they were not really allies in a military sense - and except for some submarines in the Indian ocean later in the war - never managed any form of military cooperation.
Anyway - the queries are:
1) Would there be any interest in a scenario with stronger US earlier?
2) What political rationale would make Japan First a likely US policy?
3) What would the impact of such a policy be? Specifically.
Scenario Request: RHSJFO: uploading
Moderators: wdolson, Don Bowen, mogami
RE: Scenario Request Query
1. Sure - because it means a potentially shorter game, and that's going to be popular while waiting for AE.
2. A sunk CV. Covert landing in PH (pre-game setup - PH has been captured, but all US forces are still in the hex, and are in a race to retake the base before IJA lands more troops). Covert landing in Anchorage (oil?). Sudden discovery that British signed a non-agression pack with Japanese. Political assassination of FDR by a japanese citizen.
Book of the hour: Debt of Honor by Tom Clancy.
3-A. No Soviet forces - all available resources are sent to fight Germany. USSR fought Germany and, without lend-lease, failed. In 1943 IJA gains German (and captured Soviet) tech, units.
3-B. British, French, Dutch align with Japan. There aren't as many of their forces, as European casualties are greater, and IJA/IJN have to spare a few of their own just like in WW1, but come 1945 either Grand fleet makes it down to Tokyo to help out, bringing along captured German blueprints, or starting 1945 American reinforcements drop drastically as Britain and allies wage war against US in the Atlantic.
Either way, China will have much easier time.
2. A sunk CV. Covert landing in PH (pre-game setup - PH has been captured, but all US forces are still in the hex, and are in a race to retake the base before IJA lands more troops). Covert landing in Anchorage (oil?). Sudden discovery that British signed a non-agression pack with Japanese. Political assassination of FDR by a japanese citizen.
Book of the hour: Debt of Honor by Tom Clancy.
3-A. No Soviet forces - all available resources are sent to fight Germany. USSR fought Germany and, without lend-lease, failed. In 1943 IJA gains German (and captured Soviet) tech, units.
3-B. British, French, Dutch align with Japan. There aren't as many of their forces, as European casualties are greater, and IJA/IJN have to spare a few of their own just like in WW1, but come 1945 either Grand fleet makes it down to Tokyo to help out, bringing along captured German blueprints, or starting 1945 American reinforcements drop drastically as Britain and allies wage war against US in the Atlantic.
Either way, China will have much easier time.
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el cid again
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RE: Scenario Request Query
Copy of remarks from Scot - who made the proposal:
I am not challenging the Germany first argument. The pre-war meetings of the Combined Chiefs were correct to decide on a Europe first strategy based on the significance of Europe's war potential. After the invasion of the Soviet Union, the unwritten theme of Allied conduct in the Second World War is the Allied fear of the Soviet Union coming to terms with Germany. Both considerations mandated Germany first. The only reason to go to Pacific first would be political and peculiar to specific circumstances.
For example, what if Germany had not declared war on the US after Pearl Harbor or if it had even gone out of its way to distance itself from the Japanese after the Japanese decided to not attack the Soviet Union? That could be a correct political decision, had Germany more correctly calculated America's war potential. I doubt that such efforts would be more than only partially successful but they might have delayed American concentration against Europe. The nature of German relations with the Japanese at the personal level prevented this but Japan's actions harmed Germany's interests in several ways. German policy was aimed primarily at getting Japan to attack the Soviet Union, only secondarily at tying up the western Allies. The Germans were quite disappointed when Japan did not join in. Later the Germans were furious that the Japanese allowed what we now know was half of all Allied shipments to the Soviet Union by volume to arrive in the Far East. The Japanese repeatedly rebuffed German entreaties to block the shipments.
Unlike World War I, the United States did not declare war while German submarines attacked our ships in the Atlantic. Do I believe that the United States would not have declared war on Germany at all? I think it would have happened anyway but at more political cost to the Roosevelt administration. There were voices raised in the US to concentrate on the Japanese first. There were also anti-British voices on the American political landscape. Roosevelt correctly ignored them. Those who urged Pacific first had either institutional prejudices (Navy orientation) or came from the formerly isolationist side of the American political scene and simply believed that we were morally more justified in fighting the Japanese because the Japanese had attacked our territory. That feeling would be stronger if Japan had invaded or even conquered Hawaii. The fear that the American public would prefer to fight the Japanese aroused sufficient concern that American propaganda efforts emphasized German and Japanese cooperation even where none existed. What if American cooperation with Britain broke down at the leadership level? King threatened to concentrate on the Pacific at least once in high level conferences. Do I really believe that he would have done so if push came to shove? No, in the end he knew better and Roosevelt would have fired him if he went too far but he did threaten it and that might have triggered a British miscalculation in response. On the other hand what if Henry Wallace was president? While he was pro-Soviet (to an embarrassing degree) he might not have been as able to reign in the dissidents who resisted Roosevelt.
These hypothetical examples assume that events were close to what they were until the second half of 1941. It is possible that the political dynamics might have been worse between the US and Japan earlier giving the US an even more anti-Japanese stance. What if Japan did not apologize for the Panay incident for example?
You are right to observe that the percentage of US commitment to the Pacific varied and that the old percentage argument of what we allocated to the Pacific is not valid particularly when it is broken down into categories. Furthermore, even if the policy was Pacific first, it would be correct to conclude that the US would not have abandoned the Battle of the Atlantic or the strategic bombing campaign of Germany. However Torch, Sicily, or Italy would be potential break points in Anglo-American decision making. In practical terms, Pacific first would not be all that its proponents would have argued, which is another implication that indicates that it was not the correct strategy to begin with. A Pacific first strategy would probably mean more ground and tactical air forces being sent to the Pacific (including engineering and base personnel), a less than proportional transfer of shipping to the Pacific, and probably at best only a modest increase in naval forces sent to the Pacific. Given that such a policy amounts to alienating Britain, let alone ignoring her interests, Britain would not send anything more to the Pacific (and would send less if she could get away with it).
I am not challenging the Germany first argument. The pre-war meetings of the Combined Chiefs were correct to decide on a Europe first strategy based on the significance of Europe's war potential. After the invasion of the Soviet Union, the unwritten theme of Allied conduct in the Second World War is the Allied fear of the Soviet Union coming to terms with Germany. Both considerations mandated Germany first. The only reason to go to Pacific first would be political and peculiar to specific circumstances.
