Does anyone else think the USA CV pilots are over skilled for 1941?

[Bombur]

Why on Earth would you take out Midway? Why not take out Coral Sea and Santa Cruz? You need to look at all the battles to get an broader analysis.

-Because, as I said before, the performance of IJN leadership in Midway was so bad, from strategic planning to tatical operations of carriers, that aircrews skill really didn´t count too much in the final result of the battle. Most IJN planes were destroyed on their carriers before they had an opportunity to have contact with USN planes (except TBD´s, of course). The three other battles were more symetrical, in the sense that both sides were able to see and attack the enemy at the same time. So I think it´s reasonable to take out Midway if you want to compare aircrews abilities, but even doing this we cannot reach any definitive conclusion.

It wasn't luck that put the USN in position to hit the Japanese Carriers. It was the skill of Code Breakers. Once the First Devastator attacks came in Nagumo knew he was fighting more then 1 USN carrier. You seem to be willing to grant the Japanese amazing skill for fighting back and getting past US AA and Radar. Yet you don't grant the same skill to the USN pilots that faced your vaunted Japanese aircrews and still sank four out of four. You can't say, "well the zeros were drawn low by the TBDs so it doesn't count" the superior Zero pilots should have know where torpedo bombers are Dive bombers are sure to follow.

-I never said the USN had luck in Midway, quite the opposite, it was USA superior intellingence and IJN mistakes that produced the final results. I´m not saying that the USN or IJN aircrews were better too. What I said is that the results in Midway simply doesn´t reflected relative skills from pilots due to other variables, and that in the other battles we have a better performance of IJN, BUT ONLY BECAUSE THEIR TORPEDO BOMBERS HAD A BETTER PERFORMANCE. So, our opinions aren´t really much different. On the performance of USA attackers in Midway, again we are confronted with atypical situations, because the TBD´s were decimated (as expected, if Kates attacked unescorted the results would have been the same), the escort F4F´s took a minor part in the battle, and the SBD´s found no CAP. Neither we can say the A6M´s on CAP performed well, because essentially all of their victories were obtained against unescorted bombers,so we have a situation were the most impressive performance is that from IJN bomber crews that achieved some success in very adverse conditions, but this doesn´t imply they were better than their USA counterparts, if you gave them TBD´s and USN torpedoes they wouldn´t have achieved too much.

Jimmy Thach shot down his zeros over the Japanese task force, not the USN one. Check your facts but more then half of the Zero losses were over their own carriers.

-Do you have this data? I would like to see it. And also to see how many Zeroes were lost while on CAP defending CVL´s, as both Ryujo and Shoho were sunk the the mentioned battles. IF most of A6M´s were lost to escorting F4F´s in the 4 battles, we have some evidence of better skills favoring USN pilots.

Radar proved much more effective to vector in WIldcats on Jap Bombers. They didn't need to tangle with the Zeros unless it got in the way of their mission to defend the Carriers, by shooting down bombers. Radar was one of the tools that USN aviators trained with. Why discount it? That's like saying you can't compair Zeros and Wildcats because the Zero was more manueverable!

-Hmmmm....I will agree with you on this.

In this area things get murky. You can't compair the pilots Apples to Apples. The historical fact is that in these Carrier battles the losses of Zeros and Wildcats turns out to be even. It shouldn't matter who's carriers they were over, not to elite pilots. I've never stated that USN pilots were superior or that IJN ones were.

-Well, again I agree with you.

But I disagree strongly with the statement that the Japanese were vastly superior to their USN counterparts. The impression one gets from these message boards is that the USN pilots were horribly unskilled and the only way they ever survived was because of shear luck. History doesn't agree either.

-This is correct.

I´m not saying here that IJN or USN pilots were superior, just pointing to the obstacles in making a correct analysis.

[/quote]

-On Santa Cruz battle: The Zui and Sho still had good aircrews, but they were probably not at the Pre Midway levels, as the number of Midway survivors were not probably enough to fill complately the two carriers, and we must consider that about 1/3 of planes (from IJN side) involved in that battle were from the two light Carriers (well, the Junyo was not exactly a light carrier...)

[mdiehl]

You seem to be willing to grant the Japanese amazing skill for fighting back and getting past US AA and Radar.

It is as though the standards of evaluation shift every time you win the argument. [;)] Midway is a very interesting fight. Coral Sea as well. I do not think that one can evaluate the quality of the pilots on the basis of the numbers or types of ships sunk or damage, but if one uses that standard one should count ALL of the ships. I think the better standard is how did the pilots fare vs each other, and for my book the only really germane way to evaluate that is to look at the F4F vs A6M loss ratios in combats between the two planes; that is, you can't even just count all the F4Fs lost or all the A6Ms lost because both types were lost in combat against aircraft other than fighters or simply "missing, presumed lost, fate unknown."

Leo (Apollo11) is right. I do not think that there was much USN luck involved at Midway. I think most of the luck favored the Japanese. 1. The USN was where it wanted to be because of skill and a simple, direct, achievable objective. 2. The USN deliberately timed its airstrikes to catch Japanese a/c on the deck reloading, courtesy of Brown. Paid the price in TBDs as a result. 3. There is no evidence that NOT dragging the CAP to TBD level would have saved the Japanese. In part because the SBDs were quite capable of fighting through to their targets and also because many of the SBDs had escorts. The TBDs at Coral Sea when unmolested were able to put six detonating torpedo hits out of nine fired into, err, Shoho. 4. The only reason why the IJN found ANY USN ships at all was because Tone 4 scout plane launched late. Bob Ballard has demonstrated on the basis of that plane's flight log that had she flown her assigned patrol route, Yorktown would never have been observed. 5. The Japanese Soryu pilots benefitted greatly from pure luck in spotting distantly the retiring US SBDs and followed them back to Yorktown. With a tiny CAP, most of the attacking aircraft were destroyed. Soryu was then destroyed in a follow-up strike launched using sabout 2/3 of a carrier load of planes. No reason to think that 1 for 1 a USN CV was not as lethal as a big IJN CV.

