Some years ago I read a book called The Deadly Fuze by Ralph Baldwin, that went into considerable detail on the devolpment of the VT fuze.
As a former user I can testify to the advantages of this system. While it does have the capacity to vary the range gate on the fuze most of the time, in naval use anyway, it is employed "right out of the box". This makes firing a lot quicker. The MT type fuze requires the individual round to be inserted in a fuze cutter, a cylindrical device on the gun mount, connected to the fire control computer which rotates the timer bands on the MTF to the correct configuration before loading. MTF can be set manually, via a special wrench, but that tends to be really slow. The MT fuze is most commonly encountered in star shells these days, although it can be used with just about any shell type (the fuze well dimensions and threading are pretty much universal in USN ammunition above the machine gun, defined as 40mm or less in USN parlance, size weapons).
Someone mentioned point and train as a problem for AAA. Even in WWII this was becoming a problem and led the USN to abandon the 40mm for the hydraulically driven 3" mount which has a much faster rate of train, which itelf was supplanted by various point defense systems due to the vast incrrease in angle change that came with jets.
It would be interesting also to determine what system of fire control that Japan used for AAA. From sources such as Principles of Naval Orndnance and Gunnery the US systems became increasingly computer controlled and cooordinated through the war which should lead to a progressive increase in their effectiveness, especially coupled with the VT rounds. I don't have a great knowledge of WWII Japanese TO&E and am curious about their AAA/ADA organisation. If it is as weak as it sounds (I have, sofar only played to April, 1942 and that against the AI) is this historical? I don't recall reading much where the Japanese flak aroused the respect in allied fliers that the German system had. Should this be the case was it a question of technology, doctrine, training or production limitations. Doctrine and training could be dealt with, although probably slowly given the way naval air training reacted during the war, but technology or production only at the expense of something else.
IMPORTANT: Huge undefended "empty" zone in AA coverage!
Moderators: Joel Billings, wdolson, Don Bowen, mogami
RE: Just found this...
It would be interesting also to determine what system of fire control that Japan used for AAA.
That was their weak point. Most Japanese AAA guns onboard ship were under local control without radar direction. They normally used the gun captain to pick out the target with a pointer. The net effect was to have a fairly large volume of fire late in the war but it was pretty ineffective compared to the US and Brits. Yamato put up a very heavy AA fire but it was uncoordinated and ineffective. The Beehive shells fired from the 18' were only effective at long range and little effect during her last battle.
While some of the Japanese later radars were pretty good, they were underpowered and their integration into the fire control solution left a lot to be desired, nowhere near the degree of integration of US systems.
As far as ground based AAA goes, the Japanese were far behind the Germans in flak effectiveness. Their guns were good enough but without a decent fuze system and an inability to accurately judge the target's height, they just could get enough lead close enough to the target. In the early years, the Germans would sometimes send up an aircraft to pace the bombers reporting of their speed, altitude and course. The Japanese never tried the same.
Chez
Ret Navy AWCS (1972-1998)
VP-5, Jacksonville, Fl 1973-78
ASW Ops Center, Rota, Spain 1978-81
VP-40, Mt View, Ca 1981-87
Patrol Wing 10, Mt View, CA 1987-90
ASW Ops Center, Adak, Ak 1990-92
NRD Seattle 1992-96
VP-46, Whidbey Isl, Wa 1996-98
VP-5, Jacksonville, Fl 1973-78
ASW Ops Center, Rota, Spain 1978-81
VP-40, Mt View, Ca 1981-87
Patrol Wing 10, Mt View, CA 1987-90
ASW Ops Center, Adak, Ak 1990-92
NRD Seattle 1992-96
VP-46, Whidbey Isl, Wa 1996-98
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jwilkerson
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Summary ( mostly Westermann )
More useful data – there is soooo much … that I will first provide a summary and then drill into details based on any questions or comments.
Eventually I will write the whole thing up and post on the Uber WITP Wiki …
Ok first, we are trying to address whether there was a “flak gap” somewhere between 6,000 to 9,000 feet in the Japanese WWII AA. As per the original post there seems to be one in the game.
So far I have found three pieces of evidence for the existence of some kind of flak gap in WWII AA.