For example, what if Germany had not declared war on the US after Pearl Harbor or if it had even gone out of its way to distance itself from the Japanese after the Japanese decided to not attack the Soviet Union? That could be a correct political decision, had Germany more correctly calculated America's war potential. I doubt that such efforts would be more than only partially successful but they might have delayed American concentration against Europe. The nature of German relations with the Japanese at the personal level prevented this but Japan's actions harmed Germany's interests in several ways. German policy was aimed primarily at getting Japan to attack the Soviet Union, only secondarily at tying up the western Allies. The Germans were quite disappointed when Japan did not join in. Later the Germans were furious that the Japanese allowed what we now know was half of all Allied shipments to the Soviet Union by volume to arrive in the Far East. The Japanese repeatedly rebuffed German entreaties to block the shipments.
Unlike World War I, the United States did not declare war while German submarines attacked our ships in the Atlantic. Do I believe that the United States would not have declared war on Germany at all? I think it would have happened anyway but at more political cost to the Roosevelt administration. There were voices raised in the US to concentrate on the Japanese first. There were also anti-British voices on the American political landscape. Roosevelt correctly ignored them. Those who urged Pacific first had either institutional prejudices (Navy orientation) or came from the formerly isolationist side of the American political scene and simply believed that we were morally more justified in fighting the Japanese because the Japanese had attacked our territory. That feeling would be stronger if Japan had invaded or even conquered Hawaii. The fear that the American public would prefer to fight the Japanese aroused sufficient concern that American propaganda efforts emphasized German and Japanese cooperation even where none existed. What if American cooperation with Britain broke down at the leadership level? King threatened to concentrate on the Pacific at least once in high level conferences. Do I really believe that he would have done so if push came to shove? No, in the end he knew better and Roosevelt would have fired him if he went too far but he did threaten it and that might have triggered a British miscalculation in response. On the other hand what if Henry Wallace was president? While he was pro-Soviet (to an embarrassing degree) he might not have been as able to reign in the dissidents who resisted Roosevelt.
These hypothetical examples assume that events were close to what they were until the second half of 1941. It is possible that the political dynamics might have been worse between the US and Japan earlier giving the US an even more anti-Japanese stance. What if Japan did not apologize for the Panay incident for example?
You are right to observe that the percentage of US commitment to the Pacific varied and that the old percentage argument of what we allocated to the Pacific is not valid particularly when it is broken down into categories. Furthermore, even if the policy was Pacific first, it would be correct to conclude that the US would not have abandoned the Battle of the Atlantic or the strategic bombing campaign of Germany. However Torch, Sicily, or Italy would be potential break points in Anglo-American decision making. In practical terms, Pacific first would not be all that its proponents would have argued, which is another implication that indicates that it was not the correct strategy to begin with. A Pacific first strategy would probably mean more ground and tactical air forces being sent to the Pacific (including engineering and base personnel), a less than proportional transfer of shipping to the Pacific, and probably at best only a modest increase in naval forces sent to the Pacific. Given that such a policy amounts to alienating Britain, let alone ignoring her interests, Britain would not send anything more to the Pacific (and would send less if she could get away with it).
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el cid again
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RE: Scenario Request: RHSJFO
I will see if this is feasible quickly. The scenario is tentatively designated JFO for Japan First Option.
It will be based on RHSRAO - the Russian active variant of CVO - and at present I don't contemplate any changes for the Japanese data - a slightly simplifying assumption.
I AM considering a change in scenario length: tentatively end the scenario sometime in 1944 - 1 Jan - 1 July - or even 31 December. This would impact some slots - freeing them up for additional Allied units earlier in the war. This is not so much a statement that the war MUST end sooner as "we will assess how well you did when it ends" - and if you DIDN'T clearly win by then - you lost perhaps as well.
I am interested in suggestions about what units or production rate changes might be involved with such a strategy?
I am interested in any comments or suggestions as well - not subject limited.
It will be based on RHSRAO - the Russian active variant of CVO - and at present I don't contemplate any changes for the Japanese data - a slightly simplifying assumption.
I AM considering a change in scenario length: tentatively end the scenario sometime in 1944 - 1 Jan - 1 July - or even 31 December. This would impact some slots - freeing them up for additional Allied units earlier in the war. This is not so much a statement that the war MUST end sooner as "we will assess how well you did when it ends" - and if you DIDN'T clearly win by then - you lost perhaps as well.
I am interested in suggestions about what units or production rate changes might be involved with such a strategy?
I am interested in any comments or suggestions as well - not subject limited.
RE: Scenario Request: RHSJFO
I think one of the reasons for "Germany first" was, that this a much more efficient option.
The Allied had to make sure both UK and USSR survive - even if they went for Japan first. Thus we can not assume that everything the USA sent to the ETO could be sent to the Pacific in this scenario. Three things must not happen: Starvation in Britain, a major defeat of the Red Army (which might put the Russians out of the war) and German troops reaching the Suez canal.
Thus, if we consider "Japan first" - what would we get for the pacific?
* More LCUs. The US troops used in the Mediterranean theatre would go to the Pacific.
* More aircraft go to the pacific.
* Overlord would not happen, these troops would go to the Pacific, too.
BUT there won't be many more ships! The US didn't have to send many warships to the Atlantic - the Royal Navy ruled the waves anyways. Some more transports could probably be sent (because they were not needed in the Med). But they would have to deal with the thread of German subs under a "Japan first" doctrine, too. And a lower intensity of the war in the Med. would also free German subs for other theatres, thus they would need more ASW and escort ships to protect the necessary traffic to Britain and Murmansk. Thus only very few additional warships would go to the Pacific.
Britain would probably send less equipment to India/Burma, because they would need more at home and in North Africa.
One might argue that the USA would invest less in the production of tanks etc. and more in shipyards. But even with "Japan first", they had to deal with Germany eventually, thus they couldn't ignore ground armament too much. Maybe they built one extra CV in late 42/early 43 and a few warship to escort it, but not much more.
Overall, I think the USA wouldn't perform that much better in the Pacific than they did under the "Germany first" doctrine. The lack of warships would slow them down, and Japan would be stronger, because it needed less troops in Burma and suffered less attrition there.
The Allied had to make sure both UK and USSR survive - even if they went for Japan first. Thus we can not assume that everything the USA sent to the ETO could be sent to the Pacific in this scenario. Three things must not happen: Starvation in Britain, a major defeat of the Red Army (which might put the Russians out of the war) and German troops reaching the Suez canal.
