You mean other than the numerious things they DID copy aside from the replacement system?
No, just a source that shows the examination and the conclusions drawn. My understanding was that the German system was rejected as innefficient. The American system was far more centralised and administered. The soldiers would have preferred a system on the German model, but the service forces preferred things as they were because it was more efficient administratively.
Yes and I am sure the German replacement was served milk and cookies and wasnt hearded around like sheep. The difference here is US troops have roughly the same rights as a US civilian does. The right to complain. This wasnt allowed in the German army.
Do you have a source for this? My understanding was that the right to complainwas present in the German Army. The basic rules dated back to the 19th century but were updated in 1936, suggesting complaints were amn issue and something they wanted to administer properly. By contrast the Ameriocan system was not one likely to produce results very quickly, as it was centralised like everything else.
Further, since 1933 Germans were blasted with the propaganda that they were the "super race" and I am sure that played in to their lack of complaints and lack of "battle fatigue".
I've not seen any evidence in the literature proving this.
How many US ground troops (not counting air crew) became prisioners of war vs the Germans? How many Germans became US prisioners? I suspect a number of the German "battle fatigue" cases ended up surrendering rather than to report to a field hospital as opposed to US troops which would make counting their numbers accurately difficult if not impossible. Then there is also the problem with the Germans having destroyed a lot of records before the surrender. We will never have accurate information of the German situation.
Everything I've quoted from the German side comes from records that did survive. It should be noted that the German record remained low whether they were on the offensive of the defensive. Both early and late in the war, their numbers wre low. Battle fatigue often takes hold away from the front line, so surrender would not have been an option. Even if it was, its impact on the record would surely not have been to the tune of ten fold in certain theatres.
Of course it is relevant. Virtually everyone in Europe was touched by WWI. Deadths in the family, stories of "the war", first hand knowledge of it. Where as in America, a very small percentage of the population participated, and only slightly more could find France on a map. Civilians were a target from the outset of WWII, and they knew they would be before the war. British and German civilians had gas masks in their homes between the wars. US civilians didnt know what a gas mask looked like (most still dont). So consequently, the European replacement effectively had actual combat experience before they were even drafted/enlisted.
We must disagree here. I do not believe the threat or experience of bombing, or stories passed on by Granddad about the trenches count as actual combat experience. Certainly it wouldn't have been a help when faced with machine gun fire or shelling. The generation that fought the war would have been in the support services or in the Home guard in the forties or perhaps serving as Officers or sometimes NCOs. the average European replacement had no idea what it was going to be like. We are more experienced having watched wars on television.
The 1.5 million were rejected for a number of reasons including those that were prone to "battle shock", not exclusively for that reason.
Do you have a source for this. My reading suggests "preliminary screening had already removed 1,686,000 men suspected of emotional or mental disorders."
But it beat the alternitive. The German army lacked support troops most of all. Why was this? That is a simple question to answer really. They lacked support because they had too many units. Replacements dont go into support units nearly as much as they go into the combart arms, therefore in order to train these new replacements in the German system, the whole division had to be withdrawn, INCLUDING the support elements. And that reason, and probably that reason alone is why the US system was better than the German system. We didnt compromise on the support to the ground trooper, whereas the Germans did. And ultimately, that led to their downfall. And on the rare occasion when a unit was pulled off the line, the support units by and large were corps or army assets and could be easily reassigned.
I think you're way off here. The question of divisional slice has been looked at in some detail. It should be noted that the average number of support troops in the German Army was at it's lowest in 1941/42 when the Germans were at their peak. It increased after this time towards the end of the war, not decreased. The Germans were simply more efficient. The percentage of the German Army in combat units remained between 53-55% throughout the war. For the Americans it dropped to 40% by the end of the war. Some of this was due to the fact the Americans were essentially an expeditionary force, and more service troops were required, but the Army itself had this to say on the subject,
On 30 June 1944, during the most critical days of the Normandy operation, the number of enlisted men in the US qualified for overseas duty but assigned to Zone of interior jobs exceeded the number of enlisted infantrymen in the European and Mediterranean theatres.
Many combat soldiers in the theatres were physically inferior to men scheduled to remain at home. This situation was not one of which the AGF approved, but it was difficult for the War Department to correct in 1944. Since the early days of mobilisation, many prime physical specimens had been trained as technicians in Zone of the interior assignments.
This was written by the K Greenfield in "the Organisation of Ground Combat Troops" in 1947.