(1) LeMay’s rational for the low altitude fire bombing based in part on his “hunch” that the Japanese flak would not be effective in this altitude band ( sources mentioned above in post #22 )
(2) Ian Hogg’s statement that Germans were first to recognize the “flak gap” between light and heavy AA ( source mentioned above in post #26 )
(3) Westermann’s repeated statements that Germans placed the barrage balloons between 6,000 and 9,000 feet in one band … and below 3,000 feet in the other band. This split deployment would only make sense if something was going to fire into the 3,000-6,000 foot gap and something was going to fire over 9,000 feet. The two devices available were light flak and heavy flak … unfortunately Westermannn stops short of telling us why this 3,000 foot gap in the Balloon deployment exists – but until I find something to the contrary I will think that we are seeing the “shadow” of the flak gap – with the balloons deployed from 6,000 to 9,000 feet.
Restating earlier thoughts ( based on reading of Westermann, Edward “Flak – German Anti-aircraft defenses 1941-1945”, University Press of Kansas, 2001 ) …
As early as 1917 the Germans recognized that “barrier fire” was inefficient and wasteful and that an effective method of “directed fire” was essential ( ibid. p22 )
Before the end of the war ( WWI ), the Germans introduced an early 88mm purpose built flak weapon with a timed fuse. Although an improvement, the timed fuse had to be set manually and the guns crew now needed to compensate for both the time required to set the fuse and the time required to aim the gun at the predicted location of the target aircraft. The length of these delays depended upon individual gun crew proficiency ( ibid. p23 )
By 1935, the newer 88s added direct transmission of firing solution data from the director to the gun. Known as Ubertrangungs 30 this device sent elevation and traversal ( a.k.a. deflection ) data to the gun whereupon a panel of lights lit up which the gunner then had to “match” by traversing the gun into the indicated position. A later ( 1939 ) version Ubertrangungs 37 – had a double system of dials and the solution was transmitted electronically to these dials and the gunner the matched ( the other set of dials ). This system apparently only provided elevation and deflection , not fuse settings so these would have been passed by other means. ( Hogg, GERMAN ARTILLERY OF WWII, p163-164 )
The below summary is all from Westermann.
In 1940 the very high availability of flak ammunition lead to a general relaxation on “barrier fire” and for this year alone, barrier fire came into general use. Also the rapid expansion of the flak arm upon the start of the war left many battery’s without director equipment hence “barrier fire” ( un-aimed fire ) was the only viable option. In Dec 40 the shoot down totals were 24 planes by directed fire and 1 plane by barrier fire, thus illustrating the greater efficiency of directed fire during the “barrier fire” era.
In early 1941 orders were issued against barrier fire as directors became much more generally available and flak ammunition shortages were now happening. For the rest of the war, barrier fire was generally only allowed for “foreign” weapons ( captured equipment ) which were usually manned by less well trained men and were usually without directors.
In early 1944 for example of the roughly 2,000 batteries defending the Reich, about 200 were “barrier fire” enabled .. with 124 of these being equipped with Russian AA gear.
Shortages of directors continued throughout the war, though in the second half of the war, rather than expand inefficient barrier fire to the regular batteries, these were grouped into “super-batteries” of up to 24 guns ( thus requiring less directors )
In 1944 a new type of director, the Zug 44 was produced which could control up to 32 batteries !!! However, no data on field use of this device is yet available.
An interesting but mostly unrelated piece of data is that in 1943 116,000 young women were drafted into the Flak Arm as search light battery “troops” … there was a lot of debate about this but even Hitler agreed to it.
On the Japanese situation.
Per TM-E-30-140 Oct 44 … Japanese 75mm AA gun used essentially WWI tracking and fusing technology as firing data was transmitted manually and fusing was done manually.
The 105mm AA gun however, had a “match the dials” system probably similar to the U35/37 described above. It is also stated that fuse setting is automatic though details of how this is done are not provided.
Summary ( of summary )
Evidence suggests that there was probably flak gap in all AA services of somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 feet due to the inability of light flak to effectively fire into this band and the inability of the heavy flak to effectively fire into this band. Light flak had a greater tracking problem to solve at this altitude and generally had less sophisticated director equipment to assist in the solution. Heavy flak also had a tracking problem but this was exacerbated by greater time requirements to set fuses and lay the gun. The Japanese gap may have been a bit worse that the German gap due to even less sophistication on the Japanese equipment in general.