Thus, if we consider "Japan first" - what would we get for the pacific?
* More LCUs. The US troops used in the Mediterranean theatre would go to the Pacific.
* More aircraft go to the pacific.
* Overlord would not happen, these troops would go to the Pacific, too.
BUT there won't be many more ships! The US didn't have to send many warships to the Atlantic - the Royal Navy ruled the waves anyways. Some more transports could probably be sent (because they were not needed in the Med). But they would have to deal with the thread of German subs under a "Japan first" doctrine, too. And a lower intensity of the war in the Med. would also free German subs for other theatres, thus they would need more ASW and escort ships to protect the necessary traffic to Britain and Murmansk. Thus only very few additional warships would go to the Pacific.
Britain would probably send less equipment to India/Burma, because they would need more at home and in North Africa.
One might argue that the USA would invest less in the production of tanks etc. and more in shipyards. But even with "Japan first", they had to deal with Germany eventually, thus they couldn't ignore ground armament too much. Maybe they built one extra CV in late 42/early 43 and a few warship to escort it, but not much more.
Overall, I think the USA wouldn't perform that much better in the Pacific than they did under the "Germany first" doctrine. The lack of warships would slow them down, and Japan would be stronger, because it needed less troops in Burma and suffered less attrition there.
They who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety. (Benjamin Franklin)
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NormS3
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RE: Scenario Request: RHSJFO
I pretty much agree. I will point out in this senario that it would be the heavier units like the new battleships, that would find themselves into the pacific sooner, perhaps influencing an earlier victory in Solomns.
This in turn could/should keep units that are slated for Overlord, still in the Atlantic. I think that they would be overkill. The Med Divisions should allow the US any numerical superiority that might be needed in the Pacific.
Escort Carriers would be ready sooner as well. I doubt that the Ranger would have been called upon, unless Midway backfired.
Replacement rates would also be higher, as well as the pilot pool.
It is not a game that I'd want to play as Japan. But still I'd be interested in seeing it.
This in turn could/should keep units that are slated for Overlord, still in the Atlantic. I think that they would be overkill. The Med Divisions should allow the US any numerical superiority that might be needed in the Pacific.
Escort Carriers would be ready sooner as well. I doubt that the Ranger would have been called upon, unless Midway backfired.
Replacement rates would also be higher, as well as the pilot pool.
It is not a game that I'd want to play as Japan. But still I'd be interested in seeing it.
RE: Scenario Request: RHSJFO
If you want the allies stronger in the beginning I'd put lost CVs back on the respawn list. Together with a recommendation to actually use what you have early on this would be a very easy change and should suit the request well enough.
To answer the question, no I wouldn't be interested in a stronger allied side. I'm happy with realistic scenarios and don't like what-ifs very much in general.
EDIT: ... and I'm playing the allied side.
To answer the question, no I wouldn't be interested in a stronger allied side. I'm happy with realistic scenarios and don't like what-ifs very much in general.
EDIT: ... and I'm playing the allied side.
If you gained knowledge through the forum, why not putting it into the AE wiki?
http://witp-ae.wikia.com/wiki/War_in_th ... ition_Wiki
http://witp-ae.wikia.com/wiki/War_in_th ... ition_Wiki
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el cid again
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RE: Scenario Request: RHSJFO
There are problems with respawning - and except for small vessels - it is surgically removed from RHS. Changing it involves a lot more than one would guess - and it is not something condusive to a quick scenario generation. I can do a quick scenario very fast - but not when it involves a lot of technical changes. To which add that I don't like it: if the Allies fail to lose carriers, for example, then they NEVER get them - which seems hardly fair or a way to make them stronger - complete with the assigned air groups. This is a big reason we got rid of the concept: Allied players didn't like it when they did well and were penalized in this way.
Obviously - a what if scenario can only be for someone who wants to play one. IMHO ALL games become what if scenarios - and the longer they last - the less they look like history. You may get historical units on historical dates in historical locations - but you don't have historical events - and that makes it become to some degree irrational and illogical. Lots of decisions were made - some very surprising and unlikely - in particular re ship building - responding to events IRL - and if those events didn't happen when they did - or happened significantly differently - the decisions would not then have been the same. So the later unit appearences are - in that game world - not really sensible any more. Also - sometimes important historical players get killed - and that changes decisions (the most famous example being for example the death of Adm Yamamoto). What if Mac had died or been unable to leave the Philippines? What if Kimmel and/or Short had not been relieved? Kimmel remains = no Nimitz in charge of Pacific Fleet in the critical early period. That might change what units are sent where when? A flaw in the strictly historical scenarios of RHS, in stock scenarios, and in CHS, is the political planning for out years often has units appearing in theaters which make no sense whatever in game terms - and players lack the points to address this in a realistic time frame. I think that one can be overly concerned with a rigid recreation of history - and so bind players to a scenario that makes little sense for the events in their fictional campaign. There are various solutions for this - the best being impossible (a third player in the middle as judge or God adjusting things) - and more political points being perhaps the most practical one. Note that RHS adoptes this even in strictly historical scenarios - and no one is complining there are too many points even if they are generous by WITP standards. Yet another solution - and one we use extensively - is to create scenarios with different assumptions - BBO and CVO being the original examples of that - along with Russian active and passive variants of both. Still another solution is to permit a Shinano (or whatever) to convert to a different kind of ship. This was in stock - but in a rigid way (for Ise, Hyuga, Chitose, Chiyoda) and in CHS in the form of you get both Shinanos - but had to suspend one or the other - or you end up with both flavors. IRL Japan drew up plans to convert ALL BB and most cruisers to carriers or semicarriers - three different versions for each BB - and then it decided which to convert. I don't think it is "strictly historical" to deny this sort of flexability to players - who may need more carriers in their game war - and so in that respect the "non strictly historical" scenarios of RHS may be more historical. As for what is "realistic" - is it realistic to impose a historical choice in the context of different events? Suppose - for example - the US has NO option about the matter? HITLER screwed up and declared war on the USA right after hearing about Pearl Harbor. What if he did not? He miscalculated badly. The US Congress isn't going to declare war on Germany because Japan attacked and sank the United States Fleet. In one game the opening Japanese attack was so savage that the players observed "if this had really happened, Japan First advocates might have got their way." Well - they might have. If you have no interest in the scenario - don't chime in on how you would like it to be done.