America created an innefficient supply train, in which most of the best men served. At a time when the Army was fighting hard, most American Soldiers never heard a shot fired in Anger.
One last point to note. I understand the daily supply delivery to an American Infantry Company was much higher than it was to its German equivalent. The German Company (within it's more meagre allocation) had three times as much ammunition allocated, though. Make of that what you will.
The Germans had time to prepare for almost 4 years for D Day.
But only really started defending the hundreds and hundreds of miles of coast in Jan 1944 when Rommel really got to work.
Entrenched. Pre-registered artillery positions. Ammo stockpiled.
Much of this artillery was attacked by Naval gun fire or Paratroopers before the beaches were hit.
Fall back positions were already set up as well.
These positions didn't really prove to be the issue. The advance reached several miles inland before the front congealed with the arrival of German reinforcements. These reinforcements lined up where the Allies had reached, they didn't fill pre-dug positions.
US troops in the Ardennes had about 4 minutes to prepare. The initial contact in the Ardennes hit the 7th Armored, 9th Armored, 28th Infantry and 106th Infantry. And of these, the 9th Armor and the 106th Infantry had never been in combat before. You cant compaire the 2 battles.
Many of the German formations hit on D-day were garrison formations, classed as fit only for static defence. The class units only arrived later (luckily).
As opposed to the "tank country" of the bocage?
The Terrain was (you are correct) poor in Normandy, as poor as it was in the Ardennes, but the Germans moved through their terrain at a better pace.
Not bad when you consider they had planned to launch their own offensive very soon in an entirely different direction. Drove 90 some miles in 48 hours and went into the attack without rest. I think you are belittling the effort put in to stopping them. The 1st and 12th SS had been off the line since August (4 months).
Patton's intelligence chief had suggested something was likely in the ardennes and drawn up plans for the about face, it wasn't planned and executed in forty eight hours, merely executed in 48 hours, the plans were already there.
The comment about the 1st and 12th SS Panzer is simply wrong. They were released by CINC West for re-equipping in late September, and began regrouping and re-equipping in Mid october. They had perhaps two months to regroup, retrain, re-equip and prepare, not four months.
Ever see the mini-series "Band of Brothers"? At Bastogne most of the 101st's men had less than 6 rounds. The Germans were so effient and attacked so rigerously that they couldnt break through a line held by men with less than a half dozen bullets apiece with no air support.
Bastogne was (if memory serves) a supply dump for VIII Corps, so supply wasn't generally an issue (I thought they were only completely surrounded for a few days as well. Things may have been more difficult for some of the Para's weapons as they were specialist weapons and an Army supply dump might not have carried rounds for them.
I don't think the German efforts to break in were as savage as folk memory holds. Average casualties for German troos betwen 21-26 in the Bastogne sector was around 1% per day or 271 men. American casualties (despite being on the defnesive) were 341 men per day.
It was their superior support system, artillery on call, ect that held the line. Elsewhere there were squads that were delaying German battalions, and in a lot of cases, holding them. The same reason the Germans couldnt move supplies is the same reason (ironically) that the allies couldnt move theirs. The allied airforces had destroyed virtually every train on the western front. And the closer to Germany we got the longer our supply lines got. And the shorter the Germans got I might add.
But the Germans had few trucks to shift the supplies, no fuel to power the trucks, few good roads, and no roads that weren't clogged with Germans or subject to Air interdiction. I'd need examples to consider the issue of squads holding battalions etc.
I suspect these figures arent broken down by who fought who. That the Germans caused more casulties per man shouldnt be a surprise. They killed 25 million Russians. I would be VERY surprised if their kill ratio vs US troops was better than 1 : 1.
This is incorrect. The figures are very high when the Russians are factored in.
An analysis of 50 engagements between US and German forces found the average differential was 1 (US) to 1.55 (Ger). In other words, the Germans inflicted half as many casualties again as the Americans did per 100 combat troops. This figure was relatively constant whether the Germans were on the attack or defence.
Using Dupuy's other method (QJMA), he calculated German combat effectiveness to be in the order of 20-30% higher than American Combat effectiveness.
The difference between the two results (25% more effective using QJMA, 50% more combat effective using casualty stats) has been assigned to a couple of factors. The most convincing I've seen has been the projected superiority of certain German weapons (Panther, MG 42) etc.
However you analyse it statistically, the Germans were more combat efficient.
Regards,
IronDuke