All of this gets back to "EXP" which is one of two major factors that influence the outcome of engagements in this combat sim. On the basis of kill ratios, the USN/USMC plane(F4F)+pilot(exp) combination should be more lethal to the A6Mplane+pilot combination than the latter is to F4Fplane+pilots. From 1941-June 1942 this should statistically play out to somewhere between 1.2:1-1.5:1 favoring the USN.

Hipper --

I dont think at any time in operational service in north africa in 1941 or 1942 the RAF felt that the various models of P40 that they had were a match for the opposing marks of Me 109. I don't think they appreciated being boomed and zoomed. They compensated by using superior numbers and letting those "marginaly better hurricanes" try to take on the german fighters, of course the Hurricane II's were outmached as well.

Maybe not, but I'm not sure their opinion matters in setting up the model for a strategic sim. Since you can't put real pilots in real planes we have to use these crude proxy indices like maneuverability and "exp." The only way to know if your model works properly is to look at the central tendencies -- on the whole pilots of X nation and service flying aircraft model Y, in combat with pilots of x-prime nation and service flying model Y-prime, lost Z of their own aircraft while destroying Z-prime of the enemy. I farnkly don't know the RAF records for North Africa. I do know that most accounts of USAAF P40s vs. Me109s give the P40 more kills than planes lost. When you look at the circumstances in which they were used, chiefly below 17,000 feet, at least part of the conclusion is inescapably that the P40 was a better a/c in those circumstances; it was more maneuverable and faster at that altitude.

Now I am interested in the P40's combat record after TORCH I dont think the record of the allied air forces in French North Africa was that good (apart from shooting down the French that is) untill 1943 when again numbers were begining to tell.
but I remain to be educated

Part of the problem is that the argument must be based on qualitative summaries (you can look for example at the two major histories of the USAAF in WW2) and "official confirmed kills." AFAIC, the latter aren't worth squat. US and German "confirmed kills" awarded fighter pilots seem to me on the whole to be inflated by a factor of three. Japanese "confirmed kills" somehwere between a factor of ten and twenty. In numerous instances in 1942, you see the Japanese claiming more kills than there were US aircraft engaged --- often as extreme as "Confirmed kills: 17" vs. "Actual results, one plane destroyed."

The record of the P40 in the western desert does not bear out your proposition that it was a superior fighter compared to the opposing 109's , the real world has no height limits.

Actually, the real world does in fact have "height limits." When you read, for example, accounts of some of the 1942 escorted Japanese bomber strikes on New Guinea, one thing that pissed off the Japanese fighter pilots is that the P40s would not turn into them and climb to 21000 feet to engage. The Zekes thought the Allied pilots rather cowardly (but I note they were often unwilling to descend to 16,000 feet to engage). So "height limits" exist if a pilot is smart enough to keep his plane in its best performance envelope. Since the consequences of not intercepting these ineffective raids were nil, seems like a good tactic to me.

like the sig files btw

Thanks!

[mdiehl]

The three other battles were more symetrical, in the sense that both sides were able to see and attack the enemy at the same time.

Carl Sagan in The Demon Haunted World put together, as a kind of logical tool, something he called the "Baloney Detector Kit." One of the flashing red lights that indicates baloney is the selective use of data. What's so "symmetrical" about Coral Sea where the US ships were, during the critical hours, easily observed in clear weather, but Shokaku and Zuikaku obscured by low overcast? There's luck that far and away trumps any argument of US luck at Midway.

[m10bob]

ORIGINAL: Bombur

Why on Earth would you take out Midway? Why not take out Coral Sea and Santa Cruz? You need to look at all the battles to get an broader analysis.

-Because, as I said before, the performance of IJN leadership in Midway was so bad, from strategic planning to tatical operations of carriers, that aircrews skill really didn´t count too much in the final result of the battle. Most IJN planes were destroyed on their carriers before they had an opportunity to have contact with USN planes (except TBD´s, of course). The three other battles were more symetrical, in the sense that both sides were able to see and attack the enemy at the same time. So I think it´s reasonable to take out Midway if you want to compare aircrews abilities, but even doing this we cannot reach any definitive conclusion.

It wasn't luck that put the USN in position to hit the Japanese Carriers. It was the skill of Code Breakers. Once the First Devastator attacks came in Nagumo knew he was fighting more then 1 USN carrier. You seem to be willing to grant the Japanese amazing skill for fighting back and getting past US AA and Radar. Yet you don't grant the same skill to the USN pilots that faced your vaunted Japanese aircrews and still sank four out of four. You can't say, "well the zeros were drawn low by the TBDs so it doesn't count" the superior Zero pilots should have know where torpedo bombers are Dive bombers are sure to follow.

-I never said the USN had luck in Midway, quite the opposite, it was USA superior intellingence and IJN mistakes that produced the final results. I´m not saying that the USN or IJN aircrews were better too. What I said is that the results in Midway simply doesn´t reflected relative skills from pilots due to other variables, and that in the other battles we have a better performance of IJN, BUT ONLY BECAUSE THEIR TORPEDO BOMBERS HAD A BETTER PERFORMANCE. So, our opinions aren´t really much different. On the performance of USA attackers in Midway, again we are confronted with atypical situations, because the TBD´s were decimated (as expected, if Kates attacked unescorted the results would have been the same), the escort F4F´s took a minor part in the battle, and the SBD´s found no CAP. Neither we can say the A6M´s on CAP performed well, because essentially all of their victories were obtained against unescorted bombers,so we have a situation were the most impressive performance is that from IJN bomber crews that achieved some success in very adverse conditions, but this doesn´t imply they were better than their USA counterparts, if you gave them TBD´s and USN torpedoes they wouldn´t have achieved too much.