All the other comments were germane - and helpful. I am inclined to think that Torch might be cancelled - and the "soft underbelly of Europe" theory turned out to be a poor one anyway - so it might not have been such a bad thing. I don't think Overlord would or should be cancelled - and I think the risk Stalin might make a separate peace would compel it to happen. The thing that matters isn't the glamorous carriers - it is the logistic foundation - cargo and supplies - and the ships to lift it - along with allocation of aircraft that would matter. Allied players that had higher rates of these sooner would be more effective - never mind the elite units are virtually identical. And a few more troops sooner would not hurt either. One thing I thought of reading the comments is that maybe Germany sends more submarines to Die Erste Monsun operation in the Indian Ocean? These subs are technically different - and pretty useful - and it might be cool to have more of them. And that makes me wonder if we could not have them appear at at an islet which is essentially unused in the straits between Madagascar and Africa?
My big problem is - I need history in ETO to know how things work for PTO. Without it - I am more or less unable to tell what is available. No us war with Germany is too radical for me - and a later declaration of war too hard for me to estimate - and if we could do that - the war is so different I have no sense of what is going on. So I must take a minimalist approach - to keep a pretty historical ETO I can understand - and that means - essentially - the Japan First advocates won the argument - but all the things needed for ETO remain as foundation issues. This will be a diviation - but not a radical one. That also means little need to change lots of things - which IS condisive to a quick scenario production.
ETA = Monday or Tuesday if we do it.
Obviously - a what if scenario can only be for someone who wants to play one. IMHO ALL games become what if scenarios - and the longer they last - the less they look like history. You may get historical units on historical dates in historical locations - but you don't have historical events - and that makes it become to some degree irrational and illogical. Lots of decisions were made - some very surprising and unlikely - in particular re ship building - responding to events IRL - and if those events didn't happen when they did - or happened significantly differently - the decisions would not then have been the same. So the later unit appearences are - in that game world - not really sensible any more. Also - sometimes important historical players get killed - and that changes decisions (the most famous example being for example the death of Adm Yamamoto). What if Mac had died or been unable to leave the Philippines? What if Kimmel and/or Short had not been relieved? Kimmel remains = no Nimitz in charge of Pacific Fleet in the critical early period. That might change what units are sent where when? A flaw in the strictly historical scenarios of RHS, in stock scenarios, and in CHS, is the political planning for out years often has units appearing in theaters which make no sense whatever in game terms - and players lack the points to address this in a realistic time frame. I think that one can be overly concerned with a rigid recreation of history - and so bind players to a scenario that makes little sense for the events in their fictional campaign. There are various solutions for this - the best being impossible (a third player in the middle as judge or God adjusting things) - and more political points being perhaps the most practical one. Note that RHS adoptes this even in strictly historical scenarios - and no one is complining there are too many points even if they are generous by WITP standards. Yet another solution - and one we use extensively - is to create scenarios with different assumptions - BBO and CVO being the original examples of that - along with Russian active and passive variants of both. Still another solution is to permit a Shinano (or whatever) to convert to a different kind of ship. This was in stock - but in a rigid way (for Ise, Hyuga, Chitose, Chiyoda) and in CHS in the form of you get both Shinanos - but had to suspend one or the other - or you end up with both flavors. IRL Japan drew up plans to convert ALL BB and most cruisers to carriers or semicarriers - three different versions for each BB - and then it decided which to convert. I don't think it is "strictly historical" to deny this sort of flexability to players - who may need more carriers in their game war - and so in that respect the "non strictly historical" scenarios of RHS may be more historical. As for what is "realistic" - is it realistic to impose a historical choice in the context of different events? Suppose - for example - the US has NO option about the matter? HITLER screwed up and declared war on the USA right after hearing about Pearl Harbor. What if he did not? He miscalculated badly. The US Congress isn't going to declare war on Germany because Japan attacked and sank the United States Fleet. In one game the opening Japanese attack was so savage that the players observed "if this had really happened, Japan First advocates might have got their way." Well - they might have. If you have no interest in the scenario - don't chime in on how you would like it to be done.
All the other comments were germane - and helpful. I am inclined to think that Torch might be cancelled - and the "soft underbelly of Europe" theory turned out to be a poor one anyway - so it might not have been such a bad thing. I don't think Overlord would or should be cancelled - and I think the risk Stalin might make a separate peace would compel it to happen. The thing that matters isn't the glamorous carriers - it is the logistic foundation - cargo and supplies - and the ships to lift it - along with allocation of aircraft that would matter. Allied players that had higher rates of these sooner would be more effective - never mind the elite units are virtually identical. And a few more troops sooner would not hurt either. One thing I thought of reading the comments is that maybe Germany sends more submarines to Die Erste Monsun operation in the Indian Ocean? These subs are technically different - and pretty useful - and it might be cool to have more of them. And that makes me wonder if we could not have them appear at at an islet which is essentially unused in the straits between Madagascar and Africa?
My big problem is - I need history in ETO to know how things work for PTO. Without it - I am more or less unable to tell what is available. No us war with Germany is too radical for me - and a later declaration of war too hard for me to estimate - and if we could do that - the war is so different I have no sense of what is going on. So I must take a minimalist approach - to keep a pretty historical ETO I can understand - and that means - essentially - the Japan First advocates won the argument - but all the things needed for ETO remain as foundation issues. This will be a diviation - but not a radical one. That also means little need to change lots of things - which IS condisive to a quick scenario production.
ETA = Monday or Tuesday if we do it.
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el cid again
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RE: Scenario Request: RHSJFO
The US map edge supply increases marginally:
by 10% at Salt Lake City initially (9000 to 9900)
BUT ALSO resources increase continuously for 1200 days - so that both supply and resources grow significantly over time (compared with a limit of 400 in CVO and BBO family scenarios).
by 10% at San Diego (3000 to 3300)
For a net increase of 1200 supply points per day at the start - and (because resource centers generate one supply point) another 800 by the late war period = 2000 supply points per day IF the player elects to invest in the resource centers (giving a player some options in a variety of investment senses - including taking the 1200 points per day entirely for operations).
SOVIET map edge supply decreases significantly from 9600 to 6000 - and fuel from 1800 to 1000 per day at Krasnyarsk.
by 10% at Salt Lake City initially (9000 to 9900)
BUT ALSO resources increase continuously for 1200 days - so that both supply and resources grow significantly over time (compared with a limit of 400 in CVO and BBO family scenarios).
by 10% at San Diego (3000 to 3300)
For a net increase of 1200 supply points per day at the start - and (because resource centers generate one supply point) another 800 by the late war period = 2000 supply points per day IF the player elects to invest in the resource centers (giving a player some options in a variety of investment senses - including taking the 1200 points per day entirely for operations).
