Coup De Main

[shocks]

Great fun. First effort lost hands down Playing as allies I tried to attack and defend to many VLs before XXX corp arrived. Learnt my lesson and replayed defending Arhhem. I let the axis wear its self down attacking the paras in built up areas. My blocking force west of Arnhem saved my bacon a couple of times. I was suprised/disappointed/pleased that the relief columns had such an easy run north. No resistance at all! Had to rebuild the railway bridge. The axis never gave up just ran out of quality troops attacking entrenched positions
Great fun!

Shocks
Armchair General and Sofa Surfer

[Golf33]

Sounds like you managed to block the Axis forces North of the river - that can happen if you hold both bridges or hold the Highway Bridge and the Railway Bridge gets blown. Nice work!

Regards
33

[Cage]

How'd you deal with the Tiger II's? They are brutally tough to destroy.

Cage.

[Arjuna]

In a word - "17pdrs". Either AT or Fireflys. That's what you need. However, a 6pdr or 75mm tank gun from a Sherman shooting one up the rear can do the job.[:)]

[Cage]

Yeah I fully understand the realistic principles of taking out Tiger II's. I was wondering in practical terms within his campaign how he did it...he mentions it being pretty easy, I've never yet had what I would call an "easy" time taking out the Tiger II's.

Plus given his casualty numbers, I'd say the fighting must have been pretty bloody in areas.

Cage.

[Grognard]

Plus given his casualty numbers, I'd say the fighting must have been pretty bloody in areas.

Cage.

Actually, given those casualty #'s, how about a new victory level called "Pyrrhic".

[Cage]

Very true.

Cage.

[Makoto]

looking at your score it seems like this was a slugathon [;)]

[Golf33]

ORIGINAL: Makoto

looking at your score it seems like this was a slugathon [;)]

Not necessarily. Remember in wargames we keep fighting to achieve the objective, regardless of cost. In real life, commanders will make a decision to cut their losses at a much lower level of bloodshed. For example, historically the XXX Corps drive to Arnhem was called off because it threatened to become a bloodbath; in the game no player is likely to simply abandon this effort because then they will lose anyway!

Regards
33

[Cage]

Actually any wargame I play, I'm always ruled by casualties rather than objective. I never "waste" my electronic men pursuing Victory points. Always works very well for me as a principle, conservation of force...kill the enemy and don't let any of yours die. Maximum aggression with minimum risk.

In the Historic Arnhem campaign I put Victory conditions on myself of attaining the Objectives at a cost of 8000 dead. Less than that the better, so by my ideal losing 16400 dead would be a defeat no matter how many enemy I killed.

[Grognard]

When any of my units get down to about 30% effectives it's repo/depo time for them.
They can garrison VP locations or perform rear area security. I don't like losing units.
I think historically if a unit got down to about 30%, under non extreme conditions it was pretty much done as a front line combat unit and treated as such by command.
Unfortunately, Arnhem was VERY extreme and the only "rear area" was due south across a major river, and even that was still "indian country".
We know now that Market-Garden was seriously flawed in planning and execution, especially at Arnhem (we can argue about the concept). My point is, in the Historical Arnhem Campaign(s) only, the victory conditions are unrealistic as they are based on that flawed planning.
I say give the Axis MANY more VP's for "Destroy the Enemy". That changes the operational thinking for the Allied commander considerably. A Decisive victory becomes almost impossible - as it was historically.
Settle for the RR bridge, shorten your lines, and don't waste (however simulated) lives.
A Decisive victory with 27,000 casualties is not a decisive victory.
The British 1st Airborne Division has still ceased to exist.
I guess I'll mod the scenario and finally play one through to the end.........

[Golf33]

Bear in mind that the 'kills' statistic includes all losses whether killed, wounded, shell-shocked, deserted, or surrendered.

Regards
33

[Arjuna]

ORIGINAL: Grognard
I say give the Axis MANY more VP's for "Destroy the Enemy". That changes the operational thinking for the Allied commander considerably. A Decisive victory becomes almost impossible - as it was historically.
Settle for the RR bridge, shorten your lines, and don't waste (however simulated) lives.
A Decisive victory with 27,000 casualties is not a decisive victory.
The British 1st Airborne Division has still ceased to exist.
I guess I'll mod the scenario and finally play one through to the end.........

First off, I agree that conservation of force is very important. But history is replete with examples where this was not the paramount concern of the commander in question. This is particularly so, when a commander is but one part in a bigger plan, where he knows that his superior is prepared to sacrifice lives to attain an objective, which in the superior's view will ultimately save more lives than not, or where there is no alternative. Eg. Ridgeway's orders to seize the causeway near Carentan in Normandy. He knew that the first unit ordered to assault would more than likely be cut down. But he also knew that if he did not secure the causeway the invasion beachead would be lost. Ditto at Nijmegen with the suicidal assault river crossing. Likewise with Arnhem, where the securing of the crossing would have greatly shortened the war and reduced overall Allied casualties. From the strategic commanders view point, the loss of the 1st Abn Div would have been worth it. If successful it probably would have saved over 100,000 allied casualties.

Patton held the view that the best way to save lives was to drive his men headlong into the enemy with relentless pressure. While this increased the risk to those at the sharp end he argued that it reduced overall casualties by avoiding set peice battles where the advantages enjoyed by a mobile fighting force were largely offset. By and large this line of argument was accepted by his field commanders and in conjunction with his policy of rotating the units at the sharp end was largely accepted by the troops too.