Jimmy Thach shot down his zeros over the Japanese task force, not the USN one. Check your facts but more then half of the Zero losses were over their own carriers.

-Do you have this data? I would like to see it. And also to see how many Zeroes were lost while on CAP defending CVL´s, as both Ryujo and Shoho were sunk the the mentioned battles. IF most of A6M´s were lost to escorting F4F´s in the 4 battles, we have some evidence of better skills favoring USN pilots.

Radar proved much more effective to vector in WIldcats on Jap Bombers. They didn't need to tangle with the Zeros unless it got in the way of their mission to defend the Carriers, by shooting down bombers. Radar was one of the tools that USN aviators trained with. Why discount it? That's like saying you can't compair Zeros and Wildcats because the Zero was more manueverable!

-Hmmmm....I will agree with you on this.

In this area things get murky. You can't compair the pilots Apples to Apples. The historical fact is that in these Carrier battles the losses of Zeros and Wildcats turns out to be even. It shouldn't matter who's carriers they were over, not to elite pilots. I've never stated that USN pilots were superior or that IJN ones were.

-Well, again I agree with you.

But I disagree strongly with the statement that the Japanese were vastly superior to their USN counterparts. The impression one gets from these message boards is that the USN pilots were horribly unskilled and the only way they ever survived was because of shear luck. History doesn't agree either.

-This is correct.

I´m not saying here that IJN or USN pilots were superior, just pointing to the obstacles in making a correct analysis.

-On Santa Cruz battle: The Zui and Sho still had good aircrews, but they were probably not at the Pre Midway levels, as the number of Midway survivors were not probably enough to fill complately the two carriers, and we must consider that about 1/3 of planes (from IJN side) involved in that battle were from the two light Carriers (well, the Junyo was not exactly a light carrier...)
[/quote]
Bombur......
Partner,your knowledge of the Battle of Midway is flawed..The Japanese had excellent leadership at all levels during that battle,and the only 2 major mistakes made were making the entire plan too complex(and this was only in the crucial simultaneousness of the seperate fleets needing to perform their seperate tasks in order),and the spur of the moment decision to unarm planes and rearm,allowing the U.S.planes to find the carriers with loaded decks..
This carrier force was the very same force which hit Pearl Harbor,(Akagi,Kaga,Hiryu,Soryu)..
The tactical leader was the same,Mitsuo Fuchida.
The plan was so secret none of the operational Admirals were even involved in Yamamato's plannings till they had all returned from their southern expeditions..
(Recommend you read MIDWAY,by Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya,printed by U.S.Navy Institue,1955).
Joseph Roquefort(U.S.Navy cryptologist extraordinaire) was only reading approx 2(two) percent of the Japanese code just prior to Midway,and the ONLY way he could half-ass sell his belief to Nimitz was with that "broken water purifier" message he had the Midway base put over the radio.
The real heroes at Midway were Torpedo 8,who came in at low level and dragged the "out of control" CAP to their level,which allowed the Dauntlesses to attack unhindered..
I have for years read that last statement in several books,and have always wondered why 4 Japanese carriers could not have the training necessary to post CAP at different levels?
ALL were "on the deck" when the DB's arrived......(So much for Japanese pilot discipline/training)?
Fighter involvement did not happen till after the bomb runs,and then John Thach(Not "Jimmy")and his people made the combat debut of the "Thach Weave".
Please see the websites I listed on my last thread entry..Lotta "official" detail there,and surely something there for all of us?

[freeboy]

Midway was one thing, a bush-wack... by this I mean strategically the Jap fleets where not ready the day of the decisive battles to engage the US cvs, and the US was ready.. intercepts!!! If you redo history, give the Japs some idea the us is around things look much different...
btw bush -wack is not a political comment [:-]

[m10bob]

Freeboy,your kidding,right?..Armed forces are trained and go into battle with the expectation of meeting the enemy.What do you think they were there for??.Do you really think the U.S. "jumped out from behind a rock"??.We were all at war......
Please re-read my last thread ref Commander Roquefort..We were only reading 2% of the Japanese code..
Try writing a 100 word letter and then only send 2 of those words to somebody......[8|]

[mdiehl]

Midway was one thing, a bush-wack... by this I mean strategically the Jap fleets where not ready the day of the decisive battles to engage the US cvs, and the US was ready.. intercepts!!! If you redo history, give the Japs some idea the us is around things look much different...

No, things do not look all that different. Following IJN fleet ops doctrine you still have: 1. CA based float planes doing your recon for you - an insufficient number of them, 2. An unsuppressed major land installation and airbase that will absorb the attention of your CVs. That was the strategic problem facing Nagumo. If you go assume that CVs are in the area and pull your punches on the land base, then the land base might kill you. To ignore this well-known, well-understood fact is to assume that Nagumo could no, on the basis of no information, that Midway's air components lacked offensive punch. Even so, Midway was still a far more effective scouting platform than the IJN's cruiser-scouts, so it seems very likely to me that the US would still have located the Japanese TF first, and that the US would have time the delivery of its airstrikes to catch Japanese planes on the deck.