SOVIET map edge supply decreases significantly from 9600 to 6000 - and fuel from 1800 to 1000 per day at Krasnyarsk.
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el cid again
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RE: Scenario Request: RHSJFO
Six Soviet HQ which all appear 1 June 1945 are now delayed - two each 1 July, 1 Aug and 1 September 1945.
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el cid again
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RE: Scenario Request: RHSJFO
Although the B-17 was not considered entirely appropriate for the Pacific campaign eventually - early on it was available and a vital part of US strategic thinking. [Gen Marshall described the four squadrons in the Philippines "the greatest assemblage of stragtegic air power in history"] Early production of B-17E at Seattle will increase from 10 machines to 15 per month (the same as in EOS - this is not a big number). When replaced by B-17G - allocaion of the G will start at 16 (15 +1) vice 11 (10 + 1) - and will increase to 47 (32 +15) vice 25 (15 + 10). This will make a significant differene in 1942 without grossly impacting the use of the aircraft in other theaters at any time. As always - these are numbers available to players for use in the field - not total numbers made - and takes into consideration lots of other uses. They were already worked out for EOS family - we are just migrating the data over in this case. Seattle is slot 853.
C-54 production at Los Angelus (Slot 851) increases to a maximum of 33 per month (vice 16) - again the data being lifted from EOS. This aircraft has a October 1942 start of production in game terms.
C-60 production at Los Angelus increases to 6 (up from 4) - initially - being a reallocation of the constant production rate to this theater. It continues at this rate until the end of the war.
P-51A production at Los Angelus (starting in December 1942) increases to 20 vice 10. This will convert to P-51B production a year later. This will convert to P-51D in September 1944.
In addition, another line will make P-51D - increasing to 99 (vice 54) per month starting at 1 in Sept 1944.
P-70A Havoc production at Los Angelus (starting at 1 in December 1942) increases to 40 vice 20. This will convert to P-61 in April 1944.
SBD-3/4 production at Los Angelus - initially - is 21 vice 11 - being a realloction of the constant production rate to this theater. It upgrades to SBD-5/6 in Feb 1943.
In addition, another line starts SBD-5/6 production in Feb 1943 and increases to 84 (vice 42).
B-25C/D production at Los Angelus starts at 18 (vice 9) and increases to 92 (vice 46). This upgrades to B-25 H in April 1943 and to B-25J in January 1944.
PV-1B or B-34 production at Los Angelus increases to 57 (vice 23) starting at 1 in December 1942. This upgrades to PV-2 Harpoon in July 1943.
A-20B production at Los Angelus starts at 24 (vice 12) - being a reallocation of production. This upgrades to A-20G in January 1943 and to A-26 in January 1945.
In addition, another line at LA increases A-20G production to 15 (vice 10) - and upgrades to A-26 as well.
A-36A production at LA increases to 20 (vice 10) starting at 1 in May 1943. It upgrades to P-51B in September 1943. It upgrades to P-51D a year after that.
P-38G production at LA starts at 1 in October 1942 and increases to 46 (vice 23). This upgrades to P-38J production in September 1943 and then to P-38L production in June, 1944.
In addition, another line at LA starts P-38J production in September 1943 and increases to 110 (vice 56). It too upgrades to P-38L production in June 1944.
B-24 production is a complex subject in RHS - because different scenarios use completely different rationales for what is produced - including in particular the naval and air forces versions of the aircraft. We essentially should keep the early historical numbers - except for a change in priority. So initial producition is 2 (up from 1) and 5 more are added (vice 4) for a total of 7 (vice 5) per month for the B-24D/E/G at San Diego (Slot 850). This upgrades to B-24J in Sept 1943.
In addition, the B-24J has another line starting in Sept 1943. It increases from 1 to 17 (vice 14).
The naval B-24 - PB4Y-1 starts production at San Diego in January 1943. It increases by 41 (vice 31).
FYI British Liberator IV production remains as it was - at 10 - and this not only is at San Diego in the game - but really was in San Diego as well - from Aug 1943 - and it starts at 10 - without need to ramp up. This is NOT a change.
In addition, B-24 variant production at Salt Lake City (representing most of the Eastern USA) is unchanged at:
PB4Y-1 starting at 1 in January 1943 increasing by 24
B-24 D/E/G starting at 1 when the game begins increasing by 19. This upgrades to B-24 J in Sept 1943.
B-24 J starting at 1 in Sept 1943 increasing by 42
The recon variant PB4Y-1P remains unchanged starting at 1 in April 1944 increasing to 12 total. This variant is also called the F7.
Hellcat production remains as it was - since they only went to PTO - at San Diego in our game terms.
PB2Y-3 production at San Diego starts at 15 (vice 10) and never changes.
PBY-5 production at San Diego starts at 48 (vice 32). It upgrades to PBN in March 1943.
F4A production at San Diego starts at 1 in April 1942 and increases to 15 (vice 7). It upgrades to F5B/C in Sept 1943. In turn this upgrades to F6D in April 1944.
In addition, another line starts F5B/C production at 1 in Sept 1943 and increases to 15 (vice 7). This also upgrades to F6D in April 1944.
C-54 production at Los Angelus (Slot 851) increases to a maximum of 33 per month (vice 16) - again the data being lifted from EOS. This aircraft has a October 1942 start of production in game terms.
C-60 production at Los Angelus increases to 6 (up from 4) - initially - being a reallocation of the constant production rate to this theater. It continues at this rate until the end of the war.
P-51A production at Los Angelus (starting in December 1942) increases to 20 vice 10. This will convert to P-51B production a year later. This will convert to P-51D in September 1944.
In addition, another line will make P-51D - increasing to 99 (vice 54) per month starting at 1 in Sept 1944.
P-70A Havoc production at Los Angelus (starting at 1 in December 1942) increases to 40 vice 20. This will convert to P-61 in April 1944.
SBD-3/4 production at Los Angelus - initially - is 21 vice 11 - being a realloction of the constant production rate to this theater. It upgrades to SBD-5/6 in Feb 1943.
In addition, another line starts SBD-5/6 production in Feb 1943 and increases to 84 (vice 42).