It is probably that later low level B29 attacks ( after Okinawa ) such as the May 25th Tokyo raid, did run into “barrier fire” though the Japanese were clearly deploying and using directed fire for their heavy artillery.
So – certainly no 100% definitive answers – but the above is a summary of what I’ve seen in the past couple of days. The subject is intriguing to me probably for 2 reasons … one I was in Field Artillery which is at least a distance sister service so discussions of fusing and laying a gun are familiar – and the other is the difficulty of finding data on the mechanical fuse era of AA weapons ( 1917 – 1943 ).
Eventually I will write the whole thing up and post on the Uber WITP Wiki …
Ok first, we are trying to address whether there was a “flak gap” somewhere between 6,000 to 9,000 feet in the Japanese WWII AA. As per the original post there seems to be one in the game.
So far I have found three pieces of evidence for the existence of some kind of flak gap in WWII AA.
(1) LeMay’s rational for the low altitude fire bombing based in part on his “hunch” that the Japanese flak would not be effective in this altitude band ( sources mentioned above in post #22 )
(2) Ian Hogg’s statement that Germans were first to recognize the “flak gap” between light and heavy AA ( source mentioned above in post #26 )
(3) Westermann’s repeated statements that Germans placed the barrage balloons between 6,000 and 9,000 feet in one band … and below 3,000 feet in the other band. This split deployment would only make sense if something was going to fire into the 3,000-6,000 foot gap and something was going to fire over 9,000 feet. The two devices available were light flak and heavy flak … unfortunately Westermannn stops short of telling us why this 3,000 foot gap in the Balloon deployment exists – but until I find something to the contrary I will think that we are seeing the “shadow” of the flak gap – with the balloons deployed from 6,000 to 9,000 feet.
Restating earlier thoughts ( based on reading of Westermann, Edward “Flak – German Anti-aircraft defenses 1941-1945”, University Press of Kansas, 2001 ) …
As early as 1917 the Germans recognized that “barrier fire” was inefficient and wasteful and that an effective method of “directed fire” was essential ( ibid. p22 )
Before the end of the war ( WWI ), the Germans introduced an early 88mm purpose built flak weapon with a timed fuse. Although an improvement, the timed fuse had to be set manually and the guns crew now needed to compensate for both the time required to set the fuse and the time required to aim the gun at the predicted location of the target aircraft. The length of these delays depended upon individual gun crew proficiency ( ibid. p23 )
By 1935, the newer 88s added direct transmission of firing solution data from the director to the gun. Known as Ubertrangungs 30 this device sent elevation and traversal ( a.k.a. deflection ) data to the gun whereupon a panel of lights lit up which the gunner then had to “match” by traversing the gun into the indicated position. A later ( 1939 ) version Ubertrangungs 37 – had a double system of dials and the solution was transmitted electronically to these dials and the gunner the matched ( the other set of dials ). This system apparently only provided elevation and deflection , not fuse settings so these would have been passed by other means. ( Hogg, GERMAN ARTILLERY OF WWII, p163-164 )
The below summary is all from Westermann.
In 1940 the very high availability of flak ammunition lead to a general relaxation on “barrier fire” and for this year alone, barrier fire came into general use. Also the rapid expansion of the flak arm upon the start of the war left many battery’s without director equipment hence “barrier fire” ( un-aimed fire ) was the only viable option. In Dec 40 the shoot down totals were 24 planes by directed fire and 1 plane by barrier fire, thus illustrating the greater efficiency of directed fire during the “barrier fire” era.
In early 1941 orders were issued against barrier fire as directors became much more generally available and flak ammunition shortages were now happening. For the rest of the war, barrier fire was generally only allowed for “foreign” weapons ( captured equipment ) which were usually manned by less well trained men and were usually without directors.
In early 1944 for example of the roughly 2,000 batteries defending the Reich, about 200 were “barrier fire” enabled .. with 124 of these being equipped with Russian AA gear.
Shortages of directors continued throughout the war, though in the second half of the war, rather than expand inefficient barrier fire to the regular batteries, these were grouped into “super-batteries” of up to 24 guns ( thus requiring less directors )
In 1944 a new type of director, the Zug 44 was produced which could control up to 32 batteries !!! However, no data on field use of this device is yet available.
