In Georgia, Lee held off Grant once again. With Grant not having initiative, he wasn't giving his combat bonus to his units. The fact that the army did as well as it did is a testament to the quality of the corps commanders there, the experience of the troops, and the huge Union artillery advantage (several battalions of heavy artillery were left in Atlanta as they are not allowed to move in the reaction phase).
In Tennessee, the Confederates fought a delaying action before retreating to Chattanooga where Thomas Jackson and several units from the Army of Mississippi arrived to stabilize the situation.
In Wilmington, a Union amphibious force caused a number of casualties to the defending Confederates before the Confederates withdrew to the Wilmington fortifications and the Union army decided they were not strong enough to take the town.
This brings us to Darlington and the mistake that may prove to have gotten Lincoln elected. Joe Johnston in Columbia did not have initiative in August. Although his army was close enough to move to Darlington (up the rail line from Columbia towards Wilmington), the lack of initiative meant that he would not be able to give his command bonus to more than the few units that started in Darlington. This represents that he did not react quickly enough to maximize his defense of Darlington. Knowing this, I could have declined a major engagement and instead remained in Columbia. Of course, losing Darlington would strain the Confederate ability to protect both Columbia and Wilmington. Going into the battle, I knew that I could get 50,000 troops to Darlington, but didn't know how large the enemy army was. I gambled that the Union army wasn't big enough to push aside a major Confederate army. This proved disastrous as the Union army was 75000 strong and without the Johnston's combat bonus, he couldn't beat Sheridan. The battle odds at the end were 1.15 to 1, and Sheridan one a strategic victory.
The new of all of these battles was a gain of about 20 political points for both sides, terrible attrition, and a bad strategic situation for the Confederacy. On the other hand, the Union movements gave my cavalry several chances for raiding. Wade Hampton followed Grant's army back to Augusta and harassed it mercilessly, destroying an capturing 41 supplies, trashing the rail system, and rendering the depot there impotent. Wheeler's cavalry slipped past Sheridan's army after the battle of Darlington and trashed the depots in Georgetown. Both Grant and Sheridan will be paying double supply costs to supply their army next turn. In Mississippi, Forrest went wild, causing 50,000 Union troops to have to pay double supply costs in September. The destruction to supplies, the added supply costs, and the supplies needed to repair the rail damage amounts to nearly 300 supply points. I'm pretty sure that some of the Union army will be short on supply next turn (perhaps as much as 100,000 troops), and the Union will have a hard time replacing the units lost, repairing the rail lines, and restocking it's supplies. Also, in September, Lyon in Tennessee, Sheridan in South Carolina, and Grant in Georgia will not be getting depot bonuses for initiative. On average, only 1 or 2 Union generals should get initiative next turn.
Of course the Union doesn't need much now, only about 20 more political points, in order to get Lincoln re-elected.