B-25C/D production at Los Angelus starts at 18 (vice 9) and increases to 92 (vice 46). This upgrades to B-25 H in April 1943 and to B-25J in January 1944.
PV-1B or B-34 production at Los Angelus increases to 57 (vice 23) starting at 1 in December 1942. This upgrades to PV-2 Harpoon in July 1943.
A-20B production at Los Angelus starts at 24 (vice 12) - being a reallocation of production. This upgrades to A-20G in January 1943 and to A-26 in January 1945.
In addition, another line at LA increases A-20G production to 15 (vice 10) - and upgrades to A-26 as well.
A-36A production at LA increases to 20 (vice 10) starting at 1 in May 1943. It upgrades to P-51B in September 1943. It upgrades to P-51D a year after that.
P-38G production at LA starts at 1 in October 1942 and increases to 46 (vice 23). This upgrades to P-38J production in September 1943 and then to P-38L production in June, 1944.
In addition, another line at LA starts P-38J production in September 1943 and increases to 110 (vice 56). It too upgrades to P-38L production in June 1944.
B-24 production is a complex subject in RHS - because different scenarios use completely different rationales for what is produced - including in particular the naval and air forces versions of the aircraft. We essentially should keep the early historical numbers - except for a change in priority. So initial producition is 2 (up from 1) and 5 more are added (vice 4) for a total of 7 (vice 5) per month for the B-24D/E/G at San Diego (Slot 850). This upgrades to B-24J in Sept 1943.
In addition, the B-24J has another line starting in Sept 1943. It increases from 1 to 17 (vice 14).
The naval B-24 - PB4Y-1 starts production at San Diego in January 1943. It increases by 41 (vice 31).
FYI British Liberator IV production remains as it was - at 10 - and this not only is at San Diego in the game - but really was in San Diego as well - from Aug 1943 - and it starts at 10 - without need to ramp up. This is NOT a change.
In addition, B-24 variant production at Salt Lake City (representing most of the Eastern USA) is unchanged at:
PB4Y-1 starting at 1 in January 1943 increasing by 24
B-24 D/E/G starting at 1 when the game begins increasing by 19. This upgrades to B-24 J in Sept 1943.
B-24 J starting at 1 in Sept 1943 increasing by 42
The recon variant PB4Y-1P remains unchanged starting at 1 in April 1944 increasing to 12 total. This variant is also called the F7.
Hellcat production remains as it was - since they only went to PTO - at San Diego in our game terms.
PB2Y-3 production at San Diego starts at 15 (vice 10) and never changes.
PBY-5 production at San Diego starts at 48 (vice 32). It upgrades to PBN in March 1943.
F4A production at San Diego starts at 1 in April 1942 and increases to 15 (vice 7). It upgrades to F5B/C in Sept 1943. In turn this upgrades to F6D in April 1944.
In addition, another line starts F5B/C production at 1 in Sept 1943 and increases to 15 (vice 7). This also upgrades to F6D in April 1944.
RE: Scenario Request: RHSJFO
I think you should take lend lease shipments to the USSR into account. If the USA runs a "Japan first" doctrine, many German forces would be freed for the eastern front - thus more lend lease aircraft would be required. This means that the replacement rates of the most common lend lease planes should not be increased that much.
In the real war, the USSR received 3066 A-20 (plus 1699 spare engines) and 865 B-25 (plus 633 engines). If we consider an increased demand (e.g. 100% more), you can probably not increase the replacement rate of the A-20 at all. You might even have to decrease it. They received 6695 fighters (mostly P-39 and P-40). I'm not sure how an increased demand would affect the number of planes available for the PTO. Numbers are from http://lend-lease.airforce.ru/documents ... tion_1.pdf
The production rate of Soviet and British aircraft should be cut down, and new types should be available later. Most of their reinforcement air units should be delayed or not arrive at all.
The pilot replacement rate should be lower for the Russians and Brits, much higher for the Americans.
I'm not sure how Australia and New Zealand would be affected by a "Japan first" doctrine. Would they send more equipment to Noth Africa to help the Brits, or would they adopt "Japan first", too, and send less afainst the Germans? Maybe we should simply not change them at all.
In the real war, the USSR received 3066 A-20 (plus 1699 spare engines) and 865 B-25 (plus 633 engines). If we consider an increased demand (e.g. 100% more), you can probably not increase the replacement rate of the A-20 at all. You might even have to decrease it. They received 6695 fighters (mostly P-39 and P-40). I'm not sure how an increased demand would affect the number of planes available for the PTO. Numbers are from http://lend-lease.airforce.ru/documents ... tion_1.pdf
The production rate of Soviet and British aircraft should be cut down, and new types should be available later. Most of their reinforcement air units should be delayed or not arrive at all.
The pilot replacement rate should be lower for the Russians and Brits, much higher for the Americans.
I'm not sure how Australia and New Zealand would be affected by a "Japan first" doctrine. Would they send more equipment to Noth Africa to help the Brits, or would they adopt "Japan first", too, and send less afainst the Germans? Maybe we should simply not change them at all.
They who can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety. (Benjamin Franklin)
RE: Scenario Request: RHSJFO
ORIGINAL: Bogo Mil
I think you should take lend lease shipments to the USSR into account. If the USA runs a "Japan first" doctrine, many German forces would be freed for the eastern front - thus more lend lease aircraft would be required. This means that the replacement rates of the most common lend lease planes should not be increased that much.
In the real war, the USSR received 3066 A-20 (plus 1699 spare engines) and 865 B-25 (plus 633 engines). If we consider an increased demand (e.g. 100% more), you can probably not increase the replacement rate of the A-20 at all. You might even have to decrease it. They received 6695 fighters (mostly P-39 and P-40). I'm not sure how an increased demand would affect the number of planes available for the PTO. Numbers are from http://lend-lease.airforce.ru/documents ... tion_1.pdf
The production rate of Soviet and British aircraft should be cut down, and new types should be available later. Most of their reinforcement air units should be delayed or not arrive at all.
The pilot replacement rate should be lower for the Russians and Brits, much higher for the Americans.
I'm not sure how Australia and New Zealand would be affected by a "Japan first" doctrine. Would they send more equipment to Noth Africa to help the Brits, or would they adopt "Japan first", too, and send less afainst the Germans? Maybe we should simply not change them at all.
Japan first for America would have allowed the Commonwealth to keep a full Australian corps in the Near East, possibly with the reinforcement of the Australian Armoured Division that was forming.