But all of this is informed speculation. If you really want to diddle with circumstances you can create any scenario you want. Like this one. At Coral Sea, a damage control technician vents a certain compartment manually, rather than engaging a blower. USS Lexington retires from the combat area and joins the other three at Midway. Earlier in the Coral Sea engagement, IJN Zuikaku is sunk, being detected in open water and clear skies and having spent most of her air complement in a massive strike on a DD and a fleet oiler. All her pilots die looking for a place to land. Shokaku, badly damaged, founders on her return trip to Japan (as she almost did), leaving the US talley at Coral sea as follows: no US CVs lost, 2 big and 1 baby IJN CVs sunk. At Midway, the US "big 4" catch ALL of the IJN remaining 4 by surprise, resulting in the loss of 4 IJN CVs and no damage to the USN CVs. Indeed, the initial strike is so effective that substantial amounts of USN aircraft remain to deliver subsequent strikes on the IJN's fleet escorts. Four IJN CAs are sunk. Nagumo is killed. No Japanese pilots who sail with Kido Butai on that mission survive. At night, ice weasels overwhelm the crews on the retiring Japanese transports and they all die of plague.

[Bombur]

Bombur......
Partner,your knowledge of the Battle of Midway is flawed..The Japanese had excellent leadership at all levels during that battle,and the only 2 major mistakes made were making the entire plan too complex(and this was only in the crucial simultaneousness of the seperate fleets needing to perform their seperate tasks in order),and the spur of the moment decision to unarm planes and rearm,allowing the U.S.planes to find the carriers with loaded decks..

-Exactly. These two mistakes were big enough to cost IJN four carriers. I would add a little more mistakes.
1-Disposition of Naval forces. There was no necessity of diversionary action in the Aleutians.Junyo and Ryujo should have sent with the invasion fleet. They would have resulted in additional firepower and much more air recon.
2-Poor position of Battleships. They should have supported the main fleet, maybe 50-60 miles ahead of IJN CV´s, instead of being in the rear. The potential threat of Yamato and Co would have make the USN plan more complicated, as the CV´s should have reached dangerously close to the Japanese BB´s to launch their TBD´s, and the IJN BB´s would have been subjected to air attacks that, otherwise, would have been reserved to IJN CV´s.
3-Absence of adequate air recon. The Japanese relied on a few floatplanes, while the USA had land based recon
-In order words, by dispersing its superior firepower in a ver large area, the IJN reached a situation where the attacker had less planes than the defender in the battle zone. By lacking adequate air recon, the Japanese allowed USA to attack first. These are fatal planning mistakes, I think. Notice that I´m hardly a IJN fanboy, as I´m arguing that the IJN put itself in a very dangerous situation, and actually the wargames made before Midway pointed to the fact the operation was extremely risky. You will be in inferiority every time you attempt to attack an enemy that has land based air cover while you´re depending on CV based air support only, unless you outnumber or outclass the enemy by a large margin. The question is very simple. CV´s can be sunk and land bases can´t. The superior USA intelligence made things even worse for IJN.

The real heroes at Midway were Torpedo 8,who came in at low level and dragged the "out of control" CAP to their level,which allowed the Dauntlesses to attack unhindered..

-Well, there were also the many LBA which attacked the IJN CV´s. I´m not sure but it probably caused some additional disruption on CAP

I have for years read that last statement in several books,and have always wondered why 4 Japanese carriers could not have the training necessary to post CAP at different levels?

-And so we´re back to poor leadership....

[m10bob]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Midway was one thing, a bush-wack... by this I mean strategically the Jap fleets where not ready the day of the decisive battles to engage the US cvs, and the US was ready.. intercepts!!! If you redo history, give the Japs some idea the us is around things look much different...

No, things do not look all that different. Following IJN fleet ops doctrine you still have: 1. CA based float planes doing your recon for you - an insufficient number of them, 2. An unsuppressed major land installation and airbase that will absorb the attention of your CVs. That was the strategic problem facing Nagumo. If you go assume that CVs are in the area and pull your punches on the land base, then the land base might kill you. To ignore this well-known, well-understood fact is to assume that Nagumo could no, on the basis of no information, that Midway's air components lacked offensive punch. Even so, Midway was still a far more effective scouting platform than the IJN's cruiser-scouts, so it seems very likely to me that the US would still have located the Japanese TF first, and that the US would have time the delivery of its airstrikes to catch Japanese planes on the deck.

But all of this is informed speculation. If you really want to diddle with circumstances you can create any scenario you want. Like this one. At Coral Sea, a damage control technician vents a certain compartment manually, rather than engaging a blower. USS Lexington retires from the combat area and joins the other three at Midway. Earlier in the Coral Sea engagement, IJN Zuikaku is sunk, being detected in open water and clear skies and having spent most of her air complement in a massive strike on a DD and a fleet oiler. All her pilots die looking for a place to land. Shokaku, badly damaged, founders on her return trip to Japan (as she almost did), leaving the US talley at Coral sea as follows: no US CVs lost, 2 big and 1 baby IJN CVs sunk. At Midway, the US "big 4" catch ALL of the IJN remaining 4 by surprise, resulting in the loss of 4 IJN CVs and no damage to the USN CVs. Indeed, the initial strike is so effective that substantial amounts of USN aircraft remain to deliver subsequent strikes on the IJN's fleet escorts. Four IJN CAs are sunk. Nagumo is killed. No Japanese pilots who sail with Kido Butai on that mission survive. At night, ice weasels overwhelm the crews on the retiring Japanese transports and they all die of plague.

***Some die of the" Bloody Flux"....****LMAO[:D]

[m10bob]

ORIGINAL: Bombur

Bombur......
Partner,your knowledge of the Battle of Midway is flawed..The Japanese had excellent leadership at all levels during that battle,and the only 2 major mistakes made were making the entire plan too complex(and this was only in the crucial simultaneousness of the seperate fleets needing to perform their seperate tasks in order),and the spur of the moment decision to unarm planes and rearm,allowing the U.S.planes to find the carriers with loaded decks..