An interesting but mostly unrelated piece of data is that in 1943 116,000 young women were drafted into the Flak Arm as search light battery “troops” … there was a lot of debate about this but even Hitler agreed to it.
On the Japanese situation.
Per TM-E-30-140 Oct 44 … Japanese 75mm AA gun used essentially WWI tracking and fusing technology as firing data was transmitted manually and fusing was done manually.
The 105mm AA gun however, had a “match the dials” system probably similar to the U35/37 described above. It is also stated that fuse setting is automatic though details of how this is done are not provided.
Summary ( of summary )
Evidence suggests that there was probably flak gap in all AA services of somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 feet due to the inability of light flak to effectively fire into this band and the inability of the heavy flak to effectively fire into this band. Light flak had a greater tracking problem to solve at this altitude and generally had less sophisticated director equipment to assist in the solution. Heavy flak also had a tracking problem but this was exacerbated by greater time requirements to set fuses and lay the gun. The Japanese gap may have been a bit worse that the German gap due to even less sophistication on the Japanese equipment in general.
It is probably that later low level B29 attacks ( after Okinawa ) such as the May 25th Tokyo raid, did run into “barrier fire” though the Japanese were clearly deploying and using directed fire for their heavy artillery.
So – certainly no 100% definitive answers – but the above is a summary of what I’ve seen in the past couple of days. The subject is intriguing to me probably for 2 reasons … one I was in Field Artillery which is at least a distance sister service so discussions of fusing and laying a gun are familiar – and the other is the difficulty of finding data on the mechanical fuse era of AA weapons ( 1917 – 1943 ).
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Bradley7735
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RE: Summary ( mostly Westermann )
ORIGINAL: jwilkerson
Eventually I will write the whole thing up and post on the Uber WITP Wiki …
Where is this "Uber WITP" thread I've been hearing about?
The older I get, the better I was.
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Slotermeyer
- Posts: 3
- Joined: Tue Oct 11, 2005 10:01 pm
RE: Summary ( mostly Westermann )
In the official USAAF training film "Flak" (1944), dealing with both German and Jap flak, the existence of a flak gap was referred to as a "legend", and stated that all heavy flak has a minimum effective altitude of about 3000 feet. It also stated that flying at extremely low altitude was safer than flying at low altitude because of aiming problems.
FLAK is available for viewing at Zeno's, the segment in question is about 14 minutes into the film:
http://www.zenoswarbirdvideos.com/realg2/FlakRV1056.ram
FLAK is available for viewing at Zeno's, the segment in question is about 14 minutes into the film:
http://www.zenoswarbirdvideos.com/realg2/FlakRV1056.ram
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jwilkerson
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RE: Summary ( mostly Westermann )
Interesting film - thanks !
We have to consider all data - and it is not unusual when digging into details - to find conflicting data - hence we must look far and wide - and when the day is done - assimilate all the data and see if we can determine the truth. Sometimes we can - sometimes we have to decide we just can't be sure.
For example, the film spends most of its time talking about evasive manuvers - whereas LeMay felt that 8AF bombing accuracy was heavily ( and negatively ) influenced by evasive manuvering ... p289 Westermann, op cit ( per above posts ).
Also the film indicates heavy flak is effective at 3,000 feet because that is the altitude at which the fuse becomes effective - however it could be that lag time between ability to transmit targeting data and then set the fuse and lay the gun would significantly reduce chance of hit for "lower tech" flak systems - relying on less automation in the process - as the Japanese had. So I wouldn't on maximum effectiveness at the lowest altitude where the fuse becomes effective - that is just the first altitude where any result is possible.
And here is a Master's thesis which states they LeMay believed that Japanese Home Island Low Altitude flak was ineffective and that this was one of the reasons for the shift to low altitude bombing ( though many others are given as well ) ... P69 of the following link.
http://www.uk-us.org/stinet/ada406554.pdf
Let the hunt continue !
We have to consider all data - and it is not unusual when digging into details - to find conflicting data - hence we must look far and wide - and when the day is done - assimilate all the data and see if we can determine the truth. Sometimes we can - sometimes we have to decide we just can't be sure.
For example, the film spends most of its time talking about evasive manuvers - whereas LeMay felt that 8AF bombing accuracy was heavily ( and negatively ) influenced by evasive manuvering ... p289 Westermann, op cit ( per above posts ).