Harry Erwin
"For a number to make sense in the game, someone has to calibrate it and program code. There are too many significant numbers that behave non-linearly to expect that. It's just a game. Enjoy it." herwin@btinternet.com
"For a number to make sense in the game, someone has to calibrate it and program code. There are too many significant numbers that behave non-linearly to expect that. It's just a game. Enjoy it." herwin@btinternet.com
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el cid again
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- Joined: Mon Oct 10, 2005 4:40 pm
RE: Scenario Request: RHSJFO
ORIGINAL: Bogo Mil
I think you should take lend lease shipments to the USSR into account. If the USA runs a "Japan first" doctrine, many German forces would be freed for the eastern front - thus more lend lease aircraft would be required. This means that the replacement rates of the most common lend lease planes should not be increased that much.
In the real war, the USSR received 3066 A-20 (plus 1699 spare engines) and 865 B-25 (plus 633 engines). If we consider an increased demand (e.g. 100% more), you can probably not increase the replacement rate of the A-20 at all. You might even have to decrease it. They received 6695 fighters (mostly P-39 and P-40). I'm not sure how an increased demand would affect the number of planes available for the PTO. Numbers are from http://lend-lease.airforce.ru/documents ... tion_1.pdf
The production rate of Soviet and British aircraft should be cut down, and new types should be available later. Most of their reinforcement air units should be delayed or not arrive at all.
The pilot replacement rate should be lower for the Russians and Brits, much higher for the Americans.
I'm not sure how Australia and New Zealand would be affected by a "Japan first" doctrine. Would they send more equipment to Noth Africa to help the Brits, or would they adopt "Japan first", too, and send less afainst the Germans? Maybe we should simply not change them at all.
These are somewhat difficult matters - and I am taking a minimalist approach - both because that makes the risks of improper analysis less - and it means less work for me (conveniently.)
To start at the end - I think your last suggestion is best - and easiest as well. Australia and New Zealand more or less have a Japan First strategy as it is - Australia got in a fight over units Churchill wanted to divert to Imperial requiements - but Australia was adament - we defend the homeland. So far so good.
I am not sure about the pilot replacement rates changing for the UK or USSR - but I tend to agree re US. I will probably use the rates calculated for EOS unless a clear reason for a different ratio is given. I will publish these for comment. As for UK - I think it was on a ETO first basis already - and had no real option to change what it sent elsewhere. Same for the USSR - it was fighting for its life - and in that context - we know what it sent to the Far East. I think the ETO conflict might last marginally longer - but it is fought with essentially the same resources - excepting only what we divert from it. That makes the mod easy to impliment - and I want a clear reason for any exceptions.
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el cid again
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- Joined: Mon Oct 10, 2005 4:40 pm
RE: Scenario Request: RHSJFO
ORIGINAL: herwin
ORIGINAL: Bogo Mil
I think you should take lend lease shipments to the USSR into account. If the USA runs a "Japan first" doctrine, many German forces would be freed for the eastern front - thus more lend lease aircraft would be required. This means that the replacement rates of the most common lend lease planes should not be increased that much.
In the real war, the USSR received 3066 A-20 (plus 1699 spare engines) and 865 B-25 (plus 633 engines). If we consider an increased demand (e.g. 100% more), you can probably not increase the replacement rate of the A-20 at all. You might even have to decrease it. They received 6695 fighters (mostly P-39 and P-40). I'm not sure how an increased demand would affect the number of planes available for the PTO. Numbers are from http://lend-lease.airforce.ru/documents ... tion_1.pdf
The production rate of Soviet and British aircraft should be cut down, and new types should be available later. Most of their reinforcement air units should be delayed or not arrive at all.
The pilot replacement rate should be lower for the Russians and Brits, much higher for the Americans.
I'm not sure how Australia and New Zealand would be affected by a "Japan first" doctrine. Would they send more equipment to Noth Africa to help the Brits, or would they adopt "Japan first", too, and send less afainst the Germans? Maybe we should simply not change them at all.
Japan first for America would have allowed the Commonwealth to keep a full Australian corps in the Near East, possibly with the reinforcement of the Australian Armoured Division that was forming.
1) Why? Is not the threat to AUS the same?
2) What division - and is it in our list?
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el cid again
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- Joined: Mon Oct 10, 2005 4:40 pm
RE: Scenario Request: RHSJFO
Score Damaged Ships is now turned off for all scenarios. I like the concept - but it fails to score damaged Allied ships - so it isn't balanced.
Pilot replacement rates for the US are increased by 25% to 250 (USN) 500 (USA) and 125 (USMC).
This had not been done for EEO, EBO and MEBO - but it should be - and now is.
EOS, AIO, MAIO are revised to 225 (USN), 450 (USA) and 113 (USMC).
Pilot replacement rates for the US are increased by 25% to 250 (USN) 500 (USA) and 125 (USMC).
This had not been done for EEO, EBO and MEBO - but it should be - and now is.
EOS, AIO, MAIO are revised to 225 (USN), 450 (USA) and 113 (USMC).
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el cid again
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- Joined: Mon Oct 10, 2005 4:40 pm
RE: Scenario Request: RHSJFO
C-47 production at Long Beach (slot 897) increases from 52 at start (vice 41) adding 48 more (vice 31) for 100 (vice 72).
F4U-1 production at Salt Lake City (slot 330) increases to 66 (vice 44). It starts in Feb 1943 and upgrades to F4U-1D in May 1944.
F4F-4 / FM-1 production at SLC increases by 73 (vice 31) from 15 (vice 13) in January 1942. It upgrades to FM-2 in March 1943.
P-40E production at SLC starts at 45 (vice 29). It upgrades to P-40N in April, 1943. This is a simple reallocation of existing production - and it means 16 fewer got to ETO per month.
Salt Lake City (and New Orleans) represent production in the Eastern USA or sometimes foreign countries not on the map.
F4U-1 production at Salt Lake City (slot 330) increases to 66 (vice 44). It starts in Feb 1943 and upgrades to F4U-1D in May 1944.
F4F-4 / FM-1 production at SLC increases by 73 (vice 31) from 15 (vice 13) in January 1942. It upgrades to FM-2 in March 1943.
P-40E production at SLC starts at 45 (vice 29). It upgrades to P-40N in April, 1943. This is a simple reallocation of existing production - and it means 16 fewer got to ETO per month.