-Exactly. These two mistakes were big enough to cost IJN four carriers. I would add a little more mistakes.
1-Disposition of Naval forces. There was no necessity of diversionary action in the Aleutians.Junyo and Ryujo should have sent with the invasion fleet. They would have resulted in additional firepower and much more air recon.
2-Poor position of Battleships. They should have supported the main fleet, maybe 50-60 miles ahead of IJN CV´s, instead of being in the rear. The potential threat of Yamato and Co would have make the USN plan more complicated, as the CV´s should have reached dangerously close to the Japanese BB´s to launch their TBD´s, and the IJN BB´s would have been subjected to air attacks that, otherwise, would have been reserved to IJN CV´s.
3-Absence of adequate air recon. The Japanese relied on a few floatplanes, while the USA had land based recon
-In order words, by dispersing its superior firepower in a ver large area, the IJN reached a situation where the attacker had less planes than the defender in the battle zone. By lacking adequate air recon, the Japanese allowed USA to attack first. These are fatal planning mistakes, I think. Notice that I´m hardly a IJN fanboy, as I´m arguing that the IJN put itself in a very dangerous situation, and actually the wargames made before Midway pointed to the fact the operation was extremely risky. You will be in inferiority every time you attempt to attack an enemy that has land based air cover while you´re depending on CV based air support only, unless you outnumber or outclass the enemy by a large margin. The question is very simple. CV´s can be sunk and land bases can´t. The superior USA intelligence made things even worse for IJN.

The real heroes at Midway were Torpedo 8,who came in at low level and dragged the "out of control" CAP to their level,which allowed the Dauntlesses to attack unhindered..

-Well, there were also the many LBA which attacked the IJN CV´s. I´m not sure but it probably caused some additional disruption on CAP

I have for years read that last statement in several books,and have always wondered why 4 Japanese carriers could not have the training necessary to post CAP at different levels?

-And so we´re back to poor leadership....
No,Bombur,my last sentence did not say "leadership",it said "training".Put your glasses on..I understand you just want the last word,but ya' gotta earn it..Now I have provided you with websites and books I referance my info on,and all you've given us is your opinion..
O.K.,maybe the Japanese would have won if you had been there to lead them,it's possible,you sure as heck have pointed out all of their serious flaws..
Up the ante....

[Bombur]

Carl Sagan in The Demon Haunted World put together, as a kind of logical tool, something he called the "Baloney Detector Kit." One of the flashing red lights that indicates baloney is the selective use of data. What's so "symmetrical" about Coral Sea where the US ships were, during the critical hours, easily observed in clear weather, but Shokaku and Zuikaku obscured by low overcast? There's luck that far and away trumps any argument of US luck at Midway.

-Again and again, I never said the USN had luck in Midway. Quite the opposite, I put all the blame on bad decisions took by IJN. To say that Midway was not symetric I use the following arguments
1-USN were fighting under LBA umbrella and IJN was not
2-USN had intelligence information on IJN ships location and IJN didn´t have
3-USN attacked IJN CV´s before they couldn´t mount an attack by themselves UNLIKE ANY OTHER of the three battles
-These are major asymetries, I think, while the weather is a minor asymetry (USN planes attacked anyway). There are other minor asymetries in every CV battle, the most important being the superiority of the combination Kate/Japanese torpedo over the combination TBD/ US torpedo, which, I believe, resulted in IJN tatical victories in the combination of the other three battles.

[Bombur]

No, things do not look all that different. Following IJN fleet ops doctrine you still have: 1. CA based float planes doing your recon for you - an insufficient number of them, 2. An unsuppressed major land installation and airbase that will absorb the attention of your CVs. That was the strategic problem facing Nagumo. If you go assume that CVs are in the area and pull your punches on the land base, then the land base might kill you. To ignore this well-known, well-understood fact is to assume that Nagumo could no, on the basis of no information, that Midway's air components lacked offensive punch. Even so, Midway was still a far more effective scouting platform than the IJN's cruiser-scouts, so it seems very likely to me that the US would still have located the Japanese TF first, and that the US would have time the delivery of its airstrikes to catch Japanese planes on the deck.

-Exactly, this asymetry is what doomed the IJN in Midway. That´s what I call Midway less symetric than the other battles. The IJN put herself in such a situation that the best result they could get was a draw. Assuming a "what is if" scenario were the IJN was lucky enough to see USN carriers and launch a full strike before the USN caught them (or a half full strike with planes not used to attack Midway), they would probably had sunk two USN CV´s (assuming the same effectiveness of attacks against the Yorktown), but it wouldn´t have changed the fact that the SBD´s would have it the IJN CV´s anyway, but the Akagi could have survived if her decks weren´t full of planes/fuel/ammunition. So we have a 2x2, assuming the IJN being lucky enough.

[Bombur]

http://www.hexwar.com/Help/About/HistoryofWargaming.htm

Here I found. The very simulation made the IJN in preparation for Midway resulted in a defeat to them.....isn´t this bad planning????

One of the best known anecdotes about World War II wargaming concerns the Japanese simulation of the Battle of Midway. In this very elaborate game, the Japanese Naval officers playing the role of the Americans launched an attack on the Japanese carrier force and inflicted devastating losses on it. When a number of the Japanese carriers were sunk, the umpires were told to cancel the result (in effect, the Japanese cheated at their own game) and “re-float” the ships. The game then went on to indicate the victory at Midway that the Japanese felt was inevitable. In the real event, the Japanese carrier force was struck almost precisely as indicated by the game and with even more disastrous results. This is but one of the more remarkable instances of an all-too-typical behavior pattern evident in the military use of wargames as stochastic devices: when the result isn’t what the planners expect, the temptation to cheat can be overwhelming.

http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/200481122.asp

[Bombur]

No,Bombur,my last sentence did not say "leadership",it said "training".Put your glasses on..I understand you just want the last word,but ya' gotta earn it..Now I have provided you with websites and books I referance my info on,and all you've given us is your opinion..
O.K.,maybe the Japanese would have won if you had been there to lead them,it's possible,you sure as heck have pointed out all of their serious flaws..
Up the ante....