Also the film indicates heavy flak is effective at 3,000 feet because that is the altitude at which the fuse becomes effective - however it could be that lag time between ability to transmit targeting data and then set the fuse and lay the gun would significantly reduce chance of hit for "lower tech" flak systems - relying on less automation in the process - as the Japanese had. So I wouldn't on maximum effectiveness at the lowest altitude where the fuse becomes effective - that is just the first altitude where any result is possible.
And here is a Master's thesis which states they LeMay believed that Japanese Home Island Low Altitude flak was ineffective and that this was one of the reasons for the shift to low altitude bombing ( though many others are given as well ) ... P69 of the following link.
http://www.uk-us.org/stinet/ada406554.pdf
Let the hunt continue !
AE Project Lead
SCW Project Lead
SCW Project Lead
RE: Summary ( mostly Westermann )
Hi all,
Will read it - thanks!
BTW, wasn't all super low altitudes (that correspond to "altitude gap" of 6000ft - 10000ft we have in WitP) LeMay introduced _ONLY_ used at night and _NEVER_ repeated at day?
Leo "Apollo11"
ORIGINAL: jwilkerson
And here is a Master's thesis which states they LeMay believed that Japanese Home Island Low Altitude flak was ineffective and that this was one of the reasons for the shift to low altitude bombing ( though many others are given as well ) ... P69 of the following link.
http://www.uk-us.org/stinet/ada406554.pdf
Will read it - thanks!
BTW, wasn't all super low altitudes (that correspond to "altitude gap" of 6000ft - 10000ft we have in WitP) LeMay introduced _ONLY_ used at night and _NEVER_ repeated at day?
Leo "Apollo11"
Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance!
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P: UV, WitP, WitP-AE
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jwilkerson
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RE: Summary ( mostly Westermann )
ORIGINAL: Apollo11
snip ...
BTW, wasn't all super low altitudes (that correspond to "altitude gap" of 6000ft - 10000ft we have in WitP) LeMay introduced _ONLY_ used at night and _NEVER_ repeated at day?
Leo "Apollo11"
Per one of my earlier posts above ... per blue book ... I found at least 3 day light attacks that were low to medium ( over heavily defended areas ) ... restated they were ...
Page 637 ... " altitudes ranging from 12,000 to 20,500 feet" [ these were daylight raids on Nagoya/Mitsubishi ]
Page 640 ... " unusually low for a day light strike ... altitudes from 13,650 to 18,000 ... " [ Kobe on 5 Jun 45 ]
Page 649 ... " over Tachikawa ... bomb visually from 12,000 feet"
Only problem is that these are almost at the altitudes that I would think were most optimal for flak ... ( 12,000 to 20,000 ) .. so maybe all this means is that Japanese flak sucked period ! The above strikes were all "after" the Okinawa interlude ... so late May on .... but they are above any "gap" whether it existed or not ( I would think ).
AE Project Lead
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SCW Project Lead
RE: Summary ( mostly Westermann )
Hi all,
We know that Germany used 4000+ heavy AA guns in defense of the homeland.
Are there any info on Japanese homeland AA at all?
Leo "Apollo11"
We know that Germany used 4000+ heavy AA guns in defense of the homeland.
Are there any info on Japanese homeland AA at all?
Leo "Apollo11"
Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance!
A & B: WitW, WitE, WbtS, GGWaW, GGWaW2-AWD, HttR, CotA, BftB, CF
P: UV, WitP, WitP-AE
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jwilkerson
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RE: Summary ( mostly Westermann )
ORIGINAL: Apollo11
<snip>
Are there any info on Japanese homeland AA at all?
Leo "Apollo11"
Here is a start - the OB.
===============
AAA Regiments: 1 thru 26, 33, 34, 40, 101 thru 104, 111 thru 118, 121 thru 125, 131 thru 135, 141, 152, 171 ( 19 of these are identified as being "in Japan" )
TO&E included 16 75mm "Heavy" AA guns
===============
AA Defense Regiments 1(Japan), 41(Korea), 51(Formosa), 52(Formosa)
TO&E included 16 "Heavy" 75mm AA guns
===============
AAA Units
Rangoon, Manila, 15, 19, 20, 21 ( none of these are in Japan - they are company or battery sized units with an estimated 100 men ... so probably 4 "heavy" AA guns at most )
===============
Field AA Defense Units
11 thru 20 ( none of these are in Japan - they are company sized < 100 men ... so probably 4 "heavy" AA guns at most )
===============
AAA Regiment Replacement Units
1 thru 6 and 8 ( not sure whether these had any guns .... TO&E manpower is 1800+ ... they would've mostly been in Japan ...
