Tactical use of airpower in COTA and WW2

[Count Sessine]

I have always wondered somewhat about the use of airpower in COTA. With a game where the focus is on the operational level, it has always struck me as inconsistent that airstrikes are micromanaged the way they are. It also seems inconsistent with the way airpower was used in WW2. In WW2, as far as I know, it was very rare that ground based units had the opportunity, indeed the possibility, of calling in tactical air-to-ground support in the way we see it used in COTA. Wouldn't it be more realistic to give the airforce a 'box', say of 8*8 km, in the morning of each day, and tell them to either interdict movement, or strike tanks/artillery positions etc? That way you cannot guarantee exactly where it hits, only the general area where aircraft will operate. You could also potentially include friendly fire incidents. Another, less work-intensive, way of dealing with it (that is if you agree it needs dealing with ), is to remove the strikes completely.

[Arjuna]

Count Sessine,
 
It is certainly true that at the start of WW2 techniques for ground air control were very primitive. And by todays standards they weren't that hot by the end of the war. But certainly by 1944 the Western Allies had invested in and developed the equipment and the procedures to do so. It required specially trained personnel ( often ex pilots ) manning specialised vehicles fitted out with powerful radios to communicate between air units and ground commanders.
 
At the time of Market Garden for instance the Guards Armoured Division had at least one of these units effectively permanently attached to each of its four battle groups. And they were pretty effective at calling in strikes at short notice and in close proximity to friendly ground units. Admittedly they had plenty of air cover overhead and both the air units and controllers had experience working with each other.
 
The American units in the Bulge also enjoyed excellent close air support once the weather permitted. When the weather was bad yes they fell back on bomb lines and inderdiction zones. But this was not the optimum option.
 
German ground /air control was less effective. They too had specialised controllers, but less of them and their pilot quality was so low by 1944 that they rarely achieved effective close air support in that way. Instead they relied on pre-planned bombing targets ususally conducted at night ( as at Eindhoven in MG and Bastogne in the Bulge ).
 
Can we do better at simulating this. For sure we can. I'd like to better simulate it by representing the air forces as units, with bases either on-map or off and conducting realistic air missions. But again, it's a big job and for now it will have to wait.