-Hmmm....your sarcasm seems to be very constructive...sorry because I didn´t put my references here, I didn´t have time to do so. Actually, Midway was a battle that the Japanese could have won by not fighting it. If they decided to do it, they should have paid attention to their own wargame, a simulation executed before the real battle, with results similar to those which eventually happened. Correct me if I´m wrong, but the complexity of Yamamoto´s plan and the dispersion of forces were noticed by other analysts too. I promise to place some websites here as soon as possible.

[Hipper]

In reply to the title on this thread I think that the US CV pilots have got to be about correct especially since I read the us evaluation of the zero in that handy thread below

apparently it was superior to the F4F in all aspects above 1000 ft so in general term it must have been pilot skill plus operational cicrumstances that held them in the ring

by the way does anyone know a source that compares combat losses in engagements for the carrier duels rather than concentrating on claims ie such and such carrier had so many fighters left after the battle tricky when so many were sunk I Know.



Mdhiel

You're being a bit sneaky here you start out claiming that the P40's outclassed the me 109 at low altitudes I point out that RAF operational data suggests that more tomahawks were shot down than otherwise. you retreat to claiming USAF P40N's had a better combat history in early 43 then point out that operational sources ( the basis of your claim) are a bit dodgy.

I am trying to make the point that the P40 as a fighter was not in the first class of land based fighters. My point about height limits was that Height = Energy = Speed and that the 109's were more than capable of performing slashing attacks then vanishing

I suspect the Zeros in your example could have been under orders to escort the bombers rather than mix it with non interceptors.

Now if we are trying to create combat models for WITP or its counterpart "WITM" looking at loss rates and saying that one aircraft is better than another is a bit tricky if we dont try to isolate as many elements as possible.

Dragging ourselves back to the PTO The Hurricanes in Java were had a very high loss rate to japanese attacks, however the the circumstances were, that there was no effective air raid warning apparatus so combats tended to occur in disadvantageous circumstances for the RAF

Over Rangoon in contrast there was an efficient radar set up which helped the AVG to perform well against opposing Nates & Oscars, and I discount tales of AVG pilots buying kills from the RAF as Sour Grapes ! but do suspect that the AVG's renumeration system may have encouraged inflated claims

in truth I suspect that there is no way to isolate all the elements so we should go back to absolute performance figures now the only way to represent the P40 as a decent fighter is to use range bands rather than overall maneuver and maximum speed figures which seem to have been chosen to flatter US fighters !

cheers

[Bombur]

IJN planning flaws at Midway

http://www.space.edu/LibraryResearch/ba ... ryhill.htm

... Had they concentrated their forces with the single, simple objective of engaging the American fleet in a decisive battle, the outcome could have been quite different. Another problem with the Japanese plan, which turned out to be critical, was that the carriers had had their masts shortened so as not to hamper the take-offs and landings from their decks. The result was that the carriers were incapable of intercepting American radio messages. When members of Yamamoto’s staff offered suggestions to have Yamato sail with the carriers or to have her relay messages, Yamamoto refused. He refused the first recommendation because he was still clinging to the idea that the battleships were the “Main Force” and that they needed to be behind the carriers (using the carriers as a screening force). Yamamoto refused the second recommendation because he was convinced that they still had the element of surprise, and refused to break radio silence....

(As you see, I´m not the only...)

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... 89/FBT.htm

And....

IV. Conclusion: The attack on Midway ended in disaster for the Imperial Navy, because the operations plan which brought it about was ill-conceived, inflexible, and lacked vital intelligence support.


....
The Naval General Staff presented

its major arguments against the Midway operation:

1. Because Midway was close to Hawaii its defenses could be easily reinforced; as a result of the attack on Pearl Harbor the Japanese Fleet was unlikely to achieve surprise.
2. The Japanese forces would be operating without the benefit of land-based air support.
3. Could Japan afford to defend and supply Midway, if it was successfully occupied?
4. There was currently a shortage of aircraft.

-As you see, there were enough Bomburs at IJN in 1942. My presence there was not needed[:D]

and more...

A further intelligence gap developed during the execution, when Yamamoto's flagship intercepted radio traffic from Pearl Harbor, which indicated the possible sortie of the Pacific Fleet. Yamamoto, operating 300 miles behind the Carrier Striking Force, neglected to relay this critical information to Nagumo, who had not picked it up

-So much for excellent leadership at all levels....

-And more

http://www.combinedfleet.com/prinob_f.htm

-Here we have a different opinion. He gives more emphasis to tatical mistakes made by Nagumo

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/20 ... t3-Su0.htm

Had the Japanese gotten their attack launched, they stood a very good chance of winning the battle. They possessed a deadly ship-sinking weapon—an aerial torpedo that was very accurate and reliable, and so fast it was difficult to evade. The American aerial torpedo at that time in the war was unreliable and slow—it essentially did not work. Nor did the American navy have armor-piercing, delayed-fuse bombs that could penetrate into the bowels of a ship before exploding, as the Japanese had.4 The bombs carried by the American carrier dive-bombers were short-fuse, high-explosive bombs that could destroy a large aircraft carrier only if it was caught in its most extreme condition of vulnerability—with decks crammed with planes fully fueled and laden with bombs or torpedoes. But that was how the three Japanese carriers were caught. They were destroyed more by fire from their own gasoline and secondary explosions from their own ordnance than by any fatal structural damage inflicted directly by the American bombs.