===============
Independent AAA Bns ( included 8 x 75mm guns each )
1, 2, 3, 6, 12, 25, 27, 31, 34, 41, 42, 43 ( 6 are listed as in Japan )
===============
Independent AA Defense Bns ( included 8 x 75mm guns each )
1, 2, 11, 12, 21, 25, 31, 32, 51 ( 5 are listed as in Japan )
===============
Field AAA Bns ( included 12 x 75mm in type A and type B units and 18 x 75mm in type C units )
31 thru 41, 44 thru 84, 89, 94 ( none of these are listed as being in Japan )
===============
Independent AAA Companies ( included 4 x 75mm AA )
1,2,3,11,12,13,21 thru 25, 31 thru 35, 41 thru 45, 51 ( 13 of these are listed as being in Japan )
===============
Independent Field AAA Companies ( included 4 x 75mm AA )
21 thru 31, 33 thru 51, 53, 54, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63 ( 2 of these are listed as being in Japan )
===============
Totals:
19 x 16 = 304
01 x 16 = 016
06 x 08 = 048
05 x 08 = 040
13 x 04 = 052
02 x 04 = 008
Total = 468
This includes Army units only ( not Navy ) but we have to start somewhere ... and this does not include numerous "machine cannon" units which were only light flak ( nor the light flak components of the above listed units ) and I haven't seen seen data on production figures for either 75mm AA or 105mm AA ... and last but not least, the above units have relatively few "dates" associated with them .. but certainly the OB was not static throughout the war ... some units were disbanded and some were first created ... I have of that data .. but doubtly all of it.
Source: Underwood ( reprinting Madej, "Japanese Armed Forces, Order of Battle, 1937-1945 ( 2 vols ), Game Publising Company, Allentown PA 1981 )(Note that essentially Madej just reprints documents from the US archives which are either caputed enemy records and or records produced by the military during or shortly after the war )
AE Project Lead
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SCW Project Lead
RE: Summary ( mostly Westermann )
Hi all,
Nice list!
BTW, any idea how many of those defended Tokyo itself (since one Tokyo night was biggest success of Japanese FLAK)? DO we know what altitude B-29's flew that night when highest looses occured?
Leo "Apollo11"
Nice list!
BTW, any idea how many of those defended Tokyo itself (since one Tokyo night was biggest success of Japanese FLAK)? DO we know what altitude B-29's flew that night when highest looses occured?
Leo "Apollo11"
Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance!
A & B: WitW, WitE, WbtS, GGWaW, GGWaW2-AWD, HttR, CotA, BftB, CF
P: UV, WitP, WitP-AE
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jwilkerson
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RE: Summary ( mostly Westermann )
ORIGINAL: Apollo11
Hi all,
Nice list!
BTW, any idea how many of those defended Tokyo itself (since one Tokyo night was biggest success of Japanese FLAK)? DO we know what altitude B-29's flew that night when highest looses occured?
Leo "Apollo11"
Questions, questions, questions [;)]
Oh just found more ...
Naval ==========
==============
205 Naval AA Defense Units ( Bokutai ) t/o strength 300 men, number almmost sequentially up through 205, located throughout the pacific theater
( gee the above is a direct quote - but more un-said than said ) .. I'd guess these had best case 8 x 75mm ... and that maybe 20-33% of them at most would be in home is ... but that is pure guess based roughly on the Army breakdown
Also for Navy 14 SHipping AA Defense Units ( Sempaku Bukutai ) t/o 75 men ...
