Ey Tbird3!
I am posting this maybe too prematurely and unedited because it is likely that we will be asked to move out to other forum/thread. So forgive if memory fails me in my writing.
I am convinced that maneuver warfare is sometimes like saliva: it's in everybody's mouth but not many know what exactly is! Not that I claim that I know it. Neither I claim you don't know about it. However, pro and con arguments regarding maneuver warfare have been made popular by people with less than perfect knowledge of what the thing is about. The damaging effect of these popular arguments is as collosal as the one produced by creationists who misinterpret scientific evidence that proves that evolution is real and is happening right now.
Maneuver warfare is not the same as "fire and maneuver", the common and useful tactical principle the US Army painfully learned in WWII. Maneuver warfare is not simply just moving your forces to punch a hole in the enemy line, outflank, or envelop the enemy.
A simple outline of maneuver warfare as I understand it
1) OODA loops (observation, orientation, decision, action). The cycles a fighter pilot takes when engaged in aerial combat, as described by John Boyd, can be extended to commanders in the battlefield.
Implications:
a) if your OODA loops are shorter than the ones of you enemy you will force him to shorten his, a thing he may not be able to do. You have to master the art of shorten the OODA loops in your command structure.
b) if your OODA loops are short and your actions adequate you will force your enemy to take wrong decisions and it will not fight as an organized force anymore.
2) Surfaces and gaps
a) You take advantage of the enemy's gaps, avoid/bypass his strengths and struck into the rear areas to disrupt his cohesion and ability to fight.
3) Point of main effort (schwerpunkt)
a) All units under your command must support the schwerpunkt. All unit commanders under your command must understand which is the schwerpunkt and how to take tactical decisions that support it. A schwerpunkt is not a terrain piece but rather a portion of your forces you commit as the force that will cause the collapse of the enemy's ability to fight as a coherent force (the enemy's center of gravity).
4) Mission type orders.
a) The orders you impart have to be short and must tell exactly what your intentions are in terms of the "big picture". Say goodbye to this kind of orders: "take hill 128 by attacking with your company using the cover of the woods here". Say hello to this: "the schwerpunkt coys will likely be threatened by enemy fire at hill 128. Deny the enemy the ability to fire from that hill". Your subordinate knows what you want because he knows why you want it. Granted he may take the cover of the mentioned woods and take hill 128, but he could also position his forces yielding the enemy position at hill 128 useless, forcing him to evacuate that hill. Commanders under your command have to be given the freedom to act on the spot and take decisions of actions they think will likely help the schwerpunkt. Your goal is to create a highly decentralized force and accept the apparent chaos of not knowing exactly where some of your insubordinates are.
Now certainly, points 1) to 4) are not new. Not an argument there. "Maneuver warfare is not new. It probaly dates from the first time a caveman surprised an enemy from behind instead of meeting him club-to-club. The first clear case in recorded history was the battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C." This is an exact quote of W. Lind's "Maneuver Warfare Handbook". Maneuver warfare is not a new way to fight (generals had used it since long time ago) but a series of principles that try to capture the essence of previous successes. So I will not argue more (in fact I never said that) with the "this is not new" concept.
There has been some kind of historical backlash that tries to imply that the US Army just recently learned how to fight and win wars effectively. The typical assertion of manueverist is that the US Army historically only fought attritionally in the past and has just recently adopted this new theory of effectively waging war.
I don't belong to the camp of people who thinks that the US Army learnt to fight modern wars recently. I don't believe that the US Army was transformed to the mean war machine of today because of maneuver warfare.
When you go down this trail I have to ask several questions. What level of war are we talking about? Strategically? Operationally? Tactical?
Operationally and tactically.
General Grants Wilderness campaign is one of the first that come to mind. WWI might be another one...oops, we can do the indirect approach and hit Turkey maybe? Oh, thats right, they tried that.....I believe it was Galipoli?
The American Civil War was the painful realization that the days of those Napoleonic decisive battles (the single battles that decided the fate of an entire war) were totally over. Years of bloody and indecisive battles. That's what we want for a model of waging war?
The same applies for WWI. Galipoli was a costly battle too.
Lets look at it for a second. Desert Storm I, a great example of maneuver warfare! The "hail mary", "the left hook", and on and on. In reality it was generally a good application of the doctrine of airland battle. Airland battle was formally established in the US Army in 1982. If you look at what the MEF did in DS I you can in no way convince me that they were conducting maneuver warfare. The literally attacked into the teeth of the defense of Iraqi's. I believe that this attritional warfare at it's best, servicing enemy target arrays as necessary. However, from the 3rd Army's and CENTCOM's point of view they were conducting a penetration attack to initially fix the Iraqi army to facilitate VII and XVIII corps to conduct an envelopment of the Iraqi forces in and near Kuwait. Now, when you look at what VII corps did upon meeting the Iraqi Republican Guard Divisions you can't really call it manuever warfare either because it basically consisted of putting four armored divisions online and blasting their way through the enemy forces. So my arguement is that it just flatout depends on what your trying to accomplish is what will drive your course of action.
The two wars against the Iraqi Army were fought with the upmost profesionalism by the Coalition forces. However, the operational and tactical errors commited by the Iraqis were so gross that ANYTHING would have worked.
Absolutely! See above. A good commander is going to try to set the conditions for victory. It might be through manuever or might be through direct application of massive combat power at a selected location.
And if that selected location is the enemy's center of gravity, voila, you are a maneuverist!
Hey, the Germans eventually lost at the strategic, operational, and yest the tactical level. You have to win starting at the bottom up in order to achieve victory.
Granted, but the German Army was carrying out operational and tactical orders from a lunatic that shot (or forced to suicide) his best generals.
Additionally, maneuverist never quite completely tell you how to win but often than not how not win (read attrition).
BTW, how would you define attrition warfare?
Who said that it isn't working in Iraq now? I tell you with the utmost confidence that it is being used very effectively. The conditions have merely changed and there is no "quick" solution to fight that is going on there now.
Do you really think that the present-day US Army is going to beat sustained guerrilla operations in urban environments?
Cheers,