.....
Why could no attack be launched before 1025? The problem that prevented an immediate response to the discovery of the American carrier fleet is well known: at 0715, less than fifteen minutes before the American fleet was discovered, Nagumo had ordered the rearming of his torpedo planes and dive-bombers for a second strike on Midway. (The first strike had been launched at 0430 with 108 planes, thirty-six each of the torpedo, dive-bomber, and Zero types. A second wave, of equal numbers but intended—and armed—to attack ships, had been brought up to the flight decks of the four carriers.) The planes were struck below to the hangar decks: the torpedo planes (on Akagi and Kaga) were to be reloaded with eight-hundred-kilogram land-type bombs in place of torpedoes, and the dive-bombers (on Hiryu and Soryu) with 242-kilogram high-explosive fragmentation bombs instead of 250-kilogram, armor-piercing antiship bombs.

The rearming of the torpedo planes with land-attack bombs contravened a standing order by Yamamoto that half of the torpedo planes in Nagumo’s Mobile Force were always to be fitted with torpedoes, on standby in the event an American carrier fleet showed up at Midway.7 Nagumo justified his decision on grounds that the first-wave commander had notified him by radio at 0700 that Midway had not yet been neutralized and that a second strike was needed. As the Mobile Force was then under attack by torpedo bombers from Midway, this recommendation was given heightened force. Also, the fact that no American ships had been discovered after two and a half hours of search tended to confirm Nagumo’s belief that there was no enemy carrier threat in the area.

[Jon_Hal]

The topic of this Thread is "Does anyone else think the USA CV pilots are over skilled for 1941? " With that in mind lets look at a few things.

Most IJN planes were destroyed on their carriers before they had an opportunity to have contact with USN planes (except TBD´s, of course).

not the entire air wing of the Hiryu and not the CAP Zeros of all four IJN CVs. How many planes do you need to have in the air before you consider Midway valid? I would hasten to add that the IJN Carriers at Midway had more CAP zeros aloft then at Santa Cruz or the Solomons. While still only facing two Carriers worth of USN planes. (Let's face it, the Hornet's contribution was minor. VT8 died honorable but all the Dauntlesses and Wildcats from the Hornet played NO role in the battle.)

Because, as I said before, the performance of IJN leadership in Midway was so bad, from strategic planning to tatical operations of carriers, that aircrews skill really didn´t count too much in the final result of the battle.

Aircrew skill really didn't count for much in the final result of the battle??? You must be looking at another battle of Midway then the one I know. Aircrew skill determined the outcome of every single carrier battle, ever. even Midway. Part of an Naval aircrew's skill and training is precisely dealing with tacitcal operations of Carriers. that's what they are there for. The IJN Charged into to Midway over confident and secure in the knolwedge that they were completely superior to the USN. They were wrong and it cost them. There is no evidence that the defense of the Japanese Carrier task force would have been any different had they known the day before USN carriers were there. When the USN Strike groups arrived the Japanese had over 40! Zeros on CAP Japanese lost 11 Zeros in air to air combat in the defense of their fleet. The largest such lost suffered by naval Zeros until then. The USN lost 1 Wildcat in that action. Was there some mental anguish that kept the elite Japanese pilots from performing well because the USN suprised them 2 hours earlier? At that point they shouldn't have been? They'd been fighting most of the day already. If we are talking about pilot skill then you need to include Midway. Those Japanese pilots were fighting over their carriers, had 40 to 6 odds in fighters and had tons of combat experience over their American advasaries and still lost.

The three other battles were more symetrical, in the sense that both sides were able to see and attack the enemy at the same time.

In the context of this thread why does it matter if they attacked the enemy at the same time? once a pilot encounters an enemy in the air it doesn't matter who is winning on the ocean's surface. It doesn't matter what the final tally of the battle is. We are talking aircrew skill here. You have to look at all your available data here. You can't exclude one set of results because you don't like the outcome. I'm not posting in this Thread to argue who won these battles, it's beyond the scope of the original discussion. No one has brought a concise arguement forward to prove that the USN pilots are rated too high in the game. I find it humorous that every pro USN event is always followed by millions of excuses.. Poor leadership, we were suprised, yada yada yada, yet your willing to grant the IJN every benefit of luck and doubt. If this had happened different or that had happened.. well then those Japanese really would have wholloped the Americans! That kind of thinking doesn't help this topic. I believe you need to examine the evidence you have not eveidence that could have been. I think when you look at the data as an overview you will see that the USN and IJN skill was about equal. Both were the elite airmen of their respective nations, the best of the best.

Jimmy Thach shot down his zeros over the Japanese task force, not the USN one. Check your facts but more then half of the Zero losses were over their own carriers.

-Do you have this data? I would like to see it. And also to see how many Zeroes were lost while on CAP defending CVL´s, as both Ryujo and Shoho were sunk the the mentioned battles. IF most of A6M´s were lost to escorting F4F´s in the 4 battles, we have some evidence of better skills favoring USN pilots.

[/quote]

I will look it up tonight when I get the chance.. After running my WiTP turns and get back to you.

-On Santa Cruz battle: The Zui and Sho still had good aircrews, but they were probably not at the Pre Midway levels, as the number of Midway survivors were not probably enough to fill complately the two carriers, and we must consider that about 1/3 of planes (from IJN side) involved in that battle were from the two light Carriers (well, the Junyo was not exactly a light carrier...)