So guess here would be no more than 4 x 75mm per unit ... with maybe 33 to 66 % of them in home is
=============
Army Replacement Units ( 3 types )
Type 1 had 8 x 75mm
Type 2 had 6 x 75mm
Type 3 had 4 x 75mm
Assume 6 of the 7 of these would be in home islands - so on avg probably 36 more guns from these
=============
205 x .28 x 8 = 459
007 x 4 = 028
036
Total 523
=============
So combined total adding in Naval and replacement units is now
0468
0523
-----
0991
=============
As to the Tokyo raid, I assume you mean the May25, 1945 attack. Per pages 638-9 of volume 5 of the Blue Books, 502 B29s bomb ... altitude not given, but altitude for Tokyo attack 2 days prior by 562 B29 was 7,800 to 15,100 so assume same. Total 26 B29 destroyed all causes, 100 damaged all causes, percent hit by flak unknown assume at about 50% based on similar ratio in Europe ( 50% of British Bomber losses were due to enemy flak or fighters ).
BTW losses from the Tokyo raid 2 days prior were 17 lost to all causes ( of which 4 of these were lost to operational causes ) out of 562 attacking B29s ( p638 v5 Blue Books )
How many guns at Tokyo that night ? Wouldn't even wanna hazard a guess without more data ... I have a few units pegged to Tokyo .. but a lot of them are just "Japan" ...
AE Project Lead
SCW Project Lead
SCW Project Lead
RE: Summary ( mostly Westermann )
My reference just says under 10k....but sounds like a generalization for many of those raids late war.
Worr, out
Worr, out
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castor troy
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RE: Summary ( mostly Westermann )
So will there be a change with the coming patches or is it just a new Allied advantage we all know now? To attack always at 6000 feet with everything because Allied know that Japanese flak doesn´t even shoot at them. Japanese can´t do that because with the crappy planes they have they get shot down by light flak as easily at low alt like at higher alt with heavy flak. grrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr [:@]
RE: Summary ( mostly Westermann )
As it stands right now all you IJN fanboys should just count your blessings that your planes don't get shot at with VT-fuzed shells.
BTW, there has been some doubt expressed as to whether the Japanese IJN/IJA developed this technology into an operational weapon. THEY DIDN'T!!!!
BTW, there has been some doubt expressed as to whether the Japanese IJN/IJA developed this technology into an operational weapon. THEY DIDN'T!!!!
RE: Summary ( mostly Westermann )
Hi all,
As far as I remember the "VT Fuse" was implemented in both UV and WitP as significantly increased AA effectiveness starting at certain date.
So there is no bias here at all and historically facts were used for US side...
Leo "Apollo11"
ORIGINAL: spence
As it stands right now all you IJN fanboys should just count your blessings that your planes don't get shot at with VT-fuzed shells.
As far as I remember the "VT Fuse" was implemented in both UV and WitP as significantly increased AA effectiveness starting at certain date.
So there is no bias here at all and historically facts were used for US side...
Leo "Apollo11"
Prior Preparation & Planning Prevents Pathetically Poor Performance!
A & B: WitW, WitE, WbtS, GGWaW, GGWaW2-AWD, HttR, CotA, BftB, CF
P: UV, WitP, WitP-AE
RE: Summary ( mostly Westermann )
In UV the increased US Flak values come from increasing the number of gun tubes and adding on 40mm instead of 1.1" and 20mm instead of .50 cal.
I believe the same applies to WitP.
Check the editor. Are there different AA values for the 5"/38 gun (ACC) which depend on year of service. Can't check myself right now but I bet not.
I believe the same applies to WitP.
Check the editor. Are there different AA values for the 5"/38 gun (ACC) which depend on year of service. Can't check myself right now but I bet not.
RE: Summary ( mostly Westermann )
As a proof I would suggest that all increases in AA power result from an 'upgrade' requiring the ship to put in to a shipyard. Taking on a load of ammo for ones guns does not require a "yard period" to repair the sys damage.
RE: Summary ( mostly Westermann )
Conversion to VT-fuzed ammo would essentially have to appear as a spontaneous increase in the flak value of every ship armed with 5"/38 cal guns on a certain date.
Pretty sure nobody has seen anything of the sort.
Pretty sure nobody has seen anything of the sort.
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jwilkerson
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RE: Summary ( mostly Westermann )
But note that use of VT aboard ships was not 100% from a given date forward for the rest of the war. Restrictions were placed on use of VT fuses in areas where they could possibly fall ashore and be recovered / examined by the enemy .. which is why you can see pictures of ships using MT fuses even at Okinawa. But certainly not sure how to model that within the current system. Modeling VT in general would be possible with another device type ( though we are totally out of device types in CHS ). So one change we need to advocate for going forward is to expand the size of the device array.
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