Salt Lake City (and New Orleans) represent production in the Eastern USA or sometimes foreign countries not on the map.
RE: Scenario Request: RHSJFO
Australia and New Zealand worked a deal--US divisions defending Australia and New Zealand covering for ANZAC divisions in the Near East. The 8th Army got to keep an Australian and a NZ division while the other two Australian divisions came home and the 1st Australian Armoured Division stayed home. Patton's 2nd Armored Division was also to deploy to Egypt instead of the armoured division, but it wasn't tanks the 8th Army was short of.ORIGINAL: el cid again
ORIGINAL: herwin
ORIGINAL: Bogo Mil
I think you should take lend lease shipments to the USSR into account. If the USA runs a "Japan first" doctrine, many German forces would be freed for the eastern front - thus more lend lease aircraft would be required. This means that the replacement rates of the most common lend lease planes should not be increased that much.
In the real war, the USSR received 3066 A-20 (plus 1699 spare engines) and 865 B-25 (plus 633 engines). If we consider an increased demand (e.g. 100% more), you can probably not increase the replacement rate of the A-20 at all. You might even have to decrease it. They received 6695 fighters (mostly P-39 and P-40). I'm not sure how an increased demand would affect the number of planes available for the PTO. Numbers are from http://lend-lease.airforce.ru/documents ... tion_1.pdf
The production rate of Soviet and British aircraft should be cut down, and new types should be available later. Most of their reinforcement air units should be delayed or not arrive at all.
The pilot replacement rate should be lower for the Russians and Brits, much higher for the Americans.
I'm not sure how Australia and New Zealand would be affected by a "Japan first" doctrine. Would they send more equipment to Noth Africa to help the Brits, or would they adopt "Japan first", too, and send less afainst the Germans? Maybe we should simply not change them at all.
Japan first for America would have allowed the Commonwealth to keep a full Australian corps in the Near East, possibly with the reinforcement of the Australian Armoured Division that was forming.
1) Why? Is not the threat to AUS the same?
2) What division - and is it in our list?
1st Australian Armoured Division. Formed in July 1941, operated around Perth, and disbanded two years later.
Harry Erwin
"For a number to make sense in the game, someone has to calibrate it and program code. There are too many significant numbers that behave non-linearly to expect that. It's just a game. Enjoy it." herwin@btinternet.com
"For a number to make sense in the game, someone has to calibrate it and program code. There are too many significant numbers that behave non-linearly to expect that. It's just a game. Enjoy it." herwin@btinternet.com
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el cid again
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RE: Scenario Request: RHSJFO
I don't understand this post in game terms. I asked if the unit is in our order of battle? If it is - nothing changes. If it isn't - this is an issue for all scenarios, not just JFO. This is a minimalist mod - for practical and analytical reasons - and it is difficult to really know what might change at all - but inertia in policy is probably a good principle to follow in any case it isn't clear something else applies. National interests sent a,b and c to the Far East - and that probably remains pretty similar- in this almost historical mod.
The USSR tends to understate the value of the Aliled in WWII. But WE tend to understate the value of the USSR in WWII. Part of this is point of view - part of it attitude - and part of it mutual (even wilful in the Russian case) ignorance. Lend Lease is not a big deal - no matter what we believe - in grand terms. And if the bulk by weight went to the Far East by ship - it mostly is not for use in the Far East - and we have no pracical way to model it (whatever we give a player - they use ON the map; also - code cannot tell a Russian flag ship from other ones - and does not understand "neutral" - so shipping is a problem needing some management). Right now it appears we - on advice - messed up in ALL scenarios - and left out the Liberty ships transferred to the USSR - but how many of them do we need - and what are their names? IMHO the Russians would not know they were "better off" because of JFO - they would still see battle in Europe as critical - and indeed I cannot see how it changes very much? What Germany has that matters in the East it still has - and the Soviet response is still what it was. Even if something changes - it probably does not change what Lend Lease is sent. It might change where things go - but by very little: trucks came from the USA - and they are still going wherever they went (the Russians apparently didn't make trucks during the war at all).
CW navies, including Dutch and French but excluding Canada and India and RAN and RNZN (many ships built in theater), have ships arrive 1 month later in 1943, 2 months later in 1944 and 3 months later in 1945.
The USSR tends to understate the value of the Aliled in WWII. But WE tend to understate the value of the USSR in WWII. Part of this is point of view - part of it attitude - and part of it mutual (even wilful in the Russian case) ignorance. Lend Lease is not a big deal - no matter what we believe - in grand terms. And if the bulk by weight went to the Far East by ship - it mostly is not for use in the Far East - and we have no pracical way to model it (whatever we give a player - they use ON the map; also - code cannot tell a Russian flag ship from other ones - and does not understand "neutral" - so shipping is a problem needing some management). Right now it appears we - on advice - messed up in ALL scenarios - and left out the Liberty ships transferred to the USSR - but how many of them do we need - and what are their names? IMHO the Russians would not know they were "better off" because of JFO - they would still see battle in Europe as critical - and indeed I cannot see how it changes very much? What Germany has that matters in the East it still has - and the Soviet response is still what it was. Even if something changes - it probably does not change what Lend Lease is sent. It might change where things go - but by very little: trucks came from the USA - and they are still going wherever they went (the Russians apparently didn't make trucks during the war at all).
CW navies, including Dutch and French but excluding Canada and India and RAN and RNZN (many ships built in theater), have ships arrive 1 month later in 1943, 2 months later in 1944 and 3 months later in 1945.
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el cid again
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- Joined: Mon Oct 10, 2005 4:40 pm
RE: Scenario Request: RHSJFO
Duplicated post from 7.957 update thread:
ROCAF 41st Squadron (French Volunteer Squadron) is reclassified as French - giving it a different experience base of pilots to draw on.
It is a glorified flight - only six planes maximum. (slot 1086)
ROCAF 14th Squadron (International Volunteer Squadron) flights - slots 1082, 1083 and 1085 - are all reclassified as US Army for the same reason.
China Airline (slot 1084) is reclassified as Commonwealth for the same reason.
ROCAF 41st Squadron (French Volunteer Squadron) is reclassified as French - giving it a different experience base of pilots to draw on.
It is a glorified flight - only six planes maximum. (slot 1086)
ROCAF 14th Squadron (International Volunteer Squadron) flights - slots 1082, 1083 and 1085 - are all reclassified as US Army for the same reason.
China Airline (slot 1084) is reclassified as Commonwealth for the same reason.