Irrelevent- The Enterprise and Hornet had very few of the same pilots flying. Unlike the Japanese who kept their pilots active until they were killed or injured the USN rotated out Air Wings of it's Carriers. For the vast majority of the USN pilots Solomons and Santa Cruz were their first combat experience. Still the Japanese did not domintate those battles.

regards,

Jon

[m10bob]

ORIGINAL: m10bob

These are notes from interviews with AVG and Naval pfliers,regarding their perception of their planes and the Zero.
http://yarchive.net/mil/zero.html
And here is a site which tells of the 1st captured Zero,(which was NOT the one in the Aleutians).
http://www.j-aircraft.com/research/WarPrizes.htm
A good site with info on the Pacific pilots and their planes..Very candid,(including John Thach's feelings about the F4F..)
*Please take some time and go to these wonderful websites and see why the U.S. carrier pilots ratings are apparently reflected accurately in the game WITP (per this thread).*
My friends Bombur and Freeboy have helped explain this as well,(wether by poor Japanese leadership or their evident failure to realize an impending U.S presence),and Bombur has provided excellent websites in which to analyze a rough starting date for this,(indeed we may say by Midway anyway?)..

http://www.acepilots.com/index.html#top
This is the U.S.Navy's official site,and sez the Wildcat had a kill to loss ratio of 7 to 1..
http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/hist-ac/f4f-4.pdf
And this site explains American tactical formation evolution,(and how John Thach developed the "Thach Weave" in the summer of 1941(before Pearl Harbor),using info provided by CBI evaluations of Japanese planes.
This site also indicates the kill to loss ratio was 1.5 to 1,F4F vs Zeroes,(for those who might want to know how many of the "7 to 1 ratio" were other than Zeroes)..

www.centuryinter.net/midway/appendix/ap ... vftac.html

[Bombur]

not the entire air wing of the Hiryu and not the CAP Zeros of all four IJN CVs.

-Which are less than 50%

How many planes do you need to have in the air before you consider Midway valid?

-Not a question of "valid or not". Of course, Midway WAS valid, as IJN was defeated there. What I say is that the results of Midway doesn´t reflect relative abilities of each side´s aircrew. And the exclusion of this battle will give us a better ides of relative aircrews competence (which are fairly EQUAL)

Aircrew skill really didn't count for much in the final result of the battle??? You must be looking at another battle of Midway then the one I know. Aircrew skill determined the outcome of every single carrier battle, ever. even Midway.

-Wrong. Three quarters of IJN torpedo bomber were destroyed before they could have contacted the enemy, as it happened with 3/4 of Vals pilots, so their skills had no influence in the battle. Performance of IJN CAP cannot be well examinated, as they simply weren´t where they were needed. The same thing happened with USA escorts, as the dive bombers were unescorted. USA dive bombers did well in very favorable conditions. IJN bomber crews did well in unfavorable conditions, but they were too few to make difference. USA TBD´s crews had such a crappy aircraft (and torpedo) that their skills didn´t make too much difference, they would have been decimated anyway. I cannot talk about A6M´s role as escorts.

When the USN Strike groups arrived the Japanese had over 40! Zeros on CAP Japanese lost 11 Zeros in air to air combat in the defense of their fleet. The largest such lost suffered by naval Zeros until then.
The USN lost 1 Wildcat in that action

-Sources? This of course points to a superiority of USA fighter aircrews if correct. That´s a conclusion we can reach. However, what about those data that IJN lost only 14 A6M´s in A/A combat in CS PLUS MIDWAY? There seems to be a contradiction here.

I think when you look at the data as an overview you will see that the USN and IJN skill was about equal. Both were the elite airmen of their respective nations, the best of the best.

-Already agreed on this. I´m simply saying that Midway final results doesn´t reflect this equality. I think you´re misunderstanding me.

[m10bob]

ORIGINAL: Bombur

not the entire air wing of the Hiryu and not the CAP Zeros of all four IJN CVs.

-Which are less than 50%
[:'(]*IMHO the percentage does not matter,the Japanese fighters failed to accomplish their mission.

How many planes do you need to have in the air before you consider Midway valid?

-Not a question of "valid or not". Of course, Midway WAS valid, as IJN was defeated there. What I say is that the results of Midway doesn´t reflect relative abilities of each side´s aircrew. And the exclusion of this battle will give us a better ides of relative aircrews competence (which are fairly EQUAL)
[:'(]O.K.,if a football team fails to get off the bus,do they forfeit the game,or "does it not count"?

Aircrew skill really didn't count for much in the final result of the battle??? You must be looking at another battle of Midway then the one I know. Aircrew skill determined the outcome of every single carrier battle, ever. even Midway.

-Wrong. Three quarters of IJN torpedo bomber were destroyed before they could have contacted the enemy, as it happened with 3/4 of Vals pilots, so their skills had no influence in the battle. Performance of IJN CAP cannot be well examinated, as they simply weren´t where they were needed. The same thing happened with USA escorts, as the dive bombers were unescorted. USA dive bombers did well in very favorable conditions. IJN bomber crews did well in unfavorable conditions, but they were too few to make difference. USA TBD´s crews had such a crappy aircraft (and torpedo) that their skills didn´t make too much difference, they would have been decimated anyway. I cannot talk about A6M´s role as escorts.
[:'(]O.K.,we agree again,the Japanese fighter pilots were NOT WHERE THEY NEEDED TO BE.
The IJN bomber crew did well considering the failure of their fighters,but since this thread is addressing the reason U.S. carrier pilots have such a good rating,I believe we are all arriving at the same point.The ratings reflect history pretty well..[:D]

When the USN Strike groups arrived the Japanese had over 40! Zeros on CAP Japanese lost 11 Zeros in air to air combat in the defense of their fleet. The largest such lost suffered by naval Zeros until then.
The USN lost 1 Wildcat in that action

-Sources? This of course points to a superiority of USA fighter aircrews if correct. That´s a conclusion we can reach. However, what about those data that IJN lost only 14 A6M´s in A/A combat in CS PLUS MIDWAY? There seems to be a contradiction here.




-Already agreed on this. I´m simply saying that Midway final results doesn´t reflect this equality. I think you´re misunderstanding me.

[:'(]All in all,looks like we all agree,their IS a reason the U.S. carrier pilots have a good rating!!!
Seriously folks,please do at least look at those other threads I gave you,they might shed some light on other grey areas as well,P-40 info